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Abstract 
Through a re-examination of the issue of moral panics, with particular reference to 
sociological work around ideas of 'risk' and a 'culture of fear', this thesis attempts to 
examine the emergence of the social problem 'antisocial behaviour'. Situated in part 
within the changing political terrain of the 1990s, the emergence of the politics of 
behaviour is related to the dirninution of the human subject and the development of a 
therapeutic culture - both trends helping to lay the basis for an engagement by the 
political elite with the 'vulnerable public'. These developments are traced through the 
1980s and 1990s to illustrate the construction of the problem of 'antisocial behaviour', 
with particular reference made to the shift in left-wing thought from radical to 'real'. 
Using the example of the Hamilton curfew in the west of Scotland, empirical research 
with adults and young people, and media coverage of this safety initiative, are examined 
to explore the idea of a 'culture of fear'. The legitimation of the curfew justified by 
various claimsmakers is examined to indicate the emergence of the new 'amoral' absolute 
of safety. The experience of the curfew for the local people is also analysed and the 
contradictions between local concerns and those of the authority are contrasted. Finally, 
through exploring the changing' meaning of the term 'antisocial behaviour' and its 
growing politicisation, the emergence of this social problem is related to the deterministic 
and managerial form of politics that emerged at the end of the 20th century. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The demandfor law and order, which atfirst sight appears to attempt a restoration of 
moral standards, actually acknowledges and acquiesces in their collapse. Law and 
order comes to be seen as the only effective deterrent in a society that no longer 
knows the difference between right and wrong (Lasch 1977: 187). 
Initial Concerns 
The idea for this thesis originated in 1996 when I was running a youth drop-in centre 
in Lanarkshire. Following Strathclyde Police's Operation Spotlight initiative I 
discovered that every young person who attended the drop-in centre had been stopped 
and searched. A colleague giving a talk on children's rights at a nearby school found 
that all the teenagers in the class had been stopped and searched. And when he 
discussed this with the teacher of the class, he found that all the young people that 
went to her Sunday School had also been stopped and searched. 
With an existing awareness of works on moral panics by Stanley Cohen (1972) and 
Geoff Pearson (1983), 1 started to look into the issue of youth crime, antisocial 
behaviour and the developing concern with the fear of crime - and to look at this 
development within the framework of a moral panic. 
Following the election of a Labour government in 1997 and what appeared to be, if 
anything, an acceleration of the focus on youth crime, my interest in the issue of 
antisocial behaviour was reinforced - most particularly by the Hamilton Child Safety 
Initiative or what became know as the Hamilton curfew. 
My concerns were directed initially by a sense that, whatever the problem of youth 
behaviour, the stopping and searching of all the young people in the area I worked was 
excessive. But also when looking at the curfew in Hamilton, I was curious to observe 
not only an element of 'yob' bating, but also a more 'caring' approach and concern 
about the safety of the children and young people in the area. 
With this in mind I decided to study the Hamilton curfew in an attempt to understand 
how, if at all, this initiative could be understood in terms of a modem day moral panic. 
The problem of antisocial behaviour 
In October 1997 the Hamilton curfew was launched. Intended to create 'safer 
communities' the curfew, officially named the Child Safety Initiative (CSI), was 
targeted at young people under the age of 16 who were to be moved off the street if 
they did not have a 'good reason to be out after dark'. This initiative was one of the 
first significant attempts by a local Labour council to deal with the 'social problem' of 
antisocial behaviour following the election of the Labour government in 1997. With 
the backing of the government, the 'success' of the curfew was used to justify the 
extension of these police powers in 1998 with the passing of the Crime and Disorder 
Act. The Hamilton curfew has subsequently and repeatedly been discussed as a key 
example of Labour's new approach to crime and disorder! 
By 2002, the issue of antisocial behaviour had become so central to British politics 
under Labour that prime minister Tony Blair used the Queen's Speech to attack what 
he saw as the main social problems facing British society: - graffiti, vandalism and 
fly-tipping -: while the Labour MP Frank Field described the antisocial behaviour of 
young people on estates as a form of tefforism (Field 2003). 
This thesis attempts to explain why the use of curfews and antisocial behaviour 
initiatives has developed. What is at the heart of these initiatives and new laws? Who 
has helped to construct the 'social problem' of antisocial behaviour? Ultimately, what 
does the issue of 'antisocial behaviour' tell us, not about the behaviour of young 
people, but about society itself? 
The 'reality' of crime 
The trend within social science research - and to a degree within criminology - over 
the last decade or so, has been to recognise, rather than reject, the reality of crime as a 
social problem. This is a major shift from the radical days of the late 1960s and 70s, 
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when Marxist and labelling perspectives were develoPed2, and even from the 1980s 
when 'crime panics' continued to be understood as part of a moral backlash (Pearson 
1983). Today, feminist (Pain 1995, Kersten 1996, Smith and Torstensson 1997) and 
new realist perspectives (Lea and Young 1984 and Young 1988)3 line up alongside 
child and social psychology (Farrington 1997 and Rutter 1998), to expose the 'real' 
and growing problems of crime and antisocial behaviour of young people. 
However, the 'epidemic of crime and disorder' (Labour 1996) remains open to 
question. How society experiences crime and antisocial behaviour is related to the 
objective existence of the problem, but this can never be the whole story. Individuals 
and organisations have a significant impact upon the promotion of certain social 
problems, while the way in which a problem is experienced by the public will always 
depend in part upon the political and cultural framework within which it occurs. 
Understanding these 'subjective' factors is perhaps more important than ever today, 
when there is no systematic opposition to the idea that crime and antisocial behaviour 
are serious social problems. 
The concern about antisocial behaviour has grown alongside the fear of crime and 
remains closely associated with the issue of crime. However, even when studying the 
'objective' nature of crime, this social problem is far from clear-cut. The 'reality' of 
the rise in crime can be seen in the offences recorded by the police. Here crime is 
shown to have been increasing slowly from the 1930s and accelerating from the mid- 
1950s and late 1980s before declining from the mid 1990s. A similar trend is also 
4 indicated by the British Crime Survey (Maguire et al 2002). However, there remains 
some questioning of these crime statistics, both from conservative critics like Simon 
JenkinS5 and from those on the left, including John Muncie (1999), who argues that 
crime statistics are both partial and socially constructed. 6 
Examining conviction statistics for the 1980s and early 1990s, when reported and 
recorded crime figures were reaching an all-time high within both the police and the 
British Crime Survey reports, we find that convictions of burglary, for example, fell 
by one third (Rose 1996a: 102-3). Looking at youth crime during this period, a 
Bamardos survey concluded: 'Even taking account of the number of unrecorded 
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offences, demographic changes and the growth of strategies to divert young people 
from prosecution, there is little evidence that youth crime has actually increased' 
(Roberts and Sachdev 1996). Similarly, research published by the Trust for the Study 
of Adolescence concluded that, 'there is little evidence of any great increase in the 
level of crime committed by young people during the last decade' (Coleman 1999: 
81). Even Michael Rutter, whose book Antisocial Behaviour by Young People, is 
predicated on the notion that the problem of crime and antisocial behaviour amongst 
young people is on the increase, recognised that, 'the number of juveniles found guilty 
or cautioned for indictable offences per 100,000 of the population fell, between 1984 
and 1994, by 44% for males aged 10-13 and by 19% for males aged 14-17' (Rutter et 
al 1998: 70). 7 
With the shift in focus of once radical criminologists, backed up by the development 
of the British Crime Survey, there is a greater acceptance of crime as a 'real' problem. 
However, the myth and reality of crime remains a contested area. This thesis does not 
propose to disprove the 'reality' of crime. But the question of, when and why crime, 
and more particularly antisocial behaviour, became a 'social problem', in part depends 
on it being defined as such by significant groups and individuals who act as 
claimsmakers for this particular problem (Spector and Kitsuse 2001). In this respect, it 
is interesting to note that one of the reasons for the development of the British Crime 
Survey in the early eighties was not to prove the high level of crime, but rather the 
opposite - to show that the fear of crime was an exaggerated concern (Hough and 
Mayhew 1988). 
The rise and rise of crime over the last fifty years, at least as far as statistics are 
concerned, could have led to conservative and radical thinkers to have highlighted the 
'problem' of crime at almost any point within this time period. But it was not until the 
1970s and then the 1990s that political parties associated with the right and then the 
left adopted the posture of the party of law and order, and not until the mid-1980s that 
some radical criminologists became 'realists'. 
Particularly for radical criminologists and sociologists, the 'problem' of crime was 
questioned to a far greater extent in the past than it is today - despite the constantly 
4 
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rising crime figures (Cohen 1972, Hall 1978, Pearson 1983). The justifications for the 
growing acceptance of crime as a social problem are wide and varied, often referring 
to economic and social changes (Lea and Young 1984, Campbell 1993). This thesis, in 
contrast, will attempt to locate the concern about crime and particularly antisocial 
behaviour within the changing ideological and political outlooks of those who have 
helped elevate these concerns. 
Whereas studies in the past have explored conservative reactions to societal changes 
in formulating what were defined as moral panics, few British studies have been 
carried out to look at the more radically-based 'panics' of the 1980s and 1990s. With 
the emergence of the Labour party as a party of law and order, 9 and the increasing 
importance being given by the government to issues of crime, the fear of crime and 
antisocial behaviour, the emphasis of this thesis will be on uncovering the strands of 
thought and the active claimsmakers who have helped to situate concerns about 
'behaviour' at the centre of much social policy. 10 
It is worth pointing out at this stage that what is under study here, and what is defined 
as antisocial behaviour, is not what would traditionally have been understood as crime 
- theft or burglary, crimes often associated with economic gain, and seen as being an 
affront by the 'crook' to the state. Rather, with the elevation of the problem of 
antisocial behaviour, it is the 'petty' incivilities of noise, rowdy behaviour and 
dropping litter, or petty crime like graffiti and vandalism, that are understood to be a 
problem for the individual and ultimately for society. 
Unlike crime, which has had a relatively long shelf-life as a perceived social problem, 
the issue of antisocial behaviour has only emerged and become understood as a 
serious problem in the last decade, and particularly since the election of the Labour 
government in 1997. Many of these 'antisocial' acts create 'victims' not in a physical or 
economic sense; rather, it is the perceived 'emotional victimisation' and a sense of fear 
and anxiety that is being addressed. For example, if the presence of a group of young 
people is creating fear within a community, regardless of their activities, this very 
presence can be interpreted and labelled as being antisocial behaviour. 
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At a time when crime figures are shown to be falling, with a, '25 per cent fall in crime 
measured by the BCS in the five years between 1997 and 2002/03', it is still the case 
that 'three quarters of the public still believe that the national crime rate has been 
rising' (Home Office 2002/2003). This anomaly is explained by some as being caused 
by the day-to-day incivility of antisocial, sexist, racist and ageist behaviour, often by 
young people, which undermines the sense of wellbeing of both the individual and the 
community (Field 2003, Young 1999, Smith and Torestensson 1997, Pain 1995 Junger 
1987, Lea and Young 1984). Here the high level of fear of crime is explained in 
relation to various forms of harassment that do not show up on the crime statistics. 
The understanding of these problems, and the impact that they have on individuals, 
have been influenced by claimsmakers who help formulate the problems within 
certain parameters: parameters that have increasingly been set by what Joel Best 
describes as the 'victim industry', and which have a particular ontology (Best 1999). 
Equally, and more generally, the understanding of these problems and the impact they 
have on individuals and society will be influenced by the specific political and cultural 
climate of the day -a cultural climate that Furedi has labelled a 'culture of fear' 
(Furedi 1997). 
Antisocial behaviour of adults and especially young people is generally understood to 
be the cause of much of the fear in society. However, following the work of Best and 
Furedi, the fear of disorder is examined as part of a cultural process based on a more 
generalised sense of risk and insecurity, a social and political process that has helped 
create a sense of vulnerability amongst the public. How this sense of vulnerability has 
been encouraged and institutionalised is examined through the case-study of the 
Hamilton curfew. 
The politics of 'safe' behaviour 
From the early 1990s onwards, law and order has become a key issue for all political 
parties. More specifically, the 'non-criminal' behaviour of antisocial youth - 
behaviour that in the recent past would have been described as 'mischievous"' - has 
become one of, if not the, major concern in law and order policies and debates. 12 In 
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Scotland for example, part of the Strathclyde Police's, 'Operation Spotlight Initiative', 
launched exactly one year before the introduction of the Hamilton curfew, targeted 
young people causing a public nuisance, which included dropping litter outside 
schools and being noisy (The Scotsman 2 October 1996). 
'Nuisance behaviour' has also become a concern for the public, and in the same year 
that Operation Spotlight was launched in Scotland, the Audit Commission in England 
and Wales noted that between 10 and 20 per cent of phone calls to the police were for 
nuisance behaviour. This definition of 'nuisance behaviour' specifically relates to non- 
criminal activities - shouting, swearing, hanging around and fooling around in groups, 
sometimes outside other people's homes (Audit Commission Report 1996: 13). 
Other types of behaviour have also been criminalised. For example in 1996, Glasgow 
City Council introduced a street drinking ban covering the whole of the council area. 
Anyone found drinking outside now risked being fined and labelled as antisocial. 
Today, local authorities have defined 'community safety' as one of the core strategic 
objectives that directs council activities. The antisocial behaviour of young people is 
one of the main concerns raised within this community safety framework, and local 
initiatives costing hundreds of millions of pounds aimed at tackling the behaviour of 
antisocial youth, have been set up across the UK, 13 with the involvement of almost 
every council department, education department and voluntary organisation (Waiton 
2001: 31). Even trade unions have developed their own policies to deal with the 
antisocial behaviour of the public, with monitoring and research being produced 
annually to assess the 'growing problem' of this behaviour (Waiton 2001: 39). 
The assumption that the preoccupation with antisocial behaviour simply reflects the 
real changes in behaviour, and particularly that of young people, is challenged in this 
thesis. This is not to argue that there is no Problem, or even to reject the idea that some 
problems of behaviour may have got worse. But, to understand the significance of 
'antisocial behaviour' to political and public life, an examination must be made of the 
changing nature of politics itself. the loss of any opposition to the politicisation of 
crime; the emergence of 'micro-politics' that has transformed social issues into 
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problems of individual behaviour; and the changing relationship between the state, 
other institutions like the trade unions, and a fragmented and more insecure public. 
Safety and the desire to be safe is. not a new concern for individuals or for society. 
What is new is the extent to which being safe has become an all-encompassing 
organisational principle for society. This is often seen most clearly in relation to 
children and young people, where the prefix of 'safe' is now automatically added to 
any activity that involves youngsters. How this focus upon safety has come about is 
examined below, as is the impact that this has had upon social policy and the 
regulation of young people's lives. 
From moral panics to amoral anxieties 
Beginning from an understanding of the moral panic studies of the past, this thesis 
attempts to modernise the concept of 'moral panic', a concept that was developed at a 
time of conflicting beliefs and visions of society by those generally labelled as 'left 
and right'. Today, when society is understood by some to have moved beyond left and 
right (Giddens 1994, Furedi 2005), the following question is posed: What impact has 
this had on moral panics in society, and how are these changes to be conceptualised? 
Much of the key critical work examining crime panics in the UK, particularly work 
carried out prior to the 1990s, was done within the broad framework of moral panic 
studies (Young 1971, Cohen 1972, Hall 1978, Pearson 1983). In this framework, fears 
about Mods and Rockers, or muggers, was understood to be generated by a 
conservative reaction to cultural and economic changes from the 1960s onwards. 
However, whereas these studies were examining occasional 'panics' within a society 
that was generally 'calm', today a growing body of social science research has 
attempted to describe and understand society with reference to a more permanent 
sense of risk (Simon 1987, O'Malley 1991, Feeley and Simon 1992, O'Malley 1992, 
Beck 1992, Furedi 1997, Glassner 1999). 14 
Rather than panics occasionally erupting within a society that is otherwise at ease, 
government policies and institutional arrangements appear to be both initiating panics 
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and institutionalising practices based upon a cultural sense of anxiety (Fitzpatrick 
2001, Burgess 2004). Concerns about the 'behaviour of youth', for example, are no 
15 longer the preserve of conservative groups and 'outsiders" but involve a wide 
spectrum of opinion, institutional practices, and every political party, focusing on 
issues related to drugs, drink, sex, smoking, bullying, peer pressure, antisocial 
behaviour and so on. Concerns about 'youth' are not new, but rarely in the past were 
they so widely felt, and they did not take such a central place within society. Panics 
continue to erupt in society, but it will be argued here that it is more accurate to 
classify society as being in a constant state of anxiety. 
Where panics once took the form of a conservative reaction to changes in society, 
expressed through the promotion of moral values, more recently panics have been 
generated by more 'radical' thinkers, around such issues as the environment, child 
abuse and ADDS (Cohen 1988: 260-3, Jenkins 1992, Fitzpatrick 2001). Indeed the 
basis of many of today's panics and anxieties are more commonly formulated through 
the morally neutral, 'scientific', or amoral language of risk and safety. Previously 
panics took place within a contested political context, within which traditionalists, 
would promote the ideal of the past - of the family and, the 'British way of life' - 
while radicals would challenge these panics, embracing changes in society within a 
more positive vision of the future. Today neither traditional conservative moral values 
appear to be central to the promotion of many panics, and nor is there a radical 
opposition to them. However, moral panic research is still often framed within this 
paradigm (Thompson 1998), and as such remains somewhat one-sided. Rather than 
attempting to understand contemporary anxieties as an expression of traditional 
moralising, this thesis will endeavour to formulate an explanation for the rise of 
amoral anxieties that cut across the political spectrum. 
With the introduction of the Hamilton curfew by the newly-elected Labour 
government in 1997, the issue of child safety merged with the fears about young 
people who hang about the streets. Here the development of a curfew was largely 
understood, not as a panic reaction, but as a necessary initiative to protect the public 
from perceived risks ý and more specifically to protect them from this fear. This 
9 
safety-based initiative is understood and discussed within this thesis as an example of 
the institutionalisation of arnoral anxieties. 
Anxious Authoritarianism 
The Hamilton curfew, like many crime and safety initiatives, should be understood, 
not simply as a police initiative to deal with crime and disorder, but also as a relatively 
new form of state legitimation predicated upon the political elite's attempt to reengage 
with an anxious public. 
How the Hamilton curfew became an acceptable, indeed celebrated, initiative can only 
be understood with reference to the emerging culture of control that is identified as 
developing most systematically from around 1993. This trend towards directly 
regulating public space and cver-more areas of life is situated within the loss of 
direction of both left and right, and with the growing disengagement of the public 
from politics. How the political elite reacted to these developments and attempted to 
reengage a more fragmented public is of central importance here in attempting to 
understand the preoccupation with crime and antisocial behaviour. 
Within the discussion about antisocial behaviour, there are differing explanations of 
the cause of this problem. In political writings, for example, Labour MP Frank Field 
(2003) has described the significance of the declining influence of evangelical 
Christianity that framed the actions and civility of everyday life within the working 
class. The Conservative Alexander Deane (2005) has examined the 'great abdication' 
of the middle class who, he argues, have given up on the standards of good behaviour, 
that influenced the whole of society. Both of these perspectives accept that antisocial 
behaviour is a major - indeed the major problem facing society; a contention that is 
questioned within this thesis. 
Rather, this thesis argues that the central development in the last two decades in 
understanding the significance of antisocial behaviour as a social problem is the 
4collapse' of politics, which reflects the loss of belief by the political elites in their 
own capacity to direct social changes. Lacking a political dynamic and an ability to 
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engage the public, the result is a political elite with an exaggerated sense of society 
being out of control. This is coupled with a profound sense of pessimism amongst the 
public about not only political life, but about public life and ultimately about other 
people. In this respect, rather than antisocial behaviour being understood as a major 
social problem, the rise of the concern with this problem is seen here as a reflection of 
a widespread sense of society being out of control, and a more pessimistic, indeed 
fearful, perception of the actions of others. 
C. Wright Mills has described, what he considered to be the emergence of a 'mass' 
society, where there is a loss of an active public and a resulting preoccupation with 
personal troubles rather than public issues. Following this idea, this thesis argues that 
the concern about antisocial behaviour - or indeed of incivility (Deane 2005) - is a 
reflection not of a loss of concern about 'politeness' by the public, but the opposite: a 
more exaggerated preoccupation with personal behaviour. If politics really has all but 
'collapsed' - if we are living in an age where we face the 'end of ideology' (Bell 
1962), the 'end of utopia' (Jacoby 1999), or what Rose has described as the 'death of 
the social' (Rose 1996) - then the intense concern about antisocial behaviour is 
perhaps less to do with the behaviour itself than due to the fact that polite contact with 
other individuals is all we have left? 
Therapeutic vulnerability 
The development of a 'culture of control', and of authoritarian initiatives like curfews, 
has been understood as part of a neo-liberal agenda that engages with the 
'individualistic morality of our consumer culture' (Garland 2002: 198). However, 
while accepting the significance of the 'individual' to social policy developments, the 
nature of this individual does not appear to be the 'individualistic' or 'greedy' 
character that is often portrayed as having emerged out of 'Thatcher's Britain'. Rather, 
the contemporary human condition can more accurately be described, and is addressed 
within this thesis, as being founded upon a fragile sense of vulnerability. 
Throughout this thesis an attempt is made to identify the nature of the subject being 
engaged with and promoted within society. In so doing, the broader moral system of 
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belief underpinning state actions is examined (Beetham 199 1: 11), and the basis of 
modem day claimsmaking is explored. Where previously individuals were understood 
in relation to the Enlightenment vision of the active and rational 'man', today the 
relationship being developed between the individual and society is predicated upon 
the cultural sense of diminished subjectivity (Heartfield 2002). This cultural sense has 
led to the emergence of 'safety' as the new 'morality' for an anxious age. As Furedi 
notes: 
Today, the fear of taking risks is creating a society that celebrates victim-hood 
rather than heroism ... The virtues held up to be followed are passivity rather 
than activism, safety rather than boldness. The rather diminished individual 
that emerges is indulged on the grounds that, in a world awash with conditions 
and crises and impending catastrophe, he or she is doing a good job just by 
surviving (Furedi 1997: 12). 
The new basis for state legitimation that developed systematically towards the end of 
the 2& century, both Nolan (1998) and Furedi (2004) argue, was a form of 
therapeutic legitimacy. 16 Rather than engaging the public with a political or moral 
programme - an outlook that connected the individual to society and its values - 
government instead attempted to relate directly to the individual and the emotional 
self - an emotional self that was understood as being profoundly vulnerable. 
The most recent example of the government's 'respect agenda' is significant in this 
regard. This agenda, which at first sight appears to resemble a more traditional 
demand for morality and decency, when examined further exposes the more 
vulnerable and therapeutic nature of government interventions today. For example, 
what are the moral standards underpinning this idea of respect? Few if any institutions 
have been held up as deserving of respect, nor indeed has the old adage of 'respect for 
the elderly' been seriously promoted. Rather it seems that respect is something that 
everybody - adults and children alike - should be given or perhaps more importantly 
should feel. 17 Where previously the idea of respect was in some way associated with 
adult society, its values and institutions, today it appears to relate more to the 
vulnerability of individuals and their interactions with other people. Respect is now 
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demanded by the government as a form of protection of the emotionally-constituted 
public. 
The significance of the understanding of the public as being fundamentally vulnerable 
is explored in the thesis with reference to the changing nature of claimsmaking, and 
the formation of social problems predicated upon what Garland has correctly 
described as the universalised notion of victimhood (Garland 2002: 11). How this 
sense of vulnerability that has emerged is explored, in order to understand the cultural 
framework within which the Hamilton curfew was established. This engagement in 
society with the public, through the prism of vulnerability, will be shown not simply 
to be a reactive process that connects to a more fragmented individual, but a 'creative' 
one that helps to form and inform the nature of individual subjectivity, people's 
actions and expectations of themselves. 
The Hamilton Curfew 
The case study of the Hamilton curfew is used to explore the themes discussed above 
and to examine how the cultural and political trends identified impacted upon a 
working-class estate in Scotland. This is done through the use of semi-structured 
interviews with young people affected by the curfew, and by examining the 
representation of the problems being addressed by the key claimsmakers within the 
media. 
The semi-structured interviews with children and young people in the targeted area are 
used to help explore how the curfew impacted upon these young people. More 
broadly, these interviews help us to examine the broader concerns and fears held by 
young people and adults alike. Rather than simply reflecting 'real' dangers 
experienced by local people, the fear within the curfew-targeted areas is also studied 
as part of a broader culture of fear -a culture of fear that has arguably been 
encouraged with the criminalisation and politicisation of antisocial behaviour. Much 
of what is being examined is the justificatory process of the curfew, the central themes 
that were used to give legitimacy to the police and council's actions and the 'warrants' 
or values that underpinned the arguments used. 
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Through this research, a number of themes are uncovered: the centrality of the idea of 
the 'vulnerable public' and the 'victim' of both crime and antisocial behaviour; the 
emergence of the 'amoral absolute' of safety and particularly child safety, which 
dominated the discourse of those both for and against the curfew; and, in relation to 
the above, the promotion of 'rights' as a form of protection of the vulnerable adult, 
child and young person. 
Discussed with reference to the development of zero tolerance policing in Strathclyde, 
the dual elements of the criminalisation of young people and the 'victimisation'18 of 
adults and young people is explored. In essence it is argued that the increasing 
understanding of both adults and young people as potential victims has led to the 
criminalisation of young people in public space. In this respect, the curfew is 
discussed less as a 'right wing' authoritarian initiative than as a logical progression 
from the developing relationship between the state and the individual, predicated upon 
the notion of individual vulnerability, the unquestioned centrality of 'community 
safety' and, in part, the therapeutically-oriented understanding of the need to protect 
the emotional well-being of the public. 
Following from this, the idea of the diminished subject is explored. Rather than 'risks' 
being understood as challenges for ordinary people to face, the public were 
encouraged by those promoting the curfew to have a passive relationship with these 
'social problems'. This observation raises the question of what is meant by the notion 
of 'responsibility' and 'active citizenship', when a more passive relationship is 
encouraged between members of the public, and fear becomes institutionalised 
through public safety initiatives. 
The process of legitimation adopted by the authorities in their promotion of the curfew 
raises questions about the basis of government and political legitimation -a form of 
legitimacy that relates less to social institutions and public morals than to individual 
safety and feelings of fear. Here the extent to which a therapeutic approach influenced 
the development of the curfew is explored (Beetham 1991 and Nolan 1999). 
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Through this research the myth and reality of 'kids running wild' is examined and the 
impact of the curfew at a time when overprotected, 'cotton wool kids' was becoming 
recognised as an alternative social problem. 19 Equally, the ideas of safety and risk that 
were promoted by the authorities are questioned, and the notion of perceived and 
projected risks are compared to the cultural sense of insecurity in the area. By 
exploring the use made by the authorities of the issue of safety and fear, the 
potentially detrimental effect that this had upon individuals and the community is 
raised. 
Finally, the contradictory attitude of young people to the curfew is explored. Often 
annoyed by their own personal experience of the police, the young people of Hamilton 
nevertheless were generally supportive of a more policed and regulated environment. 
In the newspaper coverage, before the Hamilton Child Safety Initiative was launched, 
the concern was raised about how a curfew would create an 'us against them' 
mentality amongst angry young people. However, given the 'culture of fear' in 
society, the question addressed here is to what extent can it be argued that young 
people have themselves adopted the safety-first mentality often understood to be the 
preserve of elderly adults. In this respect, again, questions are raised about the 
detrimental 'impact that 'risk awareness' has upon young people and upon the 
interactions between themselves and others within a community. 
Conclusion 
The research in this thesis looking at the impact of the Hamilton curfew was originally 
developed in, an attempt to examine Furedi's understanding of the emerging 'culture 
of fear' (Furedi 1997). This remains central to the thesis but has been developed 
further with reference to the idea of a 'therapeutic state' (Nolan 1998), and through 
the study of the nature of the individual and the culturally promoted idiom of 
vulnerability (Furedi 2004). 
The emergence of the culture of fear is analysed in Chapter 2 through a study of past 
moral panic theories, and here the transformation of both the traditional 'moral' 
framework of these concerns, and also the 'panic' based nature of these now more 
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generalised public anxieties, is questioned. Rather, it is argued, the recognition of an 
all-encompassing culture of fear is useful in helping to explain the amoral safety- 
based 'panics' that have arisen in the late 2& and early 21" century. 
Following this chapter, the thesis develops chronologically by analysing the way 
crime and the fear of it have changed within politics, social institutions and also 
within academia. Chapter 3 ultimately attempts to explain the 'politics of antisocial 
behaviour' and the growing centrality across the political spectrum of the idea of the 
vulnerable public that has informed this development and lies at the heart of the 
emerging preoccupation with antisocial behaviour. 
Having established the background to what are described as amoral anxieties prior to 
the introduction of the Hamilton curfew, this 'Child Safety Initiative' is explored, with 
reference to official justifications of it and to the experience of local young people. 
Finally the thesis looks more generally at the meaning of the politically-loaded idea of 
antisocial behaviour, and attempts to unearth the essence of this term. This 
penultimate chapter examines the concern about antisocial behaviour both historically 
- prior to the introduction of the curfew - and also with reference to its growing 
significance to society today. Tracing the recent rise in the political and public 
concern about 'antisocial behaviour', this chapter asks: What does it mean to be 
antisocial at a time when common 'social' values are less coherent and society is more 
individuated? With this in mind, the meaning of being 'antisocial' and also of the 
more psychologically-formed understanding of 'behaviour' is explored. 
In conclusion, this thesis reinterprets the idea of moral panics and explains how the 
very basis of the amoral anxieties that have been institutionalised today express the 
problem not of antisocial individuals, but of an anti 'social' society. 
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Chapter 2: From Moral Panics to Amoral Anxieties 
It is widely acknowledged that this is the age of the moral panic (Tbompson 1998: 1). 
Introduction 
The concept of the moral panics grew out of the 1960s to explain a conservative 
reaction to a perceived threat to 'sacred and fundamental' values of society (Cohen 
1972). However, what today's fundamental values are is less clear than ever before. 
The promotion of The Family has become replaced by an acceptance of families, 
Britishness now embodies the idea of multiculturalism and even the Conservative 
Party rarely campaigns around traditional moral values. Despite these shifts, we do 
indeed appear to be living in an age of panics. How do we account for this? 
In the 1970s and 1980s moral panics were understood to be a right-wing reaction to 
economic and social changes at a time when the hegemony of the capitalist elite was 
breaking down (Hall et al. 1978). Moral panics were in part about class and class 
conflict. Today, however, this conflict is at an all time low. The once powerful British 
labour movement has all but disappeared from the political stage and a key basis for 
the moral panics of the past appears to have vanished. 
At the same time, panics have emerged in society, generated not by traditional 
conservatives but by radical thinkers and groups. Child abuse (Jenkins 1992), AIDS 
(Fitzpatrick and Miligan 1987), and the environment (Cohen 1988: 260-3), for 
example, are just three areas that have been identified as sites of radical panicking. 
Concerns about crime and youth disorder, which would historically have been 
conservative preoccupations that were challenged by radicals, have also become more 
mainstream. Indeed not only crime, but also the often non-criminal behaviour of 
young people, has become a significant social problem for conservatives and liberals 
alike - viewed as the problem of 'antisocial behaviour. 
Also, whereas panics in the past were often occasional, short-lived, focused on 
specific groups and activities, and generated by conservatives, today almost all 
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sections of society are involved to some degree in panicking about an ever-wider array 
of issues, from MMR to bird flu, the millennium bug, paedophiles, binge drinkers, 
sexually transmitted diseases, passive smoking and global warming. Whatever the 
myth and reality of these 'panics', the language of 'epidemics' and 'chaos' used to 
describe them depicts a society that is out of control, and expresses a deep sense of 
pessimism about the future. Rather than panicking being the preserve of reactionary 
traditionalists, it seems that to one degree or another we are all in a panic about 
something. 
Today, many panics are not only promoted by less predictable groups and individuals, 
but, like the MMR panic (Fitzpatrick 2004), have helped to undermine rather than 
shore up the authority of the political elite (Ungar 2001). 
To make sense of these changes, the framework of understanding contemporary 
panics in relation to conservative moral reactions to societal changes needs to be 
reassessed. Historical specificity is required to re-conceptualise this 'age of moral 
panic' and to understand what, if anything, are the sacred and fundamental values of 
society today that are being defended by those promoting these panics. The following 
chapter will attempt to do just that, firstly by analysing moral panic literature of the 
past to ascertain what these theories achieved, and then by studying the social 
constructionist methodology that will be adopted within the thesis. The chapter as a 
whole aims to show that the left/right framework within which moral panics have 
been understood is no longer valid: rather, it is the collapse of this moral and political 
contestation that helps to explain the more ever present state of anxiety across society. 
Finally, theories of 'risk' (Beck 19.92) and especially 'fear' (Furedi 1997) will be 
examined to explain the rise not of moral panics but of what is a more accurate 
concept within today's 'liquid modernity' (Bauman 2000) of amoral panics and 
anxieties. 
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Introducing moral panics 
British moral panic research, beginning with Stanley Cohen (1972) and developing 
with Stuart Hall (1978), was stimulated by a 'radical' belief that reactions to certain 
social problems were disproportionate to the reality of them. For Cohen and Hall the 
attack, by certain conservative groups in society, on sections of British youth was new 
and told us less about 'the youth of today' than about the conservative elite and British 
society more generally. The development of moral panic theories is explored below, 
not only as an approach that explained the moral and class dimension of these panics, 
but also one that acted as an opposition to them 
Since Jock Young (1971) coined the term 'moral panic', and Stanley Cohen (1972) 
developed the concept in his work on Mods and Rockers, the term has become one of 
the few sociological concepts to become part of modem political language. General 
explanations of who causes moral panics and why have been developed by a number 
of researchers. For Cohen the main promoters of the moral panic around Mods and 
Rockers were 'interest groups' - middle cI lass professional groups - and the media, 
although the role of the police and politicians and other 'right thinking' individuals 
was also explored. Hall (1978), in his work on 'muggers' in the 1970s, developed a 
critique of the 'elite' interest group - although a key focus was again on the media and 
their role, something that has become an increasing focus for more recent writers 
(McRobbie 1995, Thompson 1998). Pearson's work looked largely at the anxiety of 
the elite in times of national and democratic crisis (Pearson 1983); while others on the 
left have identified a similar emergence of moral panics at times when 'society has not 
been able to adapt to dramatic changes, such as the Industrial Revolution or the 
modernising trends of the 1960s (Furedi 1992). Social problem theorists, particularly 
those from the US, have also focused upon 'interest groups' as the key to moral panics 
(Jenkins 1992, Best 1993 and 1999), but they have also examined the role of those at 
the 'grassroots' of society, examining the role of 'the public' in generating moral 
panics (Best 1993, Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). 
Class conflict and the interests of the elite in relation to the working class has been a 
major factor in British moral panic research. From Pearson, who studied panics in 
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Victorian England onwards, to Hall, who looked at the emerging class conflict in the 
1970s, moral panics were often understood as an expression of a conservative reaction 
to the perceived threat from sections of the working class. For most writers on moral 
panics - UK writers more than those from the US - part of the motivation for this 
work, and part of the explanation for the rise of moral panics, has been a questioning 
of traditional conservative values and more recently a challenge to the rise of the new 
right. 
Cohen and Hall 
20 Stanley Cohen carried out the first major work on moral panics in Britain in 1972 . 
Cohen's analyses of the scare surrounding the Mods and Rockers fights in the early 
1960s looked at moral panics in terms of what the Mods and Rockers represented in 
society. Rather than their actions being significant in themselves, Cohen argued that 
the Mods and Rockers were seen and treated as a symbol of Americanised affluence 
and youthful hedonism. Developed from an understanding of disaster research, Cohen 
saw moral panics as an expression of social anxiety, brought to the surface by a 
particular event or action. For a once 'great nation' such as Britain, this influence of 
the USA upon young people, Cohen argued, was seen as problematic - both in the 
values they were seen to uphold, or those they were seen to reject, like the ethics of 
sobriety and hard work (Cohen 1972). 
Cohen not only launched the term moral panic, but also was the first to recognise the 
spontaneous collective behaviour involved in these panics, which were short-lived and 
developed outside of societies' key institutions (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). The 
media exaggerated the problem (Cohen 1972: 32-3); the police and courts were 
activated and pushed for more powers to deal with the problem, thus escalating the 
issue (Cohen 1972: 88-91); politicians denounced the fighting as 'evil' and called for 
new laws (Cohen 1972: 138); local action groups emerged -a 'germinal social 
movement' (Cohen 1972: 120) - to demand tougher remedies (Cohen 1972: 125); and 
the public reacted to all of the above developments. The result: a fullY-fledged moral 
panic. - 
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Stuart Hall's examination of the panic surrounding 'muggers' in the 1970s suggested 
that news about crime was becoming a moral tale reinforcing what is right and wrong 
(Hall et al 1978). Hall's analysis adopted and developed elements of Cohen's work on 
moral panics, analysing key concerns about affluence and changes to the 'traditional' 
ways of life. 21 Elements of social change and changes in attitudes amongst the young, 
took on a 'folk devilish' form in the black mugger -a reflection of an alien who has 
no sense of respect, hard work, morals or family values and who is making the streets 
into a no-go area. The mugger, Hall explained, was a symbol of social decay that was 
first imagined and then discovered (1978: 16 1). 
Hall's analysis both looked at structural reasons for the rise of the mugging panic and 
also adopted Gramsci's concept of hegemony: the birth of the 'law and order society' 
in the 1970s being an expression of the inability of the state to win the hearts and 
minds of society, reflected in the more overt use of power to control sections of the 
population. As Hall explained, 'A crisis of hegemony marks a moment of profound 
rupture in the political and economic life of a society, an accumulation of 
contradictions' (1978: 217). 
The development of this panic and a more openly coercive state occurred at 
'exceptional' moments, triggered in the late 1960s by the 'exhaustion of consent' in 
society (1978: 219). Here the 'control culture' and the media, followed by the police 
and courts, reacted more quickly, without much pressure-from below, to events in 
society, creating a 'general panic' about social order (1978: 222). 22 
The media coverage of mugging, Hall believed, reflected firstly a sense of social loss, 
concern about family breakdown and moral decline; and secondly an image of the 
decaying inner city as a 'ghetto'. Here, the concern about social decay was mixed with 
a sense of loss in the family and was expressed in relation to not only youth, but an 
alien body of youth. Black youth. 
A key focus within Cohen and Hall's moral panic research was not so much the 
problem raised by these panics, but the reaction to them. As Stuart Hall explains in 
Policing the Crisis: 
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We want to know what the social causes of 'mugging' are. But we argue that 
this is only half - less than half [my italics] - of the mugging story. More 
important is why British society reacts to mugging [original emphasis], in the 
extreme way it does, at that precise historical conjunction - the early 1970's 
(Hall et al 1978: vii). 
American social constructionists 
As Cohen was developing his work on moral panics in the UK, in the USA similar 
work was being carried out by sociologists looking at the issue of deviance from a 
'labelling' perspective (Best 2004). This work took as its starting point a questioning 
of the accepted, official, objective description of crime and deviant behaviour. Rather 
than drug-takers and other deviants being simply deviant by nature of their behaviour, 
it was argued that they were deviant because their behaviour was labelled so by 
others, especially those in authority. Therefore rather than viewing deviant behaviour 
as an objective activity or fact, as positivists had done, the labelling of deviant 
behaviour was investigated. 
For constructionists, subjectivists or relativists, social problems and therefore moral 
panics are seen as problems that have been identified and collectively defined. These 
social problems and panics are therefore not objective realities in and of themselves, 
but rather are constructed (Becker 1991, Best 1993, Jenkins 1992,1998 and Spector 
and Kitsuse 200 1). 23 Indeed, Cohen himself also believed that 'it is the perception of 
threat and not its actual existence that is important' (Cohen 1972: 22). 
American social constructionist Philip Jenkins argues: 'It is impossible to define a 
problem in an objective or value-free way, since talking about a "problem" or a 
"crisis" ipso facto implies that there is a solution, that change of some kind is 
necessary and desirable' (Jenkins 1998: 4). For Jenkins, the very way a problem is 
discussed, and solutions developed, implies a certain value-laden view of the problem 
and of society. However, while maintaining a critical approach to 'objective' social 
problems, Jenkins and most social problem researchers also attempt to examine the 
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strengths and weaknesses of objective evidence - rather than seeing the objective 
world as purely a subjective construction. 
The approach adopted by American sociologists Philip Jenkins (1992; 1998) and Joel 
Best (1993; 1999) grew out of Social Problem Theory in the 1970s. 24 This approach, 
known as contextual constructionism is more flexible methodologically than the strict 
constructionism of Spector and Kitsuse (2001) as it allows for the usefulness and 
examination of objective 'facts' and statistics, while retaining a critical understanding 
of them (Best 2001a). 
In this way these contextual constructionists are able to explain in more depth why 
certain social problems or moral panics emerge when they do by examining in more 
detail the values and rhetoric used by certain groups and situating them within broader 
patterns of social problem construction. 
Social problem or moral panic? 
Social problem theory is raised here because it is a more flexible methodology than 
that associated with moral panics, in terms of examining social problems, and will be 
adopted in examining the construction of issues associated with antisocial behaviour 
later in the thesis. Indeed as Cohen himself notes: 
Folk Devils and Moral Panics was informed by the sixties fusion of labelling 
theory, cultural politics and critical sociology. Today's students of moral 
panics do not have to engage with this theoretical mix-up. They can go straight 
into the literature on social constructionism and claimsmaking. This is a well 
developed model for studying the contested claims that are made - by victims, 
interest groups, social movements, professionals and politicians - the 
construction of new social problem categories (Cohen 2002: xxii). 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda, while recognising much overlapping in moral panic theory 
and social problem theory, also point out that there are 'at least three' basic 
differences between them. Social problem theory, unlike moral panic theory, need not 
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have a 'folk devil', in that it need not show a discrepancy between the degree of 
concern and the actual problem. Disproportionality is not necessarily relevant, and 
while 'moral panics' imply a substantial change in the mood of a group or groups in 
society towards a particular issue, social problem theory can study any problem 
regardless of the 'panic' surrounding it (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). 
For social problem theory, issues that become institutionalised are in fact perhaps 
more important to study than those that erupt and then disappear. This is of particular 
relevance today, as we shall see, with the emergence of a 'risk society' or 'culture of 
fear' within which anxiety about social problems appear to be a permanent rather than 
a fleeting phenomenon. 
Moral panic theory generally starts from a belief that an issue is being exaggerated, 
that Mods and Rockers are not such a threat, that mugging is not as widespread as 
assumed, or that the concern about antisocial behaviour is unjustified and not based on 
a 'real' increase in this problem. For social problem writers, the myth or reality of a 
social problem is not necessarily important. Crime may be high but this doesn't 
explain why it has become a 'social problem' in and of itself. For a social problem to 
be constructed someone must raise it as a problem and campaign around this issue, 
and politicians and key social institutions must pick up on this issue and help promote 
it. Social issues like crime, even when on the increase, need not become 'social 
problems' around which campaigns are built. 
Another difference between moral panic theory and social problem theory is the 
political nature of moral panic theory. Jenkins has noted that the vast majority of 
moral panic research has been developed within a left/liberal framework (Jenkins 
1992: 145), a framework within which outbursts of traditional conservative morality 
and issues associated with the new right are challenged. 
However, moral panic work is not, argue Goode and Ben-Yehuda, inherently political 
and ideological. Jenkins (1992: 173) has used moral panic theory to explore the work 
of 'radical' feminists in the UK and the USA who helped to create and promote a 
moral panic around child abuse. Similarly, Cohen has argued that the methods used in 
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the 1960s and 1970s to explore the crusades against marijuana and homosexuality 
could equally be used today to examine modem-day moral panics that have been 
promoted by left/liberal activists around issues concerning industrial pollution, 
smoking and pornography (Cohen 1988: 260-3). 
It is true that moral panic theory could be used to examine panics on the left and the 
right. However in practice - especially in the UK - this has not materialised. Rather 
moral panic research has tended to remain within an 'anti-new right' framework. 25 
This has been less the case in the USA, where moral panic work has also examined 
radical and feminist panics, for example over the issue of -child abuse (Jenkins 1992 
and 1998). The British research, by focusing on 'right-wing' panics that often take a 
traditional moral form, is unable to examine more recent panics that take a non-moral 
or amoral form. The oxymoron of 'value free' moral-panics or the idea of 'amoral' 
panics can perhaps help examine these modem panics and will be explored later. 
In general it is still true to argue that moral panics emerge and are generated at times 
of social change by conservative elements in society made insecure by this social 
change. However, one explanation for the rise of the 'age of moral panic' today may 
be that there are simply more groups and strands of thought that have become 
conservative', even while they appear to be situated on the liberal left. 
Who makes moral panics? 
The question of who makes moral panics or social problems has been contested over 
the years and has often been connected to issues and questions of morality and 
ideology, material interest, and status interest (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 124- 
143). 
The Marxist approach adopted by Hall (1978) locates the rise of moral panics with the 
elite. Other researchers, especially those from the USA, identify interest groups as 
being central to the claimsmaking process. 26 Alternatively, others argue that moral 
panics emanate from the public themselves, or from the grassroots of society (Goode 
and Ben-Yehuda 1994). 
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Most studies of moral panics incorporate elements of all three theories, related to the 
elite, interest groups, and the grassroots. For example, moral panics cannot exist 
without an element of grassroots, support; however, these panics, even if originating 
within the public, only become defined as social problems when interest groups or 
elite groups take up the issue. In the end, the study of moral panics must recognise 
that: 'No moral panic is complete without an examination of all societal levels, from 
elites to the grassroots, and the full spectrum from ideology and the morality at one 
pole to crass status and material interests at the other' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 
143). 
Within this thesis, this combined approach is adopted, although the central role of the 
elite is identified, particularly in the role they have played in institutionalising panics 
and anxieties through new laws and social policies associated with youth crime and 
antisocial behaviour. 
The question of who makes moral panics and social problems has recently become 
more difficult to answer.. Not only because the traditional conservative basis for panics 
no longer appears to be central to many of them, but also because radicals who in the 
past denounced panics are now more inclined to support panics and policies based on 
what would previously have been seen as conservative concerns. Below the 
explanation for the emerging age of panics is connected to the collapse and 
convergence of left and right wing thought. 
The changing face of contemporary panics 
Both the rise of moral panics within conservative sections of society, and the 
interpretation of them by radical thinkers as moral panics, emerged at a specific 
moment in history and reflected a certain clash between the 'left and right'. However, 
by the early 1990s the conflicting understanding and approach to moral panics was 
becoming confused. At this time of political change, the left appeared to accept more 
readily the 'reality' of certain 'panics', while at the same time the right began to 
question the traditional moralising that had once been the bedrock of these panics. 
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Rather than this development simply reflecting objective changes in society - it 
reflected more significantly a change in the outlook of both the left and right. 
Analysing the language' of moral panics Hunt, in his study of broadsheet newspapers, 
identified a number of developments in the use and understanding of the term 'moral 
panic'. A term that had previously been used by the left to challenge the exaggerated 
reactions of conservatives was, by the end of the 1980s, being questioned by liberal 
and left-wing individuals and newspapers: for example the Guardian in 1989 
challenged the idea that concerns about crime were a form of moral panic (Guardian 
28 August 1989). Crime, it was argued, needed to be accepted as a 'real' problem, and 
as Hunt noted: 'A succession of similar articles appeared in both left-wing and right- 
wing papers throughout 1993, attacking 'progressive criminologists' for dismissing 
the crime epidemic and crisis in values as "moral panic... (Hunt 1997: 642). 
At the same time, the term 'moral panic' was being embraced by some more radical 
voices to support the condemnation of certain groups, like 'feckless fathers'. while 
alternatively articles in the right wing presi emerged where the term moral panic was 
used to attack radical panics around issues of satanic abuse and smoking (Hunt 1997). 
Finally, while there was a trend amongst liberal and left-wing thinkers to accept rather 
than challenge what would previously have been seen as panics, simultaneously many 
of those on the right were becoming uncomfortable with the use of morality to attack 
groups in society. Questioning moralistic reactions by the Conservative government 
under John Major to the killing of toddler James Bulger by two 10-year-old boys, and 
also challenging the moral campaign to get 'back to basics', both the Times and 
Sunday Times expressed a concern that the government 'was losing sight of reality'. 
'The ambivalence about moral panic, ' Hunt noted, 'illustrates the writers' doubts 
about the popular credibility of moral language' (Hunt 1997: 642). 
A new 'language' was needed at this point in time: a language that could endorse 
panics as real, but without the traditional moral framework of previous panics. As part 
of this linguistic project, Hunt observed, 'the term 'moral panic' itself had to be 
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redefined as a form of civic consciousness, an expression of public anxiety rather than 
a conspiracy of elites and interest groups' (Hunt 1997: 646). 
What would previously have been seen by radicals as a panic was now more readily 
seen as being 'real' - an objectively legitimate social problem that needed to be 
addressed. However, at the same time the moral basis for panicking was becoming 
problematic. 
Loss of moral authority 
A central element to moral panic studies has, as the name suggests, been focused on 
the morality of those panicking and promoting these panics. However, when looking 
at the construction of social problems in the 1990s, the question of what moral values 
were being defended is less clear. The 'class war' may have been won, but as 
American conservatives quickly recognised, the 'culture war' was being lost and 
traditional conservative values that had been the basis of moral panics up to this point 
were in decline. 
Part of the 'tradition' of moral panics has been the concern about nationhood and 
national decline. In Pearson's book, Hooligan, he explains how crime and violence in 
Britain has often been portrayed as un-British and a threat to the 'British way of life'. 
Even the word 'hooligan' developed from an Irish name and has been counterposed. to 
the 'English national character'. 27 The 'Victorian values' espoused by the 
Conservative Party in the 1980s were a high point in post-war Britain for the 
politicisation of, and moralising about, traditional Britishness. Similar values had been 
expressed in a more embryonic form in the early 1960s and laid the basis for the panic 
over Mods and Rockers and the subsequent work by Cohen. 
As well as a concern about nation, the family has also been a core concern within 
moral panics. Britishness was seen as being under threat from 'muggers' in the 1970s, 
for example, and here black youth symbolised not only a racial threat but also a threat 
to the family. As Hunt (1999) explains, the main anxieties over youth and crime were 
linked by the mugging panic to a deeper layer of anxieties about parental relations, 
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fragmenting communities and the end of neighbourliness. Many of these concerns can 
still be seen today when issues to do with youth antisocial behaviour are raised. 
However key differences exist in the moral language that would be seen as acceptable 
today. The use of 'racial language', for example, and the traditional defence of 
Britishness and the British way of life, are more problematic, while even the defence 
of 'family values' is more difficult than previously. 
A significant moment in the declining usefulness of 'moral' panics can be seen in 
1993, when John Major's 'Back to Basics' speech was widely ridiculed. This reflected 
not the end of moralising, but rather the growing difficulty that even a Conservative 
Prime Minister had in using traditional morals for political purposes. Following this 
moral campaign, The Independent condemned Major's attack on single motfiers, 
noting that: 'Conservative politicians are subjecting them to a vilification that would 
be illegal if addressed to racial minorities' (Cohen 2002: xxviii). 
The loss of faith in the moralising of the elite was clearly expressed by Roy Chapman, 
chairman of the Headmasters' Conference, who in attacking Major's campaign against 
'yobs' stated that: 
The family no longer provides either the cohesive force or the base line in 
standard behaviour. The church seems prepared to accept anything except 
intolerance, while the government seems to operate on the basis of political 
expediency, rather than on coherent policies, much less principles (Calcutt 
1996: 33). 
In the USA a similar trend was in evidence, as traditional morality was seen to decline 
as a source for cohering the elites and for gaining public support. As Goode and Ben- 
Yehuda noted, in 1992 the Republican presidential campaign in the United States was 
initially and substantially based on 'family values' - with its attendant attacks on 
homosexuality, abortion, divorce and other presumed Democratic-tolerated vices - 'a 
theme which failed to catch fire with the American voter' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
1994: 35). 
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The reason for this 'failed campaign' is partly due to the confusion of moral absolutes 
- even amongst traditionally conservative elites in society, as American writer Katie 
Roiphe points out in her book Last Night in Paradise: Sex and Morals at the 
Century's End: 
In the fifties, there were curfews on college campuses and social taboos 
against getting a "bad reputation" or losing your virginity before you got 
married. But now we have no popularly accepted moral attitude about 
sexuality that can be passed down from one generation to the next. Is it all 
right for teenagers to have sex, or isn't it? Is it morally wrong or just 
physically dangerous? We don't have answers. It's not just that different 
people have different answers, but that, for the first time in recent memory, we 
don't have an official answer, an answer that extends from Oprah to 
Hollywood to the editorial pages of the New York Times (Roiphe 1997: 163). 
Traditional morals, based on conservative notions of the nation and the family, which 
had been the basis of most moral panics up to this point, were becoming more 
problematic by the early 1990s. Problematic not only in terms of their relevance to the 
public, but even in terms of the cohesion and coherence they generated within the elite 
itself. Crucially, this loss of moral certainty or absolutes helped to exaggerate the 
sense of panic amongst the elite. The decline in the capacity of traditional morality to 
promote absolute values against perceived threats did not, however, result in the 
reduction of panics in society. Rather, panics escalated and were increasingly engaged 
with and even promoted by government - in part because of its own loss of moral 
authority. Conservative moralising remained, but was becoming less significant as a 
basis for anxieties and panics that from this point on were taking a less moral form. 
The convergence of left and right 
The desire to control, regulate and limit individual behaviour has historically been a 
preoccupation associated with conservative thinkers and groups. However over the 
last few decades, social problems that focus upon problematic behaviour and 
explicitly or implicitly promote the need for more regulations in society have 
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increasingly come from 'radical' individuals. Within a critical understanding of 
society, but with a focus on individual's 'abusive' behaviour, this radical approach 
often portrays the problem as being far more serious and widespread than previous 
conservatives ever did. 
Writing in The Sunday Times in 1994, Gertrude Himmelfarb bemoaned the decline in 
morality associated with the family, while perceptively recognising that the new moral 
- or amoral - absolute of the late twentieth century was developing around the issue 
. of child abuse. 
As deviancy is normalised, so the normal becomes deviant. The kind of family 
that has been regarded for centuries as natural and moral is now seen as 
pathological, concealing behind the faqade of respectability the new 'original 
sin', child abuse (The Sunday Times II September 1994). 
The above quote is used by Kenneth Thompson in his study of Moral Panics (1998: 
92), in which he discusses panics in the 1990s that he believes were generally 
articulated around 'neo-liberal individualism and neo-conservative nostalgia for a 
moral golden age - an imagined national community unified by common values, 
(Thompson 1998: 141). However, while this was true to some degree, the panics being 
generated by radicals, like that of child abuse (Jenkins 1992; 1998), are not seen by 
Thompson within the framework of moral panic studies. By focusing on the 
traditional moral basis of panics, the new trend for individuals and groups on the left 
to pathologise relationships and to generate panics themselves is lost. 
In reality, the tendency to panic in the 1990s was becoming more general across the 
political spectrum, reflected in the move by those on the left to become more 
preoccupied with issues of crime, violence and abuse, within a broader sense that 
humanity and human relationships and actions were destructive and needed to be 
regulated. 
As Fitzpatrick observed in relation to the AIDS panic, the anxiety and fear about 
AIDS did not erupt through the moral promotion of the idea of a 'gay plague. Rather, 
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this panic only captured the public imagination once the moral campaign was 
overtaken by the new 'secular' campaign for 'safe sex. Fitzpatrick accurately 
describes how, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new social problems related to 
atomised individuals, not through traditional morality but through the new language of 
risk and safety. Moralising, he argued, no longer needed a 'dog collar' (Fitzpatrick 
2001). 
For Furedi, the AIDS panic was a key moment in moral panics, one where the 
traditional moralists merged with a new 'radical' sense of anxiety: 
The high point of the unexpected synthesis between'conventional moralizers 
and proponents of the new etiquette was over the issue of AIDS ... Initially, it 
was the right-wing moralists who sought to take the initiative ... In the AIDS 
literature, this attempt to create an anti-gay moral panic is still presented as the 
dominant theme around the issue. But in reality, the anti-gay presentation of 
AIDS soon ran out of steam. Proponents of the new etiquette succeeded in 
redefining AIDS ... [into a disease where] 'everyone was at risk" [my italics] 
(Furedi 1997: 166). 
A concern raised by Furedi (1997) is that whereas radical thinkers continue to 
challenge old-fashioned moral panics by the right, another panic is often put in their 
place. Cohen, in his introduction to the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 
similarly hints at this problem, noting with reference to comments made by American 
experts challenging the idea that schools are dangerous places: 
As these stories unfold, experts such as sociologists, psychologists and 
criminologists are wheeled in to comment, react and supply causal narrative. 
Their ritual opening move - 'putting things in perspective' - is not usually 
very helpful: 'School Still Safest Place For Children; Many More Dead at 
Home Than in Classroom. (Cohen 2002: xiii) 
Here, the traditional panic about violence and a need for law and order in public, or 
within institutions like schools, is replaced by a panic about violence in the home. 
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From a certain feminist perspective, the concern about a 'violent society' has been 
turned inwards, into the home. Viewed through the prism of patriarchy, as Victor 
argues, male dominance in society and its exploitation of women and children has 
become the essential underlying threat to the moral ordq of society (Victor 1998). 
Similarly, US sociologist Donna Killingbeck, after exposing the 'construction of 
school violence as a "moral panic"', goes on to argue that the problem with this right- 
wing moral panic is that it misses the many and varied ways that violence occurs 
within schools that make it almost endemic. The elements of harm in schools can only 
be understood, she argues, once the following have been recognised: 
(1) the emotional and psychological pain that results from the domination of 
some over others, (2) the focus on interpersonal relationships that ignore the 
violence of social processes which produce systematic social injury, such as 
that perpetuated through institutiopalised racism, sexism, and classism, and (3) 
the symbolic violence of domination, or the subtle form of violence that brings 
coercion through power exercised in hierarchical relationships (Killingbeck 
2001: 10). 
Unlike past writing on moral panics that emphasised the disproportionate concern 
about violence emanating from conservative elites or interest groups, here one concern 
about violence is simply replaced by another, more radical, Foucauldian concern 
about the centrality of power and violence to the experience of children in school. 
Issues like 'racism, sexism and classism' are here challenged within the framework of 
a concern about violence. Violence becomes THE issue, and alternative approaches to 
dealing with and regulating this 'problem' are constructed. 
Interestingly, even in Pearson's recent retrospective article examining his past work in 
Hooligan, he notes that, while there are panics about young people and drugs and 
drink, 'drug-taking is a problem among young people today' (Young People Now 21- 
27 January 2004). This rather sweeping statement could easily fit into what would I 
have been seen until relatively recently as a moral panic itselL Linked to Pearson's 
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article, the same magazine, Young People Now, had a retrospective review of 
Hooligan by Rob Allen, the director of Rethinking Crime and Punishment and a 
member of the Youth Justice Board. Noting the central argument in Hooligan, Allen 
stated that 'the last 10 years have seen plenty more media moral panics: about 
persistent young offenders, paedophiles, drugs and street crime'. However he goes on: 
Rereading Hooligan, I took a different message than first time round. It is the 
continuity of hooliganism makes it more, not less, of a social problem. In 
policy terms it boils down to whether we take the American route of dealing 
with the poorest through prison, or a more European approach of building up 
economic, social and educational responses [my italics] (Young People Now 
21-27 January 2004). 
Whereas Allen had understood Pearson's work in the early 1980s as a correct 
challenge to the moral panics surrounding youth crime, by the beginning of the 
twenty-first century his view had been transformed into an acceptance of the problem 
of hooliganism. What is interesting in this review is that Allen does not try and argue 
that things are worse and society has changed, but simply states that his understanding 
of youth crime has changed. Allen had previously understood Hooligan as a book that 
challenged the anxieties of the elite - now Allen has come to endorse these anxieties. 
A similar trend to interpret social problems from a more negative perspective and to 
focus upon the need to regulate groups in society also developed in criminology in the 
1980s. In the radical criminologist Jock Young, who first used the term moral panic in 
1971, we see another example of a socialist who shifted his emphasis from the 'social 
control agents' and the exaggerated nature of crime panics, onto the criminal - and in 
particular the working-class criminal. The consequence of this shift is that it moves 
from a critical focus on the elite, towards an emphasis on social control. Arguing for a 
kind of politics of regulation, Young states that: 
Such politics of crime control are part of the wide sweep of grass-roots 
politics: the control of pollution, industrial safety, traffic control, 
environmental improvements - representing, in fact, the united interest of a 
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divided community. In this process of seeking out a common political interest 
and exerting public control, we will recreate a sense of community both in 
consciousness and in muscle, rather than resurrect a mythical entity, which has 
long since disappeared (Lea and Young 1984: 272). 
Previously, we noted how Cohen (1988) believed that radicals in the 1980s could be 
seen as encouraging moral panics over issues like pollution. In Lea and Young we see 
regulation and social control in many areas of life being seen in terms of recreating 
community and recreating community without resorting to past myths. 
This growing move away from questioning elite panics and a similarly growing desire 
for social control felt by 'radical' thinkers is expressed in one form or another in all of 
the aforementioned issues or panics, from AIDS to child abuse and onto youth crime 
and antisocial behaviour. This shift in radical thought from the late 1980s onwards 
competed with traditional conservative panics about crime and disorder, and changed 
the political framework within which moral or 'amoral' panics were generated. The 
question of who now encouraged these panics became more. confused as various 
radicals who identified the moral right as the cause for panics in the past now become 
moral - or amoral - claimsmakers in their own right. ý 
As the moral right stuttered and the ideas of the left became discredited, left-wing and 
right-wing campaigners converged more systematically around the core value of the 
1990s - safety. Unlike a number of conservative panics that tended to target the 
immoral minority, 28 the new safety panics generalised a number of problems. Now 
everyone could die of AIDS, while child abuse was porttayed as being endemic to 
society. Where the moral right had hoped to restore society to a golden past, the new 
amoral panics had no idealised vision of society: the aim for individuals was simply to 
be safe. With many of the new safety campaigns being generated by radical thinkers, 
opposition to these panics remained limited, and in the case of the AIDS panic, this 
new amoral approach was adopted by the Conservative government under the 
leadership of Margaret Thatcher, with the support of almost all radical groups and 
thinkers. Consequently, the anxieties within society expressed through this and many 
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other panics were increasingly becorning institutionalised and helped to forge the new 
social and personal 'moral' norm of safety. 
The new 'moral' icon - the victim 
Traditional moral panics upheld a set of values that were felt to be under threat. As 
such, despite the conservative nature of themi an attempt was being made to reengage 
individuals with society and with a wider set of beliefs. The new safety-based panics, 
in contrast, have no belief system associated with them and relate to the fragmented 
and fearful individual directly. Where traditionalists wanted to uphold nationalistic 
and family values, the new 'safe sex' or 'community safety' campaigners simply 
wanted to modify people's behaviour to keep them safe. The moral image promoted 
by these old moralists was of a strong family man who worked hard and would fight 
for his country. In contrast the moral icon of the new safety campaigns is the victim. 
In Moral Panic, Jenkins points out that in the 1980s a whole new branch of the legal 
profession developed in relation to lawsuits undertaken on behalf of victims (Jenkins 
1998: 219). This, rather than being a peculiarity of law, reflected what Jenkins 
describes as the new child protection movement's emphasis on the experience of the 
victim: 
For the first time in history, perhaps millions of people, mainly but not 
exclusively women have constructed their self-identity in terms of the 
experience of sexual victimization. Networks of survivors became a powerful 
interest group, protesting any weakening in societies vigilance against abuse 
and launching virulent attacks on therapists or writers who dared to speak of 
"false memory" (Jenkins 1998: 234). 
Rather than victimhood being merely an objective existence or experience, here it is 
understood as, in part, an identity developed and indeed promoted at a particular time. 
Joel Best has traced the historical emergence of 'victimhood' within the USA, 
identifying this understanding of the individual as a central tenant of claimsmaking in 
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the modem period. This is something that has similarly developed in the UK and more 
generally within Western culture. In Random Violence Best highlights a cultural trend 
that has influenced the way in which individuals and issues are understood and the 
subsequent impact that this has had on laws and policy developments. 
Tracing the emergence of 'victim rights' advocates in conservative claims for 'victims 
of crime' in the sixties, and within the women's movement who campaigned for laws 
against various forms of abuse in the seventies, Best points out that the concept of 
victims often accepted uncritically today is not simply an objective term but has 
developed over time with the help of victim centred claimsmakers (Best 1999: 94). 
A significant development identified by Best is the growing use of and strength gained 
by those using the 'victim' framework to present their case. Victims of crime, for 
example, may be labelled as victims by conservative groups campaigning on their 
behalf, while those attempting to defend the 'underclass' that are blamed for these 
crimes similarly use the language of victimhood to develop counter-claims. As Lee 
also notes, the framework within which the 'religious right' now opposes abortion is 
less in relation to morality and religion itself than with reference to the woman as a 
victim of post abortion syndrome (Lee 2001). 
Discussing the convergence of left and right in their campaigning on behalf of the 
victim, Best argues that: 
Both the right and the left now portrayed the victim as a sympathetic figure, 
using victim imagery to promote crackdowns on crime or calls for social 
reform, respectively. Both conservatives and liberals treated victims as 
powerless unfortunates, blameless for their circumstances and suffering at the 
hands of powerful exploiters (Best 1999: 100). 
Social problems analysed by various professions within the sciences and therapeutic 
field expanded at this time and overall, 'a broad range of authorities - including social 
movement activists, political conservatives and liberals, therapists, scientists, and 
lawyers - became more likely to talk about victimization in society' (Best 1999: 102). 
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This framework of understanding social problems, the language and the rhetoric, has, 
Best argues, now become dominant in the development of how new crimes such as 
stalking are discussed and made into social problems. The degree to which this has 
developed in the UK will be studied later in relation to the concern about antisocial 
behaviour. 
One significant aspect of these developments in the US, with reference to the 
changing form of morality and moral panics, is the extent to which a claim about 
victimisation. 'stakes out the moral high ground' (Best 1999: 109). As Sykes argues, 
'the route to moral superiority ... can be gained most efficiently through being a 
victim' (Best 1999: 138). 
The 'ideology of victimization', Best illustrates, has been taken up within academia - 
in lectures and education - with teachers looking out for child victims, the law - 
giving increasing priority to the victim, the mass media - talk shows, and even in 
religion - where concern for victims is expressed as a moral good (Best 1999: 117) 
One consequence of this focus upon victimisation is that 'new crimes' are understood 
within this framework, more people have become seen as 'victims' and more laws 
have developed to protect the victimisation of one individual from another. Within 
this framework of understanding society and social problems, there is, argues Best, a 
more generalised sense of anxiety that, in relation to crime, has helped create a 'sense 
that contemporary society is plagued by random violence' (Best 1999: 5). 
For Best, the idea of random violence did not represent the real world, as relatively 
few people faced serious crime and the vast majority of these crimes occurred in 
particular areas and were often done to particular groups in society. The idea of 
random violence has developed in the USA, Best believes, as a wider expression 
within society of a sense of risk and fear. 
The fact that victims have become so central to claimsmaking and the wider culture 
suggests that there is a greater sense of powerlessness within certain groups and 
38 
arguably more generally across society: a sense of powerlessness that encourages a 
greater sense of anxiety and increases the tendency for panics to erupt. 
Thompson has noted that the current period is often understood to be one of an 'age of 
moral panic'. However, this understanding, which continues to see panics as a product 
of neo-liberalism. and traditional conservatism, is both one-sided and fails to recognise 
the more significant development of amoral panics. We are indeed living in an era of 
panics, but these panics are being generated by 'left and right' wing campaigners 
around issues of safety and often in the defence of the victim. Conservatives, may 
continue to campaign on issues like abortion and crime, but they do so less as a 
promotion of moral values than through a more therapeutically oriented language that 
engages not with the 'moral majority' but with the fragmented individual. 
Elite reactions and the institutionalisation of amoral anxieties 
The current age of amoral panics is not a repeat of what went before. Not only has the 
basis of these panics changed and the radical opposition to them declined, but through 
the prism of safety many new panics are actually promoted by 'radical' claimsmakers. 
Society has subsequently become more systematically organised around panics. 
Rather than having occasional panics, contemporary modernity could more accurately 
be described as being in a permanent state of anxiety -a state that is often encouraged 
and institutionalised by the elite. 
Youth crime and 'antisocial behaviour' have, over the last decade or so become, more 
established as social problems. Having often been a site for occasional panics by a 
minority of conservatives in the past, today these concerns about youth are more 
mainstream and widely accepted as issues to address. Panics about youth and youth 
crime were central to Cohen and Hall's classic moral panic studies in the past. 
Likewise Pearson's study of past 'respectable fears' has noted the significance of 
panics about youth. However, one key difference in the reaction to panics about youth 
crime in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries compared with these earlier 
periods is that while previously the political elite generally did not 'over-react' to 
moral panics, today the elite are often at the centre ofpromoting them. 
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One measure of the importance of panics in terms of their impact is whether or not 
new laws are developed on the back of them, whether social movements emerge in 
relation, to them and whether or not the issue is adopted by official political parties as 
something to campaign around. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda put it: 
Do moral panics have an impact on the society in which they take place by 
generating formal organizations and institutions; do they, in other words, leave 
an institutional legacy in the form of laws, agencies, groups, movements, and 
so on? If so, what is the nature of that legacy? Do moral panics transform the 
informal normative structure of society? If so, what is the nature of that 
transfonnation? (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 168) 
Examining past moral panics, it is clear that at different times the British political 
elite, rather than elevating concerns connected to moral and crime panics, actually 
either challenged them or dampened them down. A sense of purpose within the elite 
appears to have mitigated against a panic reaction within the establishment itself. For 
example, Pearson notes how, in the 1840s, liberal members of the British elite saw the 
panic about crime as a problem not to be overly concerned with, as the development 
of the rational individual - especially amongst the poor - would, it was believed, 
result in an end to crime (Pearson 1983: 175). 
Similarly, in a different historical and political period, Pearson notes that despite 
continuing anxieties being expressed about family values, the destruction of 
community and lawless youth by movements like the 'Scrutiny' group in the 1920s, 
running alongside these complaints 'and often holding them in check' was a counter- 
movement, which involved a 'quite different moral emphasis'. Despite there being 
strong evidence for a sharp rise in crime and violent crime - like a 70% rise in shop 
raids and a 90% rise in bag snatching between 1925 and 1929, which Pearson believes 
was almost certainly connected to the availability of the motor car - there was no 
subsequent 'law and order' campaign. 
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Indeed, comments from Robert Baden Powell in the 1920s appear almost unbelievable 
in today's climate of crime panics. As the Times reported: 
To him it was rather a promising sign, because he saw in those banditry cases, 
robbery with violence, and smash and grab, little 'adventures'. There was still 
some spirit of adventure among those juveniles and if that spirit were seized 
and turned in the right direction they could make them useful men (1983: 34). 
Similarly, in Parliament, reports about motor banditry in the press were ridiculed as 
gross exaggerations and police memoirs, while recounting no go areas for the police, 
described much of the 'action' on the street as people having a 'good time'. Other 
examples of magistrates are cited, where stealing off the back of lorries was dismissed 
as 'perfectly innocent joyriding' and the 'line between mischief and crime' was said to 
be 'not easily drawn' (Pearson 1983: 42). 
Looking at Cohen's Folk Devils and Moral Panics we see that a significant reaction of 
the government, politicians, educationalists and religious leaders in the 1960s was not 
to inflame the moral panic but to dampen it down. As Cohen notes: 
At times of moral panic, politicians in office, even though one might expect 
them on the basis of their personal records to be full of moral indignation, 
often act to 'calm things down' and minimize the problem. Thus it was with 
the [Conservative] Home Secretary, Mr Henry Brooke, the only participant in 
the first debate who expressed an awareness of the exaggerations and 
distortions (Cohen 2002: 113). 
Also, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda note regarding the institutional legacy left by the 
Mods and Rockers panic: 
Some panics seem to leave relatively little institutional legacy. The furore 
generated by the Mods and Rockers in England in the late 1960s resulted in no 
long-term institutional legacy; no laws passed (although some were proposed), 
and the two germinal social movement organizations that emerged in its wake 
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quickly evaporated when the excitement died down (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
1994: 168). 
The above examples are, as we shall see throughout this thesis, in stark contrast to the 
reaction of the political elite in British society today. The significance of this is that 
while 'even seemingly inconsequential panics leave behind some sort of legacy'. 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 169), the impact of panics upon s6ciety is qualitatively 
increased when they are institutionalised. If a panic is institutionalised, it can - 
especially if it goes unchallenged - change the 'informal normative structures of 
society'. Over time the new understanding of a problem and the laws and institutions 
established to deal with them simply become part of the way things are. This 'norm' is 
then something that can be built upon by subsequent panics, as Jenkins notes: 
'Problem construction is a cumulative, incremental process in which each issue is to 
some extent built upon its predecessors, in the context of a steadily developing fund of 
socially available knowledge' (Jenkins 1998: 220). 
The role of the elite in the past in often challenging panics about youth crime is 
significant in terms of the impact panics have upon society. The role of any opposition 
to panics today, or the lack of it, especially within the political elite, is key to the 
extent to which public fears and those of clainismakers can become institutionalised 
and thus impact upon society. 
As will be explored in the next chapter, from the early 1990s the centrality of crime 
and crime panics to political life and institutional frameworks has developed apace. 
Centred upon the safety of victims, a raft of legislation has developed with increasing 
rapidity, not simply in relation to panics, but also as part of government programmes 
and manifestos. New terms like 'binge drinking' have emerged which give a greater 
sense of young people being out of control: terms that are used and promoted by all 
political parties. Issues of crime, violence and today even antisocial behaviour are 
rarely 'put into perspective' or 'dampened down' by government ministers. Rather, 
the extent of the problem of crime and behaviour is often pushed most vociferously by 
the government itSelf. 29 
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The direct engagement of the political elite with panics, and the institutionalisation of 
practices based upon them, is even more visible in relation to crime against children 
and young people. Having built upon the child abuse panics of the 1980s, the issue of 
child safety has become so institutionalised that following almost any one-off extreme 
act of violence towards children we can predict a political and institutional response. 
From the killing of James Bulger and the Dunblane massacre to the death of Victoria 
Climbie, institutionalised panics have resulted in new laws and safety initiatives being 
developed by government that impact upon the way all adults now work with and 
relate to children (Waiton 2001: 41-5). 
It was noted above that in the 1920s the argument was put that the line between 
mischief and crime was not easy to draw. Today this sentiment has been reversed and 
through the language of antisocial behaviour much mischievous behaviour of young 
people has been redefined as a crime. With the defence of the victim increasingly 
taking centre stage within social problem formation and political rhetoric, rarely do 
we encounter debates whereby the exaggeration of a problem is challenged. 
From moral panics to a fear of risk 
Where moral panic theories analysed what were occasional outbursts within an 
otherwise stable or calm society, more recently sociological theories have emerged 
that depict a more generalised state of risk and fear. As argued above, a key difference 
between panics past and present is that they have become an ever-present feature of 
modem society and, as such, it is more accurate to describe society as being in a 
permanent state of anxiety. Theories of 'risk' and a 'culture of fear' both analyse 
society from this point of view and are useful in helping to frame concerns about 
crime and disorder today. While appearing to be similar in their approach, however, 
Beck's theory of 'risk' and Furedi's theory of a 'culture of fear' are in fact very 
different. Indeed, following Furedi's understanding, Beck's approach can be 
understood as a form of amoral panicking itself. 
Both Beck's theory of Risk Society (1992) and Furedi's Culture of Fear (1997) 
correctly describe how 'risk consciousness' has become widespread across society. 
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Occasional eruptions of fear have been replaced by a more permanent cultural sense 
of unease. These theories both accept the significance of the fragmentation of society 
that has in part helped encourage this sense of insecurity; however, their explanations 
for why this has happened are polls apart. Where Beck understands the sense of risk as 
a correct reaction to an objectively riskier society; Furedi to some degree follows the 
approach of moral panic theories, and argues that the culture of fear is more to do with 
the current state of subjectivity. However, for Furedi the generalisation of fear is not 
simply a ratcheting up of what went before, but rather is an expression of a 
fundamental loss of belief in humanity, progress and the idea of active moral subjects, 
which has developed out of the collapse of both left and right-wing ideologies. 
Sheldon Ungar, examining the usefulness of the idea of a 'risk society' compared to 
past moral panic theories, correctly notes how 'new sites of social anxiety have 
dmerged around environmental, nuclear, chemical and medical threats'. Consequently, 
'the questions motivating moral panics research have lost much of their utility' (Ungar 
2001: 271). Whereas moral panic research, Ungar argues, is concerned with 
exaggeration of the threat and the use of panics 'to engineer social consensus and 
control', with risk society, 'accidents being highly unpredictable and uncontrollable, 
the social constructionist concern with exaggeration is largely undermined as an 
analytical strategy'. Also, because a risk society has a 'roulette dynamic' - rather than 
more consciously created folk devils - then, for Ungar, the idea of risk society being 
used to develop social controls is questioned. Rather than moral order being created 
through 'risks', authorities can find themselves as carriers of 'hot potatoes' (Ungar 
2001: 276). 
Correctly, Ungar notes how the moral panic focus is more narrow in terms of looking 
at exceptional'occasions of anxiety, whereas fearful events associated with risk are 
more ubiquitous (2001: 276). Moral panics are also often associated with a change in 
moral boundaries, whereas risks can emerge more from scientific findings. Also risks, 
for Ungar, are not developed 'top down' like many moral panics, but often emerge 
from a reaction to events like problems with nuclear reactors - which are made into 
issues by interest groups. Indeed risk society issues 'tend to involve diverse interest 
groups contending over relatively intractable scientific claims' (Ungar 2001: 277). 
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Rather than 'risks' being generated by an elite who attempt to promote an alternative 
moral order, Ungar accurately illustrates the way many risks emerge out with the 
traditional elite and can undermine rather than cohere the elite. 
However, Ungar's understanding of risks being the product of 'highly unpredictable 
and uncontrollable' developments is questionable. Like Beck, Ungar accepts the idea 
that these risks are real. Describing Beck's analysis, Furlong and Cartmel note that: 
'Whereas modernity involved rationality and the belief in the potential offered by 
harnessing scientific knowledge, in late modernity the world is perceived. as a 
dangerous place in which we are constantly confronted with risk' (Furlong and 
Cartmel 1997: 3). 
For Furedi, a culture of fear has not developed because of any technical or global 
objective changes in production or communication. Rather, changes in society and the 
weakening of institutions have come at a specific time when there is a, 'conservative 
sense of caution' (Furedi 1997: 9). In previous historical periods, Furedi argues, there 
was far more suffering, pain and disease than today. Despite there being various risks 
facing society, it is not the risks themselves but the pessimistic outlook within society 
that both inflates their significance and generates a sense of impotence in relation to 
social, scientific and even personal problems. This sense of impotence amongst the 
elite helps to explain why panics and anxieties are rarely 'dampened down', as they 
were in the past, but become institutionalised. 
Explaining this cultural sense of cautious pessimism, Durodie argues that there has 
been an: 
[U]nprecedented convergence of the political left's loss of faith in science and 
social transformation with the political right's traditional misgivings [that] 
have lent themselves to a pessimistic outlook leading to the rise. of an 
exaggerated risk consciousness (Durodie 2002: 4). 
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How society reacts to technological changes is highly influenced by the cultural and 
ideological framework within which they emerge; and for Furedi, Beck's starting point 
for analysis upon these technical changes misses what is specific about late twentieth- 
century society. Rather than risks emerging in relation to global threats, Furedi 
identifies how the emergence of a 'risk consciousness' has occurred at every level of 
society and has impacted upon all relationships and institutions. That children are 
identified as being almost permanently 'at risk', for example, cannot be explained by 
global developments, or simply in relation to the individualisation of everyday life. 
Rather it is the end of ideologies and the notion of human progress, ideologies that 
have held back the individuation of society for a century, which have collapsed and 
are central to understanding the culture of fear. 
At a certain level of abstraction, what is being proposed here is that the idea of a 'risk 
society' is a reflection of the consciousness of the elite, which is then reflected back 
upon society. As such, the 'objective' risks identified by Beck, Giddens and others are 
a sociological expression of a loss of will of this elite - rather than an indication of 
any real increase of 'risks' in society. 
Just as the enlightenment belief in science 'was a reflection and pronouncement of 
faith in humanity itself rather than merely in science' (Durodie 2002: 2), the loss of 
faith in science and the belief that the source of danger to society is not ignorance but 
knowledge (Beck 1992: 183) is the reverse - the loss of faith in humanity and of the 
capacity of human subjectivity to create social progress. All that is left for humanity is 
the question not of liberation, but of 'self limitation' (Beck 1996: 29). In a world of 
unintended consequences, 'Democracy in the sense that Lukacs described it, as 
"societal self-determination", is rendered impossible by "manufactured uncertainty"' 
(Heartfield: 2002: 81). Or as Furedi puts it, the picture portrayed by Beck is of a senýd- 
conscious humanity desperately trying to control the destructive forces it has created 
(Furedi 2004: 133). 
In this respect Beck's 'risk society' could be seen as another expression of amoral 
panicking by a sociological critic who sees a society under threat from technological 
developments rather than 'folk devils'. 30 
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For both Furedi and Durodie, Beck's exaggerated sense of risk (Durodie 2002) reflects 
societies' own timidity and impotence towards social change and experimentation. In 
a sense, risks become the 'active agent and people - at risk - are the passive agents in 
society' (Furedi 1997: 64). With the loss of faith in human progress, what has emerged 
is a culture of self-loathing, which affects how every relationship or development in 
society is understood. Rather than embracing change, the left are now as conservative 
as the right and view change with suspicion and distrust. With a degraded image of 
4man', many thinkers on the left have increasingly become preoccupied with images 
and issues associated with crime and abuse, discovering, as we have already seen, the 
endemic nature of violence across society. 
Furedi's thesis notes that while a more conservative outlook has developed amongst 
more radical thinkers, at the same time many traditional values and norms of the right 
have alsojost their consensus. Consequently without a social sense of the future and 
with the increased questioning of traditional norms, the result is a diminished sense of 
individual and social control (Furedi 1997: 68-9). 
The politics of fear will be explored in the following chapter. Here it is worth noting 
that the rise in panics about youth crime and the institutional development of more 
laws and more prisons to resolve this perceived problem took off from around 1993 - 
a year when 'old' Labour became 'New', and the Conservative Party lost its moral 
credibility following the failed Back to Basics campaign. As the heroic individual of 
the right slipped out of view and the 'social man' of the left disappeared, the icon of 
the victim took centrc stage -a victim whose fundamental demand was the right to be 
safe. 
This new 'morality of safety' filled the vacuum of traditional morals and politics and 
now the demand was for 'crime to be taken seriously', for 'victims' rights' to be 
recognised, or for 'community safety' to be prioritised. Reflecting broad social and 
political trends, the emergence of this new 'morality' or amorality was encouraged by 
claimsmakers and campaigners from the left who promoted panics around child abuse 
and transformed crime and antisocial behaviour into a 'working-class issue'. Having 
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given up on transforming society, the claimsmaking of many radical campaigners was 
reduced to demands to regulate, control and monitor individual behaviour. The loss of 
drive for social change within this process was replaced by a move to enforce social 
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control. 
Within this cultural framework of understanding, moral panics, generated by 
conservative concerns about family and nation, can still occur, but are more likely to 
develop within the general concern about risk and safety. Indeed as noted previously, 
the AIDS panic, while initially taking the form of a conservative panic about gays and 
prorniscuity, was soon transformed into the modem-day form of panic around 'safe 
sex'. In general, it is the argument of this thesis that panics may still come and go, but 
more importantly there is a general and heightened sense of anxiety that affects almost 
all relationships, policies and practices in society. Rather than there being the 
occasional disproportionate outburst to social problems, there is a trend to exaggerate 
almost all social problems and a diminished sense of the capacity to overcome them. 
Grassroots anxieties 
The panics and anxieties discussed above relate largely to the outlook and actions of 
the elite and of claimsmaking groups. However, for a culture of fear and indeed for 
amoral anxieties to be a general societal trend, the sense of unease and the desire for 
safety and a more regulated society must also take an expression within the public 
itself. The increased fragmentation of society has helped to ensure this development at 
the grassroots level of society. 
Discussing where moral panics are generated, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994: 143) 
have argued that most studies of moral panics incorporate an understanding of the role 
played by the elite, interest groups, and by the 'grassroots. Indeed for 'moral' or 
amoral panics to exist, there must at some level be an element of grassroots support 
for them. Whether or not panics are generated by the public, there does appear to be a 
high level of fear and concern in society about a wide variety of issues. The fear of 
crime has remained high, for example, despite statistical falls in crime, and indeed this 
fear has become a significant issue in its own right. Child safety concerns also capture 
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the public imagination and have had some impact on the emergence of 'cotton-wool 
kids' '32 and have also resulted in a number of paedophile panics on working-class 
estates. 
Part of the explanation for the rise in grassroots anxieties and the high level of fear is 
the increased level of individuation within society, a development that has been 
widely explored within sociology (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, Furedi 2001, 
Bauman 2000). The significance of this development is, for Thompson, that as the old 
structures and norms of society fragmented, an increasing amount of individual choice 
and diversity helped to generate more of a sense of being at risk (Thompson 1998: 
88). 
The family, Thompson notes, at a time of declining communal values, has become 'all 
that is left of traditional community' (Thompson 1998: 88). The result of this 
modernisation process is that people have a sense 'that they are constantly going into a 
strange country and being at risk' (1998: 89). At the same time, the weakening of 
traditional beliefs and hierarchies, including family hierarchies, has increased the 
sense of risk concerning children and family relationships. 
Furedi following Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's (1995: 37) point, takes this idea of the 
family as the last remaining 'institution of trust' one step further, arguing that because 
marriage itself has become a problernatised area of life, today the last remaining 
'institution' of trust is the bond between parent and child (Furedi 200 1). 33 A world has 
emerged, argues Beck, where we have 'individuals within homogenous social groups, 
and communities 'dissolved in the acid bath of competition' (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim 2002: 33). 
This emergence of a more 'liquid' form of modernity (Bauman 2000), in which 
relations of trust are reduced to the family and even to the bond between a parent and 
child, helps in part to explain the heightened levels of fear in society. However, 
individualisation has a long history within modernity and cannot in itself explain the 
emergent culture of fear. Fragmentation may have reduced trust at the level of the 
individual, but this has also been informed by a more pessimistic understanding of 
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humanity more generally: a sense of pessimism and anxiety that has also been 
transmitted through the activities of safety-based claimsmakers, and by the 
development of laws and institutional practices that attempt to engage with this more 
fragmented individual through the prism of fear. 
The new therapeutic 'morality' of safety 
Despite the declining influence of traditional morality, the tendency to moralise has 
not declined. Indeed, as we will see in future chapters, the emergence of the 'politics 
of behaviour' suggests a more intensive scrutiny of individual behaviour has 
developed. Issues related to antisocial behaviour, crime, family life and relationships 
are central to social problems that both capture the public imagination and excite 
political comment and action. However the dominant form that these problems take 
today relates not to tradition but to the amoral absolute of safety, while the 
justificatory basis (Beetharn 1991) of this development is often in the form 'of 
therapeutic governance (Nolan 1998). 
As Furedi argues, 
The marginalisation of traditional morality does not mean that society is 
without any system of values. On the contrary, the space left by the 
marginalisation of traditional morality has been filled by the system of values 
and notions of conduct associated with risk consciousness (Furedi 2002: 150). 
That this new risk conscious outlook is rarely recognised as a form of moralising is 
explained by the 'value-free' basis upon which it is often promoted. Rather than 
ascribing a particular lifestyle as such, the new etiquette of safety is more self- 
consciously non-judgmental and relativistic. Almost any form of behaviour and 
outlook is acceptable within this etiquette - as long as it is safe and does not disturb 
the safety of others. Despite being unconventional, this 'morality' is not purely 'new 
age' but also incorporates a number of traditional conservative themes, emphasising 
restraint and focusing on individual behaviour and responsibility. 34 Unlike traditional 
morality, however, that prescribed a 'single answer' to moral questions, the new 
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etiquette of safety is more individualistically oriented and is therefore more able to 
relate directly to the contemporary experience of individuation (Furedi 2002: 163). 
One key development within this more individualistically oriented etiquette is the 
emergence of the Therapeutic State (Nolan 1998), or of a Therapy Culture (Furedi 
2004). 
As the state comes to lack a moral or political basis of legitimation and engagement 
with the fragmented public, Nolan argues, a new set of 'cultural ideas and values that 
undergird the practical functions of the state' has emerged (Nolan 1998: 26). 
Reinforced by the 'demise of politics and social solidarity', social problems have 
subsequently been recast as emotional ones (Furedi 2004: 100). Social problems like 
crime, for example, have increasingly been understood in relation to the emotional 
sense of fear ascribed to it, while even welfare-related issues have become more 
therapeutic. Supporting this therapeutic framework, Giddens argues that economic 
benefits of welfare are virtually never enough - but rather, 'welfare institutions must 
be concerned with fostering psychological as well as economic benefits' (Giddens 
1998: 117). 
The state's increasing orientation towards a therapeutic model of intervention, Nolan 
observes, in the USA has influenced civil case law, where emotional damages have 
outstripped other 'damages' cases dramatically since the 1980s; in criminal law where 
drug counselling and drug courts have develop an Oprah-esque relationship with the 
accused; in education where feelings of children - their self-esteem - is seen as one of 
the key guiding principles; in welfare where both the notion of emotional abuse and 
the reformulation of support around notions of dignity and self-esteem have increased; 
and in politics where connecting with the public has increasingly been established by 
politicians explaining themselves and their policies in terms of how they feel about 
them (Nolan 1998). The significance of this development that has been replicated in 
the UK is, however, not simply in relation to the more emotionally-oriented basis of 
contemporary culture, but that within this therapeutic outlook the individual is 
understood to befundamentally vulnerable. 
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Actions and experiences that would have been ignored or understood as insignificant 
in the past are, within today's framework of therapeutic vulnerability, given a greater 
significance. Name-calling, for example, is now interpreted as a more serious form of 
'bullying' for children, while the 'mischievous' actions of children are increasingly 
being redefined as forms of 'antisocial behaviour' - both examples being understood 
as having potentially long-term and significant implications for individuals and 
communities. Even crime itself has become problematised and given greater 
importance. As Furedi notes, in the 1970s crime surveys tended to suggest that the 
impact of crime was relatively short-lived and that only a small percentage of victims 
were affected by their experience of crime. However, more recently a radically 
different interpretation has been given to this experience, and through therapeutic 
language: 'Most studies highlight the acute stress, trauma and psychological damage 
suffered by victims of more serious crime' (Furedi 2004: 112). 
The new etiquette of safety is able not only to relate to the individualisation within 
society, but through the therapeutic culture a more vulnerable individual is both 
constructed and engaged with. 
Conclusion 
Through examining moral panic studies a number of questions have been raised about 
the issue of morals, the degree to which panics occur, and the method used to analyse 
this. When asking what values are unchallengeable today, this chapter has attempted 
to explore the changing nature of values and concluded that, while traditional 
conservative reactions still occur, the new and dominant trend in terms of 'moral 
absolutes' is the amoral value of safety. Here the term amoral is used not only as a 
contrast to the traditional morals of conservatives, but also in that the amoral anxieties 
to do with safety are less associated with any grand narrative or political/religious 
ideal. Indeed concerns about victims' rights and protection are largely directed 
towards atomised individuals, and the safety campaigns around children, sex and even 
crime have a more limited ideological framework that has less social meaning or 
content. Concerns about crime, for example, within this framework are more related to 
the defence of the individual victim than to an upholding of 'British Law and Order'. 
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Amoral panics are a form of moralising without any wider system of meaning, and 
indeed have emerged largely because of a collapse in the secular : faiths' on the right 
and left, that cohered society in the past. 
These changes can be surnmarised as follows. 
Table 1 
Moral Panics Amoral Panics 
A minority concern or reaction to a A universalised sense of anxiety felt 
specific event or change in society. across society to myTiad issues. 
Often dampened down by key sections Political elite often encourages and 
of the elite. institutionalise the panic. 
Promoted by conservatives who Often promoted by 'radicals' with neither 
defend traditions from the past. a belief in the future nor past. 
An attempt to defend a conservative A rejection of universal values and 
morality associated with religion and promotion of the etiquette of individual 
nation. safety. 
Emerges at a time of political Emerges with the collapse of both left and 
contestation between left and right. right. 
Moral claims face a political Amoral claims face little opposition. 
challenge. 
Predicated on a belief in the possibility Predicated on a diminished sense of the 
of a morally responsible individual. individual and the emergence of the 
vulnerable public. 
The 'virtue' espoused attempts to It is the loss of meaning that explains 
promote a shared system of meaning. these 'panics' and no alternative system of 
meaning is promoted through them. 
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Cohen's definition of a moral panic still holds to a degree, but the values of society 
have changed, as have the 'right thinking people' who man the 'moral barricades' 
(Cohen: 2002: 1). Panics today are less about the promotion of universal human morals 
than about an individuated moralising over forms' of risky behaviour. The new 
etiquette of safety actively avoids any attempt to uphold or promote a particular 
system of meaning in society that can unite people around a common goal. Relying 
upon their engagement with fragmented individuals, amoral panics are by their nature 
a more asocial form of moralising. 
The liberal/left orientation of much moral panic work, especially in the UK, has to a 
degree meant that signs of modem-day panics have continued to be understood within 
a critique of traditional conservatism and the New Right. However, as a number of 
authors have noted, the development of claimsmakers on the left, which sometimes 
overlap with those on the right, has meant that panics today often take the form of 
defending 'victims' from crime and abuse. 
Panics, risk and fears are today less based on the more overtly class-based political 
contestation identified by Hall and Pearson. Indeed, as theories of risk and fear 
suggest, anxiety is today more pervasive than ever before. In a sense, one could argue 
that the decline of political ideologies and organisations that were largely class-based 
has left a moral and political vacuum that, in part, helps to explain a greater sense of 
unease today. This, in turn, makes elites and the public more prone to panic. 
A number of writers have also noted the significance of an 'opposition' to the 
prevention of moral panics being accepted in society. The contestation of ideas, issues 
and policies is a major barrier to the establishment of certain concerns becoming 
institutionalised and unquestioningly accepted in society. The significance of crime as 
a 'social problem' within politics is today accepted and, as has been shown, is 
something that has been increasingly accepted, indeed promoted, by the liberal press 
and by radical writers. While overt 'authoritarian' policies are still questioned today, 
as we shall go on to show, framed within a discussion about victims and safety, crime 
and antisocial behaviour initiatives are more difficult to challenge. 
54 
Although the term moral panic and then amoral panic have been used throughout this 
chapter, in a society where a sense of risk and anxiety are more general, the term panic 
becomes less useful. Panics may occur, but these panics, unlike in the past, take place 
in an already nervous climate. Rather than panics coming and going, they are ever- 
present - or at least are less of a divergence from the norm. Whereas in 1960s Britain, 
society's level of anxiety was relatively low and panics can be seen as a significant 
increase in this level of anxiety, in the 1990s and still today the level of anxiety is high 
and panics appear as a relatively small. deviation from this general state of affairs. 
Various terms will be used from here on in, simply to avoid repetition: however the 
idea of 'amoral anxieties' comes closest to the themes that will be addressed. 
Moving on to address the issue of antisocial behaviour - the Hamilton curfew will be 
examined with reference to the above theoretical considerations. However, before 
examining the Hamilton curfew that was launched under the New Labour government 
in 1997, the transformation of politics and the emergence of the 'politics of behaviour' 
is addressed to illustrate how antisocial behaviour was made into a social problem in 
the 1990s. 
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Chapter 3: Institutionalising Vulnerability: 
The Politics of Antisocial Behaviour 
Our country faces two major threats. One comes from international terrorism, the 
otherfrom neighbourhood terrorists (The Economist 22 July 2004). 
Introduction 
The above quote from the outspoken Labour MP Frank Field gives a sense of the 
problems it is assumed people face in their daily lives. The terrorists Field is talking 
about are not organised gangs of criminals, but antisocial youth. 
The problem of antisocial behaviour had comparatively little political significance 
until the 1990s yet within a decade, curfews had been introduced, Antisocial 
Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) developed, and community safety was established as a 
core framework directing the operation of local authorities. But why? Had young 
people suddenly become little terrorists in the sp ace of one generation, or was there 
some other explanation for the rise of this social problem? 
Antisocial behaviour has become a major national political issue that unites all the 
political parties. Often assumed to be simply a 'real' problem for local people - one 
that politicians have subsequently engaged with - this chapter argues that the rise of 
concern about antisocial behaviour must also be understood as an expression of the 
rise of amoral anxieties across society. 
Due to the vast array of issues that are today labelled as being antisocial, and also due 
to the central role that politics and politicians have had in promoting issues associated 
with antisocial behaviour, rather than studying individual issues of antisocial 
behaviour - rowdiness, dropping litter, and so on - this chapter focuses on the general 
concern about antisocial behaviour and the changing nature of politics to help explain 
why this new social problem emerged at the time it did. In brief, this study examines 
the change within politics from a macro and ideologically based approach to society, 
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to a micro form of 'politics of behaviour'. A number of trends identified above, the 
decline of ideology, the fragmentation of society or the emergence of therapeutic 
governance, all have a long history and are not specific to late twentieth century life. 
However, at the beginning of the 1990s a number of these trends were become more 
apparent and resulted in a clearly defined transformation not only of politics but of the 
relationship between politics, the state and the public. 
Following the approach of moral panic theorists and social constructionists, the 
starting point for this chapter is to look at what have become the unchallenged values 
of late twentieth century life , and ask, how does this influence the formation of social 
problems, and therefore what issues became politicised at this time? With the decline 
of both the moral and political traditions represented within the two major political 
parties of the UK - in other words, with the deterioration of any dynamic system of 
beliefs - the question is raised, what impact did this have on the political elite and 
how was this reflected in the changing relationship between the public and the state? 
Having started with a concern about the introduction of the Hamilton curfew in 1997, 
here the period prior to this is examined to help understand how and why antisocial 
behaviour and issues relating to individual safety became so prominent and laid the 
basis for this initiative. The impact that the emergence of an 'amoral', and 'apolitical', 
elite had in helping both to form and engage with the vulnerable public is examined 
through the rise of the politics of antisocial behaviour. 
The transformation of the Labour party, represented in its approach to law and order, 
is often interpreted as an example of New Labour's move to the right. Below it is 
argued that, in fact, notions of left and right have little meaning today and that the 
ideologically-based politics of the 1980s have been replaced by a kind of micro 
politics, which emerged under Conservative leader John Major, but has been more 
systematically developed by the Labour governments since 1997. This is a politics 
that reacts to events rather than forming them: a politics in a panic. 
The emergence of the politics of antisocial behaviour, and the political engagement 
with the 'vulnerable public' described below, is understood as a development 
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stemming from the loss of a sense of social progress and ideological engagement 
within the political elite, and between political parties and the electorate. 35 Here we 
explore the impact that the intensified loss of political purpose in the UK had upon the 
politics of crime through the 1990s following the decline of the Labour movement and 
the exhaustion of Thatcherism. 
In tracing the transforming rhetoric and policy proposals relating to crime and 
antisocial behaviour the emergence of the centrality of 'victims' of crime and the 
vulnerable public is explored - with particular reference to the example of the 
construction of the social problem of 'aggressive beggars' and the increasing centrality 
of 'conununity safety' as an organising principle for local authorities. 
Having established the changing framework within which crime and antisocial 
behaviour was understood, the role of feminist and radical criminology is explored to 
help explain the influence of the 'left' in this process. The emergence of the victim in 
intellectual and political thought, it is argued, represented not simpiy a change to the 
policy framework in the UK, but a more profound transformation in the role of 
subjectivity within politics, reflected in the loss of a sense of a 'public', and the 
emergence of a newly formed relationship between a hollow political centre and an 
atomised electorate. 
Ultimately the emergence of the 'vulnerable public' is understood as a reflection of the 
loss of a sense of subjective or human possibilities within a period of cultural 
pessimism represented by thinkers on both the left and the right. The centrality of 
antisocial behaviour within the discourse of crime is therefore seen as a by-product of 
this political mood (Feeley 2003: 127), a mood that has created a government strategy 
within which people are no longer governed as part of a social citizenry (Rose 1996: 
327). 
The emergence of what is most accurately understood as an isolated and anxious anti- 
'social' elite helps explain the political preoccupation with antisocial 'terrorists'. 
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The emergence of Labour as the new party of law and order is mapped out and the 
transformation of its approach to crime contrasted with the more 'political' approach 
of the Conservatives -a politics which ran out of steam in the early 1990s and 
resulted in an even more authoritarian and technical approach to crime and policing. 36 
Ultimately, the argument presented below suggests that while the preoccupation with 
crime had a basis in the rising crime figures, it is not any rise in crime and antisocial 
behaviour that explains the development of these issues as social problems. Rather it 
is the changing political, cultural and ideological engagement with an individuated 
public that is central to this development, and the transformation in the relationship 
between institutions and an anxious public. 
The political context - Thatcher's confrontation 
The Conservative Party throughout the 1970s and 1980s helped to fan the flames of 
fear with regard to the 'problem' of crime. Many social and political issues were 
discussed within the context of a problem of 'law and order'; indeed the 1970 
Conservative government was the first to identify itself specifically as the party of law 
and order (Pitts 1988). Describing the Tory approach to crime, Phipps noted: 
Firstly, it became conflated with a number of other issues whose connection 
was continually reinforced in the public mind - permissiveness, youth cultures, 
demonstrations, public disorders, black immigration, student unrest, and trade 
union militancy (Hall 1978). Secondly, crime - by now a metaphorical term 
invoking the decline of social stability and decent values - was presented as 
only one aspect of a bitter harvest for which Labour's brand of social 
democracy and welfarism was responsible. (Phipps 1988: 179) 
The typical criminals in question were 'outsiders', the violent trade union member or 
the young black mugger. Traditional British values and individual freedoms were 
contrasted to the collectivist, promiscuous values of the 'enemy within' (Milne 1995: 
26). Even burglars were understood as being part of the 'something for nothing 
society'. Here the 'criminal', either the trade union member or the burglar, was not a 
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victim but an immoral actor and the damage being done was not centrally to the 
victim of crime, but to the economy and moral values of society as a whole. 
Social control and public order were promoted within both a political and moral 
framework in which the deviant in question was likewise understood to have certain 
political or moral traits that needed to be confronted. 37 The responsibility for cutting 
crime was seen as not simply that of the government or police, but also that of the 
public, who, it was argued, should take action to defend themselves (Conservative 
Manifesto 1987). This, after all, was a government that promoted the idea of the 
strong individual, telling unemployed people to get on their bike and find work. 
The idea of 'restoring people to independence and self reliance', as Thatcher put it, 
meant that despite the attacks on the rights of pickets or demonstrators, the notion of 
the 'rights' and 'freedoms' of 'law abiding citizens' continued to influence Tory 
policies (Thatcher 1995: 7). Demonstrators and militants were criminalised and their 
freedoms curtailed within the discourse of 'Public order', but wider law and order 
policies continued to be influenced and somewhat curtailed by a certain libertarianism 
within the ranks of the Conservative Party. 
The legacy of 'Thatcher's decade', the 1980s, is often felt still to be with us today. 
Individuals are often portrayed as being 'greedy' (Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995) and 
living in an era where neo-liberalism is dominant (Fukuyama 1992). However, in 
hindsight the strength of the Thatcherite ideology appears to be more of a myth than a 
reality and'was something the Conservative Party itself instinctively recognised in 
1990 when Margaret Thatcher lost the leadership of the party and the country. 
As the Conservative Party continues today into a relative state of disarray, it appears 
that the key to Thatcher's success was less in relation to an internally coherent 
ideology than to the failings of the welfare state. Rather than representing a dynamic 
movement, in this respect, 1980s Conservatism should be understood as a more 
negatively based political approach that gained its strength through its opposition to 
the Labour movement (Heartfield 2002: 170). Despite the decline of Labourism at 
home and of the Soviet Union abroad, the 'victory' of the right was consequently 
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short-lived. In spite of the defeat of the left, the political and cultural victory of the 
free market right is far less obvious; and indeed the idea that the right lost the 'culture 
wars' has become more accepted today, especially in the US (Schneider 2003: 430). 38 
Even the moral renewal witnessed with the rise of 'Victorian values' in the 1980s 
appears to have little significance. As explored above, moralising may have increased, 
but outside of a traditional moral framework. The Family has been replaced by an 
acceptance of families; abortion remains contested but is largely accepted as part of 
modem life; the question of homosexuality, rather than being challenged by the elite, 
is more likely to undermine traditional institutions like the church; and the capacity of 
government to use a nationalistic Talklands factor' to win an election is far more 
limited. 
Examining Sex and Politics in the 1980s, Martin Durham notes that despite much 
rhetoric and the publicly-vocal moral campaigners of this decade, the 
institutionalisation of measures to uphold moral family values remained limited. The 
New Right were not the same as the moralists, Durham argues - something the 
feminist and Communist Bea Campbell argued at the time (Durham 1991: 142). Key 
to the New Right was an agreement that they were 'against socialism', but there was 
'far less agreement about what it was for' (1991: 143). 
For this chapter, Thatcher is understood at one level to be the last Politician - in the 
sense that her government had a sense of purpose and engaged in a political battle in 
an attempt to challenge the beliefs of the adult population. In the context of the fight 
against the 'enemy within', many policies - espeqially in relation to crime - were 
carried out within this politicised framework. This contrasts to the growing use of law 
and order in the 1990s, where the direct regulation of 'behaviour' replaced any sense 
of the role of politics in challenging the consciousness of the electorate. 
However, the negative basis of 'class war' in the 1980s and the subsequent decline of 
conservatism in Britain, once the Labour movement had been defeat, suggests that 
Thatcherism carried little internal ideological weight and lacked the ability to develop 
a new outlook for society. As Furedi notes, in this respect Thatcher's notion of TINA 
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(There Is No Alternative) can perhaps be understood not only as reflecting a loss of 
alternatives to the market, but also as a loss of political imagination by the elite about 
politics itself and its capacity to direct social change (Furedi 2005: 14). 
Perhaps Thatcher can therefore better be represented as the last economist, rather than 
the last politician - in that the key to the Conservative success was the promotion of 
an economic alternative, rather than a coherent political one. Indeed the promotion of 
the robust entrepreneurial individual within the Conservative Party was something that 
clashed with much of the overt moral campaigning of the time (Durham 1991: 152). 
More significantly, this belief in the capacity of the free individual both held back to 
some degree the rise of the 'victim' within law and order policies, and also limited the 
more paternalistic, or 'Nanny State', forms of regulation that emerged in the 1990s. 
Despite this, a more therapeutic approach was also developing at this time - in part 
due to its individualistic nature. Victim Support Schemes grew and were being well 
funded by the government as another strand to the focus on law and order (Maquire 
and Pointing 1988). However, notwithstanding this financial support, victims of crime 
were often used politically, 'paraded' by Conservative politicians and by sections of 
the media as a 'symbol of disorder', not as the central focus for law and order policy 
or rhetoric itself (Phipps 1988: 180). 
Under Margaret Thatcher, authoritarian measures were developed to back up the battle 
against the 'enemy within', but otherwise crime, policing and the regulation of 
behaviour more generally was of little political significance. This class struggle, of 
which the politicisation of crime was a part, appears to have given a certain coherence 
to the conservative political elite and also a sense of political purpose in the 1980s. In 
the 1990s however, the loss of this cohering sense of purpose resulted in a loss of 
political will, and the consequent increase in law and forms of regulation to control 
society more directly. 
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Major regulation 
Law and order in the 1980s arguably helped to develop what Heartfield describes as a 
spolice state' (2002: 165). However, despite the increased significance of law and 
order in politics at this time, the drive to control society directly and to regulate the 
behaviour of individuals more systematically did not develop until the 1990s. John 
Major's premiership, from 1990 to 1997, saw an acceleration of new laws, forms of 
policing and a greater use of prisons than any time since the Second World War. This 
was not, however, simply a continuation of Margaret Tbatcher's political 
authoritarianism, but was a qualitatively different shift towards a more technical and 
capolitical' attempt to regulate society. 
Margaret Thatcher had politicised crime in the 1980s and developed a more 
authoritarian society. However, within this confrontational approach remained a 
political attempt to win the 'hearts and minds' of the public and to forge a new era for 
capitalist development. New authoritarian laws were developed against, 'illegal 
immigrants' (British Nationality Act 1981); powers were developed against enemies 
of the state through the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (1984 and 1989), and 
demonstrators, pickets and marchers were regulated more directly via the Public Order 
Act of 1986. However, more broadly in society, outside of these 'high risk groups', 
crime and the general everyday antisocial behaviour of individuals was of far less 
importance - at least in terms of political rhetoric and legal sanction - than it was to 
become in the 1990s. 39 Under John Major society as a whole became increasingly 
organised around crime and safety, not as a means to a wider political end, but as the 
end itsetf 
In 1993 then Home Secretary Michael Howard 'broke the policy of a century by 
declaring that "Prison works"' (Dunbar - and Langdon 1998: 115). Prison numbers, 
which had increased between 1951 and 1991 by only 11,000, began to increase 
significantly and within a decade a further 25,000 people had been imprisoned 
(Guardian 14 October 2005). Similarly, the number of children under the age of 18 in 
the prison system has more than doubled since 1993 . 
40 Howard argued that the 
criminal justice system needed to be transformed from a system concerned with the 
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criminal to one based on the protection of the public, and, as Dunbar and Langdon 
note: 
Both penal policy and relations between government and judiciary had been 
changed far more within the lifetime of the Major administration than had 
happened at any of the changes of government since the end of the Second 
World War, at least (Dunbar and Langdon 1998: 2). 
Rather than using law and order to crusade and battle the 'enemy within', John Major 
in 1993 simply promoted a 'crusade against crime' (Dunbar and Langdon 1998: 115). 
Now the focus was placed upon a different section of the working class, the 
'underclass' and teenage criminals - joy riders and persistent young offenders. 
Subsequently, laws were introduced that created 'a new generation of child prisoners', 
returning the British Criminal Justice System 'not ... to the 1970s but to a period 
preceding the Children Act 1908' (Goldson 1997: 30). 
Contrasting Thatcher's promotion of moral values with the approach of John Major, 
Hugo Young observed that the 'Victorian values, to which she pledged herself, were 
essentially an economic rule-book for individualists, reminding them that thrift and 
self-help were the necessary accompaniments to both individual and national 
prosperity'. Rarely, Young notes, did Thatcher 'posit a social order handed down from 
above'. Behaviour of the individual deviant was often challenged within a political 
context, but the direct focus upon individual behaviour in itself was less of an issue for 
Thatcher than it was to become under John Major - or at least, it was not seen as 
something that could be enforced by the state. However, as Young remarked in 
relation to Major's promotion of 'family values': 
It is a disciplinary slogan, voiced in ministerial rhetoric which excoriates 
parents for their slack attitudes, and single parents for even existing. Far from 
there being no such thing as society, the component members of society need 
to be told to brace up and take their social responsibilities for what goes on 
around them, whether through ill-trained children, negligent pastors, 
unwatchful neighbours or other agents of a failed community. The manual to 
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be issued today from the Department for Education, laying down modes of 
behaviour, clothing and discipline in schools, marks another stride towards a 
society upon which Major's ministers, more and more desperate to achieve 
social control, are trying to impose standards which they, at the centre, define 
(Guardian 4 January 1994). 
The increasing use of law to enforce moral behaviour, and of prison to lock more 
people up, indicated, not the rise of the moral right, but rather its demise. Now more 
than ever, law and order became the 'only effective deterrent in a society that no 
longer [knew] the difference between right and wrong' (Lasch 1977: 187). 
By 1993, as noted previously, the capacity of the conservative elite to promote 
traditional moral values had become highly problematic, and despite its continued 
attack on the 'underclass' and on single parents, the moralising language of the Tory 
leadership was coming under attack even from conservative sympathisers. The 
cohering political framework provided by the 'militant scroungers' had disappeared - 
although it remained a framework that, to, some degree, the Conservative Party 
continued to use in developing its policies on crime. Even the economic basis of the 
Tories' success was in disarray, to the extent that the government was described as 
being 'permanently destabilised' following the country's enforced departure from the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 (Dunbar and Langdon 1998: 2). 
'Thatcher's propaganda war' had focused on issues of 'trade union power, left-wing 
extremism, law and order, British chauvinism and Victorian values' (Richards and 
Freeman 1988: 98). Despite Major's continued attempt to use these 'zombie' issues in 
the 1990s, in reality the 'class war' was over, while 'traditional British values' were in 
decline - all that remained was the issue of law and order. Following Major's failed 
attempt to promote the moralistic 'back to basics' campaign in 1993, law and order 
became increasingly central as the framework for political debate and social policy 
developments. This reflected not simply the loss of any wider political imagination 
amongst the Conservatives, but also, having lost the economic and political dynamic 
of the eighties, the political elite arguably developed an internal sense of society being 
out of control. In this respect the emerging rhetoric about the 'yob culture', the drive 
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to develop CCTV cameras, and the increasing prison numbers and laws to deal with 
crime, was not simply to engage the more individuated fears of the public, but 
reflected a state of political panic. Lacking a solution to existing social problems, 
social control became an end in itself, and laws and the police replaced moral and 
political arguments as resources for dealing with these problems. At this time, the 
focus for attention moved from the ideas and beliefs of the adult population onto the 
'behaviour' of children and young people. 
The increasingly direct regulation of society under John Major, and in particular the 
growing focus on the behaviour of children and young people, indicated a certain shift 
away from any attempt to engage with the subjectivity of adults and a loss of belief in 
political and economic possibilities. As Graef notes, at this point in time, the enemy of 
the 'miners of the mid 1980s [was] replaced by the minors of the mid 1990s' (Graef 
1995 quoted in Scratton 1997: 134). The idea of sovereign individuals having to come 
into the moral fold, despite Major's moral rhetoric, was actually being side-stepped by 
the Conservative leadership and undermined by laws that attempted to enforce this. 
The increased regulation of society in this respect became the solution offered to the 
fragmented and insecure public that emerged out of the Thatcher years, but also was 
the solution for the political elite who lacked any wider political framework for 
directing society. Politicians now engaged with people's fears not to promote an 
alternative political solution but simply to engage with the more individuated fear of 
crime and regulate more directly a society that felt out of their control. 
The 'freedom of the individual' that was, at least rhetorically, promoted in the 1980s 
was becoming less important for the Conservatives than the desire to enforce 
responsible behaviour of individuals. With social control as a central aim for politics, 
the personal behaviour of individuals was increasingly politicised and the 'politics of 
behaviour' emerged. 
From the 1980s on, the Conservative party had used moral rhetoric and developed law 
and order as both a tool with which to beat the left, but also as a way to promote an 
alternative norm, a new social vision for Britain. As argued above, much of the moral 
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rhetoric of the Thatcher government did not result in a coherent policy on the family: 
however, traditional institutions like the family and the nation were central to the 
rhetoric of 1980s Conservatives. By the early 1990s, however, the defeat of the labour 
movement had created a far more fragmented society, while the cohering basis of the 
nation and the family was in decline. At this point in time, the law and order policies 
of the Conservatives changed under John Major and a more systematic and diffuse 
form of regulation emerged. Major continued to frame much of his crime 'crusade' 
within the political rhetoric of the past: however, moral pontificating about single 
parents, and law and order initiatives targeted at ravers and the underclass based on a 
watered down form of 'class war', could no longer cohere the conservative elite, or 
engage the public as it once had. It was New Labour who were able to engage more 
systematically with the fragmented and 'vulnerable' public outside of the old moral 
and political framework of the 1980s, and were able to become the new party of law 
and order. 
New party of law and order 
As with the emergence of amoral anxieties, the shift from the politics of crime to the 
politics of behaviour was developed most coherently by those from the left of the 
political spectrum. With the decline of the labour movement and the welfare state as a 
framework for government to organise society and engage with the public, a new basis 
for policy development and public legitimacy was sought. Having jettisoned its 
relationship with 'old' Labour and without the libertarian outlook of sections of the 
right, the new Labour leadership was able to reengage more systematically with 
individuals via their sense of fear and anxiety. 
Labour's ability to engage with the idea of victimhood - often framed with reference 
to 'vulnerable groups' - was coupled with their condemnation of the greedy individual 
of the 1980s, and helped to develop both a more authoritarian and more 'caring' 
therapeutic approach to crime and antisocial behaviour. In adopting the individually- 
focused concerns expressed through the underclass debate, crime was accepted by 
Labour as being more of a behavioural than a structural question (Revell and 
Heartfield 1996: 177). However, this focus on behaviour was to emerge with a more 
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'inclusive' language, outside of the traditional moralising of conservatives like 
Charles Murray. Individual rights were defended - but these rights were redefined as 
rights of protection from others and from fear. Right-wing authoritarianism and 
attacks on the poor and 'vulnerable' were now replaced with the defence of the poor 
and vulnerable as victims of crime. Tapping into the culture of fear and promoting the 
new 'morality' of safety, Labour were successful in presenting themselves as the new 
party of law and order who could tackle the more widespread 'epidemic' of crime and 
disorder and in so doing protect the vulnerable public. 
The 1997 General Election brought the first Labour government to power since 1979. 
It was also the first time the now 'New' Labour Party made crime a major issue within 
its manifesto (Downes and Morgan 1997). In the Labour Party document Tackling the 
causes of crime: Labour's proposals to prevent crime and criminality, the extent of 
the problem of crime and the importance of overcoming the fear of it were explained 
thus: 'Tackling the epidemic of crime and disorder will be a top priority for Labour in 
government' (Labour 1996: 4) - and - 'Securing people's physical security, freeing 
them from the fear of crime and disorder is the greatest liberty government can 
guarantee'(Labour 1996: 6 (my italics)). 
Before the 1997 election - at least within Labour Party manifestos - crime had been 
either ignored or associated with wider 'social' issues. As the Guardian noted, 
comparing former Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock with Tony Blair: 
There are areas where Neil Kinnock's manifesto barely ventured. In 1992, 
crime, for instance, rated five paragraphs and mainly concentrated on 
improving street lighting. Now law and order rates two pages with the now 
familiar "zero tolerance" strategies and child curfews fighting for room next to 
pledges to early legislation. for a post-Dunblane ban on all hand guns. Such 
policies seemed unthinkable five years ago. However, in this case, Blair's 
"radicalisnf' - with its social authoritarian tinge - may play better with the 
centre rather than the Left (The Guardian 4 April 1997). 
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The shift in New Labour began in earnest in 1993 when Tony Blair made his first 
major speech attacking 'crime and the causes of crime'. Here both crime and 'chronic' 
antisocial behaviour were targeted and subsequently a 'zero tolerance' approach to 
antisocial behaviour was proclaimed and the Labour leadership moved to distance 
itself from the notion of crime and delinquency being directly associated with 
inequality. A 'Quiet Life' from nuisance neighbours and aggressive beggars was 
proposed, and the idea of curfews for young children aired. When the Conservative 
government announced a version of the US policy of 'three strikes and you're out', 
and Jack Straw, Labour's Shadow Home Secretary accepted this policy, a clear 'break 
with past Labour policy' was established (Downes and Morgan 1997: 100-6). 
In Labour's Partners against Crime, produced in 1993, the shift in their approach to 
law and order issues was clarified. Serious acts of violence that 'hit the headlines', as 
well as daily burglaries, car crime, abuse and petty vandalism, helped to 'make life 
hell', it was argued, especially for the poor and the vulnerable. Crime was now 
understood by the emerging New Labour leadership as not a transitory occurrence but 
as an endemic part of life that both undermined communities and individuals sense of 
well being (Labour 1993). One problem identified by the Partners against Crime 
paper was that of eroding confidence in the criminal justice system. The government, 
it argued, had been 'thoughtless, insensitive' and 'cruel' in their treatment of victims 
of crime and the solution to this insensitivity is to make 'the whole of the criminal 
justice system become more victim focused' (1993: 22). 
By incorporating the fear of crime and antisocial behaviour in the discussion of crime, 
New Labour understood there to be a 'chronic' 'epidemic' of crime and disorder. The 
logic of this approach was that the entire population became conceptualised as 
potential 'victims of crime'. 
Focused on the public as potential victims of crime, the concern was with the 
'damage' done to individuals - the 'fear' and 'misery' caused by a 'life of hell'. Rather 
than the moral, political or economic concerns about crime, here a central focus 
- became the emotional damage being done to individuals and communities. 
Consequently the orientation of the criminal justice system shifted and a more 
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therapeutic relationship was developed with the public. According to this outlook, the 
greatest liberty New Labour could bring to the public was to free people from the fear 
of crime and disorder. By being thoughtful, sensitive and caring, the victims of crime 
would thus regain a trust in the criminal justice system and indeed in the Labour Party 
itself. 
In this respect, New Labour had not simply moved away from 'Old' Labour's 
understanding of crime, but had also moved on from the Conservative understanding 
of the problem. An example of this change can be seen within the debate abouf 
aggressive beggars. 
'Aggressive' begging 
The concern about victims of crime had developed within politics from the 1980s. 
However the centrality of the victim to Labour's campaigning around law and order 
only emerged in the mid 1990s, and was expressed explicitly by Shadow Home 
Secretary Jack Straw when he launched an attack on 'aggressive begging' in 1995 
(Guardian 5 September 1995). 
The question of street begging had been raised a year earlier by Prime Minister John 
Major during a European Election. Major, whose 'personal rating [had] plummeted to 
record lows following the [economic] debacle of Black Wednesday', attempted to 
raise his profile and support by attacking street beggars as an eyesore (Times 3 June 
1994). 
It was not until May 1994 that the issue of 'aggressive begging' became a national 
political issue and thus a recognised, if contested, social problem. Major's attack on 
begging was seen as a European election stunt to gain popular appeal from the right. 
However a year later, to the surprise of many traditional left and liberal supporters of 
Labour, the shadow home secretary Jack Straw, using American labels, attacked 
'aggressive begging of winos, addicts and squeegee merchants' (Guardian 5 
September 1995) . 
41 The attack by the shadow home secretary was linked to John 
Major's 'understand a little less - condemn a little more' outlook, developed by the 
70 
Conservative Party, but the framework for this attack was different. Whereas the PM 
John Major and his Chancellor Kenneth Clarke had attacked the problem of begging 
using the political rhetoric of the 1980s, as a problem of 'welfare cheats', Jack Straw 
was not concerned with the act of begging so much as the aggressive behaviour that 
came with it. 
By the time the election year of 1997 came around, the soon-to-be Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair had elaborated on the typical and problematic beggar. This was not a man 
quietly scrounging money off the public, but the often drunken 'in-your-face' lout 
who would 'push people against a wall and demand money effectively with menace' 
(Guardian II January 1997). 
In this new offensive against street disorder, New Labour redefined begging: not as an 
offence against the laws of society, or a political or social problem of welfare cheats, 
as the Conservative leadership had done, but specifically as an offence against the 
public sense of 'well being'. Rather than the criminal act of begging being defined as 
the scrounging of money by those already receiving benefits, the problem was 
relocated onto the non-criminal attitude and behaviour of the beggars and the 
assumed reaction of the public. 
The public was presented as being victimised by the aggressiveness of the beggars, 
and described by Jack Straw and Tony Blair as being 'intimidated', 'harassed' and 
'bullied' by the 'incivility' and 'loutish' behaviour of - these beggars. Straw, 
appropriating a well-worn feminist slogan, demanded that we 'reclaim the streets' - 
streets that had been 'brutalised' by beggars and graffiti vandals. 
In this respect, the shift in Labour policy was less of an authoritarian move towards 
'public order' where a problematic and unlawful group are identified and punished. 
Rather Straw's concern was with a disordered public. It was the intimidation of the 
public that was of concern. It was not so much a move to defend the law and order of 
societY itself, so much as an attempt to advocate on behalf of the individual victims of 
this form of harassment. 
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Before 1994 aggressive begging was not a recognised social problem within the press, 
or one being campaigned around by politicians - indeed the term itself did not even 
exist at a public level. By the time of the election year, 1997, the notion of aggressive 
beggars harassing the public was established. In opposition to this development, 
adopting an equally victim-centred defence of beggars, homeless charities argued that 
the homeless were even more vulnerable and more likely to be victimised than to be 
victimisers. However if the problem for homeless people was also that of antisocial 
behaviour, then the need to resolve this problem - whether of public or homeless 
antisocial behaviour - was accepted. As Jack Straw pointed out, his concern was with 
the 'liberty of victims' whoever they may be (The Guardian 9 September 1995). 
The politicisation and problematisation of aggressive begging was dependant upon an 
outlook that understood the problem of crime as one of incivility that undermined the 
public's feeling of security, and with this a focus on the victims of antisocial 
behaviour was central. The justification for 'government at century's end' was here 
based not on a political battle between those for or against welfarism, but on a more 
therapeutically-oriented relationship with the public (Nolan 1998). The connection 
between the individual and the state was now more direct and based less on the 
collective will of the people represented in the laws of society than in the protection of 
the atomised individual's emotional well-being. 
New Labour and community safety 
The example of the aggressive beggar is useful in that it indicates the attempt by New 
Labour to change their relationship with the public and develop a form of advocacy to 
engage the more fearful individual. The approach adopted by the Labour party and the 
justificatory framework that was being developed was now more therapeutic than 
political - safety, and particularly the feeling of safety, being the goal. 
The use of 'safety' as a political goal developed through the 1990s within both the 
Conservative and Labour Party, and began to be a more significant basis for 
developing a relationship between the government, local authorities and individuals. 
The relationship with the public was transformed in this period from a political one to 
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a more technical and managerial form of protection. A key example of this new 
relationship was the increasing centrality of ideas associated with 'safety' - like 
Community Safety, a concept that became one of the new organising principles for 
local authorities. 
Safety in respect to community development emerged as an economic issue under 
Margaret Thatcher's government, and related to regeneration initiatives developed 
with the promotion of 'Safer Cities' in the late 1980s and early 1990s. While moving 
the idea of safety more centrally into the workings of local authorities, safer cities 
remained, to a degree, an attempt to improve the economic regeneration of an area 
through safety improvements, and also an attempt to involve businesses in the 
development of crime prevention initiatives (Cummings 1997). In a sense Safer Cities 
was more about an internal organisation of local authorities and the development of 
interagency co-operation than a relationship with the public. But from an initial 
attempt in the late 1980s to use safety initiatives to improving business confidence and 
increase entrepreneurialism (Gilling 1999), as the 1990s progressed, the issue of 
safety became a more central focus for local authorities in their attempt to reengage 
with the public. Here the re-creation of communities and the relationship between the 
political elite and state institutions developed more systematically in relation to 
'safety' as an end in itselL Emerging during the final years of the Conservative 
government, the significance of community safety initiatives increased significantly 
under New Labour from 1997. Where Thatcher had understood the creation of 'safer 
cities' as a means to developing the economic basis of communities, increasingly 
'community safety' was the end point of the new therapeutically conceptualised 
community. 
The development of policies around the idea of 'community safety, had little 
existence in the public realm until 1987, when it was radical and dejected Labour 
supporters - criminologists and feminists - who helped'develop this idea. In this year 
the term became more commonly used in the press with reference to the policing and 
community safety units set up in Labour-controlled London boroughs. Here, the 
relationship between Labour councils and the public was more explicitly developed 
within a framework of safety, and helped move these local authorities away from a 
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welfare model to one based more on the protection of individuals and 'victimised 
groups'. 42 
As the nature of politics changed and the public, particularly the working class, 
became more disaggregated, the relationship between the state and the individual 
increasingly became organised around safety issues. This development also emerged 
within the workplace at this time and helped to transform the relationship between the 
public and many public sector workers. Reflecting the more insecure and fragmented 
climate of the 1990s, this relationship developed around the sentiment of 
vulnerability. Professions that were renowned for their 'caring' approach to a public 
of whi 
, 
ch they once felt part were increasingly encouraged to monitor the behaviour of 
their 'clients' and 'customers', and to protect their members from antisocial 
behaviour. 
Trade unions, for example, transformed their role in this period, from one of collective 
bargaining to agencies involved in protecting the security of their members. At the 
Trades Union Congress annual meeting in 1996, Frank Chapman of the electronics 
union the AEEU explained that, 'Our members want zero tolerance of criminal, 
offensive and loutish behaviour'. 43 At the same conference, Tony Rouse of the Civil 
and Public Services Association said that his staff, 'go to work daily knowing they 
may be seriously assaulted', while Bernadette Hillon of the shop-workers' union 
USDAW explained how 350,000 sales staff suffered violence at work in 1995 - partly 
because of people 'losing it' when they bought lottery tickets (Guardian 11 September 
1996). 
Despite a lack of figures to compare the level of victimisation by the public with past 
experiences, the notion that antisocial behaviour was on the rise became commonplace 
and public sector workers were increasingly encouraged to institutionalise measures to 
evaluate the extent of the victimisation of their workers - victimisation and violence 
being redefined as not only acts of physical, but also verbal, 'assault' (Waiton 2001: 
40). Local Authorities, and Labour Authorities in particular, also began to develop the 
notion of 'community safety' as a priority category around which to develop services, 
and 'multi-agency' initiatives were recommended by the Audit Commission in 1996 
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which suggested a statutory duty be imposed on local authorities to establish youth 
offending teams from representatives of social services, health and education 
authorities as well as the traditional law enforcement agencies (Waiton 2001: 31). 44 
By the 1997 general election, the idea of the 'politics of left and right' had little 
meaning. Now politics was increasingly about the management of public insecurities 
and behaviour . 
45 Indeed, with the end of welfarism and 'Old' Labour, the promotion 
of concerns connected to antisocial behaviour were developed in the 1990s most 
fervently by sections of the Labour movement. 
'Community Safety', a term and framework used to relate to the public, was first 
developed by left-wing Labour councils in the late 1980s, and had, ten years later been 
incorporated into the vocabulary and operation of national government. The 
development of a relationship with 'communities' based on safety and also a 'feeling' 
of being safe inevitably led to the activities of young people who hung about the 
streets becoming an increasing focus of concern in the press, with politicians, and for 
local authorities. 
Prior to the 1990s, the Labour Party, the labour movement and Labour local 
authorities had often acted as a barrier to the politicisation of crime as a social 
problem in and of itself. With the transformation of Labour politics, not only was this 
barrier removed, but also New Labour organisations become the most vociferous 
advocates of community safety. In the 1990s, unions and local authorities, in unison 
with Labour politicians, developed a relationship with the public not based on a wider 
social, political or moral framework but focused upon the vulnerable individual and 
their sense of security and well being: a relationship predicated upon a wider culture 
of fear. The relationship with a Ivictimised' public was, however, also being 
developed by the Conservative government, although with one foot still in the past, 
there remained a tendency for the Tories to prioritise the targeting of deviant 'groups' 
within a more class-based political, and traditional moralistic, framework. For 
example with the Criminal Justice Act of 1994, the Conservatives targeted squatters, 
new age travellers and ravers - an Act that received significant opposition from the 
liberal press. 
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Unlike the Conservatives who continued to use the traditional moral and 
confrontational rhetoric of the 1980s in their condemnation of yobs and criminals, 
New Labour adopted the more 'amoral' form of moralising that relied not upon 
political and moral values but on an individuated sense of fear and insecurity. New 
Labour's cosmopolitan authoritarianism was far more appropriate for the more 
'liquid' relationships of the time (Bauman 2000). Relating to the public as vulnerable 
individuals, Tony Blair was able to tap into the culture of fear and use 'safety' as a 
modem day 'slogan' -a therapeutic promise of a quiet life for all. 
In the 1990s, 'vulnerability' became an increasingly important framework through 
which society and individuals were understood. The Conservative Party's association 
with moral and political pronouncements about 'muggers", 'scroungers', the 'gay 
plague' and so on added to its hard-nosed, 'get on your bike' image, and meant that its 
capacity to relate to the more universalising sense of victimhood was limited. New 
Labour, however, having unshackled themselves from the collective subject of the 
working class and influenced by radicals who had helped develop the idea and support 
for 'vulnerable groups', were well placed to develop their ideas to tap into the 
individualised sense of anxiety and of vulnerability. 
The rise of the victim in criminology - 
The changing emphasis within the Labour Party in the late 1980s towards issues of 
crime and antisocial behaviour were influenced in part by the work of left realist and 
feminist criminologists who had an active role within Labour local authorities. 
Through the work of writers like Jock Young, crime was made into a 'working class 
issue', due largely to the transformation in how large sections of the working class 
were understood: i. e. as 'victims' rather than active citizens. 
Social changes and political defeats of the labour movement had a profound impact 
upon subsequent developments within local and national government alike during this 
period. However, the role of clainismakers on the left is also significant in 
understanding how crime became a radical issue and an issue more centrality focused 
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around a particular understanding of the 'victim of crime' and the 'fear of crime. The 
culture of fear, as we have seen, developed in the 1990s, riding on the back of the 
growing pessimism about social change and also with the emergence of a more 
fragmented society. This fear, however, rather than being understood with reference to 
wider social and cultural changes, was increasingly interpreted as simply a reflection 
of the 'real' problem of crime and more particularly disorder. 
The increasing centrality of victims to not only the criminal justice system but more 
broadly to political and social problem formation has been noted by various 
sociologists (Best 1999; Garland 2002), and within criminology itself the victim had 
become increasingly important as an area of study (Maquire and Pointing 1988; Rock 
1990). The rise of victim-oriented research in criminology developed with the 
growing concern with the fear of crime -a fear that was initially identified by 
conservative thinkers but increasingly became a social problem focused upon by 
feminists, and then left realists. As will be examined below, this development ran in 
tandem with a growing pessimism within radical circles about the dynamic potential 
of the working class, or of the welfare state to transform society, and resulted in a 
radical reorientation around the problems of crime, harassment and antisocial 
behaviour. Whilst being a product of a declining labour movement and the result of 
the failure of welfarism, the ideas of these radicals also helped to elevate the concern 
about crime and they acted as key claimsmakers of victims of crime. 
The first significant identification of and support for 'victims' emerged in the USA in 
the form of a conservative reaction in the 1960s to criminal justice processes that were 
understood to be more concerned with the rights of criminals than with victims' rights 
(Best 1999: 98). Reflecting a more distant and pessimistic belief in the state policies 
of the time, this defence of the victim also signified a sense of alienation from social 
institutions and political processes. By the 1970s this pessimism towards welfarism, 
and the rehabilitative approach within the American criminal justice system, was 
becoming more pronounced - as illustrated in the influential article by Robert 
Martinson, where he argued that within the current system, 'Nothing Works' (Feeley 
2003: 119). 46 This pessimism was also emerging within the UK, and the vision and 
optimism of the expansive politics of the welfare state (Garland 1985) began to 
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unravel. By the 1980s numerous Home Office reports were arguing that the 
government could not resolve the current crisis within the criminal justice system - 
reflecting the fact that, as Garland argues, man was losing his 'strong moral compass' 
(Garland 1996: 45 1). 
The claim for the rights of victims represented a certain shift within social thought 
about the relationship of the individual with society. Where previously the criminal 
justice system was understood as a representation of the laws of all within society in 
relation to the criminal, by focusing upon the victim of crime, the priority was given 
to the individual who had been 'damaged' by the criminal and also who felt estranged 
from the existing criminal justice system. In the UK, the prioritisation and 
representation of the victim emerged most fervently within the feminist writing of the 
1970s and 80s with the 'discovery' of violence and abuse against women and children 
(Jenkins 1992: 23 1). 
The battle to centre the victim within criminal justice developed in the 1980s but 
remained contested; and Ashworth's view that it was questionable 'whether the 
particular victim's interests should count for more than those of any other member of 
the community' remained the established opinion (Cretney et al 1994: 16). However, 
as the former director of the Howard League, Martin Wright, noted in the Guardian, 
times were changing, reflected in the draft Declaration on the Rights of Victims being 
discussed for the first time at the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders (Guardian 28 August 1985). A similar trend was also 
becoming apparent within popular culture, with the emergence of programmes like 
Crimewatch on the television. Producer Peter Chafer explained why the programme 
was such a success. 
Ten of fifteen years ago I don't think it would have worked because ... then we 
were concerned as a society about what it was we were doing to people to 
make them criminal ... In the past three or 
four years we've suddenly said to 
ourselves, "To hell with the criminal, what about the poor bloody victim? " 
(Schlesinger and Tumber 1993: 22). 
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Concerns for the 'poor bloody victim' emerged alongside the growing concern with the 
fear of crime - both 'victimhood' and fear reflecting an increasing sense of distance 
and loss of connection between the individual and social processes. This fear was 
again first identified in 1960s America. 
In the UK the idea that the fear of crime was a direct consequence of crime itself 
remained highly contested in the seventies and eighties and both radical and Home 
Office criminologists challenged this idea. Sparks, Glerm and Dodd in 1977 argued 
that 'feelings of crime or insecurity appear to have many sources, and to be strongly 
influenced by b eliefs, attitudes and experiences which have nothing whatever to do 
with crime', and that, 'we need to be very cautious about interpreting literally 
expressions of uneasiness about other aspects of experience, or about the state of the 
world in general'(Jones 1987: 192-198). Similarly Smith noted in 1984: 'In sum, fear 
is frequently generated quite independently of either the mass media, or people's direct 
experiences of crime' (Smith 1984: 293). Indeed, as van Dijk notes, in the initial 
discussion about the fear of crime in Britain, fear itself was seen as a problem which 
undermined communities - not in terms of the level of anxiety it created, but in the 
exaggerated response by those living in fear, where 'rhose - who [took] special 
measures to protect their households against crime were said to exhibit a 'fortress 
mentality" (Van Dijk 1994: 122). In this respect it was those people who feared crime 
'too much' who were seen as being antisocial and helping to undermine communities, 
rather than criminals or antisocial youth. 
The idea and significance given to the fear of crime remains contested within 
criminology and the reality of this specific fear has been challenged and arguably been 
shown to be exaggerated (Farrall et al 1997; Farrall and Gadd 2004). However the 
emergence of the concern with the fýar of crime as a problem in its own right has 
grown within politics and in the policies developed by governments from the early 
1990s. This development was assisted most systematically within criminology by 
sections of the feminist 'movement' and by left realist thinkers, particularly with the 
growth of 'victim surveys. 
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s research had been carried out to identify victims of 
crime. Often stenuning from a feminist perspective, this research attempted to 
challenge the idea that fear of crime was to some extent irrational, 47 by illustrating the 
extent to which women and other 'vulnerable groups A developed a sense of fear due 
to their experiences of 'minor' everyday harassment. Rather than associating the fear 
of crime within wider social and political developments, this research largely analysed 
the direct experience of 'victims' within their local communities and in so doing 
focused concern upon the interpersonal relationships between people. Junger for 
example attempted to prove that the 'experiences of sexual harassment, which usually 
-are not serious but could occur relatively often, can lead women to be fearful and 
restrict themselves to their homes' (Junger 1987: 358). Other research has 'discovered' 
teenagers and elderly women to be 'victims of harassment', with the 'experience of 
crime' being the core concern addressed (Hartless et al 1995; Pain 1995). Despite 
often contradictory evidence of the significance and even the extent of the 
victimisation under study, this research had an underlying and in-built acceptance of 
the vulnerability of those people being studied. For example Hartless notes with 
'surprise' that, of the young women who said they had experienced sexual harassment 
of some kind, 'only 8% ... said they had been 'very scared" (1995: 119). Surprise at any 
level of robustness and at the ability of 'vulnerable' individuals to cope with 
unpleasant experiences was coupled with a trend to interpret any evidence of fear as a 
product of harassment. Pain, in her analysis of fear amongst elderly women, raises the 
question of why older men fear crime more than young men. Despite the myriad 
possible reasons including physical frailty, social isolation or a sense of powerlessness 
and estrangement from society which could be the cause, Pain speculates that perhaps 
it is due to their vulnerability to harassment, 'especially in very old age, to abuse from 
carers inside or outside the immediate family' (Pain 1995: 595). 
Whatever the myth or reality of the experience of harassment by these 'vulnerable 
groups', there is an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption within this work that 
communities are being undermined by crime and more particularly antisocial 
behaviour, including harassment. This antisocial behaviour, it is assumed, will have a 
long term and cumulatively damaging impact upon the individual and subsequently on 
communities as a whole. Here we see a complete turnaround from the argument put in 
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the 1970s by radicals who questioned and even denounced the 'fear of crime' as a 
reactionary sentiment. Rather than denying or challenging the notion of the fear of 
crime and the centrality of victims within the criminal justice system, in strands of 
feminist criminology there was a tendency to accept the problem of fear and to then 
discover the cause of this fear within the realm of abusive personal relationships. 
Whereas previously radicals had attempted to challenge the official statistics on crime 
and deny the social problem of crime, increasingly this feminist criminology reversed 
this approach and attempted to prove that crime, harassment, and antisocial behaviour 
was even more of a problem than was officially accepted. Here not only was the 
opposition to the notion of crime as a social problem lost, but feminists became 
promoters of the social problem of crime and of wider forms of 'antisocial' behaviour. 
This was specifically developed with particular reference to less serious or non- 
criminal offences, and was also bound up with the centrality of the fear of crime as a 
significant factor to be taken into account within the criminal justice system. 
Regardless of the intentions of the researchers themselves, one logical outcome of this 
process was to criminalise everyday behaviour and interactions, to help develop the 
'politics of behaviour', and thus to support the trend towards the 'policing' of 
relationships. 
In the 1980s feminist and left realist concerns about the impact of crime on individuals 
and society drew closer to the official criminological approach at the time - especially 
with the common use of victim statistics. 'Establishment' criminology had however 
undergone its own transformation during this period moving from a positivist belief in 
society's capacity to overcome the problem of crime to an 'administrative criminology' 
(Young 1988: 174). This administrative criminology, associated with Wilson's (1975) 
approach to crime, was a more pragmatic method of dealing with the effects of it. 
Despite the political nature of much of the feminist and particularly the left realists 
approach to crime, the common bond that had brought them and the official 
criminologist closer to one another was a diminished belief in social possibilities to 
resolve the problem of crime. With a greater pessimism about society and a greater 
sense of distance from social outcomes, radical and conservative thinkers became 
more preoccupied with the plight of the victim. The public, or at least substantial 
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sections of it were now increasingly conceptualised as being what Stanko described 
as, 'universally vulnerable' (Pain 1995: 596). 
Feminists and left realists as claimsmakers 
The significance of crime and behaviour for New Labour was assisted by the work of 
feminist and new realist thinkers of the left in the 1980s, who helped to formulate an 
understanding of the public as vulnerable. This vulnerability was understood to be the 
product of antisocial behaviour within the day-to-day relationships of significant 
sections of society. Rather than a right-wing authoritarian issue, here the fight against 
crime and antisocial behaviour was reposed as a means to recreate community. 
In Philip Jenkins' analysis of Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain, in which 
he analyses the emergence of panics around child abuse in the UK, he notes the 
significance of feminist as claimsmakers: 
From the mid-1970s on, there evolved in Britain a strong feminist movement, 
which had had an enormous impact on many aspects of society and 
politics ... [fleminist ideas soon prevailed 
in radical and left-wing 
journals ... and were commonly expressed in liberal newspapers like the 
Guardian ... [and] by the mid-1980s, fifty local authorities had women's 
committees (Jenkins 1992: 35-6). 
By the late 1970s, many of the feminist activists had already broken with the 'radical' 
outlook within criminology and were equally critical of socialist ideas on the left, 
turning away from issues of social equality and focusing more upon problems that 
emerged in the relationships between men and women. Indeed as one author noted, by 
the 1980s the women's 'movement' as a radical drive for equality had all but died and 
fragmented into individualistic concerns and a separatist celebration of 'womanhood'. 
Where the early socialist feminists to a degree rejected the idea of difference between 
men and women, many feminists in the 1980s appeared to celebrate women as caring 
rather than violent - illustrated by the peace camp at Greenharn Common, which 
excluded men because of their 'violent tendency' (Marshall: 1982: 48). This more 
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disparate form of feminism did, however, as Jenkins notes, make a substantial impact 
upon politics in the UK - as did the left realists, led by Jock Young, who, like these 
feminists, had become disillusioned with the idealist beliefs of the radical left. 
In the editor's introduction to Confronting Crime, Matthews and Young pointed out 
that'if the women's movement has indicated the way forward in terms of the creation 
of a radical victimology, it is now time to extend its theoretical and political potential' 
(Matthews and Young 1986: 3). Crime for these left realists needed to be taken 
seriously and victims needed to be placed at the centre, of concern for criminologists 
and the state. The role for socialists was now to engage with 'problems as people 
experience them! and to tackle the problem of crime -a problem that can destroy 
communities: 
Crime is of importance because unchecked it divides the working class 
community and is materially and morally the basis of disorganisation: the loss 
of political control. It is also a potential unifier -a realistic issue, amongst 
others, for recreating community (Matthews and Young 1986: 29). 
By e- ngaging with the immediate experiences of a disaggregated community and 
understanding crime as a major cause and solution to this loss of community, Young, 
along with other realists and feminists, attempted to turn crime reduction into a 
working-class issue and in the process became significant 'anti-crime' clainismakers 
on the left. 
In the 1980s both feminist and left realist thinkers had a significant influence in the 
left-wing Labour-run inner-city councils - carrying out victim surveys, and sitting on a 
number of council boards particularly within the Greater London Council. Developing 
out of the radical framework of the early 1970s, a number of feminist and realist 
criminologists became disillusioned with the fight for political and social change and, 
rather than challenging the issue of crime as a form of bourgeois amplification, for 
example, increasingly identified crime as a major issue, particularly for the poor, 
women and blacks who were now understood as being 'victims of crime'. 
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Carried out within a critical feminist and socialist framework that was often 'anti- 
police', these radicals focused their concerns on the most deprived and fragmented 
communities, discovering that crime was not a myth, as past radicals had argued, but a 
reality. Indeed crime was seen as a 'working class problem' and issue to be addressed 
(Jones et al 1986). 
The identification of harassed victims of antisocial behaviour rose proportionately 
with the declining belief - particularly of the left realists - in the possibility of radical 
social change. As the active potential of the working class to 'do' something about 
Conservative attacks on the welfare state declined, Jock Young and others uncovered 
the vulnerable, 'done-to', poor. 
Discussing the shift in Labour councils from radicalism to realism Young noted that: 
Ile recent history of radical criminology in Britain has involved a rising 
influence of feminist and anti-racist ideas and an encasement of left wing 
Labour administrations in the majority of the inner city Town Halls. An initial 
ultra-leftism has been tempered and often transformed by a prevalent realism 
in the wake of the third consecutive defeat of the Labour Party on the national 
level and severe defeats with regards to "rate capping" in terms of local 
politics. The need to encompass issues, which had a widespread support 
amongst the electorate, rather than indulge in marginal or "gesture' politics 
included the attempt to recapture the issue of law and order from the right 
(Young 1988: 172). 
It was sections of the left who, with the support of their victim surveys, both 
discovered and advocated on behalf of women, blacks and the poor as victims of 
crime, the problem of fragmented communities being located within the prism of 
crime, antisocial behaviour and the fear of crime. Indeed crime and the fear of it 
became so central to Young's understanding of the conditions of the working class 
that, when finding that young men's fear of crime was low, despite them being the 
main victims of crime, he argued that in a sense they had a false consciousness. Rather 
than trying to allay women's fears about the slim chance of serious crime happening 
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to them, Young questioned whether it 'would not be more advisable to attempt to raise 
the fear of crime of young men rather than to lower that of other parts of the publicT 
(Young 1988a: 172). 
Based upon an accurate critique of the romantic notions of radical criminologists, but 
within a climate of political defeats and working class fragmentation, Young 
increasingly related to large sections of the working class as victims, on whose behalf 
he advocated. Again, while often carrying out more accurate research of crime, the 
tendency was for Young and his co-authors both to exaggerate the significance of 
crime and to generalise an understanding of the public as fundamentally vulnerable - 
within the narrow parameters of crime and antisocial behaviour. In the demoralised 
and poverty stricken inner-city areas of London, like Islington, where crime rates were 
five times the national average, the equally demoralised realists concluded that it was 
the problem of crime that 'shaped their lives' (Jones et al 1986: 20 1). While correctly 
noting that crime was not a fantasy for the people of Islington, these realists noted that 
a third of the women of the area avoided going out after dark, concluding that this 
represented a 'virtual curfew of the female population' (1986: 201). This 
misrepresentation of one third of women being transformed into the entire female 
population reflected not simply an exaggeration, but a newly developing 
conceptualisation of the public more generally as vulnerable - something which was to 
become more central to the Labour Party's understanding of social problems in the 
1990s and would help to transform the relationship between citizen and state. 
Discovering victims of crime was by no means a uniform development and 
differences of opinion and prioritisation existed amongst those advocating on behalf 
of differing 'vulnerable groups'. Indeed identifying victims of crime was not a solely 
radical pursuit. As we have observed, within administrative criminology and amongst 
sections of conservative thinkers the victim was becoming more central to the 
approach to crime and criminal justice. Claims on behalf of victims were becoming 
more systematic and politicised by the late 1980s, and had to some degree already 
been institutionalised with, for example, the introduction of the Victims' Charter by 
the Conservative Government in 1990. 
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Before 1970, social problems associated with victims of crime and the fear of crime 
had little or no academic, public or political presence in British society. However, by 
1990, victims and the fear of crime were becoming increasingly important concepts 
informing how the problem of crime was understood. This development emerged as 
belief in social possibilities under welfarism declined, and within certain radical 
circles the previously understood creative capacity of the working class, and indeed of 
humanity in general, was replaced with a concern with its destructive potential. Where 
some practical measures to provide victim support had become institutionalised in the 
1980s (Van DiJk 1988: 120), the centrality of the victim within politics was held back 
by the remaining political contestation between the Tories and the 'Old' Labour 
movement. For the victim and the 'vulnerable public' to become central to politics and 
indeed to the state's relationship with the people, as Maguire and Pointing (1988) 
noted, 'fairly major reforms of the relationships between State and citizen' would need 
to occur. As we have seen with the example of the aggressive beggar, this 
transformation did indeed take place and was fundamentally dependent upon a change 
in the nature of subjectivity within politics and the consequent transformation in the 
understanding of the electorate from active individuals or a collective agent to a more 
passive and diminished vulnerable public. 
This transformation developed not simply within sections of the left, but also with the 
relative failure of the Conservative government to create a vibrant economic and 
moral culture founded on the entrepreneurial individual. Margaret Thatcher's ideal of 
'restoring people to independence and self reliance', as Heartfield notes, failed even in 
terms of 'rolling back the state' (2002: 156). State subsidies replaced nationalised 
industries; 'dependency on the state increased in the form of unemployment benefits 
expanding the number of those reliant upon the state more than any other post-war 
government; regulation of industry in the form of organisations such as OfWat 
increased; and from 1985-1994 the number of quangos increased exponentially, rising 
to 5521 by 1994. Rather than the rise of the free market, what emerged was an 
alternatively regulated society, and despite the defeat of collective working class 
institutions, 'flowing individualisrif did not emerge (Heartfield 2002: 158-160). 49 
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As we have seen with the example of the aggressive beggar, the Conservative party, in 
part, continued to understand and organise its policies in relation to the imagined 
problem of welfare dependency, but its rhetoric sounded increasingly hollow and its 
capacity to cohere even conservative thinkers was becoming increasingly problematic 
(Calcutt 1996). By 1994 Labour were well ahead in the opinion polls helped by their 
transformation into the new party of law and order illustrated in their support of the 
Conservative government's Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill. Prime Minister 
John Major continually attempted to paint Labour as the 'villain's friend', but to no 
avail, and the Conservative Party's disarray continued the following year, illustrated 
by the leadership challenge to John Major (Guardian 30 January 1996). 
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Chapter 4: Diminishing the Subject 
Now for the first time - outside of the extremes of conservative thinking -a 
misanthropic strain emerged that questioned whether MAN was indeed the central 
figure of the human story, and whether he deserved to be (Heartfield 2002: 2 1). 
Introduction 
By the early years of the 1990s, as Giddens correctly noted, politics was moving 
'beyond' left and right (Giddens 1994). The traditional outlook of conservatives and 
their attempt to play the morality card and get 'back to basics' was running out of 
steam (Calcutt 1996). Where the dernise of the left can be chronologically located in 
terrns of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the incapacity of the right to stand up 
for its own values rather than rely on the negative crutch of denouncing the left led to 
its own decline around 1993. Collective solutions were discredited and the 
disillusionment with grand narratives became more generalised at this time 
(Fitzpatrick 2001: viii). With a loss of belief in social progress radicals were 
increasingly inclined to panic and develop solutions to social problems not in terms of 
their positive transformative capacity but by promoting the need to conserve and -to 
regulate areas of life, including industry, the environment and also communities 
(Durodie 2002; Cohen 2002: xxiii). With the loss of belief in both left and right wing 
thought of the human potential to make history, and with the parallel loss of belief in 
politics, both in society and amongst the elite itself, risks became the 'active agents 
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and people - at risk [the] passive agents in society' (Furedi 1997: 04). 
It was within this context that the understanding of the vulnerable public emerged - 
an understanding predicated upon the develcpment of the diminished subject. 
The development of the engagement between the political elite and the public in 
relation to their vulnerability is often portrayed one-sidedly as politicians simply 
reacting to public concerns about issues like those connected with antisocial 
behaviour. However, this development should be seen as a dialectical one involving 
not simply the public, but more importantly the role of the elite and the underlying 
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philosophy, or loss of one, within which policies associated with antisocial behaviour 
have developed. At the heart of these developments is a loss of a sense of both 
individual and collective capacities and the cultural development of diminished 
subjectivity. 
In the 1990s concerns about child safety and child villainy, which were to become 
central to the formation of the Hamilton curfew, developed at a pace rarely seen 
before in political life. Indeed compared to past political periods, the tendency was for 
the political elite to panic and develop ever-more laws and initiatives to deal with 
these 'social problems'. As traditional morality declined, the moralising about 
behaviour was reconstituted and promoted through the New Labour language of 
'rights and responsibilities'. However, the meaning of responsibility, as we will see in 
the case of the Hamilton curfew, was actually being diminished, while the idea of 
rights was being transformed to relate not to people's freedoms but to a new form of 
protection of a 'quiet life'. 
This downgrading of the notion of responsibility, the elevation of the problem of child 
villainy, and the tendency for governments to panic, could all be seen in the reaction 
to the James Bulger killing (King 1997: 125). Following the election of the Labour 
government in 1997, the propensity of Labour to institutionalise new laws based upon 
this panic was illustrated when the Bulger case was used to justify the abolition of doli 
incapax -a law dating back to the Middle Ages that protected children from criminal 
charges based on the assumptiýn that they could not be held morally responsible for 
their actions. Here the question of 'moral responsibility' was revised by the Labour 
government in the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), *and minors were now transformed 
into subjects, responsible for their own actions. In criminalising children in this way, 
the image of dangerous young people who were a threat to society was projected and 
given political and legal support - this fear itself being institutionalised in the process. 
However, within this change of law ýnd the newly confused understanding of moral 
responsibility, an implicit diminution of the idea of adult responsibility was also 
suggested: if ten year old children can be said to be responsible for their actions in the 
same way that adults are, the very idea of responsibility appears to be diminished. As 
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we will see, despite the promotion of rights and responsibilities by New Labour, what 
it meant to be responsible becoming infantilised. 
The emergence of the notion of community safety and of the vulnerable public were 
predicated upon this infantilisation of responsibility, and indicated a weakening 
understanding of subjectivity and a lowering of expectations of the adult population. 
Conceptualised as vulnerable and 'at risk', the active role expected of the public was 
reduced, and politicians, interest groups, union representatives and so on, developed a 
more passive relationship with anxious individuals across society. 
The failed social, economic and political experiments of left and right by the mid- 
1990s had led to what Feeley and Simon describe as a'decline in social will' (Feeley 
and Simon 1992: 469) Despite the triumph of the market, it was not the 'market 
individual' or promethean man that stepped forward, but rather the victim and the 
vulnerable public. This does not mean that this development marks the 'death of the 
subject', but rather, as Heartfield argues, 'the human subject persists, but in denial of 
its own subjectivity'. The notion of diminished subjectivity in this respect is not a 
description of individuals as such, but is a cultural phenomenon that informs 
institutional practices: practices that have increasingly developed in relation to the 
regulation of the public. 
The image of the individual and to some extent the self-image that individuals take on 
board is one prone to a sense of vulnerability, and is best expressed in the concept of 
the victim. The victim, as Best argues, is often portrayed as blameless and powerless 
(Best 1998: 100), and whereas past moral weight was given to saints in the 
Renaissance period, or heroes in the nineteenth century, the iconic individual carrying 
moral weight in late twentieth century society is that of the victim (Best 1998: 138). 
This transformation in the understanding of humanity reflects both a more passive 
sense of human capabilities and also a more negative sense of what humanity 
represents. It has also helped to form the framework within which individuals have 
increasingly come to understand themselves. 
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The trend to identify and understand the public in terms of its vulnerability was 
something that informed the turn towards crime as a significant social problem by 
radicals in the 1980s. For the new realists, both a more passive and more negative 
understanding of individuals and in particular the working class is represented. The 
issue'of crime and antisocial behaviour was not a major focus of concern for these 
criminologists until their own subjective understanding of social and political 
possibilities had been diminished. 
Part of the reason for the left realists' orientation towards an understanding of the 
working class as victims was that the more active and dynamic sections of the 
working class were understood to be part of the problem. In a sense what developed 
was the problematisation of subjectivity itself - in the form of the problematisation of 
the aspirations of the active man. One caricature of this man was the 'Essex Min' - the 
upwardly mobile, greedy, selfish Thatcherite, who was blamed for the consecutive 
Tory election victories by many of those on the left, a caricature that was explained in 
theory within the notion of Thatcherism and hegemony. 51 The greed and selfishness of 
the Essex man was for left realist Jock Young the same greed and selfishness that 
resulted in crime and antisocial behaviour on estates. For Young, crime was a product 
of capitalist values played out on the streets, of 'individualism, competition, a desire 
for material goods and often machismo'. Values that in more optimistic times would 
have been understood as largely aspirant - something socialists could tap into when 
the market failed to deliver - were now reconceptualised as criminal and anti- 
communal (Lea and Young 1984). 
The understanding of the greedy working class Tory voter was developed most 
systematically by Stuart Hall, within his analysis of Thatcherism. The use of 
Gramsci's theory of hegemony 'offered a way of theorising the political crisis of the 
Left and understanding how the Right had come to dominate'(Findlayson 2003: 117). 
Fundamentally, Hall did this by undermining the idea of political consciousness and 
of the fluidity of subjectivity by identifying an ideology - 'ThatcherisnY 
52 
- which 
developed not simply as an idea that people agreed with but rather as something that 
got under their skin and 'inserted itself into people's experience and common sense, 
redefining their identity and sense of interests' (Findlayson 2003: 117). While correctly 
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criticising economic determinism in traditional Marxism, this approach did not simply 
elevate the significance of ideology so much as to transform ideology and subjectivity 
into a thing. Now the ideas of the working class were understood to develop in 
relation to a more statically conceptualised culture. As Malik notes in relation to the 
concept of culture in race, culture had increasingly become understood in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, as a more static conceptualisation of what we are, as 
'static and immutable', culture being related to unconscious tradition rather than with 
Oconscious activity', not the 'conscious creation of humanity but the unconscious 
product of human activity which [stands] above and beyond society' (Malik 1996: 
154-162). 
Ironically, within criminology, the 'static' cultures of deviants was something that was 
first theorised by radical rather than conservative thinkers, as Calcutt has observed 
with reference to British criminologists in the late 1960s (Calcutt 1996). Originally 
positing these cultural differences with a positive gloss, by the 1990s the conservative 
notion of cultures of crime, or what today has become a concern with 'gun culture' or a 
'knife culture, took on a more overtly negative and authoritarian dynamic. 
In the 1980s realists like Lea and Young coupled their pessimism about social change 
with a discovery of a 'culture' of selfishness and greed amongst the working class. 
Describing the problem as they saw it in 1984, Lea and Young argued that crime, 
rather than being in opposition to capitalist values, was an expression of them. By this 
the left - realists were not referring ýo Marx's understanding of alienation and the 
inequalities produced under capitalism, but rather to the values of the working class 
themselves and in particular to the 'antisocial egoism which permeates the totality of 
behaviour and values within capitalism! (Lea and Young 1984: 55). In a sense 
subjectivity was one-sidedly understood to have been objectified by the market, and 
through the ideology of Thatcherism. 
Past theories connecting capitalist values to criminal activity often took on a more 
optimistic note. American author Daniel Bell, discussing how gangsters were 
understood in the USA, noted that, 'He was a man with a gun, acquiring by personal 
merit what was denied him by complex ordering of stratified society', a man who was 
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taking a 'queer ladder of social mobility' (Bell 1962: 129). Similarly on the left, 
deviant behaviour was often seen as understandable given the limitations of capitalist 
society. Here subjective action, even if deviant, was to a certain degree seen as 
acceptable and even positive. However by the early eighties, the realist criminologists 
had already begun to see subjective intent as something implanted by the capitalist 
system that was a problem (of greed and selfishness) rather than a potential solution to 
social problems. Meritocracy and aspirations of individuals, without a belief in social 
progress, became problematised and understood more negatively to represent a 'dog 
eat dog' mentality. Young men who felt able to 'take care of themselves' in public, for 
example, were regarded as being macho and violent, and in denial of a more real 
understanding of themselves as victims of crime (Young 1998a). Subjective activity 
was problematised and seen as a semi-conscious product of capitalism under Margaret 
Thatcher: as such the active ihtent of even the criminal was to some extent denied, and 
the engagement with the 'done to' working class increasingly related to their passivity 
and victimhood. 
Within the identification with victimhood a more diminished subject is related to, and 
engagement with and this representation of individuals was increasingly universalised 
through the 1990s. At the same time, the idea of the greedy Thatcherite individual was 
also predicated upon a more static and immutable sense of subjectivity. Rather than 
being able to challenge the outlook of this 'selfish man, the call was to police him, and 
to regulate his excesses. The democratisation of the police force - and the 
involvement of the working class in the policing of the selfish Thatcherite members of 
the community - was one way the left realists felt the fear of crime could be overcome 
and the greedy criminal dealt with (Jones et al 1986). 
Interestingly, the notion that key sections of the working class were becoming more 
greedy and selfish has been questioned in research looking at the rise and fall of Essex 
Man. Questioning the structural explanations for the Tory voting worker, including 
the collapse of manufacturing jobs, the growth in home ownership and the shiftfrom a 
collectivist to individualist perspective, Hayes and Hudson noted that, 
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We were sceptical of the idea of an autonomous correlation between changes 
in working class social structure and changes in working class political 
behaviour. We chose to look at the social and political attitudes of the skilled 
working class to see if in fact these changes had eroded a sense of working 
class identity in the light of a clear falling off in the vote for Labour. We found 
that Basildon's C2's did not conform in any way to the academic stereotype of 
what they were supposed to be. The key point to highlight here is the neglect 
of the essentially aspirant nature of the skilled working class. (Hayes and 
Hudson 2001: 14 (my emphasis)) 
The support for the Conservatives was here found to be less connected to structural 
changes or to an acceptance of Thatcherite 'ideological convictions' than to a negative 
experience of Labour's welfarism, connected with poverty and an individual, 
pragmatic aspiration for self improvement. Rather than the working class having being 
transformed by a hegemonic Thatcherism, the authors stated that 'the results of the 
Basildon survey reveal that conservative policies are not capable of enthusing 
anybody. If anything, it is the lack of popular attachment to the Conservative 
programme that needs to be explained' (2001: 65). 
Ideas of the free individual subject were associated with free market theorists in the 
1980s. However, as Heartfield argues, the problems of the eighties, at a time of 
TINA, 53 became associated not with the failures of the market, but as a problem of 
freedom itself. 
The communitarians criticised subjective freedom because they took on face 
value the claims of the Thatcher and Reagan governments to represent 
individual freedom. Their response was ultimately a conservative response to 
the socially corrosive effects of market policies. But because the argument that 
there was no alternative to the market had been won, the culprit identified for 
the problems of the eighties was the selfish individual (Heartfield 2002: 154). 
Within realist and feminist criminology the problematisation was often of the active 
subject itself. Freedom, without a positive belief in social change, was increasingly 
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seen as being problematic and indeed dangerous. Aspiration became greed, self 
reliance became machismo, and active subjective engagement with others increasingly 
became understood within the Foucauldian framework of. power and its abuse. 54 The 
Foucauldian understanding of society, with its problematisation of subjectivity 
(Heartfield 2002: 20) and its pessimism about human action, also became more 
influential at this time; an understanding, as Stone explained, within which we find 'a 
denial of the Enlightenment as an advance in human understanding and sensibility', 
with a 'recurrent emphasis on control, domination, and punishment as the only 
mediating qualities possible in personal relations' (Harpham 1999: 68). 
Like the risk theorists' understanding of human knowledge as destructive, here too the 
free action of individuals was increasingly understood to be damaging rather than 
creative. Instead of being subjective actors, through the prism of the victim and 
notions of vulnerability, the public increasingly became understood as being 
'subjected to' by selfish, abusive villains. Replicating their own disengagement with 
positive subjective (or political) action this trend to conceptualise subjective activity 
in a negative or diminished light became a foundation stone upon which the politics of 
New Labour was established: a politics, or more accurately a 'process', without a 
subject (Heartfield 2002: 174). 
Regulating the culture of greed 
The outlook of members of the Labour PartY towards crime was transformed in the 
time span between the early 1980s and the rnid 1990s. A few examples of this change, 
appeared in the Guardian newspaper on 30 January 1996 and are given below. 
1982: 'Five years of Sir Kenneth Newman as Metropolitan Police Commissioner could 
leave the working class areas of (London) in as much the same state as the Catholic 
areas ofNorthern Ireland. ' (Ken Livingston, GLC Chairman, later MP for Brent). 
1985: After the death of PC Keith Blakelock at the Broadwater Farm riots, Bemie 
Grant, who became Labour MP for Tottenham two years later, said the police got a 
"bloody good hiding. "' 
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1993: 'We should be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime. ' (Tony Blair). 
1995: 'Law and order is a Labour issue. We all suffer crime, the poorest and 
vulnerable most of all. It is the duty of the government to protect them. ' (Tony Blair). 
These quotes give not only a taste of the change in the approach to crime within the 
Labour Party, but equally a sense of the transformation of what was a more 
confrontational and radical opposition to policing by left-wing Labour members in the 
1980s. By the early 1990s a number of key trends had emerged that helped this 
transformation: the collapse of the left and the labour movement, the acceptance of the 
market as the only way of running society, and the increasing centrality of the victim 
in criminal discourse. The victim and the vulnerable public, discussed above, could 
not become the core of the approach to crime while the political contestation between 
left and right continued. The conservative promotion of the active individual55 and the 
socialist engagement with the 'collective subject' of the working class declined in the 
1990s, and the more subjectless image of the victim became increasingly central to a 
diminished political elite. 
Fitzpatrick argues that whereas the working class for much of the twentieth century 
had been understood by conservatives 'as the source of instability in society', with its 
retreat from the political stage, 'perceptions of a more diffuse threat [arose] from 
trends towards social disintegration' (Fitzpatrick 2001: 91). This new, more 
amorphous sense of anxiety, as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, came about 
in part because of a sense of loss by the political elite, both left and right, of a social 
and political purpose that resulted in a generalised tendency to panic and to 
institutionalise anxiety. Increasingly the n-jicro-politics that developed focused less on 
attempting to change society, or challenging the morals of the public, and moved to 
the management of the more psychologically posed 'behaviour' of individuals 
(Finlayson 2003; Muncie 1999: 285). 
Despite left realisms increasing focus upon crime as a social problem, its 
understanding of this problem remained, in part, associated with deprivation. This 
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understanding also remained within the ranks of New Labour, but with their 
acceptance of the market, the question of deprivation was transformed into a more 
psychologically founded idea of social inclusion, and the problem of crime again was 
connected more to the attitudes and values of the public than to issues of social 
inequality. 
Despite New Labour's endorsement of the market, crime was seen as a problem 
generated within the entire culture of a selfish society. However because of this 
endorsement, it was not the market that was understood as the problem so much as the 
Thatcherite 'values' embodied within the prevailing culture. 
Somewhat ironically, following Tony Blair's denouncement of the 'self-interested' 
culture that was 'tearing apart the social fabric of society', in 1996 Margaret Thatcher 
felt the need to dampen down the concern about this endemic nature of crime and 
greed, arguing that 'Crime and violence are not the result of the great majority of 
people being free - they are the result of a small minority of wicked men and women 
abusing their freedom' (Heartfield 2002: 198). For Thatcher freedom was a positive 
thing abused by the few; for Blair, this freedom was understood more problematically 
within the perceived culture of greed. While problematising this culture of greed and 
viewing crime as endemic, particular attention was given to those who were 
understood to embody these selfish antisocial 'values' - the disconnected 
'underwolveS'56 who had the capacity to 'ruin pretty much everyone's quality of life' 
(Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995: 108). 
Disconnected therapy 
The coupling of political disorientation with an understanding of the public as being 
victimised by antisocial behaviour led to an increasing attempt in the 1990s by the 
political elite, and particularly New Labour, to re-engage the disconnected public 
through its fear of crime. The rights campaigned for by the Labour leadership were 
not classical rights and freedoms of the individual, but the right to be protected - the 
right to a 'quiet life'. Community Safety emerged, particularly after Labour's election 
in 1997, as a key organising principle for local authorities, and community 
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'participation' developed around this safety agenda, predicated on an engagement with 
a more passive and fearful public. 
Within the framework of TINA, the economic and political contestation of left and 
right was lost and social policy developments increasingly took on an individual and 
managerial orientation. Social problems were now largely understood with reference 
to the minutiae of everyday life, rather than to grand social visions based on political 
or moral principles and beliefs. Without the economic and political framework of the 
past, the fragmented public was engaged with as individuals - but more particularly as 
emotionally constituted individuals. Expressing how you felt and engaging with the 
feelings of the public increasingly became the basis of political rhetoric and the 
justification for social policy interventions. However, within the framework of 
diminished subjectivity, 'therapeutic man' was understood not as a vibrant and strong 
character, but as more fragile individual who needed emotional protection and 
support. 
A more therapeutic relationship with the public was developed by New Labour with 
their concern for the victims of crime, the fear of crime, and with their challenge to the 
'thoughtless, insensitive' and 'cruel' treatment of these victims by the criminal justice 
system (Labour 1993: 22). 'Freeing people from the fear of crime', was now the 
'greatest liberty government [could] guarantee' (Labour 1996: 6). Subsequently, the 
management of the emotions - the anxieties and fears - of individuals was now more 
central to the concerns about crime and disorder in society. 
Within this cultural and political framework, a trend has developed for 'victim' groups 
to emerge, where individuals find meaning through their experience of crime. 
Mothers' campaigns, for example, have developed in the last decade, supported by the 
unquestioned moral weight that victimhood provides. Following the model of the 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving campaign, that was launched in America in 1980, a 
variety of 'Mothers Against' groups have been formed in Britain. Beginning with 
Mothers Against Murder and Aggression in 1993 there are now mothers' campaigns 
against drugs, violence, guns, knives, crime and telecommunication masts. These 
4victim' groups have almost all been generated by the personal loss of a child or loved 
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one, relate to safety issues, and have campaigned for new laws and regulations to 
prevent the same thing happening to others. Promoting the awareness of problems of 
crimes, Ms Shakespeare of Mothers Against Crime explained in 2004 that 'Nobody is 
safe' (Birmingharn Evening Mail 11 March 2004). 
'Awareness' campaigns give out the message that you need to be more fearful than 
you are, and attract significant media interest and political support. The cultural 
validation given to campaigns of this sort acts as a further spur to the spiral of crime 
panics, and is predicated upon the incontestable amoral absolute of the victim. 
Speaking 'from the heart', the emotions of a mother who has lost a child, within a 
therapeutic culture, are not only very difficult to challenge, but are often actively 
courted by the political elite, who attempt to regain legitimacy by displaying their 
emotional awareness. 
As James Nolan has noted with reference to state legitimation, the therapeutic ethos 
has become central to the justification of the state. In the UK, like the USA, a 
therapeutic relationship with the public has developed at the same time as a more 
punitive approach to criminal justice emerged. Both of these developments can be 
understood as a more alienated engagement between the individual and the state - an 
engagement without a social or moral basis for individual or collective action. 
Describing this therapeutic development within the criminal justice system and the 
changing relationship between the state and the criminal, Nolan notes: 
Where once the self was to be brought into conformity with the standards of 
externally derived authorities and social institutions, it now is compelled to 
look within ... In other words, the contemporary cultural condition 
is such that 
externally derived points of moral reference are not available to individuals as 
they once were. Instead, cultural standards for judgement, guideposts for 
actions, understandings of oneself, and the tools for navigating through social 
life are likely to be rooted in the self. (Nolan 1998: 3) 
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The problem of crime and disorder in this respect relates, less to the laws of society 
and the upholding of these laws by the state as an expression of the 'general will' than 
to the protection of the emotional well-being of the individual. Policing has therefore 
become founded more on the fears of individuals than in carrying out the will of the 
public, and a more directly therapeutic relationship has developed between the 
'authorities and the individual. 
Furedi also notes that adults and children are today 'continually invited to make sense 
of their troubles through the medium of therapeutics. 
Take the example of crime. The belief that the impact of crime has a major 
influence on people's emotional life is a relatively recent one. Back in the 
1970s, crime surveys tended to suggest that the impact of most crime on the 
victim was superficial and of relatively short duration ... But during the past 25 
years, criminologists have adopted a radically different interpretation of the 
effects of victimisation (Furedi 2004: 112). 
For Furedi, a dialectical relationship has been established where cultural and 
institutional practices help orient the public towards a therapeutic understanding of 
themselves and their troubles. 
Coupled with this therapeutic turn, the punitive response to crime that developed most 
fervently in the UK in the early 1990s can be understood as part of a single process in 
respect to the move away from the 'social' (Rose 1996). Within criminal justice this 
can be seen in the move from practices of traditional rehabilitation to increasingly 
locking people up or developing more self-referential therapeutic practices, 
exemplified most clearly in the drugs courts in the USA that are being developed in 
the UK. 
Nolan, examining the 'emergence of a therapeutic culture with the universal 
discrediting of rehabilitative practices', notes that the rehabilitative ideal is 'dedicated 
to the achievement of social purposes' in that it intends to 'bring the offenders' 
behaviour and attitudes into harmony with certain values socially defined. and, 
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validated'. Here the judgement about morality was seen to be based upon social norms 
not individual judgements. In contrast, the therapeutic ethos is more centrally disposed 
to 'assign ultimate moral priority to the self, over and against society' (Nolan 2001: 
179). 
Whereas the emphasis of rehabilitative or adaptational therapy was to bring the 
individual into harmony with society, [today's] therapies of liberation see 
society as oppressive and as contributing to a person's illness. Society, as it 
were. is the cause of a person's sickness (Nolan 2001: 180). 
This estrangement from social nomLs and outcomes is also reflected in the punitive 
approach to crime developed in the 1990s, in that it is similarly distanced from the 
traditional idea of rehabilitation and reforming the criminal into an upstanding citizen, 
and it more negatively attempts simply to keep criminals off the streets. The 
pessimism about social change that developed out of the 1970s' rejection of welfarism 
here takes on a more detached view of the criminal. Where the tabloids shout for more 
prisons, the more liberal therapeutic approach attempts to heal the criminal by relating 
them to their inner selves and by raising their self-esteem, or by giving emotional 
support to victims. In neither approach does the 'social' world of politics, society or 
momlity enter. 
The therapeutic concern with the victim of crime has also run in paraflcl to the 
conservative promotion of this victim - both reflecting a move away from a social 
engagement with law and order and towards a more individually oriented concern for 
the victim. But as Nolan has pointed out, Ile therapeutic emphasis on the victimised 
and emotive concerns of the self are tendentiously anticommunal', and at a time of a 
growing concern with the need to rebuild communities, he asks, 'How... can such an 
orientation effectively provide the basis for a new form of civil solidarityT (Nolan 
1998: 301). 
71e increasing centrality of the victim within the politics of crime and the engagement 
with the public based upon its vulnerability and personalfears all imply a connection 
with the individual based less upon his or her active subjective engagement with the 
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'social'than a relationship ofprotection from it. Rather than people being understood 
and engaged with as producers of their environment, individuals are conceptualised 
and engaged with as products of it. A more managerial rather than transformative 
sense of society and the 'public' has similarly emerged and is seen most clearly in the 
71ird Way projeCL 
The veneer of politics 
Examining C. Wright Mills' conception of the public as opposed to a mass, we are 
able to identify a distinction between an autonomous public that has a separate life 
from social institutions, where 'virtually as many people express opinions as receive 
them', and perhaps most importantly can 'find an outlet in effective action against, if 
necessary. prevailing systems and agents of authority. This contrasts with a mass, 
where 'far fewer people express opinions than receive them', and where 'the 
community of publics becomes an abstracted collectivity of individuals who receive 
impressions from the mass media! (Mills 1968: 355). Public opinion for Mills is 
therefore predicated upon an active ebb and now of opinion where anyone can speak 
and, most significantly, does. Action by democratic institutions thus emerges from this 
'general will' of the people. Rather than the public and the democratic institutions 
reacting to society they collectively create it. 
Today. it appears that Mills' notion of a mass society is more prevalent. 57 However. 
this development has a dialectical component and can be seen in relation to politics 
and democratic institutions themselves. Logically, the transformation of a public into 
a mass, with the implied interconnection between the public and society's institutions, 
necessarily means that this transformation could not occur unless there was an equally 
profound transformation in politics itself. If in the late twentieth century icon of the 
victim we see a more powerless, socially alienated individual - within the political 
elite, a similar development must have occurred. 
In Alan Finlayson's Making Sense of New Labour, the emergence of New Labour is 
understood to represent a move away from Politics and towards a form of social 
engagement based more on sociology. What Finlayson means by this is that the 
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government has become distant from the 'energy of society' - politics - and has 
become more of a technocratic manager of a process that it believes to be beyond its 
control. Whereas political developments are predicated upon an ideology or 
philosophy and a movement from the present to the future, politics under new Labour 
is more about a sociological examination of the facts of society and a subsequent 
develop of policies according to these facts. Having lost an engagement with the idea 
of political agency, New Labour increasingly responds to social facts, which they 
believe create certain types of behaviours (Finlayson 2003). 
For Heartfield, the Wrd Way represents a 'process without a subject' (Heartfield: 
2002: 174). Blustrated in Fairclough's examination of the language of New Labour, 
we find government documents arc increasingly expressed with 'passive sentences 
without agents' (Fairclough 2000: 24). Similarly Fairclough notes how change is 
discussed by Labour n-dnisters as a noun rather than a verb, and the absence of, 
'responsible agents further contributes to constructing change as inevitable' 
(Fairclough 2000: 26). 
Citing the examples of 'globalisation' and 'modernisation', both Finlayson (2003) and 
Heartfield (2002) suggest that these concepts, rather than reflecting profound 
economic and social changes, are rather expressions of the political elites' sense of the 
rudderless nature of society: a sense expressed by New Labour in that they are 'not the 
authors of their own destiny' (Heartfield 2002: 180). 
The search for a big idea, which has troubled political leaders in the West for the last 
decade. gives an indication of the dislocation of the political elite from social 
processes. Where ideas previously emerged from society and the conflicting tensions 
and movements within it, today the new political elite believes think-tanks and policy 
officers can invent thern. Dislocated from a public, acting more as sociologists than as 
Political parties, and attempting to engage with a society that feels beyond their 
control, the political elites' own sense of anxiety and alienation has developed into a 
propensity to engage individuals through their personal insecurities. 71ie elites' own 
sense of diminished subjectivity helps them to both understand themselves and the 
public through the prism of the victinL 
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As well as the political elite reacting to society through their own sense of anxiety, 
being dislocated from the public and from a social will, they are inclined to search for 
points of contacted with the electorate. Participation subsequently becomes an aim in 
itself and has, through the 1990s and into the twcnty-first century, become 
increasingly developed at a micro, or local level - the community (Gilling 1999, Rose 
1996 and Flint 2002). As Alice Miles has pointed out, with reference to the move to 
regional governments and the rise of Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), 'Our 
rulers are in denial about the big issues and are seeking refuge in little things'(Times 3 
November 2004). 
While politicising little things'. the role of govemance has also developed, 
increasingly incorporating institutions, both voluntary and state-run, in the 
management of initiatives that attempt to regulate society more systematically and 
often engage with the public through issues of community safety (Rose 1996). Many 
of these institutions, for example trade unions, as discussed above, or housing 
associations and departments (Cummings 1997; Flint 2002, ) have also been 
transformed and subsequently developed a relationship with their consumers or clients 
based on the protection and regulation of their behaviour and that of their neighbours. 
Finally, and in reMon to the changed operation of politics, organisations like the 
police have become more directly involved in the participatory concerns of the state. 
With antisocial behaviour - noise, graffiti, vandalism and so on - being understood to 
'undermine community spirit' (Waiton 2001: 17), the police themselves have, 
according to one Chief Constable, become 'formidable agents of change' (Dennis 
1997: 116). As 'agents of change' within a therapeutic culture, the primary objective 
of the police in late twentieth century life has increasingly been transformed from 
enforcing law and order. into an objective where the 'feel safe factor is the primary 
measure'. against which they believe they should be judged (Dennis 1997: 12 1). 
That the police in Britain can today understand themselves as having a role in 
rebuilding communities by their own actions, rather than in their relationship with the 
state and as an extension of the social will, gives a sense of the loss of this will, the 
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increasingly technical approach to community building, and the growing centrality of 
safety to individual, public and political life. 
The politics of fear 
'Safety' as an amoral absolute under New Labour has developed apace, and the 
attempt to regulate social processes that appear to be beyond their control has led to 
more laws and more new crimes being created than by any other administration. " 
Relating to a more fragmented public there is simultaneously an attempt to reconnect 
with people through their fears. Safety has consequently become the organising 
principle of the politics of fear. As HearTield notes, whereas the Tliird Way in the UK 
and USA has failed to connect people to a social vision, this does not mean that they 
have made no connection: 'If they have failed to appeal to a collective vision of the 
future, both the Democrats and New Labour have managed to relate to a more 
atomised electorate. by playing upon its fears' (Heartf ield 2002: 195). 
New Laboues campaign advisor Philip Gould, in his 1994 document 'Fighting the 
Fear Factoe, argues that the public are insecure and anxious and are more inclined to 
fear that things may get worse rather than better. Given these circumstances Gould 
believed that the right had used fear as a way of gaining support. Despite Gould noting 
that much of this anxiety had developed because of social changes, and despite his 
concern with the reactionary use of fear, his proposals were for Labour to connect 
'With the populist instincts of voters through policies that are tough on crime'. In 
Gould's book 7he Unfinished Revolution he expWns: 'Progressive parties have learned 
to ... connect directly with the insecurities of working families'. and that this is 
necessary because 'in an increasingly fast-changing world, insecurity is likely to grow, 
and with it the basis for fear campaigning' (Heartf ield 2002: 195). 
New Labour developed their own form of fear campaigning, and did so more 
systernatically than the Conservatives by relating not to the public with politics, but to 
the mass of individuals through their fears and anxieties. 
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Ile killing of James Bulger in 1993, a year when, as we have seen, the Conservative 
Party's moral and political coherence was on the wane, provided an ideal platform 
from which Tony Blair could launch Labour's alternative fear factor. Rather than 
being seen as a one-off occurrence perpetrated by children who lacked the inoral 
responsibility to be fully aware of their actions, Blair used Bulgcr's death to promote a 
new morality that emphasised responsibility over selfish individualisn-L Discussing 
Blair's reaction to this event and also denouncing sociologists who had previously 
talked about 'moral panics. the editor of the Independent newspaper wrote, 
Tony Blair, the shadow Home Secretary, did not exaggerate on Friday when he 
likened the news bulletins of the last week to "hammer blows struck against 
the sleeping conscience of the country, urging us to wake up and look 
unflinchingly at what we see". This was not - as it once might have been -a 
party political argument which sought directly to connect the murder in Bootle 
of two-year-old James Bulger with unemployment and deprivation: the failures 
of capitalism equal crime, the economic system is to blame. As Blair went on: 
"We cannot live in a moral vacuum. If we do not learn and then teach the value 
of what is right and wrong, then the result is simply moral chaos which engulfs 
us all. " (Independent, 21 February 1993) 
7le fear factor was here turned against the Conservative government and the previous 
understanding of responsibility - related to adult subjects - was replaced by the 
responsibilisation of those who were previously understood to be unable to be morally 
responsible - the two children who killed James Bulger - and by a notion of 
responsibility that actually targeted the idea of rights-bearing responsible individuals, 
replacing it with a more communitarian understanding of rights and responsibilities. 
Below the same Independent editorial is quoted at length, with reference to Blair's 
concern with moral chaos. It sums up much of what had changed in political life by 
1993. and also what was to come. 
A Tory theologian - John Patten, say - could have said [what Blair had said] 
and few would have noticed. But we are all becoming moralists now - even 
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Ken Livingstone has come out of the closet - and rightly so. We have lost all 
sense of direction; we mostly despise our political leadership; ancient 
institutions combine humour and pathos; the economy crumbles. President Bill 
Clinton across the Atlantic may not be totally sincere - in terms of global 
resources his is the most seUtsh society - and he may fail. But there is at least 
in his rhetoric an appeal to sacrifice for the common good, and to a sharing of 
values and beliefs, that no government minister could hope to match here, 
because Conservatism since Tbatcher simply does not allow it. Our men at the 
top cling stubbornly to what one Japanese commentator described recently as 
"a kind of inverted Marxism". Ibcir dogma is purely economic individualism, 
with occasional forays into Old Testament certainties (John Patten) and the 
criminal-spawning tendencies of socialist local authorities (John Major, at his 
silliest) to explain away the glaring failures of British society. (Independent, 
21 February 1993 (my italics)). 
Conclusion 
Crime panics developed apace in the 1990s under John Major, while New Labour 
promoted the message of personal and moral responsibility. Cook, looking at the 
question of crime and moral panics argues, that in the 1970s and 1980s one could 
make the case that little had changed in British political life (Cook 2000: 207). 
However, in reality, this thesis has attempted to show that in fact, like the shift in 
panics from their moral to an amoral form, the politics of crime and antisocial 
behaviour in Britain reflected a profound change within politics. As Cook herself 
notes, a key change was in the collapse of the Labour movement. But this was no side 
issue - it was a change that transformed the nature of crime policies in the 1990s. No 
longer was the politics of crime pail of a wider political struggle between the left and 
right. but rather the increasing focus on the regulation of behaviour and the more 
direct attempt to regulate society was a rcflection of the collapse of politics itself. The 
regulation and control of society was no longer a means to an end but the end in itself. 
Political goals associated with individual cntrcprcneurialism or with socialism were 
now replaced by a more ubiquitous drive to create a safe society. Rather than 
engaging active subjects within these political campaigns, the more fragmented public 
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became vulnerable clients on whose behalf the new political elite advocated. This new 
politics of behaviour, like the amoral panics that accompanied it, engaged neither with 
individual subjects nor with a social or collective vision, but rather developed a more 
limited and therapeutic form of protection of individuals through the management of 
behaviour. 
By the time of the 1997 general election, as the Guardian law correspondent noted, all 
parties' proposals on law and order were about 'public reassurance rather than crime- 
fighting' (Guardian 16 April 1997). Within six months the Hamilton curfew had been 
implemented. 
Before this election the ailing Conservative Party had continued in vain to use the 
crime card as its own and attempt to label Labour as soft on crime. Where the 
previous Labour shadow home secretary Roy Hattersley, in the late 1980s, had made 
civil liberties the key test of the government's criminal justice legislation, Tony Blair 
argued that 'reducing crime had to be the first test and civil liberties the second' 
(Guardian 30 January 1996). Labour had been transformed as a political party that 
was now even more able than the Conservatives to play the crime card and in effect 
transform what liberty meant, from freedom of action to freedom from the action of 
others. 
With an anxious and fragmented electorate supporting a more regulated environment, 
New Labour followed on from John Major in developing a new authoritarianism 
based on the protection of a vulnerable public. This new authoritarianism, through the 
prism of diminished subjectivity, was largely welcomed within society - if without 
any great passion. As such, authoritarianism became understood to a degree as a more 
enlightened engagement with the real world and with the fears of real people, than as a 
form of social control by a diminished political elite over a diminished public. 
The transformation of the image of the public, 59 from political subjects to pitied 
victims, had emerged with the suspension of politics, the change in left-wing thought 
from radical to real, and the increasingly fragmented nature of the public itself. While 
the trend towards a more individuated society, the greater disengagement from 
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politics, and the loss of belief by sections of the elite can be identified many decades 
earlier, in the 1980s and peaking in the early 1990s we can see a qualitative change in 
the politics of crime and the relationship between the public and the political elite. 
The rise of a more technically authoritarian politics was predicated upon the collapse 
of political contestation between left and right: a collapse that left the Conservative 
Party without a coherent 'enemy within' to organise itself against, and one which 
helped to disengage the Labour Party from the 'old' labour movement. Both parties 
increasingly isolated from public life, reacted to events by attempting to control a 
society that they felt was beyond their control. 
Despite the desire for 'community', 60 the sentiment of 'to hell with the criminal' in the 
1990s increasingly represented the d6-moralised elites' underlying approach to 
humanity that implied 'to hell with society' and the social, and indeed, 'to hell with 
politics'. The role of micro politics was now increasingly reduced to the management 
of and engagement with the fragmented and anxious individual at the 'local level'. 
Laws, legislation and an anxious form of authoritarianism developed under John 
Major and erupted under New Labour. As Garside observed: 'Since 1997 more than 
20 crime-related Bills have been debated by parliament. More than 270 new offences 
and at least 350 regulations have been created since 2000' (Garside 2004: 7). Here, as 
Heartfield notes, Labour pursued through legislative activity what it lacked in broader 
purpose (Heartfield 2002: 1904) 
Vulnerability, a category given to specific 'groups' that classified them as in need of 
protection by their very nature of being black, women, or poor, increasingly became a 
term used for ever more groups in society and ultimately to the population as a whole. 
Clainismaking on behalf of 'victims' similarly developed in this period and carried 
with it moral weight that united radicals and conservatives and became a framework 
of relating to society that was difficult to challenge. Soon almost all claims for groups 
in society began to take this form of protecting victims and the vulnerable: the 
aggressive beggar preyed upon the vulnerable public, while the vulnerable beggar was 
a victim of aggressive members of the public; and the antisocial youth made life hell 
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for vulnerable communities, while alternatively aggressive policing victimised these 
young people. 
As the editor of the Independent argued in 1993, 'we have lost all sense of direction' - 
but on a positive note he recognised that 'we are all becoming moralists now - even 
Ken Livingstone' (Independent, 21 February 1993). The lost sense of direction 
reflected the loss of political and moral belief amongst those in authority, but the 
problem was understood as one of disorder not within the elite itself but within the 
public and in particular with the selfish individualism that was believed to have 
infested the culture of British life. 
The crisis of belief and the loss of political direction and a social will encouraged both 
a tendency to regulate society more directly and lock more people up, but also to 
moralise about 'little things. The minutiae of everyday life, the focus on community, 
and the engagement with the 'troubles' of the public, became the basis of political 
action and explains the rise of not only the politics of crime but more specifically the 
politics of antisocial behaviour. 61 Lacking a 'vision thing', the demand that the public 
learn the difference between right and wrong was no longer founded upon a moral or 
political basis, but on the more vacuous amoral absolute of safety. The beliefs and 
behaviour of people was to become judged not in terms of their relationship with 
society and their public actions, but on the personal interactions that was 
problematised through the radical language of harassment and abuse - the ultimate act 
of responsibility being a 'zero tolerance' approach to personal and public life. 
C Wright Mills, discussing the need to help constitute an active public, believed that 
for this to occur the 'troubles' of everyday life needed to be made into 'issues' (Mills 
1968). These troubles, Mills felt, could only be fully understood by being situated 
within society as a whole and transformed into 'issues' that could then be addressed 
by the public. Rather than troubles, it was 'issues' that would then become understood 
as the social problems to address. The 'troubles' of local communities before the 
1990s were generally not made into social problems. However, with the loss of a 
political and social will, these troubles have been engaged with more directly and in a 
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sense the political elite, backed up by key institutions including the trade unions, have, 
rather than making 'issues' out of troubles, made troubles the issue. 
The problems of everyday life, in the form of antisocial behaviour, rather than crime 
itself, have under the New Labour governments become the basis of politics and the 
newly institutionalised framework within which to reengage the atomised individual. 
Having lost a social will (Feeley and Simon 1992) and the energy of society 
(Findlayson 2003) to redirect social process and structures, a therapeutic culture 
(Furedi 2004) has developed within which state institutions relate not only to 
individuals and 'little things', but to the emotions associated with thern. 62 Initially 
developed within the welfare state in the form of Victim Support Schemes, with the 
collapse of the welfare state, the emotionally constituted (and damaged) victim has 
become universalised, and state legitimation has been reconstituted in relationship to 
the emotionally vulnerable public. 
Finally, whatever the problem of crime and antisocial behaviour, it is not the nature of 
these problems themselves that have led to them becoming social problems in the 
form they now take. Despite the insecurities felt by the more fragmented public and 
the relatively high statistical crime rate, there remains a tendency for politicians to 
exaggerate still further the problem of antisocial behaviour and fear within 
neighbourhoods that are understood to be 'tefforised' by antisocial youth. 
As Cummings argues with the respect to former Labour home secretary David 
Blunkett's belief that reducing antisocial behaviour will create a rise in civil 
republicanism: 
A crucial point missed by most commentators is that the fear of crime is an 
expression of atornisation rather than a cause of it. And except in a few 
extreme cases, it is a nagging sense of unease rather than crippling fear that 
people feel, even in rough areas. People generally get on with their lives, while 
worrying that they are vulnerable to unspecified threats. The politics of 
antisocial behaviour gives shape to these threats by focusing people's unease 
on clear targets, typically young loiterers. This institutionalises atomisation 
III 
rather than overcoming it by officially endorsing a fearful attitude and 
undermining people's confidence in their ability to negotiate problems without 
official support (O'Malley and Waiton 2005: 7). 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
Introduction 
The motivation for studying the Hamilton Child Safety Initiative (CSI) came from my 
existing concern and research into the developing 'Zero Tolerance' police initiatives 
being introduced by Strathclyde Police in the mid- I 990s (Waiton 2001: 5). 'Operation 
Spotlight', a stop and search initiative, had been of particular concern to me, as I was, 
at the time, running a youth drop-in centre in Coatbridge and had noted the level of 
searches of young people taking place by the local police force, and the level of 
intervention into their activities. 63 
One of the key arguments made about why the CSI would be beneficial to the targeted 
areas was that it would help to recreate a sense of community by reducing the number 
of children and young people who were 'wandering the streets at night' - young people 
who to some extent were believed to be helping to create a sense of fear in these areas. 
However, and somewhat paradoxically, research was also being developed at this time 
about the broader trend within society of the emergence of 'cotton-wool kids'. Rather 
than young people and children wandering the streets, this research suggested that the 
opposite development was more generally true - that children were having an 
increasingly regulated existence, playing out less frequently, travelling less, and 
having their free time ever more supervised. 64 
Similarly research examining the relationships between children, young people and 
adults had also suggested that the amount and quality of contact between generations 
was in decline, in part because of a loss of surety and confidence amongst adults as to 
what these relationships should be predicated upon (Furedi and Brown 1997). Situated 
within a knowledge of moral panics research and the more recent theoretical 
developments of a culture of fear (Furedi 1997), risk (Beck 1992) and individuation in 
society, a research project was developed to analyse the development of the CSI. - 
113 
As well as analYsing the projected social problems in the areas of crime, youth 
disorder and children being 'at risk', this research project also aimed to assess wider 
trends within the targeted communities. Rather than analyse to what degree fear was 
being created by young people, the project aimed to ascertain to what extent a culture 
of fear was undermining relationships between all sections of the community, and 
limiting the contact between them. Within this framework, the question being posed 
was: to what degree is the curfew actually reinforcing the culture of fear, reducing 
contact between people and ultimately undermining, rather than re-forming, 
communities? The purpose of the research was therefore to understand the operation 
of a particular social policy and its development within, and impact upon, the culture 
of fear. 
The research took a variety of forms, but at its heart were interviews with childrenand 
young people in the areas of Hamilton whose lives had been impacted upon by the 
introduction of the curfew. Added to this are more informal interviews - or 
discussions - with local adults, and observational fieldwork of the area. This work is 
supplemented by a contextual social constructionist analysis of the presentation and 
understanding of the curfew, particularly in the press. Within the Idtter research, the 
process of typification 65 is identified as is the justificatory framework and therefore 
the underlying values that informed the introduction and defence, and indeed the 
opposition, to the CSI. Through this work the very meaning of a 'good' community is 
analysed and re-connected to the. concepts developed in the previous chapter of the 
moral, or more accurately amoral, absolute of safety and the idea of diminished 
subjectivity. The ontological framework of this research is therefore largely focused 
upon individual interpretations and cultural frameworks, and attempts to understand 
lived experiences and cultural trends that inform these experiences and interpretations 
(Mason 1996: 11). 
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Numbers interviewed 
A table of the number of children and young people interviewed, and the number of 
discussions held with adults living in and around Hillhouse, is provided below in 
Table 1. In Table 2 some more details are given about the ages of the children and 
young people interviewed. Furtlýer information about these statistics is provided later. 
Table 2: Number of interviews and discussions in Hamilton 
Number of children aged 9-11 years old interviewed 32 
Sex of children 17 female 
15 male 
Number of young people 12-15 years old interviewed 26 
Sex of young people 13 female 
13 male 
Number of adults involved in discussions 20 
Sex of adults 7 female 
13 male 
Total number of interviews and discussions in Hillhouse 78 
Total number of children and young people interviewed 58 
Table 3: Ages of children and young people interviewed 
Primary Schools Secondary Schools Total 
Children 
Age 9 yrs 10yrs II yrs 12 yrs 13 yrs 14 yrs 15 yrs 
_ Number 3 25 4 3 7 7 1 9 58 
Interviewed 1 1 1 
Research methods 
As well as the semi-structured interview and the contextual constructionist work, 
which will be explored in some detail below, other research methods were used to 
develop a broad understanding of the Hamilton curfew. 
Observation of one key targeted area helped form a picture of the estate in ques, "lion 
and give a sense of its nature and the activities of young people at night. 66 This 
115 
fieldwork also included informal discussions with adults in and around this estate, 
which helped the understanding of some adult interpretations of events, and in 
particular gave a more detailed background to developments. Finally, telephone 
conversations and written statements were gained from various children's charities, 
which helped to supplement the construction of the social problems reflected in the 
press and in speeches of key claimsmakers. 
Observations 
When news of the forthcoming Child Safety Initiative broke I visited the largest of the 
three targeted areas to get an idea of the 'ghetto' which Hillhouse was, to some extent, 
being portrayed as. There were 12 visits to the area in total, two at the weekend during 
the day, 10 during the week -5 of these at night. These visits consisted largely of 
'drive throughs' where the whole estate was driven around a number of times. 
Although this could only provide a snapshot of the estate, it brought the area 'to life' 
and gave a picture of the number of privately owned houses, the state of the gardens, 
and the amount of graffiti and boarded up housing. This fieldwork also allowed a 
more detailed understanding of the 'rough streets' that were mentioned by the adults 
and children who were met in Hillhouse. 67 
As well as allowing a familiarity with the area, this observational work also gave an 
idea of where children and young people went at night, where they played and where 
they hung around. It also gave a limited opportunity to see to what degree young 
children were 'roaming the streets' late at night, as was argued by the authorities. 
The area was visited in this way four times before the curfew was implemented and 
eight times during the initial month of its inception - including the launch day, when 
the streets were 'invaded' by the press and camera crews. Conscious of the potentially 
suspicious nature of driving around the estate at night observing children - especially 
at a time when child safety and the threat of paedophiles were being raised as a 
possible problem for parents - this work was carried out with a female colleague and 
the 'drive throughs' were carried out, in the main, without stopping and drawing 
attention to ourselveS. 68 71be estate was also walked through a number of times, again 
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with a female colleague, both before and after the curfew's introduction. This allowed 
more time to observe the estate and the young people who were out at night. 
In and of itself, this work could only provide a partial glimpse of the estate and the 
activities of young people, and was largely used to gain a 'feeling' of the area and 
acquire a certain amount of local knowledge and detail about the Hillhouse estate. 
This estate was chosen simply because it was the largest of the three curfew-targeted 
areas and, as it turned out, was also the area that was chosen by the police and the 
Scottish Human Rights Centre, for much of their research. At the time I was unaware 
of any other research taking place in Hillhouse. 
Local adults 
The key focus of the research in Hillhouse was always intended to be with children 
and young people in the area. However, discussions with 20 adults also helped to give 
another perspective on the curfew and the issues of concern to older generations in 
Hillhouse and in Hamilton more generally. 
The development of the Hamilton curfew, as it was labelled in the local newspaper, 
was a significant talking-point amongst local people and offered the opportunity to 
discuss the pros and cons of this initiative. Initially I began talking to adults at bus 
stops simply out of interest in their understanding of the curfew. After the first of 
these discussions, it became clear that this informal and moderately nondirective form 
of conversation could offer valuable qualitative information and subsequently notes 
were taken after each of these discussions. This form of note-taking had its 
drawbacks, in terms of recollection and the accurate recording of what was said, and 
there was a danger that 'sound bites' rather than detailed narratives were recorded. In 
general, key points and specific quotes were gained from this work, and again helped 
to build up a picture of the local understanding of social problems and of the curfew 
itself. Part of these conversations, sometimes spontaneously, sometimes through 
questioning, would discuss young people today compared with these adults, own 
youth, in the process off6ring life histories and a sense of how people felt 'times had 
changed'. 69 Seven adults from Hamilton were 'interviewed'in this way and a further 
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seven from Hillhouse itselL These latter discussions took place on the street during the 
day outside a newsagent's. Some insight was therefore gained about the curfew from 
those on the 'outside' and those within the targeted area. 
With all of these discussions, the adults were informed at some stage that I was 
carrying out research into the curfew, and, largely due to the newsworthy nature of the 
issue, people were, generally keen to give their view of it. None of these informal 
discussions led to gaining personal details of these adults which, in hindsight, could 
have been useful for follow-up interviews. 
There was also a separate 'cascading' process of interviews that developed with adults 
in Hillhouse. This was generated after contacting a local councillor who gave me the 
name of a local activist, who then gave me another named individual to talk to about 
the curfew. This process led to 6 more interviews with adults in Hillhouse and was 
occasionally connected to specifically-named individuals being suggested to me by 
other interviewees because they had a 'story to tell'. These stories were often 
connected to issues and incidents in the local press that these named individuals had 
some direct experience of. This process was in part a form of investigation into events 
and claims made about the curfew as they unravelled. 
These interviews were often with key adults within the area, often with more active 
older men who were involved in the local politics and community groups in their area 
and were therefore not representative. However, their more active involvement in the 
locality was of interest in and of itself, in terms of the outlook that these adults had 
about young people compared with some of the other adults in the area. 
Initially interviewing the local Labour councillor, this led to a meeting with the chair 
of the community council who helped run a youth club, who then gave me telephone 
numbers for other local adults who had an opinion about the curfew - some in favour, 
and some who opposed it. Eventually, through this process, I interviewed a member of 
the Hillhouse Citizen's Jury, which was of importance at the time as it was this Jury 
that the local MP had stated had come up with the idea of the curfew in the first place. 
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All of these interviews were carried out informally and with the exception of the 
councillor and community council chair they Were all carried out by telephone. All of 
these adults were made aware of the purpose of the discussion and were specifically 
asked about being quoted in this work. 
With all of the above work with adults, the aim was to gain a general understanding of 
problems, issues, and the outlooks of local adults. As such the recording of these 
conversations was less detailed than the interviews with the children, as was the 
framework for questioning these adults. More detailed thoughts could have been 
systematised with a formal questionnaire-framed interview, although this would have 
limited some of the 'stories' being told by these adults, which were of particular 
importance at the time. 
In the process of discussing the curfew with all of the above adults, the primary 
concern they expressed, in terms of my impact upon their responses, was a concern 
about whether or not I was 'with the papers' - in other words, whether I was a 
journalist. There was a level of suspicion about the press by a number of adults - 
especially those people living in Hillhouse itself and more particularly from those who 
were upset at the image being portrayed of Hillhouse. Once it was explained that my 
work was a piece of research and that their comments would be anonymously 
recorded, there was little resistance to the questions I raised. In the 'cascading' 
interviews the fact that 'their names' had been given to me by somebody known to the 
individuals also helped to gain a level of confidence that may have otherwise been less 
forthcoming - especially when the interviews were carried out over the telephone. 
Interviews in schools 
From the standpoint of an existing concern with the 'regulation of youth' with respect 
to 'Zero Tolerance' policing in Strathclyde, the key focus for this research was on the 
impact of the curfew on children and young people in Hillhouse. The Child Safety 
Initiative, by its very name, was clearly focused upon the life and activities of young 
people, and in its actualisation was clearly targeted at transforming these activities in 
some way. It therefore appeared to be most important to ascertain the actual impact 
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this initiative had both upon the activities themselves and the perceptions of children 
and young people in the curfewed area of Hillhouse. This was seen as doubly 
important given the limited extent to which the 'child's voice' is aired in public 
discourse and media representations generally, and specifically in relation to the CSI. 
These interviews were therefore essential for 'generating data' that would otherwise 
have been unobtainable (Mason 1996: 39) 
Due to the detailed nature of the information that was required to analyse the impact 
of the curfew, the length of the interview (around 20 minutes), and also the nature of 
relationships between young and old, an interview process with individuals within a 
school setting was established. This work was carried out through one-to-one 
interviews in three local primary and two local secondary schools. In so doing I was 
conscious that this aspect of the research was taking young people away from the 
I natural' setting within which the curfew would be operating, and could be problematic 
in terms of the formal setting of the school. 
Schools were chosen as the venue for these interviews, rather than homes, partly 
because of the ease of access to the young people, and the speed with which these 
interviews could take place. At the time, the speed of accessing the young people was 
felt to be important, so that the initial response to the implementation of the curfew 
could be established. It was also felt that interviews in these young people's homes 
might be more restrictive in terms of the capacity to have privacy for these young 
people to 'speak their minds'. 
Street interviews would have been more difficult, in terms of the detailed nature of the 
questionnaire and could also have led to peer influences on the interviewee. This 
could have limited the interview, but it may also have produced more relevant results - 
in that in a group some of these young people may have been more 'up front' and 
assertive in their opinions about the curfew (Christensen and James 2000: 103). 
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Despite this drawback, the benefits of interviewing children and young people in 
schools were felt to outweigh the problems and therefore this approach was adopted. 
Both children (which for the purpose of this thesis relates to anyone in primary school 
120 
under the age of 12 years), and young people (high school pupils aged 12-15 years), 
were interviewed. 71 These groups of children and young people were targeted for 
interview due to the fact that I assumed that it would be the older young people who 
would be largely affected by the curfew, but at the same time, it was the 'safety of 
young children wandering the streets at night' that had been promoted by the police as 
the main justification for introducing the CSI. 
As an aside, it was due to the speed of contacting the schools that I was able to carry 
out this research. Others researchers, unbeknown to me at the time, were trying to 
access the schools to carry out interviews, were subsequently refused because I 'got 
there first'. There was, in this respect, a 'competition' between different individuals to 
get access to these young people - something that could have limited the research for 
this thesis if more time had been taken to set up the interviews. 
The schools were initially contacted by telephone and following these conversations a 
letter of request was sent to South Lanarkshire Council's Education Department. 
Subsequently the schools were re-contacted after permission to interview the children 
had been ganted. 
Ethics 
During this interview process ethical practice was adhered to throughout. 72 The 
schools were informed that the names of the schools would not be used in relation to 
any particular interview; parents were sent consent forms to allow the interviews to 
take place; and the children and young people were informed that the interviews were 
confidential while also being given the option of refusing consent to the interview. 73 
The capacity for the young people to opt out' may have been difficult given the 
pressure they could have felt from adults in a school asking them for their help. The 
purpose of the interview was explained to them and the general themes that were 
about to be discussed were described in brief. It was also made clear to the children 
and young people that if, at any stage during the interview, they felt like withdrawing 
their consent, this was not a problem. None did so. The young people appeared to be 
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more than happy to be interviewed and, in most instances, appeared to enjoy the 
process. 74 
The importance of talking to the children, as explained above, and the newness of the 
curfew initiative, meant that the material being collected could not have been accessed 
from another source and therefore justified the interviewing of these children. 75 
The interview process 
The fieldwork mentioned above developed into useful qualitative research in itself, 
but was also useful as preparatory work for constructing the questionnaire around 
which the interviews were based. The local knowledge gained from this process, for 
example, while rarely forming the questions themselves, did create a greater 
understanding of the answers given by young people about certain events and places 
mentioned. A trial process was undertaken with this questionnaire with five pupils 
from a primary school and five pupils from a high school, to assess the relevance of 
the questions, the language used to allow comprehension of these questions by the 
young people, and the 'gaps' within the questionnaire. 76 The final questionnaire was 
updated following this trial and was used for the main interview process. 
These qualitative interviews were in-depth and semi-structured (Mason 1996: 38), and 
attempted to find out 'facts' about the young people's lives, actions and interactions, 
and to also gain a 'narrative account' and perceptions of life in Hillhouse experienced 
by these young people (Silverman 2000: 823). The style of the interview was 
informal, verbal and face-to-face: however, the questionnaire itself was relatively 
structured, but flexible enough to allow for themes to be discussed and opinions 
expressed throughout. The framework of the interview allowed information about 
what the children and young people did, and also what they thought. 'What' and 'Why' 
questions, for example, allowing set facts and wider perceptions to be expressed, were 
asked. This helped provide a picture of the activities of young people in the area and 
of their perceptions of life, their relationships and their understanding of issues of 
safety and freedom. 
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The relative length of the interview was in part due to a 'build up' of questions, where 
specific acts and experiences were ascertained and followed up with broader questions 
about issues and relationships. For example, the children and young people were 
asked if they would ask an adult on their estate for the time, and if not why not. This 
was later followed up with a question of how much these young people felt they could 
trust adults. A number of these types of questions were used to assess what young 
people felt, for example, about adults in the abstract, and also to what degree this was 
replicated in their actions towards them. 
To a degree, this type of overlapping questioning also helped to ensure that questions 
were understood by the children and young people, as contradictory information could 
be observed and questions re-asked if it was felt that they had been misunderstood. To 
a degree this overcame the potential problem about 'ambiguity' and ensured the young 
people were answering the questions they were being asked (Mason 1996: 107). The 
relatively simple language, and the use of known terms and phrases that were used by 
the young people themselves, also helped to minimise confusion throughout the 
interview process (Mason 1996: 107). 
Questions about how young people felt about the curfew were extended to look at 
views about wider support of, or opposition to, policing and regulation of young 
people in general. This line of questioning was particularly fruitful, as the assumption 
about young people was that they would oppose further police regulation of their area, 
and overcame the overly simplistic way this was being understood through simply 
asking about whether young people supported the curfew or not. 
The questionnaires themselves were different for the different age groups, with the 
secondary school pupils having a longer and more complex set of questions. This was 
done based on an assumption that older young people would be generally 'out' later, 
have a wider number of experiences, and be able to give more detailed answers - 
especially to questions of opinion and 'feeling'. The primary school pupils' questions 
were more fact based, with more emphasis on what they did rather than what they 
thought. After the initial trial interview, it was also decided to carry out a timetable 
exercise with the primary aged children at the start of the interview, where they gave 
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details about their weeks' activities outside of school time. This was done to gain a 
greater level of detail about activities and to help the children recollect what they 
actually did at night. The timetable also allowed retrospective cross-checking of 
information to ascertain the accuracy of other questions answers. 
Despite the differences in these questionnaires, the core set of questions were asked to 
both the children and young people, thus allowing a comparative study of the answers 
given by the different age groups. 
Information of the age, sex, race, and the area, the children and young people lived in, 
was gained to allow an analysis of these factors and their influence upon activities and 
outlooks. The class of the person was not ascertained, largely due to the difficulty of 
accurately getting this information from the young people, and therefore reduced the 
ability of the interviews to allow a comparative class analysis of the information 
gained. 
The ages of the 32 primary school children interviewed ranged from 9-11 years old: 
this older group of primary school children being chosen on the assumption that they 
would have a greater amount of experience of playing 'out', and would also be most 
able to answer the questionnaire. The 26 young people interviewed were aged 12-15 
years old - different ages within this range being interviewed to give a relatively 
balanced cross-section of this group of young people. The children and young people 
were randomly chosen for interview simply by interviewing the first names on any 
particular register at school. This process meant that children and young people from 
both Hillhouse and other areas were interviewed. Of those children interviewed, 21 
came from Hillhouse and II from other areas. There were 13 young people from 
Hillhouse interviewed and 13 young people from outside this area. Interviewing those 
both living in and outside Hillhouse was thought to be a useful exercise so that 
opinions about the curfew and about the area of Hillhouse could be expressed by those 
directly affected and 'outsiders' whose area was not targeted. This reduced the 
number of Hillhouse interviews, but the benefit of having different areas represented, 
on balance, was felt to be of more use. The 'other' areas were generally in close 
proximity to Hillhouse and largely similar in nature to it. For the sake of simplicity, 
124 
and because there did not appear to be any great difference in the outlook of these 
'outside' young people, when assessing the opinions of the curfew they were labelled 
as 'others' or those 'outside' of the curfewed area of Hillhouse. 
The questionnaires for these interviews were filled out and notes were taken when the 
children and young people elaborated upon their answers. While being an efficient 
form of recording, in hindsight tape recordings of these interviews would have been 
more detailed and would be recommended for further research of this nature. 
The issue of bias was of concern in carrying out these interviews - in particular, the 
concern that children being interviewed by an adult in a school may encourage 
conservative or the 'right answer' to be given by these children. To overcome this 
problem I dressed informally, and explained clearly that the interview was 
confidential and that all names would be changed on any written work. To support 
this, when asking the names of the children they were informed that only the first 
name was required as this was 'confidential' and 'anonymous'. It was also explained 
that the research had nothing to do with the school, the council or the police. Where 
possible the interviews were carried out without a teacher present, although on one 
occasion this was not possible. In this case the need to ask the questions more quietly 
ironically gave the interview a greater sense of confidentiality, as the young people 
involved were conscious that the information was only for my use and not for the 
teacher present. The danger with this general approach is that by attempting to 
overcome one bias, another one is created. It is possible that the young people felt that 
I was 'on their side' and therefore encouraged more oppositional or anti-authoritarian 
answers. This was not felt to be the case but may have been an influence. To avoid 
this aspect of a possible bias, questions about the curfew were always asked in a 
neutral tone and indeed, before questions about the 'curfew' were asked, the children 
and young people were asked if they had heard of the 'Child Safety Initiative' and if 
they had heard of the 'curfew'. They were then asked which term they used, and this 
was the term that was used throughout the interview. 
Once completed, the interviews were analysed and the answers both coded in table 
form and assessed in terms of the more detailed and less factual opinions expressed. 
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The data that was categorised and tabled allowed percentages to be gained in relation 
to factual questions - for example, the number of young people who opposed the 
curfew. It also allowed cross-referencing'of answers to allow a study of 'types' of 
young people linking the amount of freedom they had, their relationships with others, 
and their perception of themselves and others - for example in relation to the issue of 
safety and risk. These percentages were not used 'statistically', in terms of their 
applicability to the population in general, but were useful to 'suggest' possible trends 
and outlooks, and were also useful to use with reference to other research in the area 
and wider research about young people and their use of public space. Opinions and 
elaborations by the young people were analysed, in part, to assess common 
perceptions, and also to allow clear expressions of particular thoughts and outlooks 
that were understood by myself to be particularly telling in relation to the cultural 
trends being explored. 
There were a number of shortcomings with this research, of which some have been 
mentioned already. The representative nature of the groups, for example, is 
questionable, especially in relation to class; and bias due to the process of the 
interviews themselves may have had some impact on results gained. Although 
superficially the openness of the children and young people to speaking their minds 
when interviewed suggested that the concern about giving the 'right answer' may not 
have been significant. 
Other potential issues include the in-built epistemological shortcoming of interviews - 
that experiences are being recounted rather than, for example, being directly observed 
(Mason 1996: 40). Ibis was felt to be a particular problem when discussing events 
with younger children - especially events that had happened in the more distant past. 
This difficulty with recollection meant that where possible questions were asked about 
more immediate experiences (Mason 1996: 108). 
There was also the potential problem, due to the newsworthy nature of the CSI, that as 
the interviews were not all carried out at the same time unfolding events may have 
influenced the young people over time. To avoid this being too much of an issue, the 
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interviews were carried out within two weeks of each other, which hopefully 
minimised differences. 
Finally, it has been noted that when asking children multi-choice questions, there is a 
tendency for them to choose the first answer most often (Mason 1996: 108). To avoid 
this, the children and young people were asked these questions without being offered 
alternative answers. Only after an answer was given was clarification asked about 
which 'tick box' this would most accurately represent. 
Overall, the interview process was relatively unproblematic once arrangements with 
the schools had been made, and despite the drawbacks with this approach, the results 
and information gained were felt to be very useful. The balance of 'factual' 
information and opinion also allowed a wide variety of data to be analysed and to give 
the research more than sufficient qualitative data to bring the experiences of young 
people 'to life' 
Social construction 
Within the context of moral panic research, the approach adopted for studying the 
introduction of the Hamilton curfew was that of contextual social contructionism: an 
approach that Stanley Cohen has argued is most appropriate for analysing the 
construction of social problems (Cohen 2002: xxii). 
The work of Joel Best (1993; 1999) and Philip Jenkins (1992; 1998), two American 
contextual social constructionists, has been of particular significance in the attempt to 
analyse the construction of the curfew. As discussed in the previous chapter, these 
authors were especially useful for this research in that their approach allows both an 
ability to analyse 'moral panics', and a critical approach to understanding the 
influence and the integration of conservative and 'liberal' opinion in the development 
of these panics in more recent times. Best's method provided a useful starting point 
for examining the clainismakers, and the typification made, before and during the life 
of the Child Safety Initiative (Best 1993: 10). While lacking a more structural or 
materialist analysis of 'social problems', and therefore necessarily being somewhat 
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partial, this approach has the ability to identify significant categories and cultural 
trends that influence the formation and institutionalisation of 's6cial problems'. Due to 
the particular interest in the development of a culture of fear (Furedi 1997), this 
approach was adopted to understand the core justificatory basis (Nolan 1998: 22) upon 
which the curfew was implemented, and indeed, to uncover the unquestioned norms 
and values that informed the discussion about the CSI, both from those who supported 
its introduction and those who opposed it. 
At this point it is worth noting that, while much social problem construction research 
attempts to analyse a 'new' social problem and identify its origins and the typification 
process that have led to the institutionalisation of measures to resolve this problem, in 
studying the Hamilton curfew two processes were taking place simultaneously. In 
defending the introduction of the curfew, key clainismakers were helping to typify the 
social problems highlighted, but this was taking place with the institutionalisation of 
the curfew. In other words, it is logical to assume that much of the debate and process 
of constructing the problems that the curfew was intended to counter had already 
taken place, shown by the very fact that the curfew was being introduced. In this sense 
what we are exploring here is this institutionalising process and its impact on a 
community. However, at the same time, due to the controversial and new nature of the 
initiative, a significant claimsmaking contest took place within the press to justify this 
initiative. As such we can also explore the clainismaking process not simply to 
understand the construction of the curfew, but also to examine a key example of the 
values that already underpinned the understanding of social problems associated with 
the antisocial behaviour of young people. in a sense, the claimsmaking process had 
already occurred and what we were witnessing was the justificatory process of 
legitimising the curfew. At the same time, because the curfew was a 'trial' initiative, 
there was also a constant clainismaking process that accompanied its implementation, 
which could be examined. 
Finally, it should be recognised that the aims of the curfew and the social problems 
being addressed were extremely broad and included substantial thematic 
considerations, including child safety, youth antisocial behaviour, parenting, 
community cohesion and adult fears. Within the youth crime framework alone, there 
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are myriad aspects of the problematisation of behaviour, like 'binge drinking', 'youth 
violence', 'yob culture' and so on, that could be studied individually to understand the 
process of constructing these 'social problems'. Here, it, is not the focus upon 
individual social problem constructions that are analysed, but rather the broad themes 
of safety, antisocial behaviour and fear. 77 
A major source of data for this process was national and local newspapers that 
contained articles about the curfew. National newspaper articles were analysed using 
online searches, and the local Hamilton newspaper was examined in print over a two 
year period starting just before the introduction of the CSI in October 1997. 
Supplementing this research, speeches by key claimsmakers, television interviews, 
and debates with these claimsmakers, were used to access further claimsmaking by, in 
particular, the police, the local council and politicians, in their promotion of the 
curfew. 78 A press conference, six months after the introduction of the curfew, was also 
attended and notes taken of the speeches by those defending its introduction. 
Additionally, telephone discussions were carried out with a number of children's 
charities and organisations that opposed the curfew. This was carried out in particular 
to understand the differences, and more importantly the similarities, that existed 
between these groups and those defending and promoting the curfew. 
The process of analysing the 'news' was done so less as an analysis of the way the 
media 'shapes' this news (Cohen 1972; Hall 1978; Best 1993: 88; McRobbie 1995: 
565), although this was part of the analysis - but more so as a source of access to elite 
claimsmaking and alternative counter claims. 79 The telephone discussions and 
statements made by groups opposing the curfew were similarly used for this purpose. 
This research attempted to understand how the curfew was defined, how it was 
typified, and how it was validated. In other words, what were the core examples and 
issues raised that were representative of the nature of the social problems being 
addressed? What were the core 'values' embodied within these examples? What 
'image' of children, young people and adults was used to back up these values? What 
were the counter-claims to this typification process, if any, and what were their 
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differences? Most significantly, what were the common assumptions held by both 
groups? 
Opposition statements 
In the examination of the newspaper stories, press releases and speeches about the 
curfew, there was a significant imbalance in terms of the 'voices' being aired. 
Especially in the local newspaper, the majority of the news coverage was framed 
around the claims being made by those 'elite' individuals and groups promoting the 
curfew. The 'oppositional' voice was heard relatively infrequently, and in little detail. 
While this allowed for some analysis of the nature of the counter-claims being made 
about the curfew, it was felt that through telephone interviews with key individuals 
from groups who opposed the curfew, more in-depth and detailed material would be 
forthcoming. 80 
The groups that were targeted were done so in relation to named individuals who had 
expressed an opinion in the press; through knowledge of other research that was being 
carried out that raising a critical voice about the curfew; and finally major children's 
charities and organisations were contacted. These organisations were understood to 
represent a significant 'voice' in relation to children and youth-related issues, policies 
and practices, and as such were felt to have an influential and potentially alternative 
understanding of the issues and values associated with the idea of curfews. 81 
The individuals were contacted and asked if they would like to make a statement 
about the curfew. These 'statements' were made initially through telephone 
conversations and subsequently a written statement was made by each of the 
individuals and organisations contacted, both about the Hamilton curfew, and about 
t1fe use of curfews in general. These statements were then analysed in the same way as 
those made by the 'elite' voices supporting the curfew, to assess similarly what the 
core examples and issues were that were representative of the critique of the curfew; 
what social problems were understood to be made worse by its introduction; what 
were the core values embodied within these critiques, and what 'image' of children, 
young people and adults was used to back up these critiques. 
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Issues and problems 
Thus far, it has been noted that there are potential problems with the type of research 
carried out - the potential difficulty of the environment in which the interviews took 
place, for example. In general it should be recognised that interviews, while presented 
as representing the 'truth, are necessarily partial snapshots of events and 
understandings carried out at a particular moment in time. However, the nature of the 
research and the detail in the questioning means that a similar approach could be 
adopted in the future to assess changes to the information and outlook gained from 
young people. A significant problem in this respect with this research is that there are 
a limited number of historically comparable pieces of research that would allow 
comparative work to be carried out with regard to children and young people's outlook 
in the past. 
Perhaps the greatest weakness with the research carried out was not due to the specific 
issues in relation to the methods adopted, but in the target audience it was focused 
upon. With most research, to some degree, there will be a sense that not enough data 
has been gathered or that not enough various groups have been represented. In the 
case of the research into the Hamilton curfew, a major gap in the interviews carried 
out and the information obtained is that parents were not interviewed. 
Following the analysis of the data and the issues being addressed, it became 
increasingly clear that the Hamilton curfew was not simply about young people, but 
was just as much about their parents. Questions about irresponsible parenting, the way 
parents understood the curfew, how they interpreted the 'risks' in their area, and the 
relationship they had with other parents and children, could all have been obtained 
more accurately through interviews with parents. Some of this information was gained 
through the interviews with the young people, but not to the level of detail that, in 
hindsight, could have substantially added to the analysis of the CSI. 
As will be discussed in forthcoming chapters, whereas the curfew appeared, and to 
some degree was, an issue about the management of public space, it was also, and 
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possibly more importantly, about the management of the private sphere - about 
parents and their approach to keeping their children safe. 
Conclusion 
The methods adopted within this research, both the contextual constructionist 
approach and the interviews and fieldwork, allowed a specific and relatively small 
local initiative to be examined in its own terms. However, this was never the main 
purpose of the research, which was more generally concemed to relocate these 'local' 
developments within a broader analysis of contemporary modemity. 
While recognising the specific nature of the estate in question and gaining an actual 
insight into the often contradictory and conflictual nature of the CSI, themes related to 
fear, safety, vulnerability and the nature of responsibility could all be related both to 
the particular situation in Hamilton and within a developing 'cultural' context. In this 
way different 'puzzles' (Mason 1996: 79) were uncovered by the various forms of 
research that could be integrated and reconnected within the theoretical framework 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
In particular, the research helped to focus attention less upon the 'social problems' 
being promoted than upon the norms that underpinned the approach to these social 
problems. At the same time, by examining the 'facts' and 'reality' of the Hillhouse 
estate, questions could be raised about the acceptance of, and differences to, these 
norms, within a specific location. 
From the 'direct' research into the curfew and the attempt to locate this within a 
particular cultural and political setting, the curfew work provided a basis upon which 
an analysis of both the historical development of the trends identified could be further 
explored, while also providing a starting point to analyse subsequent developments in 
society - most particularly around the 'social problem' of antisocial behaviour. 
Ile focus of this research is therefore sometimes extremely 'small' and at other times 
abstract and general. It attempts, for example, to study how a particular child gets to a 
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friend's house at night, and then asks, what is the significance of the 'culture of fear' to 
this child's biography? Indeed, what is the significance of themes like safety and 
vulnerability to communities in general? The study is both limited in the extent of its 
analysis particularly of the 'structures' of society. However, as best as it can within the 
limitations of its approach, it attempts to find out what C. Wright Mills described as 
being one of the core components of the sociological imagination - to discover: 
What varieties of men and women [and young people] now prevail in this 
society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what 
ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and 
blunted? What kinds of 'human nature' are revealed in the conduct and 
character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning of 
'human nature' of each and every feature of the society we are examining? 
(Mills 1967: 7) 
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Chapter 6: The Hamilton Curfew 
Hamilton's pioneering crackdown on street kids is set to provide the blueprintfor 
similar schemes across Britain. The Government's Crime and Disorder Bill, which 
came intojorce yesterday, allows local authorities to introduce curfews on under 10s 
in their area ... Prime Minister Tony Blair backed schemes similar to the one pioneered 
in Hamilton during his keynote address to the Labour Party conference on Tuesday 
(Hamilton Advertiser I October 1998). 
Introduction 
Following the political developments in the UK through the 1990s and the 
transformation of the Labour Party in relation to crime and safety, the first Labour 
government for 19 years was elected, and in October 1997 the Hamilton Child Safety 
Initiative (CSI) was set up by North Lanarkshire Council. Immediately labelled a 
curfew by the press, this crime and safety initiative gained both national and 
international notoriety, and was understood to be a significant reflection of the New 
Labour Government's approach to law and order. 
Seen within the context of 'moral panics' surrounding young people, this research was 
carried out to analyse the basis of the CSI, the arguments used to justify it, and the 
impact it had upon local people. In this chapter the findings of the research attempt to 
locate the development of this initiative within a culture of fear, and to a degree within 
the development of a therapeutic culture. 
Rather than studying the curfew 82 simply in terms of its impact upon crime and safety 
in the community, this chapter also attempts to uncover the justificatory process 
underlying it and the broader concerns and interests of the key clainismakers who 
were both for and against the initiative. S. afety, vulnerability, and a sense of being at 
risk it is argued, were at the heart of the initiative and were central to the justificatory 
process, the values underpinning it, the relationship between the public and the 
authorities, and also formed the basis of how local people were understood and 
represented. 
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Situating the curfew 
For social policies to develop, certain clainismaking processes generally occur prior to 
them, and the framework around which these policies are formed are informed by the 
nature of these claims. Public attention is drawn to particular social problems, but 
more specifically, certain aspects of these problems become dominant and help form 
the understanding of them. Even the 'naming' of the social problem at hand plays a 
role in the way an issue is identified and how the cause is identified and solution 
sought (Best 1995: 8). 7ypical' examples are often the way that the particular 
understanding of a problem is highlighted and then acted upon (Best 1995: 9). 
Social problems thus formed provide the basis for social policy developments - the 
'socially constructed images of conditions (such as "homelessness") ... serv[ing] as 
justifications for public policies' (Loseke 1995: 261). The Hamilton Child Safety 
Initiative, as a specific form of intervention by the police, was therefore pre-dated by a 
number of prior social problems that had been constructed in society. As the name 
'Child Safety Initiative' itself suggests, 'child safety' was a core social problem being 
addressed by this initiative - something that had been systematically problematised, 
particularly in the 1980s around the issue of child abuse (Jenkins 1992). Youth crime 
and antisocial behaviour, another key area of concern addressed by the curfew, had 
also become a significant social problem, especially since 1993 (Scratton 1997). 
Likewise the 'fear of crime' (Van Dijk 1994), 83 the significance of the 'community' 
(Rose 1996), and the notion of sections of the public being 'at risle (Furedi 2004: 127), 
had all developed as frameworks for understanding social problems - particularly 
social problems associated with children and young people. Finally, by the time the 
Hamilton curfew 84 was introduced, the idea of the 'irresponsible parent' (Furedi 2001) 
had also been firmly established as a framework for understanding a number of 
problems associated with young people, crime, and fear within communities. 
The Child Safety Initiative, while being a 'new' initiative, was therefore not developed 
upon the basis of 'new' crimes or social problems (Best 1999), but rather was 
established in relation to existing social concerns. These concerns existed within 
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politics, professional practice and areas of academic research, but were also reflected 
in 'grassroots' demands for more policing of the streets. As Professor of Criminal 
Justice Rod Morgan noted at the time, there was an 'insatiable' public demand 'for a 
85 visible, uniformed presence on the streets' (Guardian 22 January 1997). 
Similarly, this initiative, in terms of policy developments, was not a 'bolt from the 
blue', but rather a continuation of a number of initiatives, policies and laws developed 
under the Conservative governments of the 1980s and especially the 1990s (Goldson 
1997). It was closely related to the development of inter-agency forms of crime 
prevention, linked to the notion of 'community safety' (Gilling 1999; Jacobs et al. 
2003), and was also related to the development of 'Zero Tolerance' forms of policing, 
at this time (Dennis 1997). 86 
The curfew was, however, a major new initiative introduced not by the Conservative 
government, but by the newly elected New Labour government, and can be as seen as 
part of the crossover of concern from right and 'left' about the issue of crime and 
especially disorder. 
Just as it had been the Democratic President Bill Clinton who gave his support to the 
introduction of many of the curfew initiatives in the United States, in Britain it was the 
Labour Party that, when in opposition, had first promoted the idea of youth curfews. 
In the US, Jeffs and Smith (1996) note that from the predictably alarmist underclass 
theorists like Murray and Wilson, through to Galbraith and Jenks on the liberal left as 
well as New Communitarians like Etzioni, the concern about the threat posed to social 
stability from an 'underclass' youth was intense. Similarly, within the UK, the 
development of a political consensus around the significance of crime, discussed 
previously, also coincided with an increasing concern with violence, abuse and 
general antisocial behaviour by more radical academics (Young 1984, Campbell 
1993). Within psychology, authors like Rutter and Smith were also developing their 
influence within the discussion about Psychosocial Disorders in Young People (1995) 
and left-leaning think tanks like Demos were publishing papers describing young 
people as 'underwolves' who were Vi5connected from society' (Wilkinson and Mulgan 
1995). 
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Theoretical and methodological considerations 
The CSI was a local initiative addressed at problems identified in three relatively 
small housing estates in Hamilton. It was however, clearly developed in relation to the 
'national' social problems and issues identified above, and had also developed as part 
of a series of initiatives and developments within the Strathclyde Police area itself . 
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While being local, the Hamilton curfew became significant - in its own terms, winning 
a number of national and international community safety awards (Hamilton Advertiser 
15 October 1998), and also in terms of its 'success' being used as a justification by the 
Labour government's subsequent implementation of curfew initiatives across the UK. 
For example, following the Queen's Speech in 2000, Jack Straw defended the 
extension of curfew legislation to include under- I 6-year-olds with reference to the 
success of the Hamilton initiative (Guardian 7 December 2000). It was therefore an 
initiative of some significance, both at the time and in terms of its consequential 
impact on future discussions about curfews in Britain. 
In studying this initiative, however, it must be borne in mind that much of the 
'groundwork' and 'claimsmaking' for the basis of this development had already taken 
place, and therefore the focus of the research was somewhat different to much social 
problem studies. Whereas most social problem research identifies a 'new' social 
problem and traces its genealogy and specific clainismaking process, what is under 
study within this chapter is the institutionalisation process of a number of already 
established social problems, in the particular form of the Hamilton Child Safety 
Initiative. Consequently, the subsequent examination of this initiative focuses on the 
justificatory basis upon which the curfew was established. As a policy development - 
or more precisely an 'initiative' - introduced by the local authority and police, the 
primary focus of this analysis is therefore upon the elite voices that justified the 
actions of the police and council. Within this justificatory process, it is still possible to 
identify the form that the 'claims' took, which establish the framework for how the 
social problems being addressed were understood and represented, and equally what 
the causes and solutions to these problems were understood to be. 
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A large number of social problems were being tackled by the curfew, from child 
safety to youth crime, and there was a wide array of relationships between people 
being addressed, from parent and child relations to peer relations and adult-youth 
relations. Consequently, in studying the justifications used to introduce the curfew, the 
general ontological understanding of the people in Hamilton held by the authorities, 
which laid the basis for the initiative, could also be explored. By examining how 
people and their relationships were understood, it was therefore also possible to 
analYse the type of 'citizen' being promoted and also the basis of the relationship 
being developed between the state and the individual. 
With the apparent 'death of the social' and the rise of 'community' as a framework for 
governance (Rose 1996), the idea of the 'responsibilisation' of individuals has 
emerged and is examined below (Garland 2002: 124-7; Flint 2002). The idea that local 
people in Hamilton should take more responsibility for their actions was indeed 
promoted during the CSI. However, despite this, a contradictory and to some extent 
unintended consequence of this process was that the idea of individual responsibility 
was actually undermined and diminished. Governance based on an engagement with 
the vulnerable individual, within the rubric of the amoral absolute of safety, can be 
seen through the example of the curfew to weaken rather than encourage a notion of 
the 'responsible individual'. 
Despite the predominance of a 'market society' (Feeley 2003 : 117) and more 
individually-based relationships in society (Beck and Beck-Gernsheirn 2002), the 
curf6w illustrates the centrality of the activities of a therapeutic state rather than a 
market-led form of governance, in reformulating the nature of relationships in society. 
The therapeutic basis of this intervention, whereby the role of the state becomes to 
manage the anxieties of the population, is here illustrative of the developing state form 
of 'governing the soul' (Rose 1999). However, again this development and 
understanding of the therapeutic nature of relationships, which is understood in part to 
be simply a reflection of a form of neo-liberal self-actualisation, is questioned 
(Gordon 1991: 42). Rather this therapeutic engagement is predicated on a diminished 
sense of the self (Furedi 2004: 195) and it is this weakened understanding of the 
subject that was both engaged with and promoted through the Hamilton curfew. 
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It is worth noting that, despite the limited nature of the Hamilton curfew, what is 
being examined within this initiative is an approach to a population by sections of ' 
the 
state that, it is believed, can be generalised and seen as part of a comprehensive and 
new form of political engagement and management of people and places within 
contemporary modernity. 
The curfew at one level can'be seen as a continuation of police and social work 
activities within an area that are not new - moving young people on and engaging 
with the maltreatment of children. However, the basis of this intervention was to some 
degree specific, and it is the elements of change from past practices and outlooks - 
rather than their continuity - that are focused upon. At the risk of being somewhat 
one-sided, this approach is adopted to emphasise what are felt to be the new and 
significant trends in culture and social policy that have gone on to influence 
approaches and attitudes to initiatives related to antisocial behaviour. 
Finally, there were a number of critics of the Hamilton curfew, and their 'voices' will 
also be examined. For many of these critics, the curfew was understood to be an 
exclusionary form of authoritarianism: indeed as Garland notes, the criminal justice 
system has move from one based on the idea of solidarity to one of exclusion and 
punishment. 88 However, rather than being simply exclusionary, this initiative can also 
be seen as an attempt at re-including the targeted communities on a more diminished 
basis, in relation to their fears, but also in relation to their unsafe lifestyles. As such 
the local authority was attempting to reengage the more atornised public through their 
sense of being at risk, within a more therapeutically-oriented framework. 
Background to the curfew 
Visiting Hillhouse, the largest of the curfew-targeted areas, for the first time, I was 
struck by the unexceptional appearance of the estate. In conversation with local adults 
and the primary school teachers working in the area, they too appeared somewhat 
bemused by the initiative and the international media aitention it had received. in an 
article examining the curfew, the music magazine The Face gave an apt, if somewhat 
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dramatised, picture of Hamilton -a picture that was equally applicable, if without the 
9 guns', 'hatchets' and 'heroin', to the Hillhouse estate. 
There are knives, guns, hatchets, heroin, booze and unemployment problems 
throughout the vale of Hamilton, but it's nowhere near as grim as Glasgow's 
Easterhouse or Castlemilk. Or Manchester's Moss Side or Pill in Newport and 
a thousand other places in Britain and beyond. Places you can probably see 
from your own bedroom window. (The Face June 1998) 
Hillhouse was an area of relative poverty, with a couple of small streets with largely 
boarded-up windows and a population of 2,400. Public sector housing made up 80 per 
cent of houses in the area compared to 44 per cent throughout the region of South 
Lanarkshire, with a greater percentage of young people and single parents living in 
them. Despite the murder of a Hillhouse boy two years prior to the introduction of the 
curfew, as the local police repeatedly informed the press, it was not an area with a 
particularly high crime rate. 
Hillhouse was in no sense a ghetto. 89 
The Child Safety Initiative (CSI), commonly known as the Hamilton Curfew, was 
launched in October 1997 and was to run for a trial six month period, ending in April 
1998.90 Three working class areas within Hamilton in South Lanarkshire were chosen 
for this pilot project - YvUtehill, Fairhill and Hillhouse. The aim of the CSI or curfew 
was to move any under- 1 6-year-old off the streets if they were out 'after dark' and 
could not give 'a reasonable excuse' as to why they were out. While not specifying a 
strict curfew time, the CSI was clearly aimed at encouraging young people to stop 
hanging around the streets at night and put the onus on them to justify their public 
presence. Although 'after dark' was the time at which the police stated they would 
start to act in Hillhouse, most of the young people spoken to in the area believed the 
police started picking people up around 9pm. 
The announcement of the Child Safety Initiative on 23rd October came with speeches 
from both Chief Constable John Orr and council leader Tom McCabe. From the outset 
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the CSI was promoted as a joint initiative, not simply a police initiative, involving 
South Lanarkshire Council and in particular the Social Work Department. On 
numerous radio and television debates about the curfew, it was not the chief of police 
who explained the purpose of the new policing initiative, but Sandy Cameron, director 
of social work. Through the social work department, the Child Safety Initiative was 
presented as a safety initiative, to prevent young people becoming criminals, and also 
as a mechanism for ensuring the safety of young children who are allowed to wander 
the streets late at night. Sandy Cameron explained that, 'This is not a curfew, but an 
issue of safety and in particular the safety of young people'. 91 
The justification for this initiative therefore took on a distinct form compared with the 
more narrowly-focused zero tolerance police initiatives up to this point, which had 
been directed largely at the antisocial behaviour of young people as a problem for 
communities, and at the fear of crime. The apparently contradictory aspect of the CSI, 
which on one hand was being tough on youth and on the other was promoted as being 
a caring initiative concerned largely with children and young people's safety, was seen 
by many as being untenable, or simply a public relations exercise by the police. 
From the outset, the CSI was labelled a curfew by the press, partly because of the 
nature of the initiative itself, but also due to the promotion of the need for curfew 
legislation being promoted at the time by the New Labour government. Especially for 
the tabloid press, this was simply another crackdown on 'juvenile crime', where kids 
would be 'nicked' for being out at night. Frustrated by the curfew label the local police 
chief, Jim Elliot, argued that the police were a 'caring organisation' not an 'oppressive 
one' (Daily Record, 3 October 1997). A year on from the launch of the initiative, 
Allison McLaughlan, a freelance journalist for the Daily Record, summed up what 
many of her colleagues thought about the police safety-first PR campaign: describing 
it as 'bollocks, it's about cutting down on crime' (The Face, June 1998). 
However as we will see, the focus upon the CSI as simply an authoritarian form of 
policing of youth crime missed a number of wider trends that laid the basis for the 




The curfew was promoted by Strathclyde Chief Constable (Orr 1997a) as part of an 
'enlightened', 'child welfare' approach related to the children's hearing system in 
Scotland - in which the emphasis is on protecting the welfare of the child rather than 
punishing his or her criminality. The emphasis placed upon safety by John Orr in his 
launch speech is presented below in detail to give a flavour of how the police were to 
justify the Child Safety Initiative - where italics are used this is to show my emphasis. 
T'he Hamilton Child Safety Initiative is a pilot which aims - simultaneously - 
to protect the safety of young people, decrease the opportunities for them to 
become involved in juvenile crime and reduce the fear of crime among the 
public ... [it] seeks to highlight the dangers faced by youngsters allowed out 
after dark without adult supervision - risks which can lead to children falling 
prey to possible danger, becoming involved in crime or creating a nuisance to 
others. [The initiative] was drawn up in response to local householders and 
young people about vandalism and the presence of unsupervised or unruly 
children on the street after dark ... [and] the principle aim of the patrols is to 
ensure that vulnerable youngsters aged under 16 - and particularly those aged 
12 or less - are not exposed to dangers or tempted to become embroiled in 
crimes associated with being out alone too late in the dark or with equally 
vulnerable company - crimes such as vandalism, creating disturbances and 
minor violence. 
Police officers who come upon unaccompanied children during the evening 
patrols and who believe the children are at risk will return the youngsters to 
their homes. Parents or carers will be reminded of the dangers facing children 
out alone in the dark ... The police patrols will 
be undertaken by a pool of 
community police officers who have been specially selected for their 
experience, skills and empathy when it comes to dealing with young people. 
Some of the officers are parents themselves. 
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In truth, the police have always had powers to return children home if they 
have concerns about their wellbeing. It is just that with this particular project, 
we areformalising this approach and giving a modem slant to old-fashioned 
community policing. 
We do not allow young people to be in danger in the home so we shouldn't 
permit it in the street. Our hope is that by taking vulnerable and impressionable 
youngsters out of harm's way, there will be a double spin-off. They will be 
safer and they won't be tempted to get caught up in mischief-making or worse. 
John Off went on to give examples of the typical problems he was talking about, 
which included a story about a nine-year-old girl found in a close only in her 
underwear whose mother was 'dead drunk'. Another story was told of a nine-year-old 
boy found on the street whose mother was at the bingo and father was in the pub. This 
example of unsupervised children, Off stated, 'beggared belief, as: 
Yet - and what a paradox - paedophile court cases hit the headlines regularly 
and there is controversy about the issue of the rights of communities to know 
where convicted offenders are living. 
Then in relation to the crime situation of Hamilton, John Orr explained that, 
The figures for crime in the Hamilton area are down considerably so far this 
year, due to the hard work of the local police ... But if people remain anxious 
and concerned, then we must respond - decisively. 
Explaining that this was not a curfew he continued, 
Strathclyde police do not think young people are public enemy number one 
and this force is not anti young people. On the contrary, we are taking this 




Views on people's rights are many and varied but there can be no argument 
surely against the right of all people - including and perhaps even especially 
the young - to live in safety in the conununity, safe from crime and neglect too. 
People have responsibilities, as well as rights. All-in-all, what Strathclyde 
police and South Lanarkshire Council want this initiative to do is to remind 
everyone of their responsibilities to others. 92 
For John Orr this was a caring initiative based on the right to be safe, a right that, he 
felt, could not be argued against. The absolute nature of the 'amoral' principle of safety 
was central. The Child Safety Initiative was a form of responsibilisation. The 
responsibility that members of the public had was to ensure the safety of one another. 
This was not simply in relation to crimes like burglary or assault, as Orr explained - as 
far as police statistics went, crime was significantly lower in Hamilton than it had 
been. Rather the main target of the initiative was petty crimes of vandalism and 
antisocial behaviour of young people, with the key indicator of this problem being the 
levels of fear by local adults indicated by the number of complaints the police 
received. 
But safety was not simply about adults. It was equally about children who were 
unsupervised at night - especially young children. These children not only risked the 
dangers of paedophiles but they were also 'at risk' of becoming involved in antisocial 
and criminal activities. 
Following John Off's speech, the South Lanarkshire Council leader, Tom McCabe, 
spoke, echoing many of the comments made by John Orr. Straight away, McCabe 
challenged the idea that this was a curfew (McCabe 1997): 
This is a nonsense notion! Such a notion has no place in Hamilton, no place in 
South Lanarkshire. It has no place in a society heading for the new 
millennium. The Hamilton child safety initiative is about improving the quality 
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of life for the people of Whitehill, Hillhouse and Fairhill. It is about the safety 
and the protection of our children - today, now - and in the future. 
On the issue of rights, responsibilities and the destruction of communities caused by 
fear, he explained that: 
It is about responsibility. It is about civil liberties and freedom - thefreedom of 
everyone in the community to live withoutfear or intimidation. Each of us has 
responsibilities to other people within our communities. We have to recognise 
that when some people chose to ignore their responsibilities - to their children, 
to their neighbours, to their community - to society - it leads to an erosion of 
community. It leads to people becoming fearful and distrustful of each other. 
Challenging the civil liberties arguments that had been made in relation to children's 
rights, McCabe argued: 
The initiative we are launching today is not about an increase in powers at the 
expense of the freedom of children and young people ... It is in fact about 
returning liberties to communities - about removingfear. The truth is that our 
children and young people's safety initiative has at its core the rights of 
children. 
However, these rights, he continued, must also involve young people and 'perhaps 
more importantly' parents being more responsible, as it is in the home that'we learn 
that we are part of the conununity'. 
It's about the responsibility of parents realising and recognising it is in their 
interest to know where their children are and what they are doing. 
The safety initiative, McCabe argued, was a development from a wide process of 
consultation with young people, adults and Scotland's first Citizens' Jury, which 
I showed that for all ages the number one priority was community safety'. Backing up 
John Orr's early point, McCabe reiterated that the targeted areas, 'have been chosen 
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not because they have any more problems than any other communities throughout the 
country - but because the community itself has called for action. 
When we looked at the evidence from the surveys and from the 
recommendations of the Hillhouse CitizensJury - the message came over loud 
and clear - safety issues were a top priority. And that includes safety of young 
people, particularly at night. 93 
The partnership between the council and community was stressed in this speech, and 
particularly with young people who were to have as part of the safety initiative a new 
centre built in Hamilton, which would be recreational and social - with advice and 
information provided on a range of issues. 
Absolute safety 
Safety was key to both the police and politicians' justification of the Child Safety 
Initiative: 
The aim of this initiative is not toforce young people off the street. rather it is 
to make sure that our communities are saferfor everyone. (Leaflet: Children 
and Young People's Safety Pilot, Strathclyde Police 'Q'Division 1997). 
This initiative fits in with the Government's push for partnership between 
families, the people and local authorities to create a safer society. (TIie 
Scottish Home Affairs Minister, Henry McLeish in the Scotsman 3 October 
1997). 
At one level, safety has always been an aspect of policing and the police have always 
played a role in maintaining not only the law, but also order. However, the theme of 
safety was not simply a police matter but a political issue, and unlike past historical 
periods was here, not a means to an end but the end in itself. More particularly, it was 
the feeling of safety that was being promoted and engaged with - the process of 
ensuring this feeling of safety was to some degree more important than the actual 
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safety of the local people and children. In other words, it was as much the process of 
engaging with the public sense of unease that was central to the CSI, rather than the 
aim of reducing crime and unsafe practices, which to a degree were almost accidental 
outcomes of this more significant process. 
The Child Safety Initiative was justified almost exclusively with reference to the 
generic issue of safety in and of itself. Children out at night was a concern because 
they were unsafe, young people were unsafe as, they were at risk of becoming 
involved in illegal activities, and adults were being made to feel unsafe by the 
activities of these young people. 
Looked at individually, each of these 'safety' issues could be seen as something the 
police had always been involved in. For example the Children and Young Persons 
(Scotland) Act 1937 (s. 12), 'provides that it is an offence on the part of a parent to 
neglect his child', and part of the legal justification for the curfew had been with 
reference to, 'the general duty of the police to protect life and property' (Springharn 
1998). However, the centrality of the issue of safety was qualitatively different. 
Safety was an organising principle in its own right with regard to the community as a 
whole, and was understood to. be central to the well being of the community. Indeed it 
was the issue of safety and fear that was understood to be at the heart of what was 
undermining, and equally what could recreate a sense of community. All aspects of 
the interactions between individuals within Hillhouse were therefore interpreted 
within the prism of safety - with even the previously described 'delinquent' or 'deviant' 
activities of young people being described as 'unsafe'. 
As David Garland has noted with regard to the legal system in the UK in the past, 'the 
British political establishment pursued an ideal of solidarity' (Garland 1996: 406). In 
terms of rebuilding a sense of community within the curfew-targetcd areas, there was 
an attempt to rebuild this 'solidarity' through the issue of safety. This was not, after all, 
simply a police initiative, or part of the day-to-day policing of an area, but was a 
political initiative involving the local Labour council with the backing of the New 
Labour government. It was in essence a development of the politics of fear. 
147 
Public safety 
Noticeably, following the initial national interest in the curfew, media attention 
declined, but remained ever present in the local newspaper. Here the significance of 
the police as claimsmakers can be seen, where almost every article was either based 
on police statistics and stories provided to the press or in the comments made by the 
local chief of police. With no organised opposition to the initiative, the police, to a 
large degree, were able to 'make' the news with their weekly press releases describing 
the latest curfew interventions. 
The most typical problem being addressed by the police was the safety of 
'unsupervised under 10s who wander the streets after dark', a message constantly 
reiterated by the police to explain what the CSI was 'really about' (Hamilton 
Advertiser 20 November 1997). Young children who hung about the streets were 
understood and represented in terms of being 'at risk'. Rarely was any particular risk 
clarified - rather the very act of being out after dark, indeed of being 'unsupervised', 
was understood to be unsafe. 
The extreme case of a four-year-old found on the streets after 9pm was an example of 
the typical problem being addressed by the CSI and the resulting target for 
condemnation of the 'irresponsible parent' (Herald 3 November 1997). In this respect, 
the basis of what was understood to be a good parent was a safe parent. Indeed being 
responsible, as council leader Tom McCabe argued above, was about ensuring the 
safety of all the members of a community, something which, if neglected, 'leads to an 
erosion of community. It leads to people becoming fearful and distrustful of each 
other'. 
Despite the police and local politicians' emphasis upon child safety, the CSI was also 
presented as a way to ensure the safety of adults from young people being antisocial. 
This was the core understanding of the curfew for the press, particularly the tabloid 
press, who were more inclined to typify the problem in Hillhouse with reference to 
examples of 'drunk teenagers' and yobbish behaviour. Quotes from local adults were 
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also used to back up the problem of 'Buckfast-swigging vandals trailing through 
gardens' (Scotsman 3 October 1997). This emphasis was also stressed by Labour MPs 
and national politicians. George Robertson, the local Labour MP and the then defence 
secretary, combined his concern for, 'young children who should not be out late at 
night', with a more confrontational need to 'stamp down on rowdiness that makes life 
intolerable for decent people' (Scottish Daily Mail 24 October 1997). 
Safety for adults was bound up with the fear of crime, an issue that will be examined 
more fully below. Here, however, it is worth reiterating, with respect to how children 
were understood to be at risk, that adults themselves were similarly understood to also 
be at risk - not from the criminals, but the antisocial young people in their community, 
who made the streets feel unsafe. The loss of a sense of community was located more 
centrally within adult insecurities. 
That the problem being addressed was not simply the activities of young people, but 
also the feelings of adults, was somewhat ironically recognised by Campbell 
Thompson, a local senior police officer in Hamilton. Describing the insecurities felt 
by many adults, Thompson explained that, 
It's modem society. There's a fear of crime among the elderly that's very 
seldom justified. A youngster is more likely to be assaulted than the elderly 
folk, but that's not the old folks' perception. They're taken aback by a bunch of 
boisterous youngsters in high spirits (The Face, June 1998). 
The emphasis placed on safety was most distinctive in relation to the discussion about 
young people themselves, particularly the 'yobs' who were seen by the press to be the 
main problem being addressed by this initiative. For John Orr, the issue of crime and 
safety were interconnected, and he explained that 'we really care that our young 
people live a safe and crime-free life'. Being safe was, for the Chief Constable, an 
unquestionable issue: 'there can be no argument surely against the right of all people - 
including and perhaps even especially the young - to live in safety in the community, 
safe from crime and neglect too'. 
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Tom McCabe, Labour Leader of South Lanarkshire Council, and Sandy Cameron, 
Executive Director of Social Work, explained what dangers they were concerned 
about. In an interview with Sky Scottish, McCabe explained: 'We are trying to give 
people their liberty back - especially teenagers who through peer pressure may be led 
into acts that they will regret for a long time afterwards'. 94 Young people who commit 
criminal offences were here seen, not only as criminals, but also as victims - victims 
of peer pressure who need to be protected by the police. Sandy Cameron made a 
similar point, when he noted that, 
It is important to take young people back home into dialogue with their 
parents - to help them avoid getting into criminal activities,.. We must also 
recognise that the misuse of alcohol by young people is a serious problem in 
our communities, and is something that sets patterns that affect us all. 95 
Here, both McCabe and Cameron portrayed young people, especially those young 
people committing offences, as potential victims, victims of their peers or victims of 
alcohol, and in need of protection from these peers and even from themselves and 
their 'set patterns. In this respect it became the job of the police not only to control 
the antisocial behaviour of young people that affected adults on the targeted estates, 
but also to monitor the unsafe interactions between young people themselves. 96 
The concern about safety, at the time of the CSI's introduction, was not simply a 
framework for understanding the divisions in society and the 'collapse of community'. 
rt was also a framework around which generational divisions could be overcome. 
During the curfew, but not connected directly with it, a conference was held in 
Glasgow, organised by Strathclyde police and entitled 'Bridging the Gap between 
Young and Old'. The conference was organised on a Strathclyde-wide basis and was 
intended to find 'something in common' between young and old. Understood as a form 
of awareness-raising, the conference focused upon promoting the 'mutual 
understanding of each other's concerns and fears'. The conference was set up to 
challenged the idea, which it was understood elderly people had, of young people as 
"'yobs"... only interested in drugs, alcohol and loitering on street comers'. Similarly 
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the conference wanted to challenge young people's understanding of the elderly as 
"'killjoys" with nothing worthwhile to contribute to society'. These caricatured views, 
it was felt, 'can lead to unnecessary fear, apprehension, intimidation, aggression and 
provocation'. As Strathclyde police were keen to tackle not only the issue of crime, 
'but the fear of crime', finding something that young people and elderly adults have in 
common was seen as a way of over coming this fear. 
The common ground around which solidarity could be built, the conference believed, 
was safety. As the conference promotion paper explained, 'Surely the seed is there. 
The young care about the safety of their grandparents, and granny and granddad worry 
about drugs, not for themselves but for their grandchildren'. 97 That young and old not 
only have fears of their own but also have fears for others was thus understood to be 
the basis for a common ground between the two. Fear and the need for safety was seen 
as the framework around which generational divisions and therefore divisions in 
communities could be overcome. Like the Hamilton curfew, this conference took the 
fear of crime and the issue of safety as the basis of connecting with people and indeed 
of reconnecting people with one another. 
Those opposing the curfew raised various concerns regarding children's rights. 
However, in terms of the general theme of safety as an issue of concern, or a real 
social problem', there was little challenge to the rhetoric and typification process of 
the authorities. The issue of safety was also something that those opposing the curfew 
adopted as part of their resistance to the CSI. Various children's charities, 'pro-youth' 
groups and the Scottish Human Right's Centre opposed the curfew by challenging the 
legal basis for the initiative and promoting the issue of children's right to play without 
harassment. 98 However, with regard to the issue of safety, there was little questioning 
of this more 'caring' side of the CSI. For example, the typical problem of young 
children being out at night and therefore being unsafe was not questioned; nor was the 
issue of young people being at risk in relation to drugs, drink and 'peer pressure'. 
Indeed, for a number of these groups, the 'at risk' framework was used as a basis of 
opposition to the curfew - with the home being presented as a place where children 
and young people were at greater risk of harni than when they were in public. 
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For the Scottish organiser of Save the Children, one of the dangers of the police taking 
people home was that children may face 'the possibility of domestic violence or other 
forms of harm. Similarly for Play Scotland, safety was less of an issue in public in 
relation to 'stranger danger' than the concern that 'children are most often abused by 
people well known to them in the family or close friends. Whereas 'children walking 
aimlessly' was not a positive thing, could the home, with 'the technology of video, 
computer and internet, have a worse impact on the 'future of the human raceT For 
Gerison Landsdown, the director of the Children's Rights Office, 'many children may 
be out in the evening in order to avoid abuse or violence at home. The imposition of a 
blanket curfew which forces them home would place them at a greater not lesser risk 
of harnf. Finally, Roger Smith of the Children's Society added his voice of concern, 
asking, 'Will children be forced into their own homes to suffer violence and abuse 
silentlyT (Waiton 2001: 170). 
The problematisation of child abuse, developed most forcefully in the 1980s, here 
provided an alternative framework for concern about the issue of child safety. Earlier 
it was noted that panics or anxieties promoted by the right are often challenged by 
more radical groups, only to find that they simply replace these concerns with 
alternative panics of their own. For those both for and against the curfew, this can be 
seen with the above quotes, where the fear and safety of adults promoted by the police 
and local authority was replaced by an alternative fear for the safety of children in 
their own home. 
Young people were 'at risk' for both the curfew supporters and many of the opponents 
of this initiative. The radical alternative was simply to locate 'risk' within the private 
rather than public arena - dangers being located within the interpersonal relationships 
between family and friends. 
The sense of children and young people being 'at risk' was, like the issue of safety 
itself, generic, and an accepted framework for understanding many of the relationships 
between people in the targeted area. The actual risks that children, young people and 
adults faced was not questioned. For example, how dangerous was it really for 
children to be out at night; how 'at risk' were young people of 'setting patterns of 
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behaviour' like drinking that will affect their future; how 'at risk' were adults from 
young people who hang about; and indeed how 'at risk' were the children in the 
Hillhouse area from their 'abusive parents'? 
Reconnecting through safety 
Before, during and after the trial Child Safety Initiative, both the council and police 
were at pains to prove that their activities were not self-interested or being externally 
enforced on the public, but rather, that this was an initiative developed by and for the 
public. 99 Safety and the desire to feel safe was therefore represented as a community 
issue, rather than one being adopted and promoted by the authorities themselves. 
Surveys, consultation documents and focus groups, as well as opinion polls, were set 
up and systematically referred to in an effort to show that the curfew was not only 
supported by the public, but that the idea of a curfew had itself come from the 
public. 100 Both the adult opinion of the curfew, 101 and more particularly the 'youth 
voice', 102 were constantly referred to as evidence of the support for the curfew. 
The local MP George Robertson, relating to the 'miserý( of those not able to 'live in 
peace and quiet', was the first person to claim that the idea for the curfew had come 
from the Citizens' Jury set up in Hillhouse. This was not the case - but the claim was 
repeated many times throughout the initiative to indicate that this was a community 
initiative, a 'partnership' based on 'community participation' (Scotsman 3 October 
1997). 103 
Rejecting the critical attack on the council and the police for being heavy-handed or 
for taking away young people's rights, the authorities kept relating their initiative to 
the support from the public, its desire for a safe society, and its support for increased 
police action in the areas targeted. The curfew itself was clearly justified in relation to 
the issue of safety - with all groups in the targeted area being represented as in need of 
support, in terms of the improved safety the CSI would bring to them. 
At one level, the targeting of young people who, it was felt, were responsible for the 
fear within the communities, could be understood as a form of 'authoritarian 
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exclusion'. However, more generally, this initiative should also be seen as an'attempt 
by the authorities to reengage and include the public in relation to its sense of fear and 
vulnerability. Even the once-labelled delinquents were seen not so much as groups 
needing to be excluded, but rather as vulnerable potential victims of external pressures 
who needed support. Indeed the attempt to engage young people's support for the CSI 
was often in relation to their own anxieties and fears about other young people, and 
their general sense of safety at night. 
In this respect the authority of the curfew came notfrom the authorities themselves but 
from the vulnerable public, and the role adopted by the local authority was of an 
advocatefor the victimised individual. The basis for the justification of the curfew was 
in relation to the 'at risk child', the 'fearful adult', and the 'pressurised youth' - each 
individual within these groups being understood as somewhat isolated and in need of 
protection. The participation, partnership and community involvement was therefore 
not an engagement with a collective public, but rather with atomised insecure 
individuals. 104 
The importance given to the community participation aspect of the curfew reflected 
the need of the political authorities to reengage with an atomised public with whom 
there was no ideological or organisational connection. Through the Child Safety 
Initiative and the issue of community safety, the local council and politicians 
attempted to engage with the public through its fears. The amoral absolute of child 
safety was the most powerful cultural value at the time, and was the dominant 
justificatory basis for the curfew. Equally, however, the emotional insecurities of 
adults were related to as the basis for community solidarity, and the more 
therapeutically-oriented relationship between the state and the individual was 
promoted. 
In terms of the local authority acting as advocates for the vulnerable on the Hillhouse 
estate, the issue of adult fears appeared, and to a degree was, contradictory to the idea 
of a child-friendly initiative, as young people were, in part, recast as dangerous and 
threatening to these adults. 
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Standing as advocates of the vulnerable community rather than as political 
representatives, the local politicians and the police were prone to feeling pressurised 
by alternative victim voices. The youth voice in particular, which was mobilised by 
the children's charities opposing the curfew, carried with it much weight as young 
people, by their very nature of being 'children' with 'rights', could be represented as 
powerless potential victims. Like the council's attempt to advocate on behalf of the 
public with reference to their vulnerability, the children's charities opposing the 
curfew did likewise. To counter these claims, the local authority attempted to prove 
that young people were on their side and that the curfew was in fact defending their 
right to be safe from harm. 
Through the prism of safety and vulnerability a diminished public was engaged with 
by a diminished political authority - an 'authority' which relied on the 'moral' weight 
of the victimfor its legitimation. 
Rights 
The well-worn term promoted by New Labour of rights and responsibilities was a 
central basis for promoting the values of safety throughout the life of the Hamilton 
curfew. The discourse of 'rights' was also engaged with by those opposing the curfew 
and promoting children's rights. Within social theory, there is also an understanding of 
recent social policy developments as a form of responsibilisation, whereby issues of 
crime and safety are understood to have filtered down to the community and 
individual level. However, the idea of what a right and indeed what responsibility 
meant in the context of the CSI was very different to the liberal notion of the past, and 
was in particular contradictory to what would be understood as a neo-liberal robust 
sense of individuality. With the centrality of safety over-hanging every relationship 
and experience of the adults and yo ung people in Hamilton, the understanding of 
rights as freedoms was replaced by one of rights as protection. Freedom itself was 
understood to be the freedom from fear, and from putting yourself and others 'at risk'. 
In the summer prior to the introduction of the curfew, Chief Constable John Orr had 
explained that his approach to policing was based on the 'highest possible' level of 
155 
protection, especially of children. 'Every single member of the public', he argued, 'has 
the right to be safe ... and feel safe' (Scottish Sunday Mail 15 June 1997). A month, 
before the CSI was introduced, Scottish Home Affairs Minister Henry McCleish 
likewise argued that, 'People have the right to be safe and at peace in their homes. This 
'is at the cornerstone of our vision for a better, safe and more prosperous Scotland' 
(Herald 13 September 1997). As noted previously, John Off felt that the right to be 
safe was something that surely 'there can be no argument against'. Tom McCabe, like 
Henry McCleish, had also spelt out the significance of this right -a right that if 
neglected led to an increase in fear and the 'destruction of communities'. 
Freedom was therefore recast as the freedom to live without fear - something that 
local people needed to take more responsibility for, but equally something that could 
be institutionalised through police initiatives like the Hamilton curfew. Indeed, 
through the prism of safety, 'liberty' was described by McCabe as something that 
could be given back to young people by the actions of the police, while the most 
positive thing that politicians could give to communities in Hamilton and indeed 
across Scotland was the right to be safe and the freedom from fear. The principle of 
the right to be safe and to 'peace and quiet' was, for local MP and Defence Secretary 
George Robertson, fundamental to a 'democracy' (Herald, 3 October 1997). 
The rights being promoted through the CSI were rights to protection from others or 
from yourself. While adults were given the right to a quiet life, young people were, 
given their liberty back by regulating the peer pressure they faced that could lead them 
into acts that they would regret for a long time afterwards. 
The various children's charities mentioned above, that opposed the curfew, appealed 
to a number of clauses within the UN Convention on Human Rights, which protected 
children's right to freedom of association, to leisure, and to families to be treated with 
respect. However, given these groups' acceptance of the problem of young people 
being at risk and of the abusive nature of the family, these arguments were somewhat 
contradictory with the idea of individual and family freedoms. For both those for and 
against the curfew, within the objectified 'at risk' framework the freedom of families 
to make their own decisions, and of young people to associate freely, was to a degree 
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seen as a problem in and of itself. Unregulated activities, after all, carry within them 
unpredictable outcomes and risks that make them, within a precautionary framework, 
intrinsically unsafe. 
With newspaper polls suggesting that the people of Hamilton were heavily supporting 
this initiative, and with the understanding of communities being undermined by fear 
connected to antisocial young people, those arguing for these youth rights were 
depicted as being out of touch. 105 Rights as protection appeared, in this example, to 
have largely replaced the understanding and desire for rights as freedoms. Rather than 
the curfew being understood as an extreme measure, it was those who argued for civil 
liberties who were seen as extremists. 106 
As Dolan Cummings has argued, in terms of the battle for rights as freedoms against 
the growing use of surveillance and regulation of public space in the name of rights, 
Concerns about civil liberties, in as much as they represent opposition to 
surveillance, are now considered anachronistic and even damaging, the 
preserve of 'apologists for the criminal element'. Instead the important thing is 
that people are safe and that they feel safe (Cummings 1997: 4). 107 
Indeed, whereas the rights of children were understood to be'in conflict with adults' 
sense of safety, the right to be safe itself was presented as a universal human right that 
was fundamental to all the different groups of people within the curfew areas: equality 
being the equal right to be and feel safe. 
Responsibility 
The process of responsibilisation, or what Garland calls a responsibilisation strategy, 
describes a process whereby techniques and methods are used in society that 
incorporates an ever increasing number of organisations in crime control practices, 
while transforming the behaviour of the public accordingly: for example, publicity 
campaigns that target the public as a whole - rather than engaging simply with 
deviants - to raise the consciousness of everyone in relation to issues of crime and 
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safety (Garland 1996: 452). Fundamentally having been developed as an adaptation to 
the failure of the welfare state, 108 this process, Garland believes, aims to create a 
I sense of duty' and to develop 'active citizens' who become involved in their own 
crime prevention strategy as individuals and through partnership work, a process that 
results in the 'reordering of the conduct of everyday life' (Garland 1996: 453-4). Part 
of this process, Flint notes, has come with the communitarian attempt by governments 
to 'attribute responsibility for community problems back onto individuals': this has 
developed, Gilling believes, within a New Labourite version of Margaret Thatcher's 
'authoritarian populism' (Gilling 1999: 11). 109 Governing would now occur through 
'regulated choices made by discrete and autonomous actors', human beings governed 
as 'individuals - who are to be active in their own government' (Rose 1996: 328- 
330). 110 
The idea of rights and especially responsibility, leading up to the 1997 election, was 
being forcefully presented by New Labour as a way to, as Labour leader Tony Blair 
put it, 'reinvent community for a modem age, true to core values of fairness, co- 
operation and responsibility' (Guardian 29 January 1996). Both the neo-liberal 
emphasis on 'choice, personal responsibility [and] control over one's fate' matched a 
similar focus by communitarians upon 'self-responsibility and self reliance in the form 
of active citizenship within a self governing community' at this time. As Rose 
observed, despite the ideological differences of these outlooks, both 'utilize similar 
images of the subject as an active and responsible agent in the securing of security for 
themselves and those to whom they are or should be affiliated' (Rose 1996: 335; Flint 
2002: 624). 
The idea of responsibilisation and responsibility are not identical. "' However, both 
stress, to some degree, the role of the individual within this process, often with 
reference to neo-liberal and 'market' phraseology. However, as will be explored 
through the example of the curfew, despite the rhetoric of community and individual 
responsibility the meaning of responsibility had changed. Rather than individuals 
being encouraged to be 'autonomous' actors, they were responsibilised through a 
mediating 'third party'. Responsibility was subsequently widened and weakened at the 
same time. 112 
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Examining the 'responsibilisation' process in housing management strategies in 
Edinburgh and Glasgow, Flint identifies a contradictory development with this 
process - and one which is similarly noted in respect to the curfew. Despite housing 
association attempts to make tenants more. responsible for the behaviour of themselves 
and other tenants, by involving them in vetting potential tenants and organising 
meetings to help parents develop strategies for regulating the behaviour of their 
children, rather than 'individual responsibility' developing, tenants appeared to become 
increasingly reliant on the housing professionals. In this way, more trivial incidents 
were reported and issues that were seen as best resolved between tenants themselves 
were handed over to housing officers and the police to resolve. As Flint notes, one 
housing officer said that, 'In certain areas the first point of contact is often the police 
or housing association, even for trivial issues. These disputes should be easily 
resolved [between neighbours] but aren't' (Flint 2002: 632). 
The curfew, like a number of subsequent antisocial behaviour initiatives developed 
under New Labour, was largely understood and indeed presented as a form of 
responsibilisation - where individuals were held to account for their actions with 
regard to others. However, while on the one hand there was an expansion of what 
being responsible meant, what was meant by responsibility was diminished at the 
same time. Here we explore the claims made by those promoting the curfew in 
relation to the idea of responsibility and responsibilisation to give an indication of the 
more fragile and risk averse ontological understanding of and relationship being 
developed by the local authority and police to the targeted population in Hamilton. 
Responsibility was widened in relation to young people, who were now expected not 
only to refrain from criminal acts, but from behaviour that was understood to be 
creating fear amongst adults on the estate. Young people needed to be made aware of 
their responsibility for the anxieties of elderly adults, and become seýr aware of the 
risks they and their peers faced from their own and one another's actions. At the same 
time parents were now expected to internalise a greater awareness of risks posed to 
their children at night, and to likewise be aware of the fear their teenage sons and 
daughters could instil in others. In this respect, both young people and parents were 
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'responsibilised' based on an understanding of themselves and those around them as 
being fundamentally vulnerable. 
Within the 'at risk' framework rhetorically promoted by the police and local authority, 
individual autonomous action was presented as being somewhat problematic, as the 
activities of especially young people were understood to involve what Beck would 
describe as 'unforeseen circumstances'. In essence a kind of precautionary principle 
regarding actions between people was adopted and promoted through the CSI, a 
principle that placed limited expectations upon the actions and responsibility that 
individuals were expected to take for themselves and others. 
The representation of adults on the estates under curfew was of potential victims 
whose right to a quiet life was being undermined by rowdy youngsters. Understood as 
being both fearful and vulnerable, the expectation of autonomous action by these 
adults to resolve the disputes they had with these young people was noticeably 
missing from any statement by the police and the local authority. In this respect, rather 
than examining the claims made by those promoting or even opposing the curfew, in a 
sense what is being examined here is what claims, or more accurately, demands, were 
not made of the people in Hillhouse. 
Within the prism of vulnerability, risks were understood to be best avoided rather than 
confronted, and the responsibility of adults to play a wider role in their community, 
indeed of taking individual autonomous action to resolve any problems they had - 
outside of locking themselves in their home and phoning the police - was actively 
demoted by those supporting the CSI. Rather a relationship of reliance was developed, 
where a more regular police presence replaced the possible activities of local people to 
deal with the largely non-criminal nuisance behaviour of young people. 
113 This 
process encouraged a transformation of the nature of relationships between people on 
the targeted estate and to help further formalise previously informal relationships. 114 
Rather than a 'neo-liberal' sense of individuality being promoted through the CSI, it 
was a more universal sense of the passive, risk-averse individual that was engaged 
with and encouraged. This can be seen most clearly with regard to the issue of child 
safety. 
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Examining the claims made about the CSI, based as it was upon the importance of 
child safety, typified with examples of young children 'wandering the streets at night', 
it is significant to note that in no speech or press release, nor in any newspaper article, 
did any of the individuals or groups promoting the curfew suggest that the adults 
within the community itself could or should play a, more active role in ensuring the 
safety of. children who were on the street at night. Within a more fragmented and 
individuated climate, the responsibility demanded of adults was to themselves and 
their own security and sense anxiety. The safety of children was both generalised as a 
concern for the whole community, and at the same time fragmented - with only the 
individual parents of children being encouraged to take an 'active' role and being held 
'responsible' for the safety of their own child. 
In respect of the concerns about young people being disorderly, a similarly passive 
role for adults was promoted. The image of the adults on the curfewed estates 
presented by the council, police, politicians and the media, was that of not only being 
under siege, but also being unable to deal with the antisocial behaviour of children. 
Despite a recognition by the police that elderly adults' fear of crime and young people 
was exaggerated, this was not challenged within the campaign. Rather, this initiative, 
like many others, encouraged local adults not to deal with young people but instead to 
phone the police. Fear in this sense was treated as an objective condition that was not 
contestable. Fear was understood to be a risk in and of itself, responsibility for adults 
being in relation to their own physical and emotional well being - something that was 
best protected through risk avoidance and the limiting of contact with young people at 
night. ' 15 
It is worth reiterating that the social problems being addressed here were not related to 
serious violent criminal incidents but to antisocial young people and their nuisance 
activities. Phoning the police was encouraged based on the fear that something 'may' 
happen, and as such the police were being called into action not in relation to criminal 
acts themselves, but based on the fear that individuals felt about a given situation. 
Rather than having any active engagement with the nuisance behaviour of young 
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people, people were encouraged to hand responsibility to the police, who would 
intervene on behalf of the conceptualised 'vulnerable' individual. 
The image of adults as being fundamentally vulnerable and in need of support was 
equally applicable to the representation of young people in the Hillhouse estate, and 
helped to transform the nature of 'responsibility'. Through the prism of risk and safety, 
young people were simultaneously held responsible for the fears of adults, while being 
represented as ultimately incapable of being responsible for themselves. Within this 
framework, a diminished sense of expectations similar to that which was noted above 
in relation to adult responsibility was promoted in relation to young people as well. 
Young people were represented, especially by the tabloid press, as 'trouble-makers'. 
However, through the language of risk, young people were also portrayed by those 
both promoting and opposing the curfew as 'troubled' - and in need of regulation in the 
form of support and protection rather than punishment. 
Of all the groups in Hillhouse, the main one targeted in terms of the need for greater 
responsibility was parents. However, while a responsibilisation process did occur, in 
terms of encouraging an individual awareness of risks and dangers for children on the 
streets and from young people misbehaving on the street, again the more informal idea 
of individual responsibility was transformed. In its place a more contractual and 
enforced notion of responsibility was promoted, while at the same time the idea that 
parents should have personal responsibility for decisions regarding their children was 
diminished. While denouncing irresponsible parents, there was also a sentiment 
expressed by those promoting the curfew that parents were not capable of controlling 
their children and that the police, in this respect, could act as a parent support agency. 
Parents were therefore responsibilised in terms of their awareness and need to restrict 
the independent activities of their children, while being encouraged to understand this 
form of responsibility with reference to the police, whose advice and action was as a 
form of surrogate parent. 116 
In Hamilton, responsibility was more of a pressure put on parents than something that 
they were expected to take and develop for themselves. This more communitarian 
sense of responsibility ý or more accurately this post-liberal understanding of it (Reece 
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2003) - to some degree actively undermined the more classically liberal, and neo- 
liberal, idea of individual responsibility. One commentator noted that, 'Another 
objective [of the curfew] is increasing awareness of parental responsibility. Yet 
paradoxically, they seem to be taking decisions, and the authority to enforce these 
decisions, out of the hands of parents'. 117 
While promoting the idea of good responsible parenting in Hillhouse, parents were 
seen as being responsible for their children's behaviour in a way that broadened the 
meaning of responsibility within the framework of risk and safety, while also 
diminishing what responsibility meant. Children and young people who were 
unsupervised' and potentially at risk, and adults who were made to feel at risk from 
the presence of teenagers were all, to some extent, part of the problem of 'irresponsible 
parents'. A responsible parent was a risk-averse parent, who was made aware by the 
local authority and police. 
Part of the reason given by the council and Strathclyde police, for the implementation 
of the Child Safety Initiative was a need to make parents more responsible. However, 
one of the basic responsibilities of parents - the decision about when and where to 
allow their children to go at night - was in part taken from parents by the activities and 
promotion campaigns of the police during the CSI. An example of how this 
responsibility became something decided by the police rather than parents was 
demonstrated on Halloween night. For this night parents and children were informed 
by officers going to all the schools in the area that it was OK for children and young 
people to go out for Halloween. But this relaxation of the curfew came with a warning 
from a Strathclyde police spokesman: 'We would like all parents to make sure that 
their kids are supervised and go out that bit earlier in the evening' (Scotland on 
Sunday 31 October 1997). The reason for this 'advice'from the police was that'parents 
should be aware, whether it's Halloween or not, of the dangers of allowing their 
children out after dark without proper supervision' (Hamilton Advertiser 30 October 
1997). 
Discussing the use of curfews in the UK and USA, a Sunday Mail reporter noted that 
the use of curfews was a useful tool not only for the police but also for parents, as 'It 
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allows them to tell children what they should do - not because they want to lay down 
the law but because it IS the law' (Sunday Mail 15 August 1999). Rather than parents 
using their own authority to take responsibility for their children, here the authority of 
the law was borrowed by parents - the enforcement and ultimate responsibility for the 
'in-time'of children becoming that of the police. 
The population of Hillhouse as a whole was encouraged through the promotion of the 
CSI to change its behaviour, become more aware of the dangers and anxieties that 
existed in its community, and to understand itself and its children in relation to the 
risks it faced. Responsibility for the social problems addressed by the authorities was 
understood in relation to parents and young people, whose 'risky' lifestyles and 
activities undermined the security of the entire community. This process of 
responsibilisation both widened and weakened the meaning of responsibility. Through 
the precautionary framework promoted, responsibility was to the generalised risks 
portrayed by the authorities; awareness of this responsibility to others meant adopting 
a risk-averse approach to situations and experiences; with a greater understanding of 
the insecurities of others and the self leading to an expectation of caution and 
precaution. Within the rhetoric surrounding the curfew, therefore, the notion of being 
1streetwise' was problematised - both in relation to children and young people - but 
equally in relation to adults themselves. ' 18 Being aware meant being more fearful and 
replaced an expectation of individual initiative. Understanding of 'risk' replaced 
action, contact and confrontation between people. In essence, the promotion of the 
CSI sponsored a form of responsibilisation that would fonnalise infonnal 
relationships, by developing an internalised form of responsibility based on the 
doctrine of safety and caution, and by encouraging individuals permanently to mediate 
their relationships with others through the activities of the authorities. 
Therapeutic legitimation 
The existence of fear and a sense of vulnerability across the UK is often interpreted as 
evidence of growing social problems facing the public. However, as Furedi notes: 
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Fears, which are an expression ofpsychic vulnerability, are often misleadingly 
seen as the product of a world that faces unprecedented dangers ... Public 
perceptions of new risks and dangers are rooted in the sense ofpowerlessness 
circulated through therapeutic culture. This emotional script helps frame 
perceptions independent of any risk - invariably they tend to overwhelm any 
objective calculation of risk (Furedi 2004: 134). 
This sense of vulnerability had increasingly become a basis for police action in late 
twentieth century life. As Garland argued, 'The police now hold themselves out less 
as a crime-fighting force than as a responsive public service, aiming to reduce fear, 
disorder and incivility and to take account of community feelings in setting 
enforcement priorities' (Garland 2001). 
The emphasis so far within this chapter has been upon the issue of safety and the 
contradictory process of responsibilisation promoted through the CSI. Within this 
engagement with the vulnerable public a key justificatory framework took on a 
therapeutic form. The emotion of fear was understood to be central to the problems of 
individuals and to the community as a whole, and the attempt to relate to and manage 
these fears was engaged with. Ultimately, the success of the initiative itself was 
understood by the police and politicians in relation not to the reduction of antisocial 
behaviour itself, but more directly in relation to the fear of the public. Fear in this 
respect was understood as a universal emotion felt by the people of Hillhouse - 
something that had a sense of permanence and that formed the basis of the 
relationships between people on the estate and consequently provided the foundation 
upon which a connection could be made between the authorities and the public. Fears 
for and of children and young people were both related to and validated in the 
development of the curfew, and it was this generalised sentiment of fear - rather than 
the specific anxieties regarding particular activities of young people and children - that 
was being engaged with. 
The notion of a therapy culture relates not to the specific activities of therapists, but to 
a cultural elevation of the significance of the emotional aspect of individuals - and in 
particular to an acute orientation to the public as being vulnerable to emotional 
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damage. Through this therapeutic framework, an orientation towards the people of 
Hillhouse was established, within which previously understood social problems were 
reinterpreted as emotional ones and new social problems - like antisocial behaviour - 
were understood to be problematic with reference to the emotional reaction of others. 
Through the therapeutic gaze of the authorities, social problems were reformulated 
and the meaning offreedom was redefined to mean the freedom from feeling fearful. 
'Removing fear' was the way to 'return liberties', and the 'number one priority' of the 
curfew was to ensure the entire community felt safe. At the same time, the 
responsibilisation process attempted to engage with the fear that parents had for their 
children - and specific threats, like that of paedophiles, were promoted as an issue that 
should be of concern for those parents who allowed their children out at night. 
Similarly young people themselves were engaged with and encouraged to support the 
curfew, based on their own potential insecurities regarding other young people. 
Crime and antisocial behaviour were understood to be, and projected as, social 
problems with reference to the individual's sense of 'well being' and the community 
sense of confidence established through a generalised mood of safety. 
' 19 The basis and 
reconstitution of the community in this respect related to the emotional self - 
something to be engaged with and reformed by the authorities. The common 'value' 
engaged with through the CSI was the fragmented individual's feeling of anxiety. 
Moving young people away from areas where adults are concerned about their 
behaviour may not be a new development. However, the heightened significance 
given to the insecurities of adults - and indeed to the community as a whole - reflected 
a qualitative elevation adopted by both politicians and the police to the concern with 
the emotional reactions and fears of adults. 120 
Transformed from individual cases of criminal or antisocial behaviour into a concern 
with a general sense of anxiety on these estates the 'social problem' of, as one 
newspaper labelled it, 'streets of fear', was engaged with (Herald 21 October 1997). 
This existing understanding of communities, indeed of society more broadly, meant 
that any example of nuisance behaviour of young people was interpreted as the basis 
for this universalised sense of fear. 
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The fear of crime has been an issue in criminology and politics in the UK from the 
1980s. However, this fear was both contested and less central to the concern about 
crime and social problems affecting communities. As the following chapter will show, 
there were unquestionably issues regarding youth drinking and vandalism in the area, 
and as the police explained the curfew had been introduced in part because of 
complaints by adults. The question addressed here, however, is not the myth or reality 
of the antisocial activities of young people in the targeted areas - although as the 
police admitted, Hillhouse was not an area of particularly high crime rates - but rather 
the justificatory basis of the initiative, which was almost exclusively focused upon the 
sense of anxiety felt by the public. 
Within the framework of being 'at risk', fear was itself constituted as a risk . 
121 Fear 
became an essential way of understanding the targeted communities and the 
individuals within them, and regardless of the objective basis of this fear, its very 
existence was the social problem that was seen as needing to be addressed. 
In Hillhouse this fear was understood to be a problem for the whole community, each 
member of it subsequently being seen as a potential victim of crime but also an 
existing 'victim' of behaviour that created a dark cloud of fear. 122 With this almost 
mystical sense of fear, which was understood to be hovering above communities, the 
basis for police intervention related to criminal acts was transformed into a more 
subjectively constituted defence of the public's emotional well being. This 
engagement with the sense of vulnerability of the public thus provided the 
justificatory basis for the curfew. 123 
In a sense the community being engaged with was a community of vulnerable 
individuals, a community victimised by fear. This sense of victimhood was 
understood to be the common bond between individuals - and the basis of state 
engagement and legitimation. As Garland explains: 
The symbolic figure of the victim has taken on a life of its own [and has 
become] ... a new social fact. The victim is no longer an unfortunate citizen 
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who has been on the receiving end of a criminal harm, and whose concerns are 
subsumed within the 'public interest'... The victim is now, in a certain sense, a 
much more representative character, whose experience is taken to be common 
and collective, rather than individual and atypical (Garland 2002: 11). 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has not been to show what actually happened with the 
introduction of the CSI in areas of Hamilton. Rather it has most centrally been an 
examination of the claims made and the justificatory basis upon which the initiative 
was promoted. 
As noted in the first chapter; the cultural context within which the curfew developed 
was one in which fear had become a more ever-present framework of influence, one 
that impacted on not only a sense of global threats, but equally in relation to personal 
interactions between people. 'Moral' panics continue ,d 
to have some influence at this 
time; but more generally 'anxieties' about social problems were understood and 
discussed within the 'amoral' discourse of safety. Within this climate, the tendency 
was for previously discussed issues of deviance and disorder to be understood not 
within the 'dog collar' traditional moral framework, but within a newly formed 
morality - or amorality - of safety. 
The 'social problems' related to by the curfew were predicated on the previously 
problematised issues of child safety, the 'panic' about a 'yob culture, and the 
problematisation of relations between young people, which had resulted in the 
emergence, for example, of the social problem of 'bullying' and the developing issue 
of 'peer pressure'. Community safety was becoming an organising framework for 
local authority intervention into communities at this time, and the development of 
initiatives and practices like the vetting of youth workers and the emergence of CCTV 
and security around schools was emerging at this time and normalising the basis of 
safety as a framework for organising everyday life. 
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Structural changes at the time had also helped to develop a more fragmented society, 
with the decline of solidarity and collective organisations accompanying changes in 
the family. This process of individuation helped to strengthen the sense of 
vulnerability across society - something that Furedi argues was reinforced by a lack of 
clarity about what society's values should be (Furedi 2002: 68). 
The justificatory framework for the CSI was consequently based around safety - with 
rights, responsibilities, freedom, liberty and what it meant to be a good citizen or 
parent all relating to this issue. As Furedi noted at the time in hisý opening line to 
Culture of Fear, 'Safety has become the fundamental value of our time' (Furedi 2002: 
1). 
The novelty of the CSI, compared with previous Strathclyde Police Zero Tolerance 
type initiatives that more overtly targeted 'spitting yobs' (Orr 1997: 110), was the 
incorporation of the issue of child safety as the dominant rhetorical theme - at least at 
a local level. This double-edged focus on antisocial behaviour and child safety can be 
seen as a synthesis of 'traditional conservative authoritarianism with leftist intrusion 
into the affairs of the individual' (Furedi 2002: 103). 124 Whereas politicians engaged 
more with the fear of adults and the issue of crime itself, the local police to some 
extent avoided the more exclusionary and confrontational language of 'yobs' by 
discussing the young people in Hillhouse as victims who were vulnerable. In this 
respect, the rhetoric of the local police who emphasised the issue of child safety was 
more 'inclusive', and a certain unity of purpose with the community could be 
established through a more victim-centred approach to the problems in Hillhouse. As 
Best notes, 'As long as we remain focused on victims, disagreement vanishes ... [which 
helps] explain why the new-victim movements tend to gloss over the victimizers'. The 
problem being that, 'Once we start identifying victimizers, we are back in the messy, 
divisive business of trying to both understand and blame deviants. As long as we stay 
focused on the victims, we can hope to mobilize consensus'(Best 1999: 140-1). The 
basis of consensus was therefore achievable only through the rhetorical association 
with victims on the estate - but the role of the police could never be just to empathise 
with these victims, they were expected to act. 
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Despite the child safety rhetoric, as we will see in the next chapter, the real concerns 
of local people that had helped form the curfew, and the reality of the action of the 
police in practice, were largely related to the issue of 'youth' and their antisocial 
behaviour. Young people still needed to be moved off the street. 
Whereas the Labour leadership was more engaged by the fear of crime as the issue of 
concern, the local council and especially the local police appeared to be more 
apprehensive about the negative connotations of a curfew in their area. However, 
despite these differences, the framework of vulnerability and the centrality of the issue 
of safety underlay both approaches. 
Initially examined in terms of a moral panic, with reference to the first chapter of this 
thesis, the curfew should, in retrospect, more accurately be understood as a 
development based upon the emergence of a state of amoral anxieties. Safety rather 
than an alternative moral outlook or values underpinned the initiative, even in relation 
to the family. The only 'value' adhered to was that of safety, a safe parent being a good 
parent. The engagement with the community thus related to its general sense of 
anxiety, with the role of the local authority being to help the public become aware of 
and change its behaviour in relation to risk and fear. Discussing the psychotherapeutic 
emphasis on individuals' feelings and emotions in the formation of communities, 
communitarian Amatal Etzioni notes that, 'Expressive individualism assumes that the 
proper focus is on personal psychological well-being rather than social responsibility, 
not to mention comniitment to values or raising a moral voice' (Etzioni 1997: 135). In 
this respect, the focus upon the emotional aspect of the fear of crime and the 
therapeutic engagement with the public's feelings of anxiety, despite the promotion of 
'community', can be seen as something that was neither morally (or politically) based, 
or connected to a wider sense of social responsibility. 
Similarly, with reference to the emphasis placed upon the victimised nature of the 
community, EtziOni also believes that the systematic understanding of victimology 
means that, 'While social systems factors are always important, and sometimes 
dominate the situation, when they are used to imply that the victims have no choice in 
the matter, which exempts the actors from moral responsibility for their acts, the 
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notion becomes highly damaging to the moral voice' (Etzioni 1997: 137). In the 
discussion about young people facing 'peer pressure', emphasis was placed upon the 
victim-based conception of these young people - something that, by implying a lack of 
choice, potentially undermined the notion of responsibility that the council 
simultaneously promoted. 
Without the 'vulnerable' label being attached to parents, there was a level of 
responsibility expected of them in Hillhouse. However, even here, to a degree, the 
expectation of their autonomous accountability was limited by an initiative that 
presumed a certain degree of support was needed from the police for parents to control 
and care for their children. 125 
A key element in the defining of moral panics has been the argument that the reaction 
to a social problem is disproportionate. As will be argued in the following chapter, 
especially in terms of the issue of child safety, this was clearly the case in Hillhouse - 
and even at the level of the problems related to young people, these were generally of 
a nature more accurately described as nuisance behaviour. However, at the more 
abstract and general level of engaging with fear within the community, and relating to 
a more universalised sense of vulnerability, the curfew was connecting to a real state 
of mind. 126 
Despite police statements explaining that crime and antisocial behaviour was not 
especially high within-the targeted areas, by relating to the broader sense of fear in 
these areas through the discourse of risk and safety there appeared at the same time to 
be a necessary exaggeration of the social problems being addressed. Instances of 
nuisance behaviour, helped in part by the language of 'antisocial behaviour', gave a 
more problematic and ever-present significance to occasional events. 
Despite the aim of the CSI being in part to develop a sense of community, the 
justificatory rhetoric of the authorities related more directly to the fragmented and 
vulnerable individual, than to any sense of commonality - except, that is, with the 
'common' issue of individual safety and the desire to feel safe. In the process of 
engaging with people in this way, rather than individuals reengaging with one another, 
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the connecting framework implicitly being established was between the political 
authorities and the individuated public. 
It is at this level that the meaning of responsibilisation should be understood - less as a 
promoti6n of individual autonomous action, than as an encouragement of caution and 
an expectation of reliance upon third party intervention to help manage all the 
relationships between the people in 11illhouse. 127 
Despite the promotion of the CSI as a community-led initiative with community 
participation, as discussed above, community action was at no stage promoted in 
terms of individual activity to resolve issues of antisocial behaviour or even child 
safety. In essence, the initiative in this respect not only engaged with a general sense 
of fear and desire for safety, but encouraged all on the estate to stop acting themselves 
to help ensure safety was maintained. Within an 'at risk' framework, where all 
independent interactions where understood to be potentially dangerous, rather than 
encouraging self-activity in the construction of the community, the aim of the CSI was 
to encourage 'self limitation' (Beck 1996: 29). The extent to which this developed in 
practice will be explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Curfew Interviews: 
Analysing the Culture of Fear 
Hamilton's pioneering child safety initiative has won a major community award. The 
project, which has attracted attention from asJar afield as Japan and Australia, won a 
top prize in the 1998 Crime Prevention and Community Safety Awards, sponsored by 
insurance giants CGU. The awards were presented last Thursday by Home Secretary 
Jack Straw and Martyn Lewis, presenter of the BBC television programme 
"Crimebeat" (Hamilton Advertiser 15 October 1998). 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the claims made about the CSI and the legitimation process, 
were explored. Here, the actual impact of the curfew on the targeted estate of 
Hillhouse is examined in detail, and the extent to which this initiative could be said to 
be simply attempting to resolve 'real' social problems that the public were concerned 
about is explored. Through the interviews with young people and adults in Hillhouse, 
the 'real' concerns as opposed to those promoted by the authorities are contrasted, 
while the more pervasive culture of fear is studied and related to the point of 
connection being made between the local authority and individuals on the estate. In 
essence the 'real' or objective risks that faced people in Hillhouse are here contrasted 
to the subjective sense of anxiety that impinged upon not only how individuals 
understood others, but also how they understood themselves. It was this cultural sense 
of insecurity, rather than any specific 'social problem' in the area, that, it is argued, can 
be understood as the basis of the initiative itself and the framework around which the 
authorities attempted to reengage the more risk-averse public. 
What social problems? 
From police reports, media coverage, and interviews with adults and young people in 
the areas of Hamilton targeted for the curfew, there were clearly some probl5ms of 
crime and disorder. There was in Hillhouse, like many areas, a certain problem of 
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crime, drunken behaviour, graffiti and vandalism, while some children and young 
people were out on the streets at night 'after dark'. In this respect there were some 'real' 
problems that were being related to by the police and local authority that led to the 
introduction of the Child Safety Initiative. 
However to understand the introduction of the curfew in this area, we must recall that 
for 'problems' to become 'social problems', at a particular time and with reference to 
wider social, cultural and political issues, requires the existence of claimsmakers who 
draw attention to these issues. As well as the reported complaints by local adults about 
the antisocial behaviour in their area, which suggests an element of grassroots support 
for the initiative, we must also situate the CSI within the context of zero tolerance 
policing, the politicisation of antisocial behaviour, and the fear of crime. 
Unlike past panics about youth crime that were promoted by conservative groups and 
often dampened down by key politicians, the concerns about 'unsafe' young people in 
Hamilton can be seen as something that was promoted by the local authority and 
supported by the government. Zero tolerance policing, as formerly discussed, did not 
only focus police attention upon minor crimes, but also directly related petty criminal 
acts, and even non-criminal acts, to serious criminality and disorder (Off 1997). 
Likewise, by 1997, the 'fear of crime'had become a widely recognised social problem, 
a problem that New Labour had helped to promote. The fear of crime had also been 
connected not only with crime but also antisocial behaviour, with the fear of crime 
across society being understood to be undermi I ning communities. 128 In this respect the 
development of the curfew in Hamilton should be understood as relating to 'real' 
problems of the behaviour of young people, but also, and most importantly, to'a 
broader political and policing agenda that elevated the nuisance behaviour of young 
people into a significant social problem for society as a whole. 
With this in mind the actual impact of the curfew is explored below to assess the 
similarities, but also the differences, in the outlook and understanding of local people 
in the area of Hillhouse towards the problems being promoted and addressed by the 
CSI. For example, were the adults in Hillhouse living in 'streets of fear' and was this 
related to the behaviour of young people? Were children unsafe and parents 
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irresponsible in their dealings with these children? Were young people 'at risle from 
their peers? Were they also living in fear and did they therefore support the curfew, as 
the police suggested? Or, as the children's rights groups maintained, were the police 
harassing these young people and creating divisions between teenagers and the police? 
As will be explored, the issue of fear and concerns about safety were 'real' in terms of 
the existence of concerns by local people - although these concerns did not always 
match those of the authorities. The basis of these concerns, while relating in part to the 
local issues of young people's behaviour, also appeared to be linked to far broader 
social issues than the initiative suggested. Finally, with reference to the Hamilton 
Advertiser story above, the reasons why the CSI was understood to be such a great 
success will bre addressed with particular reference to the political concern with the 
'loss of a sense of community' and the need for public participation in government 
initiatives. 
The lone voice of opposition 
The typical example used in justifying the curfew, before, during and after the initial 
trial curfew period, was that of young children wandering the streets late at night. 
Being 'at risk', these children were apparently both unsafe and helping to make the 
community feel unsafe because of their antisocial activities. This group was important 
for the police in their attempt to depict the initiative as being both caring in relation to 
children and also connected to the issue of irresponsible parenting. This age group 
also took on a greater significance in relation to legislation dealing with antisocial 
behaviour in 1998, with the introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act. This Act, one 
of the new Labour government's first major pieces of law and order legislation 
included a provision for local authorities across England and Wales to introduce a 
curfew for under- I 0-year-olds between the hours of 9pm and 6am. The Hamilton 
experience was directly connected to the development of this legislation, and used as 
an example of how curfews can have a positive impact upon areas (Independent, 28 
September 1998). The justification for the Labour government's curfew legislation 
targeted at areas and individuals was more overtly geared towards the problem of 
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antisocial children, rather than child safety, as the Sunday Times explained with 
reference to 'a seven year old thief, who had been arrested more than ten times': 
The seven year old is just one of hundreds of problem under- I Os across Britain 
who police and local authorities are considering placing under curfew using 
the new law. Such children -cannot currently be prosecuted for their crimes as 
they are below the age of criminal responsibility (Sunday Times 6 September 
1998). 
In Hamilton, typical examples of the 'social problems' the police were addressing were 
given to the press a year after the curfew was launched. These included 'a four year 
old boy found cycling on waste ground some distance from his home. His 
grandmother who had been baby-sitting had not known where he was'. Another 
example was given of two young girls, 'one of them inadequately clothed', selling 
papers outside a bingo hall (Hamilton Advertiser 22 October 1998). These 'extreme' 
examples were relatively rare, but helped the typification process, presenting the 
curfew as something that was needed to keep young children safe. 
These examples occasionally appeared in the Scottish national press. 129 However, in 
the local newspaper there was one occasion when a police story about a four-year-old 
found on the streets after 9prn was challenged by a parent. The Hamilton Advertiser 
headline, 'Angry Mum Slams Curfew Claims', gave one of the few media stories 
coming from someone who had experienced the police action and opposed it. In so 
doing, the somewhat faceless and one-sided image of 'at risle children and 
'irresponsible parents' was undermined, and in its place a story of everyday life 
emerged. June Golder, the mother of the four-year-old Jamie explained that: 
This gives the impression that I'm a mother who doesn't care about my weans 
but that couldn't be further from the truth. We had been out all day and we 
arrived home at the back of eight, Jamie said he wanted to play out with his 
friends. I told him he could play out for 10 minutes then come in. I was in my 
front room and I could see him from the window (Hamilton Advertiser, 6 
November 1997). 
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This example is noteworthy, not simply because it was unusual, but because the 
potential issue 130 of parents' rights reflected in this case had no wider public 
expression or representation in any organised opposition to the curfew. This is not to 
argue that there was a coherent desire or widespread opposition to this initiative - but 
the lack of an existing framework for questioning its introduction, or for allowing 
expressions of dissent cohered around issues, meant that where concerns did exist they 
could take no public form except as a lone voice within the local press. 131 
Social problems: myth or reality? 
The curfew was presented as something that the community wanted, not only because 
of concerns about antisocial youth, but also, as council leader Tom McCabe had 
argued, because local people were also concerned about the safety of young people. 
The couplet of safety for children and safety of adults from children was central to this 
initiative. The police had similarly presented the CS1 as an initiative that was largely 
introduced because of concerns about young children 'wandering the streets late at 
night', putting themselves at risk and potentially getting up to 'no good'. However, in 
the Scottish Office research Evaluation of the Hamilton Child Safety Initiative, a 
research document based on an examination of the impact of the curfew in its first six 
month trial period, it was noted following three group discussions with adults and 
young people that: 
All three groups questioned the justification for deploying resources into the 
HCSI [Hamilton Child Safety Initiative] when they felt there was no real 
evidence that under 10s were causing crime or disorder problems on the 
streets, especially not in Hillhouse (McGallagly et al 1998: 60). 
One of the groups also questioned whether the CSI could be expected to tackle 
problems such as 'bad parenting' and change the attitudes of 'one or two irresponsible 
parents who let their children out on the streets late at night' (McGallagly et a11998: 
60). 
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MY research with children and adults on the estate also raises questions about the 
necessity of a curfew based upon the 'social problem' of young children 'wandering the 
streets at night'. Hillhouse Community Council chair Joe Parfery, for example, was 
unaware of any great safety problem, especially from strangers and paedophiles. 132 He 
was equally unaware of any great number of young children wandering the streets at 
night. He explained: 'There are a few children who stay out, especially during the 
summer, till about 10.30pm but not many. But what's wrong with that anyway? I used 
to play out all the time when I was a kid'. 
As well as the Scottish Office research finding that local people felt that the issue of 
antisocial under- 10-year-olds was not an issue, and that the question of irresponsible 
parents letting their young children stay out late only applied to 'one or two' people, it 
also found that there was no evidence of wider dangers to children in the Hillhouse 
area. The sununary of the research findings noted that: 
Due to the small number of children who were the victims of crime or road 
traffic accidents in the 6 month period prior to and during the period covered 
by the CSI, it was not possible to assess the impact of the initiative on such 
incidents (McGallagly et al 1998a: 3). 
In other words, the statistical impact of the curfew on the safety of children was found 
to be impossible to assess due to the limited safety issues that existed. Where 
comparisons were made with Hillhouse and a control area by the Scottish Office 
research, with reference to crime victimisation rates it was found that the CSI 'had 
little impact in terms of reducing child victimisation' (McGallagly et al 1998: 26). 
Finally, with reference to the 229 curfew interventions made by the police between 
October 1997 and April 1998, this research found that '20 [or 9%] were directly 
related to child safety issues' (McGallagly et al 1998: 17). Here again the 'ten year old 
child ... selling newspapers', who was 'inappropriately 
dressed', was used as an 
example of the child safety approach of the police. 
Despite the claims made by the local authority and, especially, by the police, that the 
CSI was being introduced to protect under-10-year-olds from the irresponsible parents 
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who allowed their children to wander the streets at night, the extent of this problem, 
the level of dangers present, and the impact the curfew had on the safety of children, 
are all questioned by the above findings. 
Cotton wool kids? 
Although within the promotion of the CSI the police and local authority were careful 
not to argue that the targeted curfew estates were 'problem areas' that were 'getting 
worse', the political climate, with its increasing focus on antisocial behaviour, the 
development of zero tolerance policing, and the understanding of the growing fear of 
crime, all meant that the curfew was interpreted as an initiative set up to deal with 
growing social problems associated with young people out on the streets at night. 
Indeed one could argue that the very introduction of a curfew in Hamilton, which was 
complemented with UK-wide curfew legislation, was based on an understanding of 
communities riddled with problems of crime and disorder - problems that were getting 
worse. 
However, whatever the myth and reality of these perceived social problems, there was 
also a growing body of research suggesting that children, rather than wandering the 
streets at night, were in fact having their free time increasingly regulated by parents. 133 
This research found that: the time children were allowed out was decreasing, as was 
the distance they were allowed to travel; children could play in fewer places and could 
travel less far from home than previous generations; there was a growth of children 
whose parents would define them as 'indoor kids' as opposed to 'outdoor kids'; and that 
children were engaged in more supervised as opposed to unsupervised activities. 
Research by Gill Valentine and John McKendrick sums up the trends being identified 
by this research. With reference to the growing regulatiod of children's free time, they 
noted that: 
In other words, a significant amount of children's outdoor play is taking place 
in 'private' space [or regulated space], rather than 'public' space, so that 
although children are spending a considerable proportion of their leisure time 
179 
'out-doors' most have very limited opportunities to play in or explore the 
public environment independently of adult supervision (Valentine and 
McKendrick 1997: 227). 
This general trend of an increase in the regulation of children's lives, rather than a 
growth in 'street kids out at all hours', was replicated by my research with the 32 
children living in and around Hillhouse. The latest any of the children said they were 
allowed to play out at night was 9pm, but this only applied to two 2 children - and the 
average 'in-time'was 7.30pm. A majority of the children interviewed were allowed to 
walk to school by themselves and could walk to friends' houses alone. However, 
further questioning of the children who went out alone at night - about where they 
went and where their friends lived - found that many of those who did travel to their 
friends' houses at night were allowed to do so only because they lived very close by or 
because their parents were able to watch them on their travels. 
For example, 10-year-old Jane from Hillhouse explained that she was allowed to walk 
to her friend's house alone, but only because 'I'm not even a minute away, and my 
friend's parents watch out for me'. Similarly, Mark, who was 9 years old, was allowed 
to walked to his friend's house but only because 'he only lives next door'. Joanne 
from Hillhouse also explained that she was allowed out, but that 'Mum watches me 
go. My friend's mum watches me come, and mum phones her to let her know I'm on 
my way. But I've never had any bother'. 
From these interviews and the research carried out by the Scottish Office, there was 
little evidence of children 'running wild' around Hillhouse. Indeed, around a third of 
children - similar numbers to those in the Wheway (1997) and Livingstone and Bovill 
(1999) research - said they were not allowed out of the sight of their parents. 
A quarter 
of the children said they were not allowed to play out after school hours and a third 
explained that they were not allowed to go to the shops alone. The majority of the 
children could play out for a time at night, but most of these children had significant 
limits imposed on where they could go and only two children said they could walk or 
cycle around the entire estate. 
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Rather than an overall 'social problem' of an increasing numbers of children being out 
late at night, the general trend towards the increasing regulation of children's 'free 
time', highlighted by various research projects in the 1990s, was suggested by the 
interviews with the children in and around Hillhouse. Indeed at a national level the 
concern about 'wandering children' has been raised by Fran Russell from the legal 
reform group, the Howard League. In conversation about this issue, she stated that 'no 
evidence has been produced to suggest young children wandering the streets at night 
is a serious or growing problem' (Waiton 2004: 65). Even within the police reports of 
the 'extreme' cases of young children being out late at night, these were few and far 
between. In this respect, the curfew could be seen less as an artificial imposition of 
new rules placed upon parents, so much as a replication of existing parental practices 
based on a more pronounced precautionary approach to children who were 
understood to be 'at risk. 
In terms of the irresponsibility of parents, with respect to the active involvement of 
parents in their children's 'free time', not only were many parents heavily involved in 
the regulation of children's 'street-life', but a third of parents also regularly took their 
children to and from school and to and from friends'houses at night. Three quarters of 
the children interviewed were also involved in organised activities after school and a 
ma ority of these children were taken to and from these activities by parents or older 
siblings. In other words, the idea that there was a serious problem of irresponsible 
parents who allowed their children to go out unsupervised 'at all hours' was extremely 
rare - with little or no evidence being uncovered by this or the Scottish Office 
research. Indeed the 'extreme' examples given by the police of children 'inadequately 
dressed' selling newspapers, or of a four-year-old on his bike on waste ground, would 
perhaps in previous generations, when children were more likely to be out at night, not 
have been understood as a 'social problem'. However, within a 'safety first' or an 'at 
risk' framework, these activities were reinterpreted as examples of wider social 
problems associated with irresponsible parenting. 
The relatively high level of parental supervision of the children in Hillhouse, the 
somewhat limited time and space allowed to them, and the lack of statistical evidence 
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uncovered by the Scottish Office in respect to dangers facing children in this area, 
suggest that the notion that these children were 'at risk' was questionable. 
Following the interviews with the children in and around Hillhouse, the lack of any 
significant dangers faced by these children was again shown. Almost two thirds of the 
children interviewed from Hillhouse said they had 'no bother' in their area; this was 
fewer than for the children living outside of the area. No child had been put 'at risk' by 
an adult and the home was seen as a safe place by all of these children. The main 
'bother' mentioned by these children was from other children, and especially the 
general activities of some teenagers in the area. Three children mentioned windows 
being broken, two mentioned fights, and two others described a fire being started by 
young people. Those who mentioned having had some 'bother' themselves explained 
that they had either been chased or called names. Ten-year-old Steven told me: 
'Teeýagers drink sometimes and shout at me, I've been chased as well, but only once', 
while Tim said: 'Jamie hit me with his stookie [plaster cast], he's always picking on 
smaller children. 
There appears to be a situation where some older teenagers drink and are sometimes 
'antisocial' at night in and around Hillhouse. However, the extent to which this could 
be understood as children being put 'at risk' is questionable. No paedophile or abusive 
adult was mentioned; teenagers sometimes chased or called the smaller children 
names, but overall there was no evidence that these children were facing more 
difficulties in their area than their parents may have faced when they were children. 
Interestingly, while alcohol was frequently raised as an issue throughout this survey, 
these children did not mention drugs. 
A concoction of fear 
As has been shown above, in any real sense the idea that children in Hillhouse were 
running around wild, or that they were being put at risk by irresponsible parents, was 
far from the truth - and yet this was the key justificatory basis for the curfew. Even in 
the Scottish Office research it was noted that of the 229 police interventions, only 
three 'special circumstances' were highlighted relating to poor parental supervision 
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(McGallagly et al 1998: 18). In this respect, the basis for the curfew can be seen in 
part as a concoction by the authorities based on a culturally-accepted set of anxieties 
and fears they already had about these issues, rather than a development based on real 
problems and speciflc local concerns. 134 
On the other hand, however, in general terms concerns about child safety were shared 
by parents in Hillhouse, and the promotion of child safety was supported. In the 
Scottish Office research it was found that 'despite reservations' about the focus on 
under- I 0-year-olds, 'there was a general consensus that the police were right to 
address the safety of young children' (McGallagly et al 1998: 60). In discussion with 
three focus groups, it was also noted that, 'All three groups commended the HCSI for 
its concern with the safety of young children and showed considerable interest in this 
aspect of the Initiative' (McGallagly et al 1998: 63). In other words, despite there 
being little concern by adults about the reality of the problem of young children 
wandering the streets late at night, and also despite their being little evidence within 
the Scottish Office research or in the research of this thesis that young children were 
practically 'at risk', there was a more generalised acceptance that safety was an 
important issue for children, that children were indeed more generally 'at risk', and 
that action taken to promote this could only be a good thing. 
Put more starkly, the reality of young children out late on the streets being 'at risk' was 
largely a myth and something that local people felt was not a serious problem, 
whereas the generalisedJear for children's safety was real. As a generic sentiment, the 
issue of child safety was one that was accepted and lent support to the introduction of 
the curfew. However, rather than there being agreement between the authorities and 
the public about the practical dangers children faced, the agreement was about thefear 
felt for children. In this respect the CSI was an engagement with, and promotion of, 
the culture offear, rather than a practical initiative to resolve an objective problem. 
As discussed previously, child safety was here not only an unquestioned issue but was 
also understood as an unquestionably good thing. But rather than engage with fears 
related to specific issues, the engagement between the authorities and the targeted 
areas was an engagement with a more generalised sense of fear. 
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Discussing the successes of the initiative with a group of parents, the Scottish Office 
research noted that one of the positive factors had been that 'this parents' focus group 
considered that the HCSI had been effective in making parents more aware of the 
dangers for children out late at night'. Here the success of the cur ew was not only in 
its ability to relate to people's fears, but to enhance them. Parents were now also 
believed to regulating their children more strictly because of these fears (McGallagly 
et al 1998: 78). For the local authority and police, the greater regulation of these 
children's time was seen as a positive move to make them safer - despite the reality of 
limited evidence of any dangers faced by the children. Child safety is here more of an 
absolutist 'moral' or amoral position than a reflection of, or attempt to resolve, 'real' 
social problems. 
The success of the authorities was in engaging with and encouraging a culture of fear 
amongst parents. To be a fearful parent in this respect was a good thing and reflected a 
responsible attitude, regardless of the risks that existed. - 
Ironically, in the research carried out for this thesis, the main reason children gave for 
having to be home earlier since the curfew was introduced was that their parents were 
worried about them coming into contact with the police. This does not necessarily 
contradict the idea that most parents supported the initiative, but rather suggests that 
as well as raising awareness about 'child safety' issues in general, the practicalities of 
the curfew also led to an unintended fear about police involvement in their child's life. 
The elevation of fear regarding the police was not something explored by the Scottish 
Office research. 
Having found little evidence of harm towards the children of Hillhouse, the Scottish 
Office research noted that 'over a third of those children asked felt unsafe when 
walking alone in their local area after darle. This 'provides some justification for the 
present Initiative' (McGallagly et al 1998: 49). Here again the basis for the initiative 
was established not through real problems faced by these children, but in the fears 
they had about going out in the dark. 
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Most parents, as we have discussed, were 'highly responsible' in terms of the extent to 
which they regulated their children's free time. In this respect, the curfew was simply 
reinforcing an existing high level of parental supervision. Much research suggests that 
a major reason nationally for this high level of parental supervision is. fear for their 
children's safety. 135 The curfew was reinforcing the idea that a fearful parent was a 
good parent, while targeting those parents who did not share these fears as 
problematic and a danger to their children and the community. A culture of fear was 
therefore not only expressed within this study, but reinforced by those promoting the 
curfew. There may be, in part, structural reasons for the development of this culture, 
but here we see a practical example of how a sense of anxiety was institutionalised, 
generalised still further, and promoted by the local authority - and subsequently, how 
this reinforces a local culture based more directly on an exaggerated sense of fear. 
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion it could be argued that the problem the 
authorities had with the so-called irresponsible parents was not that they were making 
their children unsafe, but that they were refusing to join the community offear - the 
new imagined basis for community and the framework around which the authorities 
were attempting to reengage the public. 
Engaging fear through safety 
As well as the CSI being introduced to make children safe, it was also an initiative 
that aimed to make adults feel safe, by stopping the antisocial and criminal activities 
of young people who were under 16 years of age and hung about the streets. 
During the initiative, the notion that local people were living in fear was promoted by 
the police, local councillors, national politicians and the press. Community safety. it 
was argued by council leader Tom McCabe, was the community's number one 
priority and helped explain why they had called for a curfew. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the curfew idea had not come from the local 
Citizens' Jury, as had been suggested by local MP George Robertson. Community 
safety was a significant issue for the people of Hamilton - as was discovered by the 
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System 3 (1996) survey carried out by the council. However, although there was a 
general concern about community safety, this survey notes that when the public were 
asked about 'specific problems in their local area' rather than 'general problems', the 
issue of unemployment came out as the highest concern. Despite this, when 
establishing the Citizens' Jury, it was the issue of community safety that was put on 
the agenda first by the local authority, rather than the issue of unemployment. 
Community safety was an issue for adults and also young people in the area. 
However, there appeared to be a tendency by the council to elevate this issue, even 
when it was not of great concern. For example, in a young people's Citizens' Jury set 
up by the council to look at the issue of leisure and entertainment, of the eight 
proposals made, community safety was fourth on the list of the report published. Yet 
this report notes that: 'The issues with regard to safety and security are varied. In 
general, the Jury did not view them as being overly important' (South Lanarkshire 
Council 1998). That an issue that was of little importance to the young people on this 
Citizens' Jury ends up as a top-listed priority suggests that the issue of community 
safety had become an established framework around which the council was organising 
its policies, rather than simply a reflection of public concerns. 
A key reason for the curfew being introduced in Hillhouse had been the perceived 
problem of the fear of crime and antisocial behaviour. This concern about the 'fear of 
crime' was politically significant at the time and was an issue New Labour had 
promoted as being important since 1993. 
In Hillhouse there was evidence of a level of fear of crime. However, the notion that 
this community was being undermined by fear due to young people's criminal 
behaviour is questionable. The Citizens' Jury, for example, when asked to isolate what 
it saw as the main problem to solve in the area, named graffiti as the key problem. 
Graffiti can have a negative physical and psychological impact on communities - 
however, compared with the idea of children running wild and young people making 
people's lives hell, the issue of graffiti appears to be somewhat less serious than the 
image of the area portrayed by the politicians and the media. If fear was being caused 
largely because of graffiti, it could be argued that this sense of fear was connected to 
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wider concerns that people associated with graffiti, like, for example, the sense of a 
loss of community. In this respect the concern about graffiti, while being a concern in 
and of itself, may also have had a metaphorical component (South Lanarkshire 
Council 1997a). 
The Scottish Office research found, when interviewing adults from Hillhouse, that the 
main perceived problem of crime and disorder for the area was caused not by young 
people under the age of 16, but rather: 'It was generally believed that crime in 
Hillhouse was caused by a small number of 'older' Young people who tended to be 
heavy drinkers or drug users and who were, for the most part, unemployed' 
(McGallagly et al 1998). If this Was indeed the main age group committing crimes and 
being antisocial in the area, then clearly the basis of the curfew must again be 
questioned, as its target audience was all young people under the age of 16. 
There were specific issues of concern in Hillhouse, regarding crime, the antisocial 
behaviour of young people, and young men who hung about drinking. However, these 
problems did not simply become 'social problems' because of the increased severity of 
them, but emerged within a political climate within which crime and the fear of crime 
had become general public concerns, assisted by the problematisation of youth crime 
by the Conservative government and by the transformation of Labour into New 
Labour in the early 1990s. The 'practical' concerns in Hillhouse, about a small number 
of young people whose behaviour was disorderly, was therefore supplemented by a 
broader climate of insecurity that gave meaning to the political promotion of a more 
general problem of a 'yob culture' and of 'streets of fear'. 
Measuring the fear of crime in the area of Hillhouse, the Scottish Office research 
concluded that fear was an issue in Hillhouse, but that in certain cases the curfew had 
done little to resolve this problem. For example, while discovering that 65% of those 
surveyed had often or sometimes felt unsafe either in their homes or on the street, after 
six months of the curfew, 'this proportion had only reduced slightly to 60%1 
(McGallagly et al 1998: xi). Also: 
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Anxiety about groups or gangs of youths or young people remained strong, 
with three quarters of respondents saying that they found the presence of 
groups of young people on the streets frightening, both before the initiative 
began and after the first six months (McGallagly et al 1998: xi). 
This research also found that'more people were likely to avoid an area after the HCSI 
began (86%) than before (77%)' (McGallagly et al 1998: xi). But despite this, it was 
also found that 44% of those surveyed said they felt safer on the streets since the 
initiative was introduced - partly because of the lower number of young people on the 
streets. 
One question that is not covered by this Scottish Office research is: What is it that the 
adults are afraid of? They are concerned about 'gangs of young people', but is this 
because these young people attack them, attack their house, or simply that they make 
them feel nervous? Also, if the fear expressed by this research related to a serious 
problem with young people, why were these problems not mentioned by the Citizens' 
Jury or identified as a problem of crime in the Scottish Office research? 
From the discussions with adults in Hamilton and within the targeted area carried out 
for this thesis, it is difficult to assess statistically the various reasons for the fear of 
crime. However, from these discussions and with reference to wider research, the 
question of adults' sense of distance from young people is suggested as one possible 
explanation for this sense of fear. It is also possible that the issue of safety that had 
become all-encompassing in relation to children had actually impacted on adults in 
terms of how they understood children and their relationships with them, and 
increased their sense of anxiety in relation to young people and public space. 
Alienating strangers 
From the previous chapter, we can note that the police themselves were conscious of 
the exaggerated concern that many elderly adults have about young people. It was also 
noted that a number of conferences have over recent years addressed a perceived 
problem of the distance between generations. Following this issue, the amount of 
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contact that young people had with adults was assessed and the extent to which a fear 
of young people related to a change in the relationships between young and old. 
Fear of crime, as Furedi (1997) has argued, is not simply related to the objective 
behaviour of people, but rather, like the broader culture of fear, is related to far wider 
social changes. In Strathclyde itself, despite falling crime figures at the time of the 
curfew, the police discovered that the public's fear of crime was continuing to rise. 
Frustrated by this, at the end of 1997 Strathclyde police launched a E150,000 
advertising campaign to inform people that crime was in fact falling (Scotsman, 11 
November 1997). 
Fear of crime was understood by the authorities to be directly related to the behaviour 
of young people at night - something that made adults fear for their own safety. 
However, research suggests that not only do older adults fear for themselves - they are 
also concerned for the safety of young people. Bamardos research, for example, found 
that three in five adults think childhood today is worse than it was when they were 
children. The main reasons given for this, from a prompted list, are the 'level of 
crime' and 'availability of drugs'. More than nine out of ten of these adults agreed that 
the level of violence in British society is increasing, and a similar figure felt that 
'children witness more crime these days' (Bamardos 1995a). These concerns may 
again relate to certain changes in young people's lives: however, there is also a sense 
expressed in this research that these adults are relating not just to objective changes in 
young people's lives but to a world that they feel has changed fundamentally. 
Previously, it was noted that the fear of crime is often a reflection of fear generated by 
wider social changes, rather than a reflection of an increase in crime itself. In 
discussion with adults in Hamilton town centre, the issue of how times have changed 
emerged in relation to the sense of distance many older people have in relating to 
other people within their community. An often-expressed sentiment within these 
discussions was the feeling that local people, and young people in particular, could not 
be trusted anymore. Most of these adults recognise that 'there have always been bad 
kids from bad families', but as a 67-year-old grandmother explained, 'In the past you 
knew who the bad ones were, but you also knew that the rest were good kids'. This 
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she contrasts to 'today', where 'you still know who the bad families are but I guess I 
just don't know if the rest of them are OK are not'. 
The Scottish Office research similarly found that adults' concern about young people 
related to broader sentiments about how 'things have changed', with there now being a 
'lack of respect' of adults (McGallagly et al 1998: 6 1). 
To assess the extent to which adults had contact with young people in the Hillhouse 
area, young people were asked about who talked to them in the street. Of the 26 young 
people, aged between 12 and 15 years, a large majority said that they had been spoken 
to by a local adult about their behaviour, while half of these young people said that it 
was local adults rather than the police who normally spoke to them at night. The 
'adults who spoke to these young people about their behaviour were usually adults that 
were known to the young people. However, once these teenagers went out of their 
own streets into areas where they knew fewer adults, the likelihood of coming into 
contact with adults decreased and the level of contact with the police rose. While half 
of the young people explained that adults they didn't know had at some time in the 
last six months spoken to them about their behaviour, over half said they had been 
spoken to by the police - this figure increased to over two thirds for those teenagers 
living in Hillhouse. 
The majority of young people living in and around Hillhouse had more contact with 
adults than with the police regarding their behaviour when out at night. Much of this 
contact with adults may well be 'negative' contact, where groups of teenagers are 
simply being told to move on. But it is still the case that, for a third of the young 
people living in Hillhouse, there was more contact with the police than there was with 
adults, and once these teenagers moved to areas they were less well known, this level 
of contact with the police, compared to adults, increased dramatically. 
Direct knowledge of young people appeared to mean that some adults continued to 
relate to young people they knew who hung about the street- However, once a young 
person moved from their direct neighbourhood there appeared to be a trend for adults 
to avoid contact with them. This may relate to the reduced sense of community that 
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allowed adults in the past to relate to all young people within a certain accepted 
framework of behaviour. 
The concern expressed above, about not knowing who the 'bad families are', was 
telling in its reflection of a growing sense of distance felt by certain adults to others in 
their community. In a similar vein, a lack of a sense of group norms was expressed by 
a Mrs Boyle, who had lived in Hamilton since 1940 and explained how, in her youth, 
'everybody' went to the dances and 'you felt like you knew everyone'. This compares 
with 'today', where it was felt that 'everybody does their own thing' and 'people seem 
to come and go', so that you, 'never know who's who'. Mrs Boyle clearly didn't know 
everyone in Hamilton in the past, but nevertheless had a sense of commonality that 
meant that she felt more trusting and secure in her relationships with people she met. 
A lack of a sense of commonality felt by some adults in Hillhouse could result in 
suspicion being something no longer felt just for the 'bad families' but more broadly, 
in relation to all those adults and young people with whom, there was no longer any 
contact or shared social or cultural norms. 
Research by Furedi and Brown has also raised the significance of a declining web of 
meaning held by adults in their relationships with young people. In this study, not only 
was contact between generations limited but, the authors noted, 'there is no foundation 
in existence for intergenerational contact for those who do not have grandchildren' 
(Furedi and Brown 1997). Two significant relationships between the experience of 
isolation and the intense consciousness of vulnerability were identified. Firstly, the 
'lack of contact and familiarity with the ways of the young tends to inflate the sense of 
difference between the generations'. One aspect of this process is that many elderly 
people feel inadequate about the task of rearing or educating children, and in some 
cases, 'a lack of familiarity with the ways of the younger generation creates a 
disposition towards accepting negative images of the young'. Secondly, the 'feeling of 
irrelevance and lack of familiarity with the ways of the young helps to accelerate the 
loss of confidence that comes with ageing', which leads to caution and distrust 
dominating elderly people's perception of youth (Furedi and Brown 1997). 
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A self-reiniorcing trend is identified here that could apply to Hamilton, whereby 
cautious behaviour serves to isolate the elderly from new social networks and this, in 
turn, exacerbates feelings of vulnerability. 
Despite the myopic focus upon antisocial behaviour by the authorities in 
understanding adult insecurities in the area, the issues that influenced the adult 
feelings of insecurity regarding young people were complex and ranged far beyond 
the mere behaviour of the young people concerned. Indeed the fear of antisocial youth 
at one level related more to the changing relationship between adults and young 
people. A certain distance, literally, culturally and socially, between young and old, 
and a change in the recognised position of adults vis-A-vis young people, appeared to 
have helped to undermine adults' surety about their engagement with the young 
people in their area. 
Ironically, through the interviews with children under the age of 12 it was found that 
the issue of safety may itself be another barrier between young and old. For example, 
when asked 'if you were out at night and needed to know the time would you ask an 
adult you don't know who was passing byT, two thirds of those asked explained that 
they would not ask an adult the time. As Linda explained, 'You don't know what they 
might do'. This compared with 100 per cent of children who said they would be happy 
to ask a police officer. Similarly, when asked whether or not they had ever visited a 
house of someone they didn't know very well - for Halloween or to raise money, for 
example - well over half of the children said they had not done so. Two thirds of the 
children felt that 'talking to adults was a good thing', but a third said it was not, and of 
those who felt it was a good thing many explained that it was only a good thing 'if you 
knew them'. 
The question of stranger danger, of adults not being people in your estate you could 
spontaneously rely on and of children's self-conscious recognition that approaching 
adults was a potentially problematic thing, again raises questions about the informal 
trusting relationships between children and adults. 
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These wider social and cultural problems were not of concern to the authorities, which 
promoted the curfew and understood the conflicts on the estate through a narrow 
prism of crime and safety. However, understanding the various tensions between 
adults and children must in part relate to the sense of distance and alienation that is 
felt between the generations - not because of the behaviour of children in and of itself, 
but in context of a changing web of meaning within which community relations take 
place. Communities are more fragmented or individualised, as Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim (2002) have described, and they are also arguably less certain about the 
basic informal rules that govern people's contact with one another. In this sense, the 
behaviour of the young people in Hillhouse could be of secondary. importance to the 
changing, more fractured relationships that have emerged between generations and 
between the more individuated people living on this estate. 
This may help to explain why, despite the relatively high level of policing in the area, 
the sense of security - or perhaps more accurately a sense of surety - did not develop 
in Hillhouse during the curfew. Discussing the curfew with George, a pensioner in 
Hillhouse, he explained that'he was pleased that the young people had been moved 
away from his street, but he recognised that this did not make him feel any more 
relaxed about approaching young people himself. Even where the immediate concern 
was removed from the streets, the broader fragility of relations between people 
remained, and would most likely continue to be expressed in future relations. 
In this sense, the impact of the curfew was to institutionalise the sense of anxiety that 
existed between people. 
Freedom versus safety 
As part of the interview process with the young people aged 12-15 years living in and 
around Hillhouse, the actual impact of the initiative was analysed to assess the level of 
contact with the police and the changes the CSI had upon young people's night-time 
activities. 
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Looking firstly at the actual impact of the curfew on young people's night-time 
activities, it was found that most of the teenagers in and around Hillhouse still went 
gut at night, but half of those living in Hillhouse itself believed that their parents were 
now more worried about them going out in case they came into contact with the 
police. It was also found that the curfew had not substantially altered the amount of 
contact the teenagers in Hillhouse had with the police - with many young people 
having had more contact the previous summer, when they were out later and when 
there was no curfew in operation. The young people felt harassed and confused about 
why they were being stopped by the police - which occurred largely when they were 
in groups. They were equally confused about why adults felt the need to phone the 
police when they were out, rather than talk to them themselves. 
Almost all of the young people from Hillhouse hung about the streets at some time in 
the week, with around two thirds going out almost every night. This had not changed 
with the introduction of the CSI. Most of the 12-13 year olds from in and outside 
Hillhouse had to be home by 9pm. Most of the 14-15 year olds from both areas had to 
be home before 10.30pm and only two teenage boys - both aged 15 - were allowed to 
stay out after 10.30pm. In other words, few of the young people interviewed were 
allowed to wander the streets 'at all hours'. 
The number of police interventions relating to young people in Hillhouse during the 
first six months of the curfew that occurred after lOpm equally suggests that few 
young people were out very late at night. For example, between 8pm and 9pm there 
had been around 160 interventions; between 9pm and lOpm there were 66 
interventions; and after lOpm there were fewer than ten interventions (McGallagly et 
al 1998). 
Only two of the young people from Hillhouse had had their home-time changed since 
the introduction of the curfew, but almost half of these young people believed that 
their parents were now more worried about them going out, in case they came into 
contact with the police. As 14-year-old Laura from Hillhouse explained, 'At weekends 
I have to be in half an hour earlier now in case I get picked up by the police'. 
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The young people interviewed who lived in Hillhouse felt harassed and confused 
about why the police moved them on or told them to go home at night. Over two 
thirds of these young people had had contact with the police since the introduction of 
the curfew, compared to less than half of those who lived in other areas. A third of the 
Hillhouse teenagers had been told to go home by the police, and another third had 
been told to move on. None of the young people interviewed had been taken home by 
the police since'the curfew was launched. 
Diane, a 13-year-oldfrom. Hillhouse, told me, 'I was sent home on the first day of the 
curfew, but that's all'. Fifteen-year-old Richard said, 'I've been moved on, told to be 
getting in for the curfew, but not much'. A number of the young people who had been 
spoken to by the police during the curfew were concerned that simply standing around 
with friends often led either to complaints from adults or to action by the police to 
move them or split up their group. 
However, as mentioned, for a number of these young people the amount of contact 
with the police had been more in the previous summer than during the curfew. 
Fourteen-year-old Laura explained, 'They move us on a lot in the summer. The police 
tell us there's been complaints, but no one complains to us which they should do 'cos 
we're never up to much. I guess they're scared of us 'cos we're a big group. There's 
about 15 of us. They think we'll hit their windows or something if they speak to us - 
but if they spoke to me I'd tell my pals we'd better move'. Angela, Laura's classmate 
from Burnbank, said, 'The police have stopped us a few times and said there's been 
complaints. We'd not had anyone complain to us - if they had we'd be quiet. It 
usually happens when we're in a big group', while 15-year-old William felt that the 
police used the excuse of adults complaining to do what ever they wanted to. 'They 
shift us all the time', he said. 'They say there's been complaints, but that's not true. 
The Scottish Office report evaluating the impact of the Child Safety Initiative after six 
months found that all of the boys in their survey had had contact with the police 
compared to only half of the girls. These young people felt that the level of policing 
was more than ever before. One respondent explained: 'Before the "curfew" I had 
been searched once but now it's about every weekend'. This report found that girls 
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appeared to avoid contact with the police - one girl explaining that, 'If we see them 
coming we run and hide up the closes' (McGallagly et al 1998). 
None of the young people interviewed expressed a concern about peer pressure. Also 
few described having had 'serious bother' in their area. Where issues of 'bother' were 
raised, other groups of teenagers of a similar age to themselves were mentioned. 
A safe generation 
The expectation of some of those groups and newspapers that questioned the curfew 
was that its impact on young people would create a greater sense of 'us and them' - 
especially for young people who felt harassed by the police activities. However, in 
analysing the thoughts of the young people in Hillhouse, the extent of this concern is 
questionable. Rather than the curfew alienating young people. frorn the police, the 
teenagers in Hillhouse appear to be part of an 'alien nation' within which other people 
are treated with suspicion, and where there is a greater readiness to understand 
freedom less in terms of individual liberty than in terms of the freedom to be safe. 
Following the interviews with young people in and around Hillhouse, it was clear that, 
despite the resentment at being targeted by the police, these teenagers were generally 
more concerned about the need to control other young people. Subsequently, as the 
police themselves had suggested, most young people actually wanted more, not less, 
policing. 
The concern felt by adults about the nuisance behaviour of young people, and the need 
to involve the police in the regulation of this behaviour, was reflected by the young 
people themselves. This desire for more regulation of others meant that the young 
people had a contradictory attitude to the police. Personally, many young people had 
experiences of being moved on by the police that frustrated them, but despite this 
there was still a desire for more regulation of other teenagers. Similarly, while there 
was an acceptance or even support for more regulation of young people's time, there 
was some evidence that these teenagers were accepting more limits on their own 
freedom at night. 
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Asked whether or not they supported the curfew, over half of the young people 
interviewed from in and around Hillhouse said they did support it. However, when 
broken down into areas, it was found that while over three quarters of those living 
outside Hillhouse agreed with the curfew, only a minority, or 38%, of those in 
Hillhouse supported it, with 54% against. Similarly, the Scottish Human Rights 
Centre's research, based on interviews with 66 young people on the streets of 
Hillhouse, found a quarter of these young people supported the initiative and 55% 
opposed it (Springham 1998). 
However, despite the fact that the majority of Hillhouse young people interviewed for 
this thesis opposed the curfew, a third of these teenagers opposed it simply because 
they felt that it was ineffective. For example, Donna believed that 'It doesn't change 
anything', while Christopher said: 'No one's going in at 9pm anyway. It's a waste of 
time'. Likewise Steven felt that 'It makes no difference, people just run away from the 
police'. 
Before and indeed during the curfew, it was argued, especially by the children's 
charities and those opposing the curfew, that young people were also opposed to it. 
The implication, which was also drawn out by newspapers like the Scotsman, was that 
young people were against the increased policing of public space and of their freedom. 
To assess this in more detail, the young people who opposed the curfew were also 
asked whether they thought the police should be given some powers other than the 
curfew to deal with the young people in their area. Here it was found that two thirds 
said they should be given alternative powers. 
This meant that, of the young people interviewed, only seven percent were against the 
curfew and against any other increase in police powers to deal with young people in 
their area. Those young people who were opposed to any increased regulation were 
also the only ones interviewed who mentioned their rights, or their parents' rights, 
being infringed by the curfew. For example Ann from Hillhouse, who was 14, thought 
that 'the age' the curfew targeted 'is wrong', and that, 'It should be just for younger 
ones 'cos I want more time. Fifteen-year-old Richard from Hillhouse was annoyed by 
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the police initiative and explained that, 'Tbey take away our freedom and boss us 
around'. Fifteen-year-old Leanne explained that, 'It should be up to your marn and 
dad'. 
The Scottish Office research in the area also found conflicting views regarding 
freedom, with one teenage boy forcefully stating that 'William Wallace fought for 
fuck all, we don't have freedom here' (McGallagly et al 1998). However, this was the 
exception rather than the norm, and made up a small percentage of the young people, 
the vast majority of whom were in favour of some increase in policing of the area. 
The limited opposition to the curfew or alternative forms of policing may in part 
reflect the age of the interviewees and the tendency for younger people to give the 
'right answer' to questions asked by adults. In this respect it would be expected that the 
older teenagers would be more inclined to demand freedom rather than more policing. 
However, the majority of the 15-year-olds from in and around Hillhouse were in 
favour of more policing of other young people. 
Continuing with this theme, the young people were asked if they would like to see 
more policing in their area. Almost a third of the young people from Hillhouse wanted 
fewer police in their area, but over two thirds wanted more or no change to the amount 
of policing that their area received. Therefore, for the majority of the young people 
living in Hillhouse, it was found that the level of policing undertaken during the 
curfew was either supported, or thought to be not enough. Despite the fact that many 
of these young people were not convinced that the curfew was either fair or effective, 
there was no overall opposition to more policing itself. 
Studying the gender difference in the support for the curfew, it was found that there 
was no gender difference in the level of support for more police, or more regulation of 
young people who were out at night. Looking again at age differences in general, it 
was also found, that there was little difference in the attitudes of the younger and older 
young people towards the police. It was expected that the younger teenagers, who 
were less independent and would be out on the street at night less, would have a more 
conservative, pro-regulatory attitude towards other young people. However, while 
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there was some evidence of this, it was also the case that the majority of the older 
teenagers had a very similar pro-regulatory approach to other young people, despite 
their own negative experiences of the police in their area. 
Examining similar research into young people's attitudes to the police, it was also 
found that despite bad personal experiences of policing, young people still wanted 
more of it. In a survey Carried out in Stirling, for example, of the 16-25 year olds 
surveyed, only one percent of respondents felt they were treated well by the police and 
yet three quarters believed the police should make their area safer (Stirling Council 
1997: 106). 
Research examining the experiences and attitudes of 12-15 year olds in the British 
Crime Survey found that 'the stereotype of young people as anti-authority - and more 
specifically anti-police - does not hold'. The report went on to explain that 'the 
overwhelming majority of young people recognise the need for the police, and many 
look to them for protection'. In conclusion the report noted that young people - many 
of whom are stopped by the police and sometimes searched - 'may come to expect a 
degree of monitoring from the police, and not always judge them any worse for it' 
(Maung 1995: 57). 
The general relationship between young people and the police appears therefore to be 
a contradictory one. As the Stirling research concluded, 'Young people seem to have 
quite contradictory views on policing' (Stirling Council 1997), or as the Scottish 
Crime Survey found, 'young people [are] unsure about how they perceived the police' 
(Anderson and Leitch 1996: 88). 
In Hillhouse, the young people had a similarly contradictory attitude towards the 
police. For many young people, their personal experience of the police was generally 
negative. Having been stopped and moved on by the police at night - often for simply 
hanging around - these young people were frustrated by police attitudes. The young 
people felt that it was unfair to be moved by the police for standing about with friends. 
However, despite these experiences, the young people in and around Hillhouse were 
generally in favour of the increasing regulation of public space - and in favour of the 
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increased regulation of young people who hung about the streets. As we have seen, 
few of these teenagers argued about their right to move around their estate without 
police interference, or about the right of their parents to decide upon the time that they 
should be allowed out at night. In terms of the general support for young people's 
freedom to use public space in general, fewer still were concerned about the rights of 
all the young people in the area, and, like the adults they often criticised for contacting 
the police, they too were keen to have the police deal with young people. The police 
were understood by these young people not as a body that dealt with crime but more 
particularly as a body to deal with regulating the petty 'antisocial' behaviour of young 
people on their estates and to ensure their safety. 
Regulating others 
To assess the extent to which both children and young people had come to recognise 
the police as the people to deal with young people's nuisance behaviour in public 
space, they were asked a serious of questions related to this. 
Given a variety of 'nuisance' activities that young people might be involved in, the 
children and young people were asked if the police should be contacted to deal with 
these problems. These activities were: 
Sitting on a stranger's wall? 
Running in a garden? 
Knocking on a door and running off? 
Smashing a bottle in the street? 
Fighting in the street? 
Playing football in the street? 
Being noisy in the street? 
Drinking in the street? 
Going out after the curfew time? 
The level of support for phoning the police if a young person was involved in these 
various activities is shown below. 
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Figure 1: Number of children and young people in favour of phoning the police 
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The most significant finding from this table is the large number of primary school, but 
more significantly high school, pupils who were prepared to phone the police for 
minor offences. Indeed, apart from the disparities in the answers of the children and 
young people regarding knocking on someone's door and being out after the curfew 
time, the percentage of children under 12 and the young teenagers who would call the 
police is very similar. There was no equivocation in particular about calling the police 
if a young person was seen drinking under age. 
Whether or not young people would actually phone the police themselves is unclear, 
but there is a significant minority of young people who said the police should be 
called for almost any 'offence' and a large majority who said the police should be 
involved if young people were fighting or drinking. This appears to reflect a certain 
attitude and a desire to have other young people moved off the street for activities that 
would be defined as nuisance or'non-criminal'by the police. 
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Despite the fact that some of these young people admitted drinking themselves, the 
assumption regarding 'street drinkers' was that they would 'get into a fight', 'cause 
trouble', or 'go a bit nuts' - and so deserved to be picked up or moved on by the 
police, just in case. 
The question about phoning the police may have been too prescriptive and could have 
been improved with a more open-ended question about what should be done if a 
young person was drinking. However, to clarify the expectation of police involvement 
compared with that of local adults, the 80 percent of young people who said the police 
should be phoned for street drinkers were also asked, 'Do you think it would be better 
to contact the young person's parents rather than the policeT Of this 80 percent, 
almost two thirds of the young people answered no to this question. Therefore over 
half of the young people, even when given the option of contacting a young person's 
parents rather than contacting the police, still said the police should be contacted first 
to deal with this 'problem'. 
The reason for this attitude towards other young people who drink on the streets at 
night is varied and relates in part to experiences of 'street drinkers' who sometimes 
cause trouble and can be rowdy. It may also reflect the simple fact that drinking is 
something young people know they should not do. It is likely, however, that these 
young people had also been influenced by the high-profile police campaigns and new 
laws that banned street drinking in many areas of Scotland in the years running up to 
the introduction of the curfew. Generally, it reflected a view held by most of these 
young people that the nuisance or antisocial behaviour of other young people was 
something that should be dealt with by the police. The chance that young people 
drinking may result in rowdy behaviour was seen as enough justification for involving 
the police and moving these young people off the streets. 
Mile possibly representing a more intolerant attitude towards other young people, 
the approach by many of the teenagers in Hillhouse to the issue offreedom in public 
space could be seen as representing a more risk-averse attitude, predicated upon a 
more limited expectation of their engagement with potential risks. 
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Regulating the self 
The extent of the personal difficulties facing young people in Hillhouse was assessed 
to ascertain the myth and reality of the idea that they were 'unsafe' in their 
neighbourhood. While over half of the young people interviewed thought that 
Hillhouse was an area with 'a lot of bother', only one in eight had personally had any 
'bother'. The trouble mentioned consisted of fights (by three females), a gang fight, 
and some teenagers being noisy at night. Fourteen-year-old Carol mentioned that there 
had been a young man stabbed and killed a few years earlier in a fight. However this 
was clearly the exception rather than the rule to life in Hillhouse, and does not explain 
why these young people had come to accept, even expect, the high level of regulation 
of public space in their area. 
The intolerant attitude that many adults have towards young people is here replicated 
by many of the young people themselves, who despite their own personal experience 
of the police appeared to be keen to have any potential troublemakers cleared off the 
streets. This desire for a more regulated environment could reflect a changing 
expectation of freedom within public space, and may also result in young people 
having a more limited expectation of themselves, of what people they are prepared to 
have contact with, and of what situations they are prepared to deal with, without 
police back-up. In this respect, the desire by teenagers for greater freedom and 
independence as they get older is potentially conflicting with the desire for more 
safety and regulation of others, and ultimately of themselves. In a survey of young 
people carried out by the South Lanarkshire youth council planning group, for 
example, when given ten options to chose from as a priority issue, 21 % of respondents 
chose 'crime, violence and personal safety', compared to only 15% who chose 'Youth 
rights'. Like the transformation of rights discussed in the previous chapter, here, too, 
the right to be safe was arguably winning the battle against the right to be free'. As 
15-year-old Simon from Earnock explained, 'If someone's drinking in my street, it's 
my right to phone the police if I want to. ' 
This desire by teenagers for safety and more policing of other young people was also 
found to be the case in Stirling. Here, it was found in a study of young people that half 
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of those surveyed wanted more police on the street; a fifth wanted CCTV to be 
introduced on their estate; and a quarter said a good way of making the streets safer 
would be to make sure young people stay off the streets at night (Stirling Council 
1997) Similarly, the attitudes of the young people in and around Hillhouse reflect a 
broader move away from what could be described as libertarian values, and a move 
towards a more authoritarian or regulated environment. 
Looking at the 12th report of the British Social Attitudes Survey, a chapter entitled 
'Libertarianism in Retreat' assesses the attitudes of the British public towards 
different forms of policing and surveillance and concludes that, 'Four years ago, we 
described the British public as "fainthearted libertarians", and our latest data give no 
grounds for questioning this judgement' (Jowells et al 1995: 204). The report also 
noted that the support for the use of video cameras on housing estates to detect 
vandals, for example, had significantly increased from 53% in 1990 to 70% in 1994. 
As with the desire for more policing of street drinking in Hillhouse, the authors of this 
chapter of the BSA survey believe that this move to accepting more surveillance 
cameras on estates is partly to do with the public becoming used to these new forms of 
policing. Once established as the norm, it is less likely that people will view new 
forms of policing as problematic and will therefore potentially come to expect a more 
regulated environment. 
This expectation of a higher level of regulation of public space reflects not only the 
normalisation of this process, but also an attitude to life that elevates the issue of 
safety and therefore protection above that of autonomy and individual freedom. 
Safety First 
What this research suggests is not only that young people have a more pro-regulatory 
attitude and level of support for police involvement in public life than young people 
would perhaps have had previously, but that more generally, their relationships with 
and negotiation of other young people in public space has been influenced by a culture 
that elevates safety and frames relationships more within a prism of being 'at risk'. As 
such the interactions and conflicts between young people which often occur in public 
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space were understood to a degree within a more problematic framework and the basis 
of support for 'antisocial behaviour' initiatives appeared to be already in existence. 
For those promoting the curfew, the issue of safety was one they felt was as relevant 
for young people as it was for adults in the area. Groups opposing the curfew 
questioned this safety promotion as being, in part, a PR exercise to hide the more 
authoritarian and anti-young people aspect of the initiative. Within this promotion the 
idea of young people needing protection from other young people and indeed from 
themselves had a paternalistic quality to it - one which would be unlikely to be 
replicated in how young people saw themselves. However, for a significant minority 
of young people in and around Hillhouse, safety was something they saw as central 
and was something which influenced their activities and relationships with other 
young people. At the same time, for most of these young people the question of safety 
was one they clearly were conscious of and, to some degree, engaged with in their 
understanding of themselves and others around them. In this respect, the issue of 
safety promoted by the authorities was indeed one which young people adhered to. 
Discussing whether or not young people felt safe on the streets, travelling around 
Hamilton, and in their dealings with other young people, what was most noticeable 
was that every young person asked these questions understood what was meant by 
being 'at risk' and being 'safe'. Also, nobody asked, for example when discussing 
feeling 'safe' on their estate, 'Safe from whaff The category of being and feeling safe 
was one that young people both engaged with and understood. 
Within a cultural climate which, as discussed in the previous chapter, understood and 
represented young people within the framework of safety, abuse and vulnerability, and 
also living in an environment where safety initiatives were highly visible and 
normalised, it was likely that this would impact not only on young people's activities 
but also on the image that these young people had of themselves and others. 
Despite the differences between the understanding that adults in Hillhouse had of the 
risks and dangers in the area compared with those promoted by the local authority and 
police, there was a general understanding of children, young people, and indeed of 
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adults themselves, as being potentially unsafe and vulnerable. Parental concerns for 
the safety of their children, for example, in this respect reflected a common culture of 
fear that was being engaged with and supported by the CSI. 
The extent to which the young people in Hillhouse did understand themselves as being 
'vulnerable' is difficult to ascertain. However, there was evidence that in terms of 
independent travel, going out at night, and travelling to friends' houses, a substantial 
minority of young people, between a quarter and a third, led highly regulated lives - in 
part because of safety concerns that they or their parents had. These concerns were 
rarely based on any personal experience of problems in the area, but rather represented 
a precautionary approach to dealings with other young people. 
Discussing her experience of travelling to a friend's house, Lucy explained that, 'it's a 
fifteen minute walk so mum takes me for my safety'. Fifteen-year-old Lillian 
remarked that, 'If it's Hillhouse I get a lift. I'm scared to walk by myself -I don't know 
everybody there'. This concern for safety, which is arguably not new, especially for 
girls, was replicated by a number of fifteen-year-old boys in the area, who gave such 
explanations as: 'I get a lift when it's dark, my parents would worry if I didn't, and 
'My mother doesn't like me walking in the dark'. 
The majority of young people in and around Hillhouse did go out at night. However, 
as discussed, they also, at least in part, understood their activities more generally and 
perhaps more acutely in terms of the safety and danger posed. More particularly it also 
appears that these potential dangers were understood less as practical issues to be 
negotiated and overcome, but as risks that simply should not be faced, or issues to be 
managed by others. When discussing the reasons for supporting the curfew, for 
example, a number of young people spoke of their own safety but also that of young 
children. Paul believed that it would, 'Keep younger kids in when drink's about', and 
Tracy supported the curfew because it 'saves young ones from danger'. The CSI in this 
respect could have elevated the awareness of safety and dangers that existed on the 
Hillhouse estate - despite the limited evidence of any real 
dangers, especially for the 
children in the area. 
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This awareness of dangers and of safety issues could explain the contradictory 
relationship that young people in Hillhouse and elsewhere appear to have with the 
police. As the Stirling research noted: 
Many young people do not feel the police respect young people and are 
therefore suspicious and distrustful (if not hostile) towards them, however they 
also argue for increased policing and a more visible police presence to increase 
their feelings of safety (Stirling Council 1997: 106). 
For young people, like the adults in the area, a 'feeling' of safety appeared in part to 
relate to their awareness of themselves as being vulnerable, an awareness predicated 
upon a precautionary consciousness of safety first. 
This safety first framework was something that was becoming an influential cultural 
trend at the time of the Hamilton curfew - reflected for example in the 'Safe Clubbing' 
movement which developed in nightclubs across the UK. Studying this development 
in young people's leisure activities, Amis noted that in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the 
main perceived danger for young people who went out clubbing came from going to 
'dodgy' clubs in 'rough' areas. Here young people would make a conscious decision 
whether or pot to go to these areas, aware that there may be trouble. Today, by 
comparison, he explained, clubs that have 'Safe Clubbing' campaigns treat all young 
people as potential victims not only of violence, and sexual harassment but, more 
significantly, as being at risk from the 'harm adolescents might do to themselves 
through abuse of alcohol and/or drugs' (Amis 1997: 11). The implicit assumption, 
Amis believes, is that the young clubbers are not capable of making their own 
assessment of what, if any, risk is involved in their activity. 'In effect, ' he states, 
4 consumption of drugs and/or drunkenness are seen as manifestations of victimhood 
where people have lost their self-control and have succumbed to temptation' (Amis 
1997: 12). 
Like the concern for young people within the CSI promotion, that they would become 
victims of peer pressure and criminal influences, here the activities of young people 
are similarly seen within the prism of the 'at risk' youth. As Arnis argued: 
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In the 1990s, the notion of conscious choice has been diminished in a number 
of ways. People are seen as less in overall control of their lives and more as 
victims of circumstance or chance. It is in this context that adolýscents and 
young adults who go out clubbing are increasingly seen as being "at risk" from 
circumstances they are perceived to be no longer capable of controlling 
without outside intervention (Amis 1997: 15). 
While many young people would challenge the notion that they are passively 
accepting a more regulated environment, Amis notes, they appear to have taken on 
board the idea that they are 'at risk'. In Hillhouse, there was some evidence of this 
more risk-conscious outlook of young people, although as we have seen the tension 
between being protected and being Tree'remained an issue for many of these young 
people. 
Partners in crime 
A year after its introduction, the curfew was announced to have been a great success 
and a declaration was made by the police that the CSI would be expanded to cover the 
whole of Hamilton. To emphasise the safety aspect of the initiative, the curfew was 
renamed the Child and Young Persons Safety Initiative and the police were now - 
possibly to overcome the 'curfew' label - said to be enforcing this initiative both in the 
daytime and at night. 
Before the CSI was launched, Henry McLeish, the Scottish Home Affairs Minister, 
explained that, 'This initiative fits in with the Government's push for partnership 
between families, the people and local authorities to create a safer society' (Scotsman 
3 October 1997). One year on, a key reasons for the CSI being seen as a success was 
the 'partnership' with the police and local authority, but most significantly with the 
public themselves. 
In October 1998 the curfew received a 'top award' from the Crime Prevention and 
Community Safety Awards scheme, and Chief Inspector John Orr explained that the 
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award was 'testament to the importance of working in partnership'. Nigel Whiskin of 
Crime Concern, who organised the awards, similarly said that: The Hamilton 
initiative shows what can be achieved with local partners to tackle crime and 
antisocial behaviour', especially when the solutions were 'based in the community' 
(Hamilton Advertiser 15 October 1998). 
The community involvement in the CSI had been a key aspect of its promotion by 
local politicians before, during and after its initial trial period. As we have seen, 
consultation had taken place with people in Hamilton to assess public concerns and 
subsequent research was carried out in schools and with local people in Hillhouse to 
gauge the impact of the CSI. The desire to show that the new initiative was something 
generated by the public themselves even led local MP George Robertson to claim 
incorrectly that the idea for a curfew had come from the Citizens' Jury - another 
consultation group set up specifically to look at the issue of community safety. 
Following the publication of the Scottish Office research into the CSI, it was unclear 
whether the initiative had been a success or not - even in terms of the categories of 
success stipulated by the police. As discussed above, the safety aspect of the CSI was 
not proven - this was something one of the researchers noted in the local paper, saying 
that 'It is difficult to state categorically at this stage whether it has been a success or 
failure in relation to the safety issue. However, he noted that 'there is some evidence 
to suggest a reduction in juvenile crime in the intervention area' (Hamilton Advertiser 
22 October 1998). The evidence for this reduction in crime was, however, also not 
clear and the research document examining various aspects of crime and disorder had 
conflicting findings (McGallagly et al 1998). Indeed, despite the fact that crime had 
fallen in the targeted areas by 23 percent compared with the six months prior to its 
introduction, when comparing the same time of year in the year before the CSI was 
introduced it was found that crimes had actually increased by 17 percent (Hamilton 
Advertiser 22 October 1998). 
This may, as John Orr noted, reflect an increase in reporting of crime. However it was 
despite the research set up by the police and the statistics they provided that the 
initiative was said to be a great success. Dismissing the significance of these findings 
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in the report, Orr simply stated that, 'I am not going to get hung up on figures' 
(Hamilton Advertiser 22 October 1998). 
Indeed regardless of the statistical evidence of the usefulness of the CSI, the act of 
engaging with the public was clearly seen by both police and especially the local 
politicians as a success in and of itself. That local people were anxious and supportive 
of increased policing across the whole of Hamilton appeared to be proven by the local 
newspaper's opinion poll. The poll questioned whether or not people would support 
the CSI being extended across the whole of Hamilton and resulted in 1556 or 93 per 
cent of callers saying they would support it. In Hillhouse itself, the Scottish Office 
research found that 68 per cent of those surveyed said they would support the curfew's 
continuation, although interestingly 54 per cent of the men asked said they would not 
support this. 
Despite the often contradictory evidence of even the Scottish Office research about the 
curfew - its success, its impact of feelings of safe, the basis of its introduction in 
relation n to young children wandering the streets and the impact on crime and safety - 
the authorities felt that it had been a great success, and indeed it won an award not 
only in the UK but also in Europe. As well as having some impact 'on the ground' of 
the targeted areas, it was the engagement made between the authorities and the public 
itself around this safety initiative which appeared central. At a certain level, the actual 
impact of the curfew was secondary to this developed relationship and the support of 
the public for the safety initiative. 
However, the nature of the 'partnership' is itself telling both in terms of the fragile 
basis of legitimacy it suggests and also the more passive nature of the 'involvement, of 
the community. That consultants were initially used to assess the concerns of the 
public suggests a certain lack of surety and direction by the local authority, as does the 
constant attempt to show that the initiative was the product of public concerns and 
demands. It also reflects a certain sense of distance between the local politicians and 
the public, who rather than acting as their representatives by nature of the vote, felt the 
need to survey their public to understand their needs and desires. To a degree the 
legitimacy and the responsibility of the CSI was handed over to the public themselves 
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and to 'experts' who could impartially analyse public concerns. However, despite the 
general sense of anxiety that did appear to exist amongst the public, the curfew was 
not something that they felt actively engaged by - it was not something that people felt 
was theirs. Indeed the top-down nature of the initiative was expressed by the focus 
groups in the Scottish Office research, where rather than feeling part of the process of 
developing this initiative, they 'expressed confusion over the purpose and targets of 
the Initiative - which age groups it would apply to and when it would operate' 
(McGallagly et al 1998: xi). 
Despite the consultation, local people in Hillhouse were not part of an active 
'movement' to develop this initiative, while on the other hand, local politicians were 
attempting, in part, to distance themselves from it by locating its emergence within the 
community. Not only were the authorities, to a degree, attempting to relinquish 
responsibility for the curfew's introduction in this way, they were also attempting to 
'de-politicise' it by using surveys to give a statistical justification for their focus upon 
community safety. Rather than situate the curfew within a, broad political programme, 
legitimacy was gained, as discussed previously, from the vulnerable public. 
As Heartfield notes with reference to the form of engagement developing under the 
'Third Way' project of New Labour: 
The Third Way connected with the electorate, not on the basis of their 
collective purpose, but instead playing upon their individuation and the 
anxieties that arose from it. The voters were no longer represented in the polity 
as the collective subject of the democratic process. Instead they were 
recognised by the state as the isolated and persecuted victims of events beyond 
their control (Heartfield 2002: 199). 
Politicising fear 
At a national level, Labour politicians were less defensive about the attack on 
antisocial behaviour, and the MP for Hamilton, George Robertson, prioritised the 
'right to a quiet life' ahead of concerns about representing the curfew as a child safety 
211 
initiative. Similarly, as was noted at the start of this chapter, by October 1998 the 
British government had introduced the Crime and Disorder Bill, which gave powers to 
local authorities to introduce 'curfews' for under- I 0-year-olds across the country. This 
was not something that the government quietly introduced, but was presented rather as 
a flagship initiative symbolising Labour's tough stance on disorder. 
The legitimacy for this development may well have come from 'borrowing' the 
authority of the victim, but was something that national politicians, the home secretary 
and the Prime NEnister felt they could actively promote and place at the centre of their 
crime policies. Like the chief inspector of Strathclyde police who was not going to get 
'hung up on figures' that questioned the curfew's legitimacy, national politicians were 
similarly confident in their understanding of the public as being generally victimised 
and in need of support. At this national level, politicians were more in tune with the 
general or abstract sense of the victimised public and more vociferous in their attempt 
to reengage this public through this representation of thern. 
That on the anniversary of the Hamilton curfew, the Crime and Disorder Bill was 
passed, allowing local authorities to introduce curfew for under- 10-year-olds across 
the country, indicates that the developments in Hamilton were part of a wider political 
process. 
In this chapter it has been shown that there was often a different response by local 
people to the initiative, to do with their understanding of the problems in their area 
and to the measures needed to overcome them. The curfew, for example, was not 
supported by most young people in the area and the extent that children were unsafe 
was not agreed upon. However, whatever the myths and realities of the 'at risk' nature 
of the Hillhouse estate, there was a general sense of insecurity which the initiative 
tapped into. Whatever the safety risks for adults and young people there was a sense 
of being unsafe, and while the curfew was not fully endorsed by all sections of the 
public there was again a general desire that safety should be 'provided' by the 
authorities and that this was a 'right' that was expected by much of the community. 
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The curfew and the concern with antisocial behaviour related both to public 
insecurities but also, and perhaps most significantly, to the concerns of the political 
elite. In this respect the study of the curfew in Hamilton was also a study of these 
concerns and of the newly developing relationship between the political authorities 
and the 'victimised public': a relationship that was therapeutically reforming around 
the 'feelings' of insecurity and the 'community of fear'. 
Conclusion 
Ignoring for a moment the intricacies of the curfew and the various justifications for 
its introduction and its actual impact, what is under study at the core of this thesis is 
the relationship between the state and society - or perhaps more accurately, between 
the state and the individual. 
In examining the curfew, we have been studying in part the arguments used to 
legitimise the state and through this, attempted to uncover the nature of the 
contemporary 'subject' both within politics and at the level of the individual: a subject 
that is less a 'reflexive' individual (Giddens 1991) or a greedy individual (Lea and 
Young 1984) than a diminished subject. 
In this respect, if at a more narrowly focused level, this thesis is attempting to address 
the problem raised by C. Wright Mills when he asked, 'What varieties of men and 
women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming 
to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made 
sensitive and blunted? '(Mills 1967: 13). 
In Hamilton, where 'child safety' was understood to be a significant issue by the local 
authority, there was no demand or expectation that the community should, or even 
could, do something about this themselves. This is perhaps the strongest example of 
the diminished expectations of local people. Despite the unquestionable moral or 
amoral absolutist position that child safety had in society, no independent action of an 
individual or collective nature was even contemplated by the local authority. But then, 
the very process of engaging with people as fundamentally vulnerable already 
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mitigates against a more robust sense of individual action. This vulnerability was 
expressed most acutely in the promotion of the problems of child safety itself -a 
problem that in objective terms appears to have had little if any validity, indeed that 
was, at a general level, a myth. 
The attempted engagement, as discussed, between the authorities and the individual 
was within the prism of safety and as such related to a more fragmented insecure 
public at an individual level. Community safety was, however, not simply a public 
preoccupation but was also something that was a political priority at the same time. 
At a local level the role of politicians was important in helping to frame the arguments 
for the curfew, and at a national level the significance of antisocial behaviour made 
politicians the dominant clainismakers in relation to this social problem. 
One reason for the previous and subsequent examination of political processes and 
rhetoric within this thesis, is the centrality of politics in the sphere of subjectivity and 
subjective action. While there are underlying social and economic developments that 
have led to the situation in Hamilton, in particular with the fragmentation of 
communities, as Heartfield notes, the examination of politics is of value because 
I politics is the realm of subject formation' (Heartfield 2002: 204). By this Heartfield 
means that, whereas economic and social changes provide the background for changes 
in society, the 'final determination of events' comes from the reaction of significant 
groups and individuals within the realm of politics. 
Despite subjectivity being discussed here as having been diminished, this does not 
signify that the role of subjectivity is less important, but rather that the exan-dnation of 
this diminished subjectivity can help to unearth and explain the increasing 
significance given to community safety and antisocial behaviour initiatives by the 
authorities themselves. 
In terms of the CSI and the diminished level of responsibility and action expected of 
the local people, discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to note that not all 
of the people in Hillhouse reflected the vulnerable individual that was represented by 
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the authorities. Some of the young people - if a minority - remained more 'streetwise' 
and dynamic in their engagement with public space, and a number of adults were still 
involved in regulating the behaviour of young people in their area. Indeed, that only 
just over half of the local men questioned in the Scottish Office survey supported an 
extension of this initiative could suggest that they felt it unnecessary, possibly because 
the problems being engaged with were ones they felt able to resolve themselves. 
Whatever the reasons for this, it was clear, in discussions with the local community 
council chair and others, that not all of the adults in the area were as engaged by the 
problems of crime, safety and antisocial young people. This is not to argue that fear 
and a level of insecurity was not significant in the area - and certainly in terms of child 
safety there appeared to be no disagreement with its importance in general. However, 
as Nolan has noted in relation to therapeutic awareness training within the workplace 
that, 'take[s] the most thin-skinned, chronically offended person in a group as the 
norm' (Nolan 1998: 294), in Hamilton the CSI was similarly based upon an 
understanding of the local adults as being 'chronically' vulnerable, and terrorised by 
the activities of local children and young people. As Garland has noted, in terms of 
how the state relates to its citizens, The victim is now, in a certain sense, a much more 
representative character, whose experience is taken to be common and collective, 
rather than individual and atypical" (Garland 2002: 11). It was this image of the 
subject which dominated the promotion and implementation of the curfew. 
That local adults were understood to be 'living in fear' was not simply a figment of the 
authority's imagination, indeed a 'culture of fear' did appear to both surround adults 
lives and also that of children. However, that this fear was a direct product of crime 
and antisocial behaviour is extremely contestable. As we noted in interviews with the 
children and young people, Hillhouse was far from being a ghetto where young people 
or adults were seriously 'at risk'. Indeed, looking not only at broad social and 
economic changes, but also at the level of the different generations and their 
interactions with young people, there appears to be far wider reasons for the level of 
insecurity and lack of surety felt by adults in their relations with the young. - 
However, despite these wider considerations it has been politicians and, most 
noticeably and currently, the New Labour Party that has not only reacted to public 
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insecurities but helped to generate them by engaging with and promoting the politics 
of fear. In his book The Unfinished Revolution, Labour Party moderniser Philip 
Gould, for example, self-consciously recognised that fear had emerged due to broad 
social changes, but nonetheless believed that New Labour must reconnect with voters 
with policies that are 'tough on crime' (Gould 1999). 
This development, rather than reflecting simple political opportunism or a conspiracy 
within the Labour ranks to engage with public fears that the politicians themselves do 
not hold, expressed an emerging political elite that, for different reasons than the 
fragmented public, also had an exaggerated sense of social disintegration, in part 
because of a diminution of a belief in its own capacity to influence social 
developments. 
As the curfew was approaching its first year in operation, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
expressed this sense of social instability in a world where subjective intervention 
appeared not only as inadequate but as part of the problem. Speaking at the Labour 
Party conference in Blackpool, Blair explained that, 
People are posing questions far more fundamental than about what is in a 
manifesto. How can I be sure about my job, about my family's safety, about 
the future prosperity of my country? This is the challenge: finding security and 
stability in a world pushed ever faster forward by the irresistible forces of 
history and human invention (Guardian 30 September 1998 (my italics)). 
History and human intervention, understood as an 'irresistible force' somehow beyond 
control, has here resulted in a conservative preoccupation with 'security and stability' 
at the international and national level. 
The focus on community safety seen in Hamilton was, in this respect, less to do with 
local fears and the activities of the local youth than with the loss of a sense of 
subjective political capacities of the political elite themselves - something that was 
reflected at the local level. In South Lanarkshire and in Hillhouse itself, the somewhat 
myopic and persistent focus upon community safety in the interpretation of surveys 
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and the setting up of the Citizens' Jury reflected this internal political preoccupation 
with and organisation around safety and security. 
However, while the 'culture of fear' has broad cultural routes, it is the development 
not only of relevant claims that promote certain social problems, but perhaps more 
importantly the institutionalisation. of these problems. 
The institutionalisation of the CSI, for example, had an impact not only at a local level 
but at a national and indeed international level, in promoting the idea that children 
were 'at risk' and that communities are being undermined by the antisocial behaviour 
of young people. In this respect this initiative not only related to the culture of fear, 
but helped to reinforce it and form the framework of understanding the problem of 
fear in society. 
Ironically, in relation to how social problems are constructed or how they are ignored, 
it was within the development of the CSI that a very different and alternative response 
by local politicians was illustrated - with the development of the Universal 
Connexions youth caM. 
This 0 million pound development was part of the CSI package - not only to remove 
young people off the streets, but to give them something to do and somewhere to go. 
However, the subsequent gathering of young people around this centre and the various 
$antisocial' activities they 'got up to' led to a significant number of complaints from 
local adults. Rather than react to these complaints with another curfew or a similar 
community safety initiative, the council leader Tom McCabe denounced those people 
complaining and rejected their calls for a 'quiet neighbourhood'. Frustrated by these 
complaints and the fact that the council had spent so much money on a new youth 
resource, McCabe swept aside the local concerns and stated that the area was 'never 
that quiet anyway' (Hamilton Advertiser 24 December 1998). 
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Chapter 8: The Meaning of 'Antisocial Behaviour9 
Antisocial., opposed to the principles on which society is constituted (Oxford English 
Dictionary in ! L83). 
Antisocial: Contrary to the laws and customs of society; causing annoyance and 
disapproval in others: children's antisocial behaviour (New Oxford English 
Dictionary 1.282). 136 
Introduction 
The term 'antisocial behaviour' has existed for many years, and indeed many of the 
issues addressed today within the parameters of antisocial behaviour are Often similar 
to those addressed in the past. 137 However, despite these similarities, it would be a 
mistake to understand the issue of antisocial behaviour - especially in terms of its 
significance to politics and society more generally - as simply a continuation of past 
concerns. Not only has the meaning of antisocial behaviour changed somewhat, as 
reflected in the dictionary definitions above, but the number and variety of forms of 
behaviour and actions that are today so labelled has increased, and continues to 
increase. Old social concerns have been relabelled as antisocial, while new 'crimes' 
and forms of problem behaviour have been discovered and branded within the rubric 
of 'antisocial behaviour'. 
Having discussed so far the rise of amoral panics and the development of the politics 
of antisocial behaviour that led to the introduction of the Hamilton curfew, here the 
increasing concern with antisocial behaviour since this initiative was introduced is 
explored more fully. 
In 1997, when the Hamilton curfew was introduced, many issues that have become 
associated with antisocial behaviour were at this point in time not defined as being 
$antisocial'. Subsequently, the rise in the significance of 'antisocial behaviour' to 
public and political life has been established to the extent that it has become one of the 
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most discussed social problems. But why is this, and why has the term 'antisocial 
behaviour' come to be used to explain myriad social problems? How does this relate 
to the nature of politics, the engagement with the vulnerable public, and what does it 
tell us about the individual and about society? 
As we will see, the use of the term antisocial behaviour has grown significantly in 
recent years, within the media, within academic research and particularly within the 
more psychologically framed forms of research and criminology. In much of these 
discussions about antisocial behaviour, it is not simply that old issues have been re- 
branded as antisocial, but rather that new forms of behaviour have been problematised 
and old issues reinterpreted through a more therapeutic gaze. Why such issues can be 
understood as both antisocial and as a form of behaviour is examined to understand 
how the themes discussed so far in the thesis can be seen within the very meaning and 
understanding of modem day antisocial behaviour. 
The rise of antisocial behaviour 
So prevalent is the term antisocial behaviour today that it is difficult to imagine that 
this 'social problem' had little public/political existence just a few years ago. Today, 
tantisocial behaviour' is a significant issue in the media, politics, law and research. In 
social policy, in local government, and within the activities of voluntary organisations, 
antisocial behaviour helps to direct myriad initiatives; while within the public domain 
and even in popular television culture issues associated with antisocial behaviour have 
become an area of significant concern and focus. This popular and political concern 
with antisocial behaviour is also reflected to some degree within academia - 
especially within the more psychologically-oriented forms of sociology and 
criminology. 
Examining the media articles addressing the issue of antisocial behaviour, for 
example, we find that from the 1980s, when there were few such articles, the concern 
with antisocial behaviour has increased significantly through the 1990s and into the 
twenty-first century. 
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From a consistent increase in articles related to antisocial behaviour up to 2001 - as 
shown above -a further and more rapid increase occurred. For example, whereas the 
number of such articles in 2001 in the Guardian was 80, this increased to 273 in 2003, 
and then to 574 in 2004.139 This increase reflected in part the institutional isation of 
initiatives to address issues of antisocial behaviour - like ASBOs (Antisocial 
Behaviour Orders), 140 and the concurrent political focus on this issue by the Labour 
government. 141 
The Hamilton Child Safety Initiative was one of the first major local initiatives, 
following the election of New Labour, to deal with issues associated with antisocial 
behaviour, and this has been followed by a number of significant pieces of legislation 
including the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, the Antisocial Behaviour Act (2003) and 
the Antisocial Behaviour Act (Scotland) 2004.142 
Politicians have also helped to make antisocial behaviour into a 'social problem', 
expressed in their speeches and laws. This can be illustrated by the number of articles 
where politicians discuss or comment on the issue of antisocial behaviour. In 1985, for 
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'Antisocial behaviour' has increasingly, over the last decade (in terms of newspaper 
coverage), become associated with 'communities' and 'estates' - and with working 
class youth in particular. Over half of the Guardian articles on antisocial behaviour in 
2004, for example, related to young people and a similar number related to 
'community' or 'estates. 144 
Judging by the number of articles on antisocial behaviour, it would appear that the 
issue has grown slowly over the 1990s and suddenly exploded from 2002 to become a 
major issue. However, this understanding would underestimate the growing concern 
about I)ehaviourin general which took various forms in the 1990s, and which by the 
turn of the century had become more directly institutionalised around the theme of 
'antisocial behaviour'. 
The media coverage of antisocial behaviour related to both the political and 
institutional focus upon this social problem - but concern about this type of behaviour 
is by no means simply an 'elite' concern. Phone calls to the police, for example, about 
'nuisance' (i. e. non-criminal behaviour) of young people, had been noted to be a major 
issue for the police in 1996,145 and before this in 1992, the British Crime Survey had 
also noted that one of the reasons for the rise in their crime statistics was due to the 
increased reporting of 'less serious' crimes, due to the 'increasing public sensitivity' to 
crime related issues (Home Office 1992). More recently the MORI poll What Place 
for ASBOs in an Era of Respect?, has noted that 'antisocial behaviour is an issue 
which resonates with the public at a 'local level'. 146 
Within the social sciences, issues associated with antisocial behaviour have also 
become more significant as an area for research. This has developed in part with the 
increased focus within criminology on victims of crime and concerns with harassment 
and abuse, 147 but perhaps most significantly within the field of psychology and 
research focused upon psychosocial risk factors. 
Examining research related to the issue of antisocial behaviour, and in particular the 
increasing use of this term, very similar results were found to the newspaper searches, 
with a huge increase in journal articles in the International Bibliography of the Social 
221 
Sciences (BIDS) containing the term'antisocial behaviour' or 'anti-social behavioue in 
the late 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century. 148 
Table 4: BIDS search for 'antisocial behaviour' or 'anti-social behaviour'. 
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Part of this increase reflects the increasing number of journals searched within BIDS. 
However, it also reflects the greater number of psychologically oriented journals, 
which, in part, have helped focus more research on issues associated with antisocial 
behaviour. 149 
In relation to policy developments associated with crime and antisocial behaviour, the 
growth of the psychologically-based developmental criminology has also been 
significant in focusing attention on issues of 'behaviour' within criminology and also 
in helping to set the parameters within which these problems are understood. As a 
leading figure within developmental criminology, David Farrington, notes: 
'Developmental criminology advanced enormously in the 1980s and 1990s', in the 
study of 'the development of offending and antisocial behaviour' (Farrington 2002: 
658). This approach to crime and antisocial behaviour has, in the 1990s, encouraged 
an 'enormous increase in the influence of risk-focused prevention in criminology, an 
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approach which was 'imported into criminology from medicine and public health' 
(2002: 660), and that, as Farrington argues, sees offending as 'part of a larger 
syndrome of antisocial behaviour that arises in childhood and tends to persist into 
adulthood' (2002: 658 my italics). 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, as Hollin states, 'criminological psychologists became 
sufficiently confident in their subject to begin to produce a string of textbooks on the 
topic of psychology and crime'(Hollin 2002: 163-5). As this confidence grew, so too 
did the 'increasing harmony between criminologists and psychologists in the UK', 
assisted in large part by the Developmental Criminology of authors like David 
Farrington (2002: 166). 
Antisocial behaviour has unquestionably grown as a 'social problem' and focus for 
concern within public life, within politics, and in research, while the media coverage 
of issues labelled as being antisocial has risen sharply over the last few years. 
However, as discussed previously, a number of issues had already arisen and helped 
lay the foundations of this focus upon problematic behaviour between people in 
society often associated with crime and abuse. Issues of abuse had emerged, especially 
in relation to children, in the 1980s; youth crime had emerged as a political priority 
from 1993; the issue of 'irresponsible parents' had developed as a major concern 
regarding antisocial young people; and the fear of crime and focus on victims within 
crime had become an accepted priority by the mid-1990s. Also areas of concern like 
that of 'community' - as a place of focus, and in terms of the sense of 'community' - 
had become issues for governance (Rose 1996), while notions of 'risk' and 'safety' had 
become more influential at this time (Furedi 2004: 127). 
How these issues inform the understanding of antisocial behaviour, and more 
specifically, what the conceptual issues are that link them together under the banner of 
antisocial behaviour, will be discussed more fully below. Before developing this thesis 
on antisocial behaviour, however, it is worth examining in more detail how antisocial 
behaviour is related to the couplet it is often paired with - crime. 
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Crime and antisocial behaviour 
Antisocial behaviour, at the time of the Hamilton curfew, was often given significance 
with reference to more serious crime, with for example the popularity of the broken 
windows theory of disorder leading to criminality espoused by Strathclyde Chief 
Constable John Off. However as the issue of antisocial behaviour has itself become 
more accepted as a serious Problem in its own right, this association with crime has 
become less necessary. 
Some of the most recent crime statistics, and the reactions to them, are telling in 
understanding how the socially constructed nature of crime is addressed today. 
Despite headlines like'Overall crime down by 44% since 1995', the high levels of fear 
of crime amongst the public and the reaction to this fear by politicians remains intense 
(Guardian I December 2005). 
Crime figures that would in previous historical periods have led to a sense that society 
was improving and that crime problems were falling have not accompanied this 'quite 
extraordinary and historically unprecedented, statistical fall in crime. Rather, the focus 
of newspaper articles, television debate programmes and most political commentary 
on these figures in 2005 was to focus in on any possible negative figure available. 
Statistics on violent crime, for example, showed an increase and became the focus of 
media and political concern, despite Home Office experts strenuously denying that 
this increase was 'real' (Guardian 21 July 2005). 150 
With crime being a universally accepted political priority, and with all political parties 
attempting to gain support by relating to this 'problem', both the Liberal Democrats 
and the Conservative home affairs spokesmen targeted these figures on violent crime, 
relating it specifically to the problem of 'binge drinking', a form of 'antisocial 
behaviour'the government had itself helped make into a social problem. 
Here, as in many discussions about crime today, the issue of 'violent crime' became a 
discussion of problem behaviour: 'binge drinking', something that is not itself a crime, 
but has become directly connected with it. Regardless of the reality that violent crime 
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- if measured using methods used in 1997 - has actually fallen, and the recognition 
that the statistical increase in 2005 is due to changes in reporting and recording of 
these crimes, objective statistics appear to be almost irrelevant to the sense that crime 
is on the increase and to the way politicians and the media relate to issues of crime 
and antisocial behaviour. Politicians from all sides continue to demand further 
regulations of problem behaviour, while the government continues to look for ever- 
more forms of regulation to make society even safer - like the proposal to ban replica 
guns, following the significant fall in real gun crime. 
Within concerns and discussions about crime and particularly antisocial behaviour, 
there appears to be a declining significance in the 'objectively' measured reality of 
these problems for both politicians and the public - helped in large part by the focus 
not on crime and antisocial acts themselves, but on the fear and anxiety expressed 
within society. 151 Rather than engaging with 'real' social problems and processes, the 
trend within politics and the press is to engage with this subjective sense of fear. 
Crime policies and discussions in this respect become less about actual crime than 
about engaging with people's perceptions, anxieties, and 'loss of confidence'. 
As the MORI Poll What place for ASBOs in an era of Respect? notes with regard to 
the development of ASBOs, 'Antisocial behaviour orders are a symbol of action - 
thereby helping to increase public confidence on an issue which resonates' (MORI 
2005). 
The relationship between crime and antisocial behaviour continues today. However, 
the emphasis of concern has shifted to focus increasingly upon antisocial behaviour as 
the problem. In the example of 'violent crime', 'problem behaviour' like binge drinking 
is directly associated with more serious crime; however, the issue of binge drinking is 
also understood to be a serious problem of 'antisocial behaviour' in and of itself - and 
has become a focus for political intervention. Whereas antisocial behaviour in the 
mid-1990s was often highlighted as being a significant problem within, for example, 
'Zero Tolerance' police initiatives, by associating petty crimes with serious crimes, 
today, the issue of 'antisocial behaviour' is a recognised social problem in its own 
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right. There is no longer a need to associate antisocial behaviour with 'serious' 
problems of crime: it is itself a'serious problem'. 
Secondly, like the positive crime figures in 2005 that are generally interpreted 
negatively in society, despite the statistical evidence to the contrary, antisocial 
behaviour needs little or no objective verification as a social problem. Indeed, rarely, 
if ever, do speeches, new laws and initiatives about antisocial behaviour come with a 
statistical justification. Where previously crime initiatives would often have been 
developed in relation to statistical 'evidence', today the problem of antisocial 
behaviour is simply accepted. 'Antisocial behaviour' as a social problem is in this 
respect related to as an almost entirely subjective problem, and one that politicians 
engage with at the level of fear, anxiety and confidence. 
The issue of antisocial behaviour - while having already been isolated as a topic of 
concern, for example in the Labour Party document Partners against crime - has 
increasingly become understood as the most significant issue in relation to this sense 
of fear and anxiety in society. 152 With falling crime rates in the last ten years, and 
particularly since New Labour came to power, but with no similar fall in the anxiety 
about crime and disorder, the focus upon antisocial behaviour has further intensified, 
and been understood as the key problem affecting communities and society more 
generally. 
Finally, despite the fact that the problem of 'antisocial behaviour' is often related to 
non-criminal or petty criminal activities, it is understood to be a problem that is 
serious - indeed to some extent more serious than crime itself. 
153 To engage with the 
issue of antisocial behaviour is to relate both to the fear in society and the broad sense 
of social disorder. In this respect it is not so much that antisocial behaviour is given 
significance in relation to crime, but rather that crime is seen as significant as an 
expression of antisocial behaviour. 
Whereas crimes like burglary, for example, which were a major focus for analysis in 
the 1970s, had a certain objective (economic) image and were recognised to be rare 
events for most people, antisocial behaviour has a more generalised air of permanence 
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and is understood to be a more 'irrational' or 'random' (Best 1999) occurrence -a wider 
problem of 'behaviour' and one which is ever-present. Even burglary, in this respect, is 
discussed most frequently with reference to drug addicts - the issue of concern being 
less on the crime itself than on the problematic lifestyle and behaviour of heroine 
users. 
'Liquid' morality 
At a time when antisocial behaviour has become a key theme in politics and society, 
this development can appear to be a reflection of a government deterrrýined to enforce 
I social' and 'moral' norms within society. However, in fact the opposite is the case. The 
rise and rise of concerns with antisocial behaviour today reflect the loss, not the 
enforcement, of moral and political beliefs. 
Comparing the original use of the term 'antisocial' - opposed to the principles on 
which society is constituted - with the definition cited at the start of this chapter in 
1989, we find a shift in emphasis of the identified antisocial actor. The first use of the 
term, in 1802 and subsequently in 1844, is highly political and referred to the moral 
and political standpoint of Republicans, who were perceived to be a threat to society 
and its social and religious/moral norms. 154 This definition of antisocial therefore 
privileges the beliefs of society against those who actively oppose them. In contrast, 
the more recent definition of antisocial has added to the idea of challenging the norms 
of society the following: causing annoyance and disapproval in others: children's 
antisocial behaviour. 155 Taking the extremes of what these definitions relate to, 
whereas the original use of the term antisocial was a conservative denunciation of 
revolutionary Republicans, the modem equivalent is related to the misbehaviour of 
children. Also, where the first definition in denouncing Republican activities as 
antisocial sets up an alternative sense of the correct moral and political 'social' 
outlook, the latter meaning lacks this wider political or moral content. 
Concern about antisocial acts both past and present evolved within a political context. 
However, the transformation of the meaning of antisocial behaviour reflects, in part, 
the shift from the politics of the past to the micro-politics of today. The original use 
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of the term antisocial emerged at the time of the French Revolution -a time when the 
ideas of 'left and right' developed, pitting ideas of change and rationality against the 
conservative demand for tradition and morality. Comparatively, the modem growth of 
the concern with the antisocial has come about precisely when we have gone 'beyond 
left and right'. In other words, whereas the original use and meaning of the term 
4antisocial' reflected a clash of ideas of left and right, and alternative meanings of 
what it meant to be 'social' as opposed to 'antisocial', today this has emerged at a time 
when this clash of ideas has largely evaporated, and with it any systematic defence of 
absolute 'social' norms. This would suggest that the very meaning of what it is to be 
antisocial today has been transformed. 
Rather, what it means to be social as opposed to antisocial today relates less to 
absolute 'social' norms and values of society, than to the offence and harm that 
antisocial individual acts may have upon other individuals. The 'social' content of the 
meaning of antisocial has largely been lost and been replaced by a concept that 
privileges and defends the individual from others. Rather than seeing this as the re- 
moralisation or re-politicisation of society, this change reflects the politicisation and 
moralising of individual interpersonal interactions. The emergence of the concern 
with being antisocial has therefore occurred at a time when the content of what it 
means to be social, political and moral has significantly declined. 
The concern with social order expressed in today's preoccupation with antisocial 
behaviour is not new. Indeed, nor is the anxiety about the loss of values and beliefs a 
late twentieth century occurrence. Emile Durkheirn for example, writing at the end of 
the nineteenth century, was largely motivated in his sociological study of religion to 
understand the moral vacuum left with the decline of tradition and religion. However, 
despite Durkheim's pessimism about the emerging individualism in society (Morrison 
1995: 146), he maintained that 'there is something eternal in religion'. For Durkheim, 
this eternal something related not to religion as such, but to the centrality of society 
and the fundamental need for people to 'reaffirm the collective feelings and ideas that 
constitute its unity and its personality' (Durkheim 2001: 322). Where traditional forms 
of collectivity were in decline more secular forms would emerge. Indeed Durkheim, 
was himself a French patriot, a firm defender of science, and is described as a socialist 
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- in this respect he embodied many of these secular forms of 'religion' that gave a 
collective coherence to much of twentieth century life and subsequently undermined 
the sense of a loss of social order which dogged Durkheim himself 156 
Today the sense of a loss of social order in Britain and the concern with antisocial 
behaviour has re-emerged and become more universal because of the collapse of these 
'secular beliefs'. This sense of disorder amongst the elite has also been encouraged by 
the decline of traditional morality - reflected in the confusion of 'moral language' and 
the inability of conservatives to promote a 'back to basics' outlook discussed in 
previous chapters. The concern with antisocial behaviour has emerged within the elite 
not in terms of its acting as the landlords of society, but rather, as Bauman argues, as 
the elite acting as 'absentee landlords'. The 'new elite' lacks both traditional 
conservative values and 'secular religions' to cohere a society that it senses is out of 
their control - an antisocial society. This sense of society being out of control is a 
reflection of the elite itself, who have abdicated the responsibility of being the 'pilot' 
of society. This elite, 'rule without burdening itself with the chores of administration, 
management, welfare concerns, or, for that matter, with the mission of 'bringing light', 
'reforming the ways', morally uplifting, 'civilizing' and cultural crusades' (Bauman 
2000: 13). Where past rules were set down by the 'captains' of society and 'displayed 
in bold letters in every passageway' - rules that could be followed or challenged - 
today, in comparison, 'the passengers of the 'Light Capitalism' aircraft ... discover to 
their horror that the pilot's cabin is empty' (2000: 59). 
In this sense, the feeling that society is somehow out of control - something which is 
increasingly related to the activities and 'behaviour of children' - is more a reflection 
of the 'behaviour' of the 'global elite' itseýf Unlike the time when the term antisocial 
was first used, a time of emerging and fundamental political contestation, today no 
such contestation exists. Concurrently, where the label of 'antisocial' was given to 
Republicans, this definition would have been contested and rejected by those on the 
left. Today, however, there is no such challenge, and it is this loss of opposition to 
conservative concerns with social order that has allowed the idea of antisocial 
behaviour to become a universally accepted problem. 157 
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In the 1980s, when politicians attempted to label someone as being antisocial, it was 
done to reaffirm an alternative moral order and was, in many cases, questioned or 
challenged by those on the left. Indeed this contestation laid the basis for both moral 
panics and the reaction to them. Where the right would denounce the antisocial 
activities of muggers or militants, the left would both challenge this label and throw it 
back at the then Conservative government. Even at the level of concerns with the 
behaviour of school children, for example, which were aired in the 1970s and 1980s 
and often within a traditionalist demand for 'decency', the question of school discipline 
and the control of young people was challenged within a radical political 
framework. 158 
Today, by comparison, there is a more generalised acceptance of the problem of 
I antisocial behaviour'in and of itself. The particular activity or outlook of an antisocial 
individual is no longer needed to elaborate upon this problem: we are increasingly, 
according to certain polls, aware of the 'problem of antisocial behavioue and in 
general support government attempts to deal with it. "9 However, the emergence of the 
concern with antisocial behaviour and a concern with social order does not simply 
represent a 'move to the right' in any traditional sense. As noted previously, the rise in 
the concern with antisocial behaviour has occurred at a time when traditional moral 
authority has declined. Rather than reflecting a rise of traditional values and beliefs, 
the concem with antisocial behaviour has been re-moralised and re-politicised on a 
different basis. 
What unites the approach by those on the 'left' with those on the 'right' is a move away 
from a social basis of legitimation (within a moral or political framework) and a shift 
towards a focus upon the individual in understanding social problems. Whereas 
antisocial behaviour in the past was understood as an affront to the values and 
institutions of society, today, even within the definition of 'antisocial' itself, the 
concern is not with society as such but with 'behaviour' of individuals and the harm 
done to individual 'victims'of this behaviour. Legitimation is subsequently gained in 
attacking antisocial behaviour, not with reference to a wider moral or political point of 
reference, but within the defence the victim. The society or 'community' that is being 
defended is, in effect, a conglomeration of individuals rather than a unified whole 
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based on 'social' (whether morally or politically constituted) values and norms. (As 
Eric Hobsbawn notes, the word 'community'has become increasingly used at a time 
I when communities in the sociological sense' have become 'hard to find in real life' 
(Hobsbawn 1994: 428)). Values have become relativised and few 'absolute' norms are 
accepted, except the 'moral' value of individual safety. 160 
Concern with problematic 'behaviour' emerged most systematically at the same time 
as the discussion about the 'underclass' (around the early 1990s), and this 
preoccupation with the values and attitudes of the poorest sections of society has 
continued today and forms a key element within the concern with antisocial 
behaviour. However, it is not the language and outlook of the moral right that 
predominates in today's discussion about, for example, the underclass, but rather the 
more morally neutral, 'scientific', language of risk and safety. Indeed the use of the 
term underclass, while still remaining, is more problematic today and often used in 
inverted commas or replaced by the idea of the socially excluded. 161 
More appropriate for today's discussion and understanding of antisocial behaviour are 
the 'risk categories' used by criminal psychologist David Farrington, who has 
incorporated many of the underclass 'categories' of concern but added various 
structural risk indicators into his predictive model of antisocial and criminal 
behaviour. Here individual behaviour and relationships are problematised, but outside 
of any totalising moral framework. 162 As we will go on to explain, the loss of a social 
sense and a moral or political relationship and engagement with activities understood 
to be antisocial has seen the emergence of a more psychologically, indeed 
therapeutically, oriented understanding of types of individual 'behaviour'. 
Today's concern with antisocial behaviour is predicated upon the end of any secular or 
moral 'religion'. Indeed, the political focus on antisocial behaviour in the modem form 
it takes is helping to institutionalise this amoral and asocial basis of engaging with 
society. 
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The issue of antisocial behaviour is a central element within the politics of fear -a 
more limited politics that attempts to create consensus around the 'morality' of risk and 
risk avoidance. 
Antisocial behaviour in a culture of limits 
Within a period of history when not only the individual, but society itself, is 
understood more generally to be 'at risle, the tendency is to look not to the creative 
potential within the individual but the destructive impact that individuals' actions and 
very existence embody. The rise of the concern with antisocial behaviour clearly 
reflects this more misanthropic understanding of the essence of human action. 
Discussing the consequential limiting of horizons within the political imagination with 
the loss of belief in alternatives to the market, Marxist theoretician Istvan Meszaros 
notes that: 
If it is true, as they say, that 'there is no alternative' to the structural 
determinations of the capitalist system in the 'real world', in that case the very 
idea of causal interventions - no matter how little or large - must be 
condemned as an absurdity. The only change admissible within such a vision 
of the world belongs to the type which concerns itself with some strictly 
limited negative effects but leaves their causal foundation ... completely 
unaffected (Meszaros 1995: xiii). 
The limited sense of social possibilities described by Meszaros above has become 
I reflected within social policies and also impacts upon how the individual is 
understood. Consequently, issues have increasingly vanished in a sea of troubles. 
At the level of politics and the 'elite', today's culture of limits not only results in the 
focus upon 'little things' like antisocial behaviour, but the purpose of governance itself 
changes from a transformative process to one in which the prevention of harm 
becomes the aim and objective of intervention. Within society the loss of a social 
imagination results in a similar transformation of how issues of everyday life are 
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understood. Our concerns not only become more 'local', but the solutions to these 
problems lose both a social perspective and an active engagement with the problems 
themselves. As society is understood to be a product offorces beyond our control, so 
too are the lives of individuals, who become conceptualised as mere ýproducts'qf their 
environment. 
'Risk' indicators within this environment emerge not simply as a 'scientific' 
mechanism of predicting 'behaviour' but as the way in which the culture of society 
engages with the individual more generally. Here tackling 'crime and the causes of 
crime' takes on a meaning devoid of structural content, and the causes of crime 
increasingly come to relate to individuals and their behaviour. In a sense there is no 
cause as such - at any social level - that can be transformed, and the perception of 
overcoming even relatively minor social problems become limited. 
For example, the international authoritY on child development, Sir Michael Rutter, 
believes that 'major advances have ... been made in prevention and intervention 
research, leading to a tone of cautious optimism'. Having examined all of the potential 
mechanisms for identifying the causes of antisocial behaviour, and studying methods 
for resolving them, Rutter, in Antisocial Behaviour hy Young People, concludes that, 
I given the multiplicity of causes and the complexity of human behaviour', the typical 
impact of initiatives to prevent antisocial behaviour will be 'in the order of a 12% 
reduction'. 
From previously held beliefs in the 'perfectability of man' or the positivist potential for 
social change, here we find the understanding of society hidden under a 'multiplicity' 
of causes. The discovery by Rutter, in practice, that just over one in ten 'at risk' 
individuals will overcome their antisocial behaviour and avoid a life of criminality, 
mirrors the cultural sense not that 'nothing works', but that almost nothing works. That 
Rutter can interpret this with 'cautious optimism' reflects well the diminished horizons 
embodied in social policy within the culture of limits (Rutter ctal 1998: 383). 
The potential, or even the aspiration for, culture', univýrsalism or a sense of 
nationhood and commonality, today is drowned in an avalanche of what are 
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understood to be crime, knife, gun, binge drinking and yob eultures. Meanwhile the 
focus upon 'community' as a resolution to problems of antisocial behaviour embody a 
similar sense of limited possibilities. As Bauman notes, the'communitarian cult'holds 
out the possibility not of social harmony but of peace within the narrow parameters of 
the walls and gates surrounding their frightened inhabitants: 
The vision of community, let me repeat, is that of an island of homely and 
cosy tranquillity in a sea of turbulence and inhospitality. It tempts and seduces, 
prompting the admirer to refrain from looking too. closely, since the 
eventuality of ruling the waves and taming the sea has already been deleted 
from the agenda as a proposition both suspect and real (Bauman 2000: 182). 
Similarly, regarding the elite's loss of a sense of purpose, Christopher Lasch in The 
Culture of Narcissism, writing in the late 1970s about 'American life in an age of low 
expectations', observes that: 
Hardly more than a quarter-century after Henry Luce proclaimed "the 
American century, " American confidence has fallen to a low ebb. Those who 
recently dreamed of world power now despair of governing the city of New 
York (Lasch 1979). 
New York may now have seen the successful governance of a 'zero tolerance' 
approach to 'squeegee merchants', but this city, which once represented the dynamic 
self-confidence of American capitalism, appears to be more inclined to promote itself 
as a 'safe city' than as part of a nation striving to 'rule the waves and tame the sea'. At 
the local level, for even those who, by virtue of wealth (who can create gated 
communities) or state intervention (can have noisy neighbours removed) and are able 
to find their island of tranquillity, the sense of isolation and estrangement remains in 
the regulated communities that have been developed, communitieg that 'feel more like 
orphanages, prisons or mad houses than sites of potential liberation' (Bauman 2000: 
182). 
234 
The problematisation of behaviour 
The problematic behaviour of different groups - the residuum, criminals or deviants, 
for example - has been a concern for sections of the elite for many years. However, 
where previously these concerns were often more common amongst conservative 
sections of society, the anxiety about problematic forms of behaviour has become 
more all pervasive today. Indeed, whereas previously issues of problem behaviour 
were generally confined to certain defined 'deviant' sections of society, today the 
'problem of behaviour' now incorporates almost all aspects of life. 
Antisocial behaviour in this respect is just one of the many issues that relates to a 
broader concern with human behaviour, within a 'problematised' framework -a 
framework within which issues of everyday life are increasingly understood to be part 
of a society undermined by myriad toxic relationships (Furedi 2W4: 77). 163 
Such is the extent of the problematisation of behaviour that it is hard to find an area of 
life that is not understood to be troubled with 'issues' of behaviour. From the family to 
school life and work relationships, issues of bullying and abuse'64 have become a 
major concern, while travelling to and from these areas of life issues of stalking, road 
and air rage have come to light in the last decade. 
While many of these 'social problems' relate to various forms of 'aggressive 
behaviour', more generally still, issues of personal habits and lifestyle have become 
problematised and defined as 'unsafe' for both 'other people' and for individuals 
themselves - with passive smoking, binge drinking, 
165 unsafe sex, and obesity, for 
example, all being modem socially-constructed problems of behaviour. 
The 'strictly limited negative' aspects of society have, at a time of TINA, increasingly 
been understood within the realm 'of individual 'behaviour', with the 'causal 
interventions' (Meszaros 1995: xiii) similarly being engaged with through the Politics 
of Behaviour (Field 2003). 
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With this growing focus and problematisation of individual behaviour, 
psychologically-oriepted explanations of social problems have become more 
prevalent, as has social policy concerns related to 'psychosocial' risk factors (Asquith 
1998). 166 As significant, therefore, as the term 'antisocial', in relation to the growing 
prevalence with the concern with 'antisocial behaviour', is the politicisation and 
problematisation of behaviour itself. 167 
This concern with the 'problem of behaviour' comes with a growing focus upon 
relationships, and can be seen within the social sciences itself. There has been a 
certain orientation within some sociological journals towards a more psychological 
approach - as, for example, with the emergence of the journal Addiction. Within a 
number of psychological journals the reverse is the case, and they have become more 
oriented to examining 'social' problems. Within both, more areas of life and 
interpersonal relationships have been problematised and studied as part of the social 
Problem of antisocial behaviour. 168, 
Contrasting articles in the influential Child Development journal over time, for 
example, it is noticeable that unlike papers in the 1960s that were more concerned 
with examining cognitive developmental processes of young children, papers in the 
mid-1990s had a more 'psychosocial' focus: problem relationships between 
adolescence, and between parents and children, being far more prevalent for example. 
From a less problematised psychological examination of child development, the focus 
has become more on the psycho 'social problems' like the various 'addictions' 
discovered amongst young people. 
The problematisation of behaviour has taken many forms over recent years, but 
perhaps the most prevalent has been with the pathologisation of emotions. 
Examining the propensity in America for discovering therapeutic problems with 
'behaviour', Christina Hoff Sommers and Sally Satel note that: 
The propensity of experts to pathologize and medicalise healthy children en 
masse has gotten way out of hand. The past decade has seen a cascade of 
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books and articles promoting the idea that seemingly content and well-adjusted 
Americans - adults as well as children - are emotionally damaged (Sommers 
and Satel 2005: 1). 
For Sommers and Satel, the significant growth and influence of therapeutic 
professionals over the last decade or so has helped to transform the way behaviour - 
especially the behaviour of children - has become reinterpreted as a social (or more 
accurately a psychosocial) problem. Part of this development has helped to focus 
attention further onto the perceived problem relationships between people. 
Within the media and in popular culture, problems of behaviour have become a 
growth industry - most clearly expressed in the various Oprahesque chat shows and 
reality television programmes that invariably come with the resident expert 
psychologist. Even within education, issues of behavioural management associated 
with bullying, but also with relationship education and emotional awareness training, 
there is a certain psychologisation and pathologisation of 'problems' that until recently 
were not understood as needing professional guidance. 
The issue of 'behaviour' has been of concern in relation to children for centuries. 
However, whereas previously there was an expectation that through a process of 
socialisation young people would 'grow up', in today's more pessimistic climate, the 
process of socialisation is itself more readily understood to be the problem. As Furedi 
notes, in terms of the growth of the perceived 'addicted society', addiction that was 
once seen to be the exception is increasingly depicted as the norm. When 'society 
itself is understood to be 'inherently addictive, the problem of behaviour - not only 
within children but adults as well - can be seen to have become highly problematic 
(Furedi 2004: 124). That this outlook has emerged in some quarters today is 
predicated upon a more fatalistic interpretation of human behaviour. 
The passive subject of antisocial behaviour 
Within the definition of antisocial behaviour discussed above, it is noticeable that the 
modem emphasis is upon the behaviour of children, rather than the actions of adults. 
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This new definition diminishes the conscious element within this form of behaviour. 
Where previously antisocial behaviour was understood to be acted out by conscious 
political adult subjects, today it has also come to relate to the relatively unconscious 
misbehaviour of children. This more subject-less understanding of antisocial 
behaviour makes sense at a time when social processes and human action more 
generally is understood to be beyond our control. 
The definition of behaviour within the Penguin Dictionary of Psychology is: a generic 
term covering acts, activities, responses, reactions, movements, processes, operations 
etc., in short, any measurable response of an organism. (Reber 1995: '86). Like this 
definition, which in part reduces behaviour to the reactions of an organism, the 
subjective human element within the understanding of behaviour is today largely 
missing within the understanding of antisocial behaviour. We consequently no longer 
act, we react; we no longer produce our environment, we are products of it; we no 
longer determine our own fate, we are determined beings. And in this respect it is less 
the thoughts and beliefs that we challenge in labelling someone as 'behaving' in an 
antisocial manner, but rather their 'thoughtlessness' - or their diminished capacity to 
think before they act. I 
Children, in everyday language, have often been described as 'behaving badly', but 
bad behaviour was generally a term not used in relation to adults, who were 
understood to be responsible for their actions rather than their behaviour. Today this is 
less the case. Indeed, unlike terms that differentiated adult criminal actions from 
young people - who were labelled juvenile delinquents - today we have no equivalent 
term in common usage that differentiates the actions of adults from children's deviant 
activities. Rather, it is more the case that adults, like children, can be defined with the 
catch-all term 'antisocial behaviour'. Where the term juvenile delinquent separated 
adults from the world of children, privileging the idea of the adult subject and 
subsequently allowing a certain space for young people to be seen as 'behaving' in a 
manner related to their age and immaturity, today, through the categorisation of 
I antisocial behaviour', we have an infantilisation of adult 'behaviour' and at the same 
time a more serious criminalisation of children. 169 
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Within the previously defined juvenile delinquent', we had both labelling of a type of 
person, but also a sense of the capacity, with age and maturity, for a progression from 
'abnormal' to 'normal' behaviour: a sense of progress embodied both within society 
and its capacity to socialise the young, and within the individual itself. This sense of 
social progress reflected in the individual is today more limited, at a time when 'causal 
interventions' must be 'condemned as an absurdity' (Meszaros 1995: xiii). 
The distinction between subjective intentions and behaviour has been muddied and a 
more deterministic understanding of humanity has emerged, giving both a more 
limited sense of the individual's capacity to act consciously, while at the same time 
giving a more static sense of people and their capacity to change themselves or to be 
transformed by and transform society itself. 
The underlying message within the discourse of antisocial behaviour is, despite the 
I cautious optimism', that of 'find me the antisocial child and I will show you the 
antisocial adult of the future'. 170 Rather than deviant actions being understood in part 
to be discrete immoral acts by individuals, today we are increasingly discovering 
'types' of people whose behaviour is understood to be a permanent aspect of what they 
are. 171 
As Findlayson has noted in relation to the politics of today, the political elites simply 
react to social facts. Likewise, individuals themselves are equally understood to 
behave rather than to act in relation to their environment. 
Within Rutter and Farrington's risk model of behaviour, people no longer make 
considered decisions before they act, but rather arc simple products of their 
environment - responding as organisms within a scientifically defined risk model of 
behaviour. As such, it is less the conscious individual who is engaged with in relation 
to his or her moral outlook, than various stimuli or 'risks' that need to be managed. 
This approach to the behaviour of both adults and children helps to explain the 
significant focus on the lives of young people, who are deterministically understood to 
be the product of their environment and relationships. 'Peer pressure', for example, as 
discussed in relation to the Hamilton curfew, is understood to be a one-sided force that 
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makes young people act antisocially. Subsequently, the 'politics of crime' itself 
becomes more about reacting to understood risk factors in childhood than a battle of 
ideas and morals within the adult population. Rather than challenging the destructive 
will of Republicans, for example, today's conservative political elite attempt to 
manage and modify the problem behaviour of children. 
This deterministic understanding of individuals, as Furedi notes, goes way beyond that 
of classical social theorists like Marx and Weber, or thinkers like Freud, Mead and 
Dewey, all of whom recognised the constraints of society and culture in forging an 
individuals identity, but equally emphasised the 'element of interaction where 
individuals could exercise a degree of individual choice, though often in 
circumstances not of their own making'. In comparison, today's model of interaction 
lias given way to an outlook where the individual is one-sidedly presented as a mere 
social product, whose action is almost never the outcome of choice, but of 
compulsion' (Furedi 2004: 124). 
Like the behaviour of the antisocial individual, the victim of antisocial behaviour is 
also understood within a more diminished framework. As discussed previously, the 
idea that people are fundamentally vulnerable has helped to inform the issue of 
antisocial behaviour. Within the definition itself, the sense of human frailty is 
introduced in the modem meaning. The original meaning of 'antisocial' made no 
reference to damage being done to the individual: indeed as noted previously, there 
was no reference to the individual within this meaning, but rather to society and the 
beliefs and morals being challenged by antisocial Republicans. Within the modem 
definition of 'antisocial', however, the victim of this behaviour is privileged - in fact, 
what it is to be antisocial is directly related to the 'annoyance and disapproval in 
others'. Antisocial behaviour, in this respect, relates less to the actions of the 
perpetrator than to the subjective experience of those on the receiving end of it. To a 
degree, even the definition that was introduced into the Oxford English Dictionary in 
1989 could be said to be somewhat out of date in relation to the significance given to 
antisocial behaviour, which is today seen as being far more damaging and 'tefforising' 
to the individuals who live amongst 'neighbours from hell' in our imagined 'yob 
culture'. 172 Taken to its extreme - an extreme which often informs political 
240 
understandings of antisocial behaviour -a more accurate definition of 'antisocial' 
would relate not to the 'annoyance' but to the 'terror' caused by this behaviour. 
With the decline in the 'social' and any positive sense of social change, the 
understanding of the individual has also been diminished and the understanding of 
their capacity and resilience to deal with conflict within everyday life has been 
weakened. This sense of individual and indeed public vulnerability is at the heart of 
the growing concern with the more petty aspects of behaviour within society. Seen 
less as actors in society than as being acted upon, today's understanding of antisocial 
behaviour relates to the object of this behaviour, rather than the subject who is acting 
in an antisocial manner. 
The understood fragility of the individual within society has helped to make 'antisocial 
behaviour' into the key political and public issue that it is today, and it has come to 
replace the more robust understanding associated within the definition of nuisance 
behaviour that preceded it. As Scott and Parker note: 
Common law nuisance is any conduct which causes "serious disturbance or 
substantial inconvenience to a ncighbour". it must be "more than "sentimental, 
speculative trivial discomfort or personal annoYance" and it should be looked 
at in the light of general social conditions in the neighbourhood (Scott and 
Parkey 1998: 328). 
However, this definition is much too robust for today's world, in which 'sentimental, 
speculative trivial discomfort or personal annoyance' are understood to be far more 
significant and damaging to individuals and to society than was previously believed. 
Nuisance behaviour in the above definition also gave some significance to the 'general 
social conditions in the neighbourhood'. More deprived neighbourhoods, for example, 
where a greater level of noise and rowdiness was more the norm, may not have had 
the same definition of 'nuisance'used within it as quieter areas. Today, however, when 
victimhood is a more generalised indeed universal framework for understanding all 
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individuals, as Garland argues (Garland 2002), then fragility and vulnerability 
becomes the bench mark for all in relation to 'antisocial behaviour'. 
This socially-constructed understanding of the 'vulnerable' is, however, not simply 
foisted upon the gullible public, but engages with a more isolated individual. The 
individual today, Bauman notes, lacks the 'solid modernity' of old and experiences 'the 
body' (or the emotional self, as will be discussed below), as 'becoming safety's last 
line of trenches, trenches which are exposed to constant enemy bombardment, or, 
which is felt to be, 'the last oasis among wind-swept moving sands' (Bauman 2000: 
183-4). 
The meaning and understanding of antisocial behaviour discussed above, despite the 
limited relation that it has with a wider moral or political understanding of social 
problems, is not valuefree. In the nineteenth century, the term antisocial emerged as a 
condemnation of radical political beliefs and actions and a defence of opposing ideals. 
Today, the focus of concern within the new definition is with behaviour seen to be a 
problem to the individual. The modem meaning of antisocial bchaviour-privilcges the 
passive recipient of the behaviour. The 'moral'weight of the term, and the legitimacy 
gained by those opposing it, comes with reference to the protection of the individual 
who is suffering at the hands of antisocial behaviour. In this respect the term antisocial 
behaviour today privileges not just the individual, but what has come to be understood 
as the individual victim The wider meaning carried by the term antisocial behaviour 
relates less to the actions of the antisocial themselves than to the reactions of the 
vulnerable individual. However, at the same time, in addressing the antisocial actor, 
he himself is understood less as a conscious active agent than as a mere product of his 
environment and the 'behaviour' of those around him. 
Within a society where a more diminished or passive subject is the expected norm, 
responsibility for antisocial actions, despite the political vilification that accompanies 
this issue, is difficult to pin upon the individual who is understood to be more an 
organism that behaves than a conscious moral subject. Likewise, where previously 
'trivial discomfort or personal annoyance' would have been understood as something 
that members of the public would be expected to resolve themselves, today it is seen 
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as a far more significant and debilitating problem - and as such is not something that 
society can expect the vulnerable public to suffer, let alone resolve. 
Therapy culture and antisocial behaviour 
Above, we have seen how the understanding of antisocial behaviour as a social 
problem has developed most significantly with the emerging understanding of the 
vulnerability of the individual in society. Psychological explanations of 'behaviour' 
have also become more influential in describing the somewhat deterministic actions of 
individuals deemed to be antisocial. Within this deterministic framework there is also 
a cyclical interpretation of this behaviour, with, for example, Farrington's research, 
which suggests that the antisocial behaviour of mothers who drink and smoke while 
pregnant will result in the creation of antisocial children (Asquith 1998: 5). 
As well as the physical damage done by antisocial mothers, even more important in 
understanding the rise in the concern with antisocial behaviour is the rise of a 
therapeutic culture that both privileges the 'emotional self but also understands the 
individual as being emotionally vulnerable and emotionally damaged. Rather than 
biological determinism, the dominant conservative understanding of humanity is 
developing around a belief in emotional determinism. 
As Lasch argued in the late 1970s: 
The contemporary climate is therapeutic, not religious. People today hunger 
not for personal salvation, let alone for the restoration of an earlier golden age, 
but for the feeling, the momentary illusion, of personal well-being, health, and 
psychic security (Lasch 1979: 7). 
Lasch believed that, 'Having displaced religion as the organizing framework of 
American culture, the therapeutic outlook threatens to displace politics as well, the last 
refuge of ideology' (Lasch 1979: 13). In the UK, the accelerated development of a 
therapeutic culture grew on the back of 'the thinning out of community attachments, 
the decline of systems of moral meaning', and was 'reinforced in the 1980s by the 
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dernise of politics and social solidarity' (Furedi 2004: 100). Subsequently, social 
problems have been increasingly recast as emotional ones. Two decades on, Lasch's 
prediction appears apposite. This does not mean, however, that politics and religion 
simply disappear, but rather that they have mutated within a therapeutic sensibility, 
with religion (and indeed politics) becoming increasingly 'new age' and focused upon 
the emotional self. 173 Even welfare, within this therapeutic climate, becomes about 
'fostering psychological as well as economic benefits'to the individual (Giddens 1998: 
117). 
This concern with the emotional well-being of the individual, however, is not simply 
of concern to the 'elites' and social institutions, but equally relates to the more fluid 
and isolated individual within society. As Bauman notes, compared to Durkheim's 
sense of individuation, which in hindsight appears to be grounded in a 'the land of 
solid modernity', today the individual and indeed 'the body' appears - in comparison 
with almost all social institutions and bonds of solidity - to be the 'last shelter and 
sanctuary of continuity and duration' (Bauman 2000: 183). However, the focus 
inwards onto the emotional self has not emerged because of structural changes in 
society, but has been encouraged by a therapeutic culture. 
This therapeutic turn not only transforms the understanding of the individual and 
society, but the in-built belief in the fragility of this emotional 'state' leads to the 
presumption of the need to protect people from an increasing array of potential harms. 
In fact, through engaging with the fragile, emotionally constituted individual within a 
culture of fear, almost all relations, with parents, peers, neighbours, workmates and so 
on have become understood as sites of harassment, harm and abuse. In this respect, 
antisocial behaviour is all around us. As insecure individuals, increasingly buried 
within our fragile emotional selves, we increasingly relate to the world as a sea of 
turbulence and inhospitality - of relationships and interactions that need to 
be 
mediated, regulated and policed. 
For Bauman, having lost the solidity of the past, liquid modernity attempts 
(unsuccessfully) to engage with and relate to the individual as a 'body' within a 
'Community', both being 'the last defensive outposts on the increasingly deserted 
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battlefield on which the war for certainty, security and safety is waged daily with 
little, if any respite' (Bauman 2000: 184). 
Through today's therapeutic culture, 'well-being', as Hoggett argues, 'is defined 
essentially in mental-health terms'. This, Furedi argues, results in the citizen being 
'transformed into a patient', and the 'private feelings of people [becoming] a subject 
matter for public policy-making and cultural concern'(Furedi 2004: 197). 
The objective measurement of 'breaking the law' is, to a degree, by-passed in an 
attempt to engage with the emotional feelings of the victim, and laws develop to 
encourage 'respect'. Part of the 'respect' offered by the state is increasingly to accept 
that if an individual 'feels' that there is a problem, then there is one. Antisocial 
behaviour subsequently becomes, not about objective actions defined as 'illegal' by 
society, but more about the subjective sense of the victim. 174 
Rather than a rise in traditional morality, within this therapeutic culture, and in 
relation to antisocial behaviour, we find a remoralisation of behaviour in relation to 
the emotional sensitivities of the public. 'Antisocial behaviour' relates less to 
conventional criminal acts - to economic damage or physical harm - than to issues 
understood to disrupt the sensibilities of the individual and the 'community. Graffiti, 
for example, may still be a problem of criminal damage, but its significance for the 
governing of communities is with the sense of disorder - felt most acutely at the level 
of the individual victim's emotional state of well-being. 175 
Even the definition of the term antisocial behaviour and the implementation of 
initiatives to tackle the problem recognise that what is deemed to be antisocial is often 
dependent upon subjective factors and interpretation. The Crime and Disorder Act 
defines antisocial behaviour as 'conduct, including speech, which has caused, or is 
likelY to cause, alarm or distress to one or more persons'. Being anti 'social' therefore, 
and somewhat ironically, relates not to wider social norms as such but more 
particularly to the impact that this behaviour has upon the feelings of vulnerable 
individuals. The correct form of behaviour for individuals is therefore predicated upon 
this concern with the 'well-being' of the vulnerable public. The wide scope for the 
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defining of what is antisocial behaviour is predicated upon the focus on the 
vulnerability of individuals - actions, taken by authorities developing accordingly to 
protect the public from such behaviour. Antisocial behaviour is therefore often 
measured in relation to the level of fear, anxiety or stress that is (or is assumed to have 
been) felt by the vulnerable public. The subjective component of the meaning of 
antisocial behaviour, coupled with the centrality of vulnerability, gives it a high level 
of flexibility and means that an ever-greater array of forms of behaviour can be 
interpreted as being antisocial. 
At the level of social policy, then, the aim in tackling antisocial behaviour is not 
connected to creating a positive sense of the 'social', but rather in allowing individuals 
to be 'liberated from fear'. The positive 'sense of community' comes about not through 
political or moral purpose and unity, but via the collection of individuals' feeling of 
safety - with this being accomplished, it is assumed, by the eradication of antisocial 
behaviour. 
Elite sense of disorder 
The issue of antisocial behaviour can be addressed at various levels. Generally it is 
understood and analysed in relation to issues of crime and the collapse of community. 
Above however, it has been situated more broadly within a focus upon the problem of 
behaviour of people more widely. 
In the previous chapters, the rise and rise of the 'social problem' of antisocial 
behaviour was also located within the political elite itself. The Politics of Behaviour, 
as the Labour NIP Frank Field argues, has indeed become a key defining aspect of 
politics in the twenty-first century, and relates not only to action that is specifically 
labelled as being 'antisocial behaviour', but incorporates myriad other forms of 
problem behaviour like bullying, staWng, binge drinking, drug taking and even 
smoking or 'irresponsible parenting' - all of which can be understood to one degree or 
another as issues of, or associated, with antisocial behaviour. 
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Antisocial behaviour is therefore an issue that, through the use of ASBOs in 
particular, relates most often to concerns with 'sink estates', 'neighbours from hcll' and 
'neds' or 'chavers'. It also, however, has a far broader remit, in that it helps frame a 
host of discussions about the behaviour and relationships between people in public 
space, workplaces and private life. In both uses it oscillates around a sense of a loss of 
social order that resonates within today's culture of fear. 
This chapter has attempted to explain why 'antisocial behaviour' has emerged as a 
significant social problem today - and also why this term itself is particularly useful 
for defining social problems as they are understood. Antisocial behaviour has been a 
term used for decades; however its significance, and indeed its very meaning, is 
historically specific and relates to the transformation of how 'society' is understood, 
and equally how the individual or subject is conceptualised within contemporary 
modernity. 
The problem of the antisocial that arose in the 1990s, while often referring to 
particular problems in 'sink' estates, also incorporates myriad forms of behaviour 
across society and in almost every 'area of life. Its centrality to politics today reflects a 
sense that people 'out there' are acting in a disorderly manner that is opposed to 
principles upon which society is constituted. However, that problems of litter and fly 
tipping, for example, have become issues of central government concern reflects a 
diminution of what 'moral' behaviour has come to mean, while equally reflecting a 
sense of fragility of the social order and the ease with which it can be disrupted. 
The concern with the antisocial in this respect reflects less the activities in question 
than the real problem of a loss of political leadership in society, and also the problem 
of the loss of a public and the capacity of the political elite to engage with and be part 
of a wider 'social will'. The disjuncture between politics and changes in society leaves 
the political elite prone to exaggerate and to see within various forms of behaviour the 
problem of the antisocial. As argued previously, in essence the concern with social 
order reflected through the discussion about antisocial behaviour represents the 
disengagement of this elite from social processes that are felt to be beyond its control. 
Beyond its control, that is, except within a more socially and politically static form of 
, 
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managerialism. that attempts to change, not the consciousness of adults, but the 
behaviour of adults and their children. In this respect, both the words antisocial and 
behaviour are particularly useful for an amoral and apolitical elite that senses disorder 
but is only able to grapple with the problem at the level of the behaviour of 
individuals. 
The term 'antisocial behaviour' today lacks specific moral or political depth and has a 
quasi-scientific psychosocial meaning. In the recent past, social problems of disorder 
were grounded in political and moral language often promoting 'traditional values'. 
The problem behaviour of the black 'mugger' who wanted 'something for nothing', for 
example, was seen as being literally alien to an alternative and morally upstanding, 
'British way of life'. Alternatively when the term antisocial was first used in the early 
nineteenth century, it was done so not with reference to 'behaviour' in the abstract, but 
to a specific political and moral outlook that was deemed to be antisocial in its 
opposition to alternative specific conservative values and beliefs. 
The more 'trivial' forms of antisocial behaviour, like noisy neighbours and young 
people hanging around, were of little significance to the Conservative government in 
the 1980s because they lacked political content: although as the collective opposition 
to the government declined, these more trivial issues of 'behaviour' - like 'lager louts', 
an issue of concern for the Conservative government in the late 1980s - began to 
become more of a focus for attention. 
As the 1990s progressed, so too did the politics of fear. Now insecurity more 
generally, outside of any specific political contest, helped inform the nature of crime 
panics, and issues of antisocial behaviour emerged more systematically. This was 
assisted by the more 'liquid' relationships between people themselves - the working 
class in particular - providing a more fluid and less stable 
basis for relationships and 
personal interaction. More fragmented, and without a 'solid' social framework for 
interacting, relationships between adults and children, for example, become more 
confused (Waiton 2001: 123). 
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Today, rather than using specific terms like 'mugger' that are 'value added', or 
defining the specific immoral beliefs underlying those being antisocial, we simply get 
'antisocial behaviour' as an ill-defined thing in itselL The term 'antisocial behaviour', 
which has grown within political discourse over the last decade, is devoid of a wider 
political, moral or even social meaning. No substantial framework for what it means 
to be 'social' - or pro-social - is reflected within this term: rather, 'moral' weight is 
given simply to the act of not being antisocial. In this respect the term antisocial 
behaviour refers not to what you should do, but rather to what you should not do. To 
be good is to be not antisocial. It is a negative concept based upon the need to prevent 
action rather than to instil an alternative belieL The limit of any positive demand 
placed upon society is confined to telling the public to be polite, to be thoughtful of 
others, and not to drop litter - mantras which sound more like what parents and 
teachers say to small children than a set of values for society. 
At the heart of government policy in the twenty-first century is not a projection of a 
moral or political framework of operation. Rather the aim is the prevention of 
incivility and the maintenance of order. Order, not disorder, is the cry, with no value 
added content. Within the language of 'risk, this reflects, like Beck's concern with the 
damaging potential of human action at a global level, government concern at a local 
and personal level of the need to prevent 'human bad' rather than to create 'human 
good'. Instead of engaging the 'energy of society' to move forward, the aim is to stop a 
static society from moving back. 'Stop being antisocial'is a cry in the dark by a hollow 
elite that no longer holds the rudder of society. 
The problem of living in a 'moral vacuum', as Tony Blair described it following the 
James Bulger killing, is thus overcome not by filling the vacuum with an alternative 
moral code or through social meaning, but by sidestepping this ideological problem 
and reposing the issue as one of individual incivility - or of 'antisocial behaviour,. 
With the decline of the welfare 'dream' (Pitts 1988: 26) - social policy has developed 
with a lack of purpose to directly regulate the behaviour of the fragmented public. 
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The problem of 'antisocial behaviour'as it is understood today is a direct reflection of 
the diminution of the political will. 
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The rise of concern within the political elite with 'antisocial behaviour', especially 
post-1993, arose not because of a rise in morality, but the opposite -a decline in the 
sense of moral or political purpose. Indeed the strength of the term 'antisocial 
behaviour' is not only in its flexibility but also in its lack of moral and political 
specificity that could lead to dissent and opposition. To say that someone is antisocial 
in the 1980s would have had little political meaning, as the question would have 
related to competing views of, for example, the militant striker and the black mugger. 
In effect, to use the term antisocial behaviour at this time would have required an 
association with a particular morally or politically reprehensible actor - the antisocial 
behaviour 'of muggers' or 'of demonstrators'. The acceptance of what 'antisocial 
behaviour' was, at this time, was contested, as were the labels associated with them - 
such as mugger (Hall 1978). 
The term 'antisocial behaviour' could only become a generalised term to describe a 
loss of social order once ideological points of opposition were lost and when 
everybody agreed that 'order' was a good thing and that there was a problem of 
disorder. 177 
Divorced of wider meaning, concern about 'antisocial behaviour' within a culture of 
fear was given legitimacy by the amoral panics and concern about abusive individuals, 
relationships and criminal behaviour that emerged within sections of the left and 
feminist thought in the 1980s. Left and right were increasingly in agreement that there 
was indeed a problem of behaviour in society, with New Labour most fervently giving 
expression to the sense that this problem behaviour was reflected in the 'loss of a sense 
of community'. Like the loss of opposition, especially in political life, to the problem 
of crime, the 'social problem' of antisocial behaviour has faced few opponents. 
In the same way that the term antisocial has become more significant, the 
problematisation of and the use of the term behaviour could only become more central 
to political discourse once the purposeful action of individuals was no longer linked to 
moral or political values - or more precisely to the question of consciousness and 
beliefs. Rather than acting, today's diminished subject is understood to be reacting. 
Rather than acting immorally, people have syndromes, addictions and rage. In the past 
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only children misbehaved - adults acted immorally. Today the distinction has been 
diminished and individuals of all ages are increasingly judged on their good 
behaviour. The understanding of actions across society, as forms of behaviour, 
represents the infantilisation of the subject. 
With the increasing focus on behaviour rather than beliefs, the logical necessity for 
government is to direct ever more attention onto the lives and relationships of 
children: the paediatrician rather than the politician becorning the key player in the 
creation of a non-antisocial society. 
Farrington's influential developmental criminology incorporates many of the concerns 
of underclass theorists while incorporating structural factors within the 'grab-bag' term 
of psychosocial risk factors, thus giving an appropriately neutral and apparently 
scientific explanation of antisocial behaviour. 178 This approach is particularly 
appropriate today, with its emphasis upon things done to you, especially as a child, 
which are beyond your control. Whether the antisocial adult's behaviour has been 
genetically, emotionally or structurally determined, this determinism of humanity 
represents the actions of antisocial adults and children alike as being semi-conscious 
and set in stone. Farrington's methodology of examining what happened to individuals 
in the past to explain their actions in the present reflects well the cultural sense of 
powerlessness - which is itself a reflection of the political sense of powerlessness felt 
by the political elite. The future within this model is not made by conscious action but 
has already been made and ingrained within our behaviour, behaviour that stems from 
our damaged past. 
Conclusion 
Historically, then, the recent preoccupation with 'antisocial behaviour' has come very 
much with the politicisation of this term, based on a more generalised concern with 
order and the location of this problem at the level of individual behaviour that is 
experienced by the vulnerable public. 
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The growth in the use the term antisocial behaviour in recent years is a reflection of 
the increasing development of policies aimed at preventing antisocial behaviour in 
society and especially on working class estates. However, lacking a political or social 
component, it is unlikely that the sense of the problem of disorder and fear that grips 
the political elite and to a degree the public themselves will be dissipated. The attempt 
to develop state legitimation in relation to antisociai behaviour initiatives therefore 
appears to be highly problematic, as in the very use of this relatively 'value free' term 
the problem of a lack of social meaning which underpins the sense of disorder remains 
unresolved. Indeed the focus upon the problem of social order at the level of 
problematic individual behaviour has helped to create a spiral of concern with ever- 
more forms of antisocial behaviour, which can only develop further as the state 
continues to relate to the public in relation to its sense of vulnerability. 
The term antisocial behaviour has ultimately emerged and grown in significance in 
recent years with the increasing sense of social disorder within the depoliticised 
political elite and also within the individuated public. The rise and rise of the social 
problem of antisocial behaviour is a reflection of this loss of politics and the 
subsequent exponential increase in the 'politics of behaviour'. 
Social problems are rarely just myths that have no basis in society, and many of the 
problems related to via ASBOs and other antisocial behaviour initiatives like the 
Hamilton curfew connect with 'real' concerns. However, the issue of antisocial 
behaviour also contains a metaphorical dimension. For an elite that lacks even the 
capacity or will to 'dream of world power, there remains the problem of its inability to 
engage the public in defining and enforcing 'social' order at home -a problem that can 
only remain when any attempt to morally uplift or civilise the public has been 
abandoned. Whether antisocial behaviour were increasing or not, there would remain, 
for the political elite and to a degree the public, a sense that we were all living in a, 
'sea of turbulence' (Bauman 2000: 13). 
Finally, one of the ironies with the growing preoccupation with issues of antisocial 
behaviour is that, despite the repeated concern with a loss of respect and responsibility 
in society, through the more therapeutic forms of intervention values related to the 
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emotions of the individual themselves further relativise ideas of moral right, while 
diminishing the idea of individual personal responsibility. In a world of vulnerable 
individuals, a call for 'respect' amounts to little more than a demand that we be nice to 
everyone, just in case we undermine someone's self esteem. 
As Sommers and Satel note: 
Therapism tends to regard people as essentially weak, dependent, and never 
altogether responsible for what they do. Alan Wolfe, a Boston College 
sociologist and expert on national mores and attitudes, reports that for many 
Americans nonjudgementalism has become a cardinal virtue. Concepts of right 
and wrong, good and evil, are often regarded as anachronistic and intolerant. 
"Thou shalt be nice" is the new categorical imperative. (Sommers and Satel 
2005: 6) 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Societies that are able to project a positive vision of the future do not need to 
employfear as a currency in public life (Furedi 2005: 134). 
Three key developments in society have been examined in this thesis: the relationship 
between the individual and the state, expressed through the relationship between the 
public and the political elite; the development of amoral rather than moral panics; and 
the nature of the individual being constructed through the prism of vulnerability and 
diminished subjectivity. 
The changing relationship between the state and the individual is one that, in essence, 
has been depoliticised and demoralised. The political elite's inability to engage the 
public with a wider set of values has resulted in a new form of 'public' engagement at 
the level of the individual, expressed most clearly in the rise of the therapeutic and 
highly regulatory 'politics of behaviour'. 
This development has undermined moral panics, as the capacity to promote absolute 
moral - or indeed political - values, has declined. in the place of moral panics, what 
has been described as a form of amoral anxiety has arisen -a more permanent and 
universal form of anxiety that engages people as fragmented individuals through 
issues of safety. 
Central to these developments has been the changing nature of the individual and the 
emergence of a more diminished form of subjectivity. This cultural development has 
material roots in the decline of ideologies, of collective organisations and institutional 
practices, and has been reinforced by the self-limiting subjective outlook within 
contemporary modernity. With vulnerability and an 'at risk' framework becoming a 
cultural norm, despite calls for 'responsibility', the exp&tations society places on 
individuals has in reality declined. 
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The outcome of this process - seen clearly through the example of the Hamilton 
curfew - is that the meaning of rights has been transformed from a promotion of 
freedom and forms of action by individuals, to a form of protection of individuals by 
the state. Likewise the meaning of responsibility has been widened but, more 
significantly, weakened, as personal safety and feelings of safety come to represent 
the highest form of responsible behaviour. Ultimately, by organising society around 
the conservative amoral theme of safety, the communities in Hamilton, and indeed 
more generally across the UK, remain fragmented and have been made more passive 
and reliant upon third party intervention. 
Permanently disconnected 
By engaging with individuals' fears, the modem political elite has been able to tap 
into the broad sense of insecurity in society, but this new 'morality' of safety lacks the 
capacity to connect people with a wider sense of meaning. Rather this development 
has helped to reinforce the disconnection that exists between people today and so 
. ntain the cultural climate that encourages a sense of fear. 
We live in a world of panics, but not a world of moral panics. Attempts to promote 
traditional morality do not lie at the heart of modem-day panics and anxieties. Rather 
it is the collapse of a coherent web of meaning once provided by morals and by 
secular 'religions' - or politics - that explains the rise of amoral panics. 
Today, through the amoral absolute of safety, the political elite is bypassing any 
attempt to reconstitute a web of social meaning that binds people together. Instead it 
engages with the more fragmented public and intervenes on its behalf to manage the 
behaviour of individuals. 
A sense of social meaning has historically related to religion and later to secular 
'religions' of the right and left - nationalism and socialism in particular - and 
has been 
supported by major institutions and organisations that enjoyed widespread public 
support. The rise of democracy, of politics and of competing systems of belief has, for 
the last two centuries, helped frame the lives of individuals but also the outlook of the 
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political elite. Whether based on tradition or a more radical belief in the future, this 
sense of social meaning upheld an ideal that gave a certain sense of purpose to the 
elite and the public alike. It is the loss of this sense of purpose on both the left and 
right that has resulted in a society that is not only more prone to panic, but which has 
institutionalised the anxiety expressed within these panics. 
As we observed earlier, in previous times panics about crime and youth crime in 
particular were often counteracted by significant elite individuals and groups, like 
Baden Powell, or the Conservative Home Secretary Henry Brooke, due in part to the 
sense of purpose felt by the elite itself. So long as those running society felt able to 
engage the 'energy of society' - or indeed the energy of youth - in a project to 
4 civilize', social problems could be addressed -within this positive sense of social 
progress. But having lost this sense of meaning and purpose, the directionless political 
elite has developed a tendency to panic and today aims to simply conserve things and 
to regulate society more directly. 
Without a system of meaning with which to direct social processes and include the 
public, institutions across society backed up by myriad social policy initiatives have 
instead attempted to engage with the individual through the micro-politics of 
behaviour. Rather than reconnecting individuals with a social project, the role of 
politics has become the management of everyday life as an end in itself. 
Fragmentation within society, coupled with a growing distance between individuals 
and any system of social meaning, has resulted in a more insecure and anxious 
electorate emerging. Consequently individual safety has become the more limited goal 
for society and one that the political elite has both engaged with and encouraged. With 
new laws and initiatives like the Hamilton curfew, the fragmented individual is in 




Significant long-term trends helped to stimulate the emergence of recent moral panics 
that grew out of the 1960s and also resulted in the amoral safety panics of the late 
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1980s and 1990s. Discussions of the End of Ideology (Bell 1962) and the End of 
Utopia (Jacoby 1999)179 give some insight into the decline of the 'great' ideologies 
associated with the left and right that have in part led to the various panic reactions in 
post-war Western societies. These broader theoretical considerations have been 
somewhat beyond the remit of this thesis but have informed its development. 
However, these 'trends' do not have a life of their own, but have been implemented 
and given concrete expression by a variety of claimsmakers and activists who have 
helped to create and recreate new crimes and new social problems over the last two 
decades. 
Most significantly, issues labelled as forms of antisocial behaviour have emerged 
within the major political parties particularly from the early 1990s, as politics moved 
from an engagement with the social or a belief in the individual subject. Rather than 
representing opposite ends of a political spectrum of left and right, the decline of 
social or collective beliefs and institutions has seen the simultaneous decline or 
diminution of the active subject as the basis for social life and government policy 
initiatives. Micro-politics has developed with an increasing rapidity to manage the 
behaviour of individuals, replacing the ideological political battle for the conscious 
support of the public. A fight over the beliefs of adults through the promotion of 
morals and politics has subsequently been replaced by an attempt to manage the 
emotions and behaviour of adults and especially children and young people. 
'Realism' emerged on the left and the right in the 1970s and 1980s, giving expression 
to the idea that 'there is no alternative' to what already exists in society. Within 
criminology, the belief in the capacity of society to overcome crime was abandoned, 
and through the left realist and feminist promotion of the defence of 'vulnerable 
groups', crime control was given a radical edge and began to be a priority issue for 
Labour councils. More generally, the 'victim' became a new cultural icon at this time, 
helped by both right-wing but especially left-wing thinkers, whose role became one of 
an advocate for newly discovered victims in society. The significance of the 'done-to 
victim' could only fully emerge as a dominant understanding of people when the 
active engagement of political subjects was no longer relevant to public life. From the 
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early 1990s a new relationship was consequently established within politics, in local 
authorities and unions, with a newly understood vulnerable public. 
Whatever the changes in the 'antisocial behaviour' of the public, the rise in the 
concern with individual behaviour was predicated upon this transformation in the 
public and within politics - something that was given added weight by the radical and 
realist claimsmakers of victims of crime and antisocial behaviour. A wider cultural 
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sense of fear emerged with the political and social changes of the time, but was 
engaged with at the individual level of problem behaviour - especially on working 
class estates. 
Within this framework, social problems in the 1990s were increasingly understood 
with reference to individual 'behaviour', rather than to social or structural factors or to 
an understanding of the 'conscious action' of the individual. Predicated on a more 
static and conservative outlook about both society and the individual, risk factors 
discovered by psychological criminologists like Farrington helped to develop a 
framework for intervention into community and family life. This more behavioural 
and deterministic approach to individual and community development was influential 
at the time of the election of the New Labour government and the introduction of the 
Hamilton curfew. Attempting to manage risk factors, this academic and 'scicntiric' 
approach to antisocial behaviour sat comfortably with the shift in politics to manage 
the behaviour of individuals outside of a moral or political framework: managing risks 
and providing safety for the public being the 'ultimate liberty' on offer from the 
government. 
Creating safe communities 
The election of the Labour Government in 1997, which preceded the introduction of 
the Hamilton Child Safety Initiative, brought a new Prime Minister to power who had 
cut his teeth on the slogan of fighting crime and the causes of crime. Creating safer 
communities was something that could relate to a more fragmented and insecure 
public, but was not part of a wider ideology or social movement - rather it was the 
result of a loss of one. 
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In the curfew-targeted area of Hillhouse, local people were 'involved' and had their 
voice made public through media campaigns, phone-in polls and council-run surveys. 
In the Citizens' Jury set up with council support, run by professional facilitators 
around a pre-set agenda of community safety, a handful of local people were 
encouraged to 'participate' in a process that in the end was not of their making. The 
resulting curfew initiative had not been the idea of this jury, as was claimed by the 
local MP, nor did the people of Hillhouse feel any great sense of ownership or even 
understanding of what was taking place. Rather than the demands of local people 
being reflected as a public voice through their political representatives, consultants, 
pollsters and facilitators were employed to help give the local politicians a sense of 
what local people wanted. 
That a Citizens' Jury was felt to be needed by the Labour-run South Lanarkshire 
Council to relate to the public gives a sense of the loss of connection between politics 
and 'citizens' at this time. The 'old' Labour Party was a mass political organisation 
that grew out of the labour movement with a socialist ideology and helped create the 
welfare state. New Labour, by comparison, had neither a vision thing, nor a 
Movement. Contrasting a time when politicians had a sense of future possibilities, 
Furedi notes how Roosevelt's New Deal speech came with the famous statement that 
the 'only thing we have to fear is fear itself (Furedi 2005: 135). How different a 
world of politics from that of the Hamilton curfew, where the only thing it appeared 
that politicians could engage with was, in fact, fear itself. 
The Hamilton curfew was a panic reaction to what were unexceptional troubles on a 
working class estate in Scotland - but a panic that was able to tap into the insecurities 
of local people. Without a wider sense of purpose or social meaning, New Labour 
nationally and locally engaged with people's fears through the value of safety - with 
rights, responsibilities, freedom, liberty and what it meant to be a good citizen or even 
parent all relating to this new amoral absolute. 
Despite claims that community safety initiatives would help to rebuild communities, 
in Hillhouse there was no sense of this developing - indeed with the emphasis on 
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awareness-raising about the variety of risks facing adults, young people and children 
in the area, it was perhaps unsurprising that fear within the community was not 
dissipated. Rather than people being reconnected with one another, the curfew did the 
opposite, by promoting a new etiquette of safety based on the suspicion and fear of 
other people in the area. 
Rights and Responsibilities 
The issue of antisocial behaviour has elevated the significance of generally non- 
criminal offences into a key social problem for communities and society more 
generally. In part this represents an attempt to create a more legally-based form of 
regulation of relationships between people, an enforced code of conduct. Introduced at 
a time when a wider system of meaning in society that helped to direct relationships 
between people had been lost, antisocial behaviour and community safety initiatives 
replicated in public space the codes of conduct and harassment codes that had been 
introduced in workplaces. As health and safety at work and in union practice, for 
example, moved from a collective form of protection of the workforce from 
employers towards a protection of workers from one another and from the public, so 
community safety initiatives developed to regulate the conflicts between individuals in 
communities (Wainwright and CaInan 2002: 143). Both developments reflected to 
some extent the. more distant relationships between individuals and a loss of a sense of 
solidarity: however, by developing practices predicated upon the assumed 
vulnerability of people, third party intervention increasingly became the norm and a 
more limited expectation of individuals was institutionalised. 
In Hamilton, the Child Safety initiative was promoted as a defence of people's rights, 
yet the meaning of 'rights' was here downgraded and came to mean the protection of 
individuals from those around them. The 'right to a quiet life' in practice meant the 
right of adults to phone the police if young people were hanging around the streets and 
the responsibility of young people and parents to others in the community was to 'be 
quiet'. In essence a code of conduct was promoted in Hamilton predicated on the 
understanding that communities were being undermined by fear generated by young 
people out at night - and also predicated on the assumption that adults could not and 
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should not attempt to resolve these problems themselves. Indeed even the question of 
child safety was understood to be an issue that the community had no active role in 
resolving. 
Since the curfew was introduced, a raft of new laws and initiatives have developed to 
regulate further the relationships between people on estates across the UK, with the 
development of community wardens, for example, potentially leading to a serni- 
permanent mediation service between people. Labour MP Frank Field, disillusioned 
with the state of parenting in society, has ultimately proposed that the police should 
become surrogate parents and take a more direct role in the regulation of children's 
bad behaviour (Field 2003). As the expectation of adults to act to resolve problems 
themselves declines -a development that is encouraged by these new safety initiatives 
an increasing burden is placed upon the police to become the creators of 
community' or even the responsible parents of the future. 
However, despite the talk of rights and responsibility by Labour politicians like Field, 
this development should be seen as a relinquishing of political responsibility by the 
political elite, which has given up on developing a framework of social meaning that 
can reconnect individuals. As problems have become understood to relate to 
individual relationships, so too have the solutions to these problems. However, rarely, 
if ever, is there an expectation that individuals can resolve problems themselves, and 
consequently a framework of reliance has been established in the last decade between 
the public and state institutions that both encourages a more passive engagement with 
society and communities. 
The experience of antisocial behaviour 
Finally, an area of interest that this thesis has said little about directly is why antisocial 
behaviour is such a major concern for individuals themselves. Why do the issues 
raised by the government - of graffiti, rowdiness and incivility of youth connect so 
much with the public? Here, by incorporating the themes addressed so far, a brief 
attempt is made to answer this question. 
261 
Following the 2005 general election, Prime Minister Tony Blair launched the 'respect 
agenda', which elevated the significance, not simply of antisocial behaviour, but of 
politeness, as a serious social problem. Within this thesis the emphasis has been 
placed on analysing the political elite and clainismakers who have helped to construct 
the problem of antisocial behaviour, but as was noted in relation to the Hamflton 
curfew, support for community safety initiatives amongst the public is high. Indeed as 
Squires notes, by 2004 Labour election co-ordinators were of the opinion that 
antisocial behaviour was the number one issue on the doorsteps (Squires and Stephen 
2005). But why is this? 
At a broad cultural level, the climate of political cynicism, which has seen the fall in 
voter turn-out, the huge decline in party political activists (Heartfield 2002: 202), and 
the development of these parties as some of the least trusted organisations in society 
(MORI 2001), has helped to create a climate of pessimism about the future and a 
diminished sense of collective and also individual possibilities. As Furedi argues, the 
significance of the collapse of politics reflects not simply a form of apathy on an 
otherwise healthy civil society, but rather: Cynicism and suspicion towards politics 
ultimately represents cynicism and suspicion towards one another' (Furedi 2005: 2). 
This 'cynicism and suspicion' of others has resulted, for example, in the increasing 
concern amongst parents and grandparents about 'what the future will be for our 
children'. Part of the more pessimistic view about life for the next generation has 
come from an increased fear of crime and antisocial behaviour that is understood to be 
blighting children's future (Barnardos 1995a). But this fear has also resulted in a more 
negative image of young people themselves, an image that preoccupies the 
imagination both here and abroad. A recent survey on public attitudes to youth and 
youth crime in Scotland, for example, found that despite the statistical fall in youth 
crime, of those interviewed 69% believed that youth crime had increased and only 2% 
believed it had fallen. 180 Describing the misanthropic outlook towards young people in 
the US and the fear of 'violent youth', Zimring notes that: 
A modest expansion in the size of the youth population is regarded as 
unqualified bad news. It is never alleged that more than a small proportion of 
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this population will be involved in serious criminality, but this is the only 
subject to be considered in congressional debate. From this perspective, an 
entire generation of future adolescents is considered to be bad news, so that the 
larger the size of the cohort, the bigger the social and government problems 
will result (Zimring 2000: 179). 
This more cynical and pessimistic sense of the future has arguably transformed the 
way young people in particular are understood - as without a positive sense of social 
meaning and developing possibilities, the lives of the future generation comes to be 
seen as more directionless and out of control. In the past, when there was a greater 
understanding of where young people would fit into society and also what the role of 
adults was in this process (Furlong and Cartmel 1997: 110), a more relaxed attitude 
was taken to forms of behaviour that are today seen as being antisocial. Without a 
sense of social progress or a view of the future, the trend in politics and society more 
generally has been to lose the optimistic belief that young people will 'grow out of 
crime' (Squires and Stephen 2005: 21), or that their energy will be harnessed in 
socially useful ways - within the workplace, by 'serving their country' or in looking 
after themselves and their family. Even the language used to describe young boys and 
men in particular has changed, as 'mischievous' and 'boisterous' behaviour has 
become reclassified as aggressive and antisocial, while being tough and assertive has 
become 'macho' and 'abusive'. 
In a society that lacks a positive vision of the future, and is preoccupied with 
preventing harm rather than creating good, the 'bad behaviour' of young people has 
become exaggerated as a social problem. It is not the behaviour of young people itself 
that has necessarily changed, but that within this more pessimistic cultural climate the 
image of the 'antisocial yob' has become a metaphorfor a loss of social control in a 
society that lacks direction andpurpose. 
'Behaviour' is a big issue today, both in politics and on the street, but whatever the 
problem of misbehaving youth, the sense that all young people are running wild is 
exaggerated. However, the problem of behaviour is real, not in the way it is often 
understood - with young people simply being seen as 'yobs' - but rather in terms of a 
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breakdown in the informal relationships between members of the public and in 
particular between adults and young people. 
The public has become disconnected from society, and from the myriad institutions 
within it, but they have also become disconnected from one another. The informal 
rules that help people to navigate their day-to-day encounters have broken down, 
leaving people more anxious and unsure about how to respond to one another. People 
may still have a sense of what is right and wrong, but the rules of the game can no 
longer be taken for granted. Adults are no longer sure if they should intervene to 
regulate young people's behaviour, nor are they clear about whether or not they 
should help a distressed child. 
Today the sense of right and wrong has become more fragmented. Parents may each 
have concerns about issues of antisocial behaviour, but when problems of their own 
child's behaviour are brought to their attention by neighbouring adults they are more 
inclined to defend the child than back. the adult. The more privatised nature of the 
family has assisted this development, but the awkwardness adults feel in relating to 
young people today has also been reinforced by the developing 'politics of behaviour'. 
Through the myriad community safety initiative over the last ten to 15 years the 
message has been sent out that the regulation of young people is no longer an 
expected role for adults. The more distant relationship this encourages between the 
generations has also been encouraged by the concerns over child safety. The 
recognition amongst both the adults and children in Hillhouse for example that 
children should not talk to strangers, expressed well the framework of distrust that has 
developed in communities - something that has been encouraged through the 
promotion of child safety both at a local and national level. The result of this 
development has led to what is today being described as a walk on by society, where 
adults turn away from children who need help, unsure what others might think if they 
dare to lend a hand. 
Society may be more fragmented, but this fragmentation and disconnection between 
people has been facilitated by the child and community safety industry that has both 
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physically and mentally lubricated this process of dislocation. The message being sent 
out to communities today, is that it is the job of professionals rather than local adults 
to engage with, discipline or even care for the children in your area. 
Outside of children in your immediate family, it is no longer clear what the role of 
adults should be in relation to young people and their rnisbehaviour. ' Given this 
situation, when young people are 'antisocial', it is not simply the behaviour itsetr 
which wefind so upsetting but our own sense of impotence and confusion about what 
our role as adults should be. 
Adults, perhaps more than at any other time, are concerned about young people's 
behaviour and support, even demand, something be done about it. But at the same 
time - there is little expectation within the adult population itself that they should be 
involved in regulating this behaviour. The result is that adults and young people have 
become disconnected from one another, while informal relationships are formalised. 
CCTV cameras on estates have increasingly become the technical way to watch over 
young people, replacing the watchful gaze of even the old 'curtain twitcher', while 
troublesome young people are given behaviour contracts by the police rather than 
being socialised through spontaneous encounters with adults. Where adults do 
intervene they often do it alone, receiving little support from those around them, and 
frequently decide that next time they will leave it to someone else. With little support 
from one another, potential confrontation with young people's parents, and 
discouragement from the authorities to get involved, the active men and women of 
conununities are a dying breed. 
Given this situation, this vacuum of adult authority, it is likely that the behaviour of 
young people will become less predictable and potentially more problematic. Thus the 
cry that 'something must be done' by the authorities gets ever louder, and the 
breakdown of informal relationships spirals ever downwards. 
Finally, the pressures on adults not to 'get involved' when young people misbehave 
also helps to raise the level of anxiety about antisocial behaviour. Because by not 
acting to resolve these problems, we undermine our own sense of adulthood. People 
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feel both anxious 'and frustrated today, not only at the young people who misbehave, 
but also with themselves because they have relinquished responsibility for something 
they sense they should be able to sort out. What individuals e-rperience from their 
inaction in relation to axiwial behaviour is a sense of their own diminished 
subjectivigy. 
Ultimately, the loss of connection between people is a significant problem today - but 
one that is rarely addressed politically. Politicians and local authorities feel more 
comfortable tapping into the public sense of fear and insecurity and do so through 
Promoting safety campaigns and launching cvCr-more antisocial behaviour initiatives. 
However. the result of this is that it reinforces a sense that young people are indeed 
Out of control and it further discourages adults from having anything to do with these 
Young people. Today's antisocial behaviour initiatives send out the message that it is 
the role of the police, of the housing department, or of community wardens, to deal 
with Youngsters, rather than local adults. This both promotes passivity and literally 
helps to reduce still further the contact that different generations have with one 
another. 
Future Research 
As the thesis 'goes to press'. a report by the Institute of Public Policy Research has 
been printed (Margo and Dixon 2006). Making the headlines on a number of issues, 
two key points made in this research relate to the findings that British adults are both 
4 scared of young people' and that compared with their European counterparts, they are 
less likely to intervene when they see teenagers misbehaving. The research in 
Hamilton Provided some evidence of this. The argument made here has been that in 
effect the community safety initiatives developed from the mid 1990s have actually 
encouraged this 'walk on by' approach by adults. However, a weaknes§ of the 
research in Hillhouse was that relatively few adults and'especially parents, were 
interviewed. What were their thoughts about the child safety message, did they 
intervene in their community, and if not why not? it appears in retrospect that despite 
the focus of the curfew app=ring to be on young people, perhaps more significantly it 
was Parents and parenting that was central to the Child Safety Initiative. With the 
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focus on young people. in tmm of interviews, the voice of the adults in the area wcre 
]relatively underdeveloped here. 
As antisocial behaviour initiatives and child safety issues become further 
institutionalised, more researcb is needed into the understanding that adults have of 
themselves and their role in their communities and especially with children and young 
people. 
Conclusion 
Many of the trends identified in the thesis related to the Hamilton curfew in 1997 have 
developed and become more pronounced today. Antisocial behaviour has become an 
increasingly significant political issue, and as crime figures fall and the fear of crime 
remains high. the focus on antisocial behaviour has intensified further. The search for 
the elusive cause of fear in society is drifting ever downwards onto the minutiae of 
everyday life and relationships between people. 7be promotion of the 'politics of 
behaviour, (Blears, 2004). which in the recent past would have been more problematic, 
is now becoming an accepted and indeed promoted role for government, with how and 
where People smoke and drink. or what they eat, for example, increasingly understood 
to be a lcgitinwe political issue of public safety and individual responsibility. 
MC-anIhile the police - an organisation that today has far greater public legitimacy 
than Political Parties (MORI 2001: 12) - has become more relied upon to resolve an 
increasing array of social issues. As the Guardian editorial commented in relation to 
the Dimbleby L-ecture by Sir Ian Bell, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, in 
November 2005, 'policing may once have been marginal to much ordinary life, but 
today it is closer to the ccntre' (Guardian 17 November 2005). Developments that 
would Previously have been understood as a move towards a police state are today 
endorsed by even liberal newspapers and acaden-ýics, as fear becomes an accepted 
framework for political actiotL 
In the case of the Hamilton curfew. it was noted that despite there being some real 
issues regarding young people's behaviour in the area. in general the fear expressed by 
local People was less to do with any particular safety issues than with a more 
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generalised sense of insecurity: a sentiment that led to a high level of support for the 
community safety initiatives being introduced. Fear of young people and fear for 
children were both significant issues promoted and engaged with at this time. Since 
1997 when Labour came into power, the engagement with fear has become 
normalised and institutionalised to such an extent that the culture of fear is today even 
more ingrained in everyday life. Antisocial Behaviour Orders are being used at an 
accelerated rate, institutionalising the more therapeutic protection of the public, not 
from crime, but from anything that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 dcrincd as being, 
'likely to cause harassment alarm or distress'. Local radio stations in Scotland today 
advertise antisocial behaviour laws to encourage people to use these new powers, and 
sound no more out of place than an advert for cereal or washing powder, while new 
rules under Disclosure Scotland'81 introduce, with the support of public sector unions, 
ever-more intrusive forms of vetting of adults working with young people. 
Safety is today's amoral absolute and the modem framework for the state to relate to 
individuals and communities. But rather than communities being developed, they arc 
being further undermined by this process. A key to the creation of communities at a 
local level is the development of relationships between adults and children, and the 
experience of bringing up the next generation of adults. Unfortunately, the more 
society is organised around fear and safety, the more fragmented and distrusting will 
these communities become, creating A truly antisocial society. 
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Notes 
'Seethe Guidance on Crime and DisorderAct. local child curfiews(1998). 2 For an over-view of this period see Joel Best's Deviance: The Career of a Concept (2004). 3 The trend towards 'radicals' accepting the social problem of crime developed with feminist writers in 
the 1970s followed by New Realists in the 1980s. However, it was not until the 1990s that the 'social 
problems' of both crime and especially antisocial behaviour became mainstrcam. This topic is 
addressed further in Chapter 5. 
4 The British Crime Survey was initially seen as an alternative source of information of crime and has 
over time become increasingly used in tandem with the official crime statistics to give a more accurate 
picture of crime in the UK. (See a review of the BCS in the British Journal of Criminology 1984. Vol. 
24, ppl95-205). 
5 Jenkins, in his critique of official crime statistics, argues that 'the first thing to say is that police 
statistics are totally useless, either as a true record of crime or as a measure of its movement over time. 
They are simply a record of police station activity' (Jenkins 1994: 83). 6 See also Coleman and Moynihan (1996). 7 See also Bob Holman's Children and Crime: How Can Society Tum Back the Tide of Delinquency 
(1995), a tide of delinquency that the leftwing Holman finds to be contradicted by the same conviction 
statistics. 
8 See also Cohen's Images of Deviance (1971), Jock Young's The Druglakers (1971) and Ian and 
Laurie Taylor's Politics and Deviance (1973). 9 Until 1997 the Labour Party had never made law and order a central part of their general election 
manifestos. See Downes and Morgan (1997). 10 Ile problems of 'harassment and abuse, for example, that have often been highlighted within 
feminist research, are central to the definition of antisocial behaviour. 11 The seriousness with which 'antisocial behaviour' of young people is taken today suggests that the 
use of the term 'mischief to describe these petty misdemcanours will. if it hasn't already, become 
obsolete. 
12 See the Antisocial Behaviour Acts in both Scotland (2004) and the England and Wales (2003). 13 In a local area of Airdrie, for example, L6 million was set aside for community safety work by the 
council, targeted at a population of fewer than 10,000 people. 
14 Beck's 'Risk Society' is different to O'Malley and Simon's, being more 'real' as opposed to a 
developing 'technology of power'. However, here the idea of risk is highlighted more generally to 
illustrate the changing analysis of society that situates risk and risk management at its heart, which 
elevates concerns about events that have often yet to occ&. 15 'Outsiders' are defined by Best as those groups of claimsmakcrs outside of the main political and 
social institutions of society (Best 1993). 16 Also see Rose (1999). 17 In the Guardian 19 January 2006, for example, the children's commissioner for England argued that 
the problem of disorder was not about young people not showing respect but was in fact a problem 
created because adults do not show young people enough respect. 18 Here the notion of victimisation is used to depict the understanding and representation of all of the 
affected groups in the curfew-targeted areas as victims. 19 The idea of 'cotton wool kids' refers to concerns about the ovcr-protected and limited nature of 
children's lives and free time, concerns that have been explored in detail through various publications 
and research projects. See for examp . le Hillman, Adams and Whitcleg (1990). 
20 Cohen's work on Mods and Rockers was developed from labelling theory that emerged in the USA in 
the fifties and sixties (Lemert 1951; Becker 1991(originally printed in 1963)). Labelling theory, rather 
than taking the deviant as a given by his actions and studying this, looked at how the very process of 
labelling came about, and what impact labelling an individual or group had on the accused. 21 This, he argued, in the 1960s was something felt most acutely by the lower middle class, as the 'work 
ethic' was seen to be displaced amongst the young by a 'New Hedonism' (1978: 157). 
22 Many on the right attacked extremists. demonstrators, squatters, black power activists and student 
radicals. Militant trade unionists were also attacked and new laws like the Industrial Relations Act 
introduced. The demonstration against this act was depicted at the time as a demonstration of rowdies 
and anarchists 'promoting the downfall of law and order' (1978: 284). 
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23 Explaining how society 'creates' deviance, Becker notes that'social groups make deviance by making 
the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and 
labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not the quality of the act the person 
commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an "offender"' 
(Becker 1991: 9). 
24 This form of social constructionism, known as contextual constructionism, will be used within this 
thesis. For a discussion about the conflicting methods of strict and contextual constructionists. see 
ýp! c_ tor and Kitsuse (1987) and Best (1990: 189) 
See for example Thompson's Moral Panic (1998), where panics are understood to be generated by 
traditional conservative moralists, and also where 'safety' based panics like the 'safe sex' campaign are 
understood more as a justifiable response to a real social problem than as a new form of panic. 26 Ile interest group theory has been developed most in the USA, due. Thompson believes, to existing 
fields of research in this country around social movements and collective behaviour studies. "csc 
social movements are defined as those groups that do not have the influence of established pressure 
groups and therefore, in part, because they need to attract attention to their issue of concern, are prone 
to present these concerns in terms of outrage and moral indignation (Thompson 1998: 19). 
27 The defence of tradition - and particularly the notion of a national tradition - is explicit within these 
statements and have been part of the conservative outlook in Britain since the French Revolution. See 
for example Edmond Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1999). 
28 Like the underclass, single parents and muggers. 29 See Knife Culture? Cut the Crap (http: //www. spiked-online. con-JArticics/OOOOOOOCA825. htm). 
30 See Beck in Lash's Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a new ecology (1996). 
31 The concern with social control as the aim for social policy and political interventions is expressed 
clearly by leading sociologist and New Labour adviser Anthony Giddcns, in his book The Third Way. 
Giddens' concern for social order is reflected in his proposals, which lose any principle and become 
simple pragmatic judgements about the best way to maintain order in society. Mcritocracy, for example 
is discussed in wholly negative terms and is questioned because of its potentially dcstabilising impact 
on 'social cohesion' (1998: 102). 
32 The idea of cotton-wool kids relates to children who are over-protectcd by their parents. 
33 This helps in part to understand the notion of 'paranoid parenting'. and the strength of the amoral 
absolute of child safety, discussed in later chapters. 
34 Although, as will be discussed later, what is meant by responsibility has changed and diminished. 35 This sense of The End of Ideology, identified by Daniel Bell (1962) in the 1950s and 1960s, was 
emerging at the time amongst key sections of the American intelligentsia. However this scnfiment was 
relatively marginal to society as a whole, but by the 1990s this sense of loss had become more universal 
within left- and right-wing thought (Furedi 1992). 
36 The 'political' approach of the Conservatives in the 1980s is contrasted to the micro politics of the 
1990s. However, this is a somewhat exaggerated distinction that masks many of the trends emerging at 
this time (for example, the centrality of crime to politics and a growing therapeutic culture), which 
developed more forcefully in the 1990s. Despite this, politics in the 1980s, compared with later 
developments, maintained an ideological dimension with competing visions of the 'social' and the 
active individual, both of which held back the centrality of the passive victim and the centrality of this 
victim to the relationship between state and society. 
37 Where the petty criminal acts of children were mentioned, the target was not simply with this 
behaviour itself, nor the impact it had on individuals, but rather with the 'soft liberal' moral values - 
held by teachers 
, and social workers - 
that it was assumed were the cause of undermining British 
Victorian values of discipline, hard work and a stiff upper lip' (Pearson 1982). 
38 As one Conservative noted with frustration, 'I believe that we probably have lost the culture war. 
That doesn't mean that war isn't going to continue, and that it isn't going to be fought on other fronts. 
But in terms of society in general, we have lost. This is why, even when we win in politics, our 
victories fail to translate into the kind of policies we believe are important' (Schneider 2003: 430). 
39 Crime was certainly an issue that the Conservative government used in the 1980s, however, as 
Dunbar and Langdon note, it was not an issue that was, 'very prominent in either of the general 
elections of 1983 or 1987' (Dunbar and Langdon 1998: 100). 
40 Reference htti): //www. rethinkinR. oriz. uk/facts/system. shtml [on 29/Nov 20051 
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41 For the first time in the history of British politics Labour were seen and described as putting the 
Tories on the defensive over crime. Indeed, now it was the turn of the Conservative government to call 
foul and demand that crime - according to the official statistics - was actually failing. 42 Ile articles discussing community safety at thii time were written with reference to the victim 
research being carried out examining the impact of racial harassment and also general crime concerns 
of burglary and robbery. This research was not simply academic but was a form of action rcw=h 
adopted by the council, 'in the hope that it will show [local people] how to defeat burglars and robbers' 
(Times 24 November 1987). Left realist, feminist criminologists and activists including Jock Young 
carried out this research. Still focused on specific areas and particular groups, this approach grew in the 
late 1990s to incorporate the entire population. 43 The extreme examples of the shooting of school children in Dunblane and the killing of the head 
teacher Philip Lawrence were sited as evidence, which typified the problem of 'an explosion of crime 
and disorder'. 
44 'Community safety' as a term used in the press with reference to crime noticeably increase in its 
significance in the mid 1990s, and a more pronounced increase followed the election of New Labour in 
1997. From zero articles in 1986 and four in 1987 this increased to 61 in 1995 and by 1998 there were 
over 900 articles related to community safety and crime (Lcxis Ncxis media search of all British 
newspapers from 1984 that contained the words 'community safety' and 'crime'). 45 Writing in 2003, one Labour MP described the changing relationship with the electorate: 'What my 
constituents see as politics has changed out of all recognition during the 20 years or so since I rust 
became their Member of Parliament. From a traditional fare of social security complaints. housing 
transfers, unfair dismissals, as well as job losses, constituents now more often than not, ask what can be 
done to stop their lives being made a miscry by the unacceptable behaviour of some ncighbours. or 
more commonly, their neighbours' children' (Field 2003: 9). 46 James Q. Wilson's book Thinking about Crime (1975), written from a conservative perspective. was 
even more influential in questioning the idea that the 'causes' of crime could be tackled, leading to a 
pragmatism and technical approach to crime reduction 
47 The idea that the fear of crime was irrational was advocated within the first British Crime Survey 
(Hough and Mayhew 1983). Developed in part because of the loss of statistical credibility in official 
crime statistics, the BCS, by discovering the 'dark figure' of crimcs that went unreported to the police. 
helped to develop a focus upon the victims of crime and more specifically the victims of minor and 
middle range offences. Despite this, left realist and ferninist criminologists argued that crimes against 
women and minor incivilities against'vulnerable groups'remained hidden. 
48 The term 'vulnerable groups' is telling in and of itself, in that it ascribes the status of vulnerability to 
an entire section of society, the commonality between these people being subsequently undcrstood 
through this label of being vulnerable. By the very nature of being a child, or elderly, or a woman you 
ARE vulnerable - regardless of how you understand yourself or experience life - and are therefore in 
need of protection. 
49 Also see Simon Jenkins's critique of the Conservative governments in Accountable to None: Tory 
Nationalisation of Britain (1995). 
50 This loss of a sense of human agency has been objectified and thcorised by Ulrich Beck's 
understanding of a risk society (1992). 
51 The understanding of Thatcherism for explaining the transformation within the working class was 
developed systematically within the radical journal, Marxism Today, a journal within which significant 
individuals who went on to influence the emergence of New Labour wrote, including Tony Blair (if 
infrequently), Geoff Mulgan and Charles Leadbcttcr (Finlayson 2003: 117). 
52 Hayes and Hudson (2001: 11) described the notion of Essex Man as a 'crude lifestyle caricature', 
which was an'implausible attempt to define a new group of workers with a 7batchcrite ideology'. 
53 TINA was a term used to describe the idea promoted by Margaret Thatcher that 71cre Is No 
Alternative to the market. 
54 See for example the NSPCC's research Child Maltreatment in the UK (20W) where this approach is 
adopted. 
55 The promotion of individual freedoms promoted by the Conservative government was of course one- 
sided and based more upon the challenge to collectivism and union power than to a celebration of the 
individual in and of itself, and the realities of the emergence of 'promcthcan man' arc questionable. 
However, this more libertarian image of the individual continued to influence conservative thinking 
about crime. 
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56 The underwolves were the disconnected, largely working-class young people, who Wilkinson and 
Mulgan of the left-wing think tank Demos believed had selfish hedonistic values and were potentially 
about to 'bite back' (1995). 
57 In a sense what Mills was discussing was the classic liberal understanding of democracy: a 
democracy that he recognised was problematic in terms of where power lay in society and the 
subsequent role of public institutions. However, his discussion of a public is nonetheless a useful 
starting point to contrast the changing nature of politics in late twentieth century Britain. 58 See New Statesman 7 July 2003 where Nick Cohen describes the '661 new crimcs' created by the 
Labour governments since 1997. 59 This transformation was not simply an 'image' and reflected the less active and collective naturc of 
political life, but was however conceptualised and to a degree labelled as bcing'vulncrable', a label that 
helped to create and recreate the public self image. 60 Indeed the move in governance to the 'community' and away from the 'national' or 'intcmational'. 
reflected this same trend - away from the 'social'. 61 This development also helps explain the emergence of therapeutic politics, as licartficld notes: 
Where the people are no longer constituted through the political process as a people, but remain instead 
atornised individuals, the state cannot represent the general will. In such conditions modem cli(cs relate 
to the electorate on a more personal basis, in which circumstance. the expression of love is more 
6 
apTpro *ate'(Heartfield 2002: 200). 
6 hTnvital ingredient', of 'fear of crime', 'discovered' in the 1980s (Gilling 1999: 1), was one of the key 
developments which led to a move towards a more therapeutically oriented approach to crime which 
became increasingly central to law and order issues as the 1990s progressed. One example of this, is the 
publication of Anxieties about crime: findingsfrom the 1994 British Crime Survey (I tome Officc 1995). 
That the Home Office researchers decided to write a specific paper on anxieties about crime rcflccted 
the growing centrality of emotional indicators as central to the understanding of the social problem of 
crime. 
63 A more detailed explanation of the Child Safety Initiative will be presented in the following chapter. 
It should be noted that the author at this point in time also set up a youth research charity, with a 
number of like-minded colleagues, to examine the issue of youth regulation. 
64 See research by Cahill (1990), Hillman, Adams and Whitelcg (1990), Barnardos (1995), Whcway 
and Millard (1997), Valentine (1997), Valentine and McKendrick (1997), Moorcock (1998), 
Livingstone and Bovill (1999), and Blatchford (1999). 
65 This is a term used by Best (1990) to explain the typical examples used that express the core elements 
of a particular social problem. 
66 See Angrosino and Mays de Perez (2000: 674) for a discussion about observational research. 
67 This observational work around Hillhouse was also supplemented by council statistics on the owner 
occupation, car ownership, and various statistics on the population. 
68 As will be explained in the following chapters, one of the issues raised by John Orr, Strathclyde's 
Chief of Police, in relation to possible safety issues for parents was that of pacdophiles. 
69 See Fontana and Frey (2000: 656) for a discussion about unstructured interviews and oral histories. 
70 As Christensen and James note in terms of the importance of context when interviewing children, 
'Me same child could be boisterous and outspoken at home, but shy and reserved at school' (2000: 
103). 
71 As the CSI specifically targeted any child 'under the age of 16. nobody ovcr this age wws 
interviewed. 
72 See Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association (BSA 2004). In particular 
note Point 6 on being responsible to safeguard the proper interests of those involved in or affected by 
this work; Point 13 on ensuring the physical and psychological well being of those involved; Point 16 
on consent; Point 17 on making interviewees aware of their right to refuse; Point 34 on rcspccting 
anonymity and Point 36 on storing data. 
73 See Appendix 1 for the consent form used. 
74 Within the writing up of this research all children's names have been changed. 
75 As a Barnardos document on research ethics with children rightly points out, research with children 
can be justified if the information being gained does not already exist, or is not attainable from another 
source (Barnardos 1995b: 2). 
76 See Appendix 2 and 3 for details of the questionnaires used. 
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77 In Random Violence, Joel Best carries out a similar analysis, in examining specific 'ncwcrimcs like 
stalking and attempting to understand them within a broader framework of the gcncraliscd fear of 
random violence in American society (Best 1999). 
78 These groups and individuals were analysed particularly as they were the key 'clitc' claimsmakcrs 
promoting the implementation of the CSI. 
9 The local newspaper coverage of the curfewýwas particularly useful for gaining access to'clitc'claims 
and justifications for the curfew, largely because most of the articles in the Hamilton Advertiser were 
generated by police press releases and comments about the progress of the initiative. 
80 This limited oppositional 'voice' was less to do with media bias than with a lack of an organised, and 
especially political, opposition to the curfew, which would have resulted in a systematic oppositional 
voice being present. 
81 The individuals and organisations contacted were: Save the Children (Scotland), Nancy Ovens - 
Vice Chair of Play Scotland, Gerison Landsdown - Director of the Children's Rights Office, Tim Gill 
from the Children's Play Council, Roger Smith of the Children's Society (who gave a statement in a 
Fe rsonaI capacity) and the Scottish Human Rights Centre. 
2 Throughout the chapter the term curfew and the Child Safety Initiative (CSI) will both be used to 
avoid repetition. Despite not being a formal curfew, as we will show, this was how local adults and 
ZI ung people alike understood the initiative. ro 3 See also Gilling (1999: 2) where he notes that, 'in the course of the 1980s a vital and further 
ingredient [to crime prevention initiatives] was added, namely the fear of crime'. " While the Hamilton 'curfew' may have been, to some degree, a mere continuation of policies 
associated with youth crime, it is worth noting that prior to this development, and especially in the 
1980s, curfews were generally discussed and understood as initiatives used only in extreme cases of 
war, civil unrest, or in countries notorious for their authoritarian approach - particularly in the Eastern 
Block. See for example the Times 26 May 1989: 'Verdict on Israeli soldiers sparks protests by Arabs. 
Richard Owen. 
85 In terms of the 'grassroots' support for community safety type initiatives in the 1990s, it is worth 
noting that an opinion poll in Glasgow found that 95% of Glaswcgians were in favour of the City 
Watch CCTV initiative developed in the city centre, and only 2% were opposed to it (Cummings 1997: 
17). 
86 By 1997 the discussion about zero tolerance policing had reached a high point, in part because of the 
general election in that year and the ensuing battle between the Conservative and Labour parties over 
the toughness of their crime policies, and also because of the impact that this form of policing was 
believed to be having in the USA. Indeed, it was this year, the year of the Hamilton curfew, which saw 
more newspaper articles, at least in the Guardian, which raised the issue of zero tolcranct in relation to 
crime, than any previous or subsequent year. (In a Lexis Nexis media search there were over 70 articles 
discussing 'zero tolerance' initiatives in relation to 'crime'. This was an increase from II the previous 
ý ear, and from 1998 on there have been around 50 such articles). 1 7 In February 1993, Strathclyde police launched Operation Blade, an initiative aimed at ridding the 
streets of knives by stopping and searching young men. In 1993 a night-club curfew was established in 
Glasgow's city centre. In the winter of 1994 Glasgow Development Agency launched City Watch, a 
CCTV scheme that covered the whole of the city centre. In the summer of 1996 Glasgow District 
Council banned street drinking - the ban was not just focused on the city ccntrc, but covered the whole 
of the district. In October 1996 Strathclyde Police launched Operation Spotlight. an umbrella operation 
that aimed to target both crime and the fear of crime. Ile Child Safety Initiative - or what became 
known as the Hamilton Curfew, set up in October 1997 - was part of the continuing Operation 
S otlight. 
8T . Instead of a society wide system of policing [for the past 200 years], the British political 
establishment pursued an ideal of solidarity ... now, at the end of the twentieth century. 
in tandem with 
the reassertion of a punitive sovereignty, threatens the eclipse of that project of solidarity which formed 
the central thrust of twentieth century social and penal politics. In its place. we are witnessing the 
emergence of a more divisive, exclusionary project of punishment and police' (Garland 1996: 466). 
89 Hillhouse, as the largest of the three targeted areas, was the one within which the research for this 
thesis was carried and as such, it is this estate that will largely be related to in tcrrrLs of the 
claimsmaking process of the CSI. 
90 Information', South Lanarkshire Council, Child Safety Initiative Launch 23 October 1997. 
91 Sandy Cameron, Executive Director of Social Work, speaking on Sky Scottish 26 October 1997. 
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92 See Appendix 4 for John Orr's full speech as provided at the launch of the CST. 93 See Appendix 5 for Tom McCabe's speech as provided at the launch of the CSI. 
94 Tom McCabe, Labour Leader of South Lanarkshire Council, speaking on Sky Scottish 26 October 
1997. 
95 Sandy Cameron, Executive Director of Social Work, speaking on Sky Scottish 26 October 1997. 96 This aspect of the 'at risk' young person appears to have been integrated into the CSI by the social 
work department themselves, giving a more 'caring' framework for the initiative. The social work department, while playing no role in the enforcement of the initiative, had worked closely with the 
police in the development of the curfew prior to its introduction. 7, Two Sides to Every Story 'Proximity Conference': Bridging the Gap Between Young and Old Conference, 10 November 1997, former Strathclyde Regional Council Headquarters, Glasgow. 98 See Waiton (2001) Scared of the Kids 7, comment section, where a number of those individuals and 
groups opposing the curfew explain their concerns. "9 In this respect - in terms of social problem formation - the basis for the curfew as far as the 
authorities were concerned was via agrassroots'conccm with safety. 100 South Lanarkshire Council prior to the curfew had hired the System 3 survey company to find out 
what concerns and issues were of relevance to local people (System 3 1996). Following this, the Tirst 
Citizens' Jury in Scotland' was set up to address the issues of corrimunity safety and it was this jury that 
was later said to have come up with the idea of the curfew (South Lanarkshirc 1997a). Subsequently 
research with young people was carried out in schools in Hamilton to assess the thoughts of young 
people about the curfew. Also the police hired researchers from Strathclyde University to assess the 
effectiveness of the curfew not simply in reducing crime but in improving the public sense of safety 
(MeGallagly et al 1998) 101 A 'phone-in' opinion poll run by the local Hamilton Advertiser 16 October 1997 showed that 95 per 
cent of the public supported the curfew - this was something referred to by Chief Constable John Off in his launch speech. 1(ý2 During the curfew the police themselves kept a record of the thoughts of the young people who they 
picked up on the street, which showed that a majority supported this initiative. ne exact figurcs of 
support by these young people has been questioned and the usefulness of statistics collected by the 
police from young people taken home can be seriously questioned (see Springharn 1997). (3 Part of the reason for Robertson making this claim was that he had suggested setting up Citizens' 
Juries to test public opinion on local issues. Often projected as a more democratic attempt to listen to 
the people'this approach to social policy development and the growth of the use of consultants in local 
government also suggests a level of disengagement felt by politicians and local authorities from the 
public. 
04 The idea of the public, here relates to C. Wright Mills' (1967) understanding of active engaged 
individuals, discussed in Chapter 4. 
105 Allison McLaughlan of the Daily Record summed up the feeling of those promoting the curfew 
when she described the Scottish Human Rights Centre as 'nutters'. 'It's OK for liberals to be standing 
sayin, 'Oh aye, it's infringing people's human rights", McLaughlan said, 'but what about the rights of 
rO6 ople who are getting their windows panned in'(The Face, June 1998). 
To what degree young people themselves had adopted this understanding of themselves and their 
'rights' will be examined further in the next chapter. 107The dominant view that today's world is structured around neo-liberal policies and practices has not 
resulted in the rise of libertarian values and a desire for individual freedom. As Brook and Cape noted 
in their chapter Libertarianism in Retreat in the British Social Attitudes Survey, all sections of society 
have become less libertarian in their outlook in recent years (Brook and Cape 1995: 204-5). 
log As Rose has argued, the emergence of the governance through 'community. predicated on a more 
micro-management form of crime prevention, has over recent years become understood as a 'cure for all 
ills'(Rose 1996: 331). 
109 Gilling also identified that the move to community safety developed under the Conservative 
government, with the primary problem being understood to be economic, 'the Conservative solution 
being a market one'. With the creation of Safer Cities it was believed, enterprise, community activity 
and personal responsibility could flourish (Gilling 1999: 5) 
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110 Rose rightly observes that the process of governance through the 'community' developed as a 'new 
plane or surface upon which micro-moral relations among persons are conccptualiscd and 
administered', and where 'a whole series of issues are problematised' (Rose 1996: 331). 111 Rose in particular has a critical recognition, for example, of the therapeutic interventionist element 
of responsibilisation and the development of new relations of governance through 'community' 
professionals (Rose 1996: 348; Rose 1999). Despite this recognition, however, to some degree the idea 
of responsibilisation relates to the individual and his behaviour. Here it is this aspect of the notion of 
responsibility and responsibilisation that is examined. 112 This is not to argue that a more individualised aspect of crime prevention has not developed in a 
technical sense - whereby individuals take more responsibility for private security measures. But within 
the realm of human consciousness and interpersonal or public action, rather than autonomous self- 
governing individuals developing, we see a promotion and emergence of diminished subjective 
engagement with the community within an ontological framework of the vulnerable individual. 113 Structural questions, the more heterogeneous nature of, or at least outlook. amongst people in 
Hillhouse, and to some degree a 'real'concern about especially drunken older unemployed young men, 
all helped to legitimise the CSI and the action by the police. However, despite this, what is being 
examined here is the changing nature of what responsibility meant to the authorities when relating to 
the people of Hillhouse. 
114 Even at the level of intergenerational communication, the 'Bridging the Gap'confcrcnce, mentioned 
above, can be seen as an example of how past informal relationships between the generations were 
formalised: a mechanism that has increasingly been understood to be the way forward for helping to 
recreate a sense of community. A number of conferences around the UK have developed over the past 
seven years connected to 'intergeneration' reconnecting. One such conference in Kccle explained that, 
'Participants took part in a variety of workshops on issues such as citizenship. fear of crime, 
reminiscence, effective intergenerational practice, building healthy communities and intcrgencrational 
mentoring. Participants also had the opportunity to see displays on a wide variety of intcrgcncrational 
initiatives' (www. bgop. org. uk/pages/events, _pastO 
19. html). 
115 This was reflected in a Strathclyde police advertising campaign at the time, which stated: 'If you 
think there may be trouble, pick up a weapon'. The weapon in question was a telephone and the 
message not to intervene yourself was clear. Also, during the curfew, following complaints by adults 
about rowdy teenagers in another area of Hamilton, the police put out a statement to the public 
commanding that people should, 'Call us and we will come round and deal with the situation. Do not 
engage them yourself, call us' (Hamilton People 12 December 1997). 116 See Labour MP, Frank Field's book Neighbours from Hell. 7he Politics of Behaviour (2003) where 
he promotes the need for the police to play the role of surrogate parents. 117 http: //www. centre2 l. org. uklagenda /agenda2OOO/articles/tough. html 118 As noted previously, this idea of being streetwise was already seen to be under threat with the 
development of what was described as 'cotton wool kids'. 119 Rather than with reference to protecting the life and property of the individual or the moral values of 
society. 
120 Ile specific activities of young people were often referred to - especially by the tabloid press - as a 
problem in and of itself However, for those promoting the curfew, the underlying problem being 
engaged with was the more generalised concern about fear which was understood to be an almost 
P ermanent emotional state of the adults living in the targeted arm. 
21 See Furedi (2004: 136) where he notes that, 7he 'scif at risk' is a construction of cultural norms that 
r gard people's fears as itself a source of risk. 
1 In April 1997, shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw had described the fear of crime as something that 
'hangs like a dark cloud in the air. Elaborating, Straw believed the extent of this problem meant that 
7wo thirds of women pensioners are scared to leave their house at night. Our pensioners are prisoners 
in their own homes who only want to live in peace. Surely the prisoners should be those who commit 
the crimes, not those who are the victims of crime. It cannot go on'(Guardian 26 April 1997). 
123 Here the focus of the therapeutic outlook has been focused on the issue of the fear of crime. 
However, this was equally significant in the attempted engagement made with young people and 
parents, i. e. the fear felt by these groups was understood as the core basis of connection and of the 
lVitimation of the curfew. 
I In terms of rhetorical pronouncements regarding the curfew, it was noticeable that national 
politicians and the chief of police were more inclined to relate to the fear of 'yobs' and the problem of 
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antisocial behaviour. Whereas the local police and social work department - possibly due to their direct 
contact with the community, the need to develop practical solutions, and their desire to be understood 
as caring rather than authoritarian - constantly described the CSI as an initiative to make children and 
young people safe, as well as adults. Whereas the local police systematically argued that the curfew was 
about the safety of young children, the local MP George Robertson echoed the 'tough on crime' focus 
of the Labour leadership and was more inclined to emphasise the 'rights' of fearful adults. Indeed as 
later developments proved, the Labour leadership was more than happy to introduce curfew legislation 
without concern about the use of the term curfew. This contrasts with the local council leader in 
Hamilton, who had stated that a curfew has 'no place in a society heading for the new millcrinium'. 125 With subsequent developments in parenting classes and the problematisation of parenting itself, it 
also appears that parents themselves have become a group who are understood to need professional 
support to be good parents (Furedi 2001). 126 While there does appear to have been a general level of fear within the curfew targeted communities, 
this does not imply that all adults were living in a constant state of fear, nor that many of these adults 
did or would engage with young people if they were encouraged to do so. Indeed by relating to the 
general sense of anxiety and promoting behaviour accordingly, it will be argued in the following 
chapter that the council were relating to, but also encouraging, a more passive and risk-avcrse approach 
to community life. 
127 Note that the definition of 'safe' is: 'protected from danger or risk [but also] cautious and 
unenterprising'. See www. askoxford. com 128 See Labour Party documents (1993; 1995 and 1996). 
129 See the Glasgow Herald 3 November 1997, where the story of a four-year-old boy found out on the 
streets at 9pm was the basis for an article about the initiative. 130 The idea of issues, which are more general and to some degree more political in their make-up, as 
opposed to troubles, which are more directly related to individual personal concerns, relates to C. 
Wright Mills' (1967) work described previously. 131 Despite this example however, which had focused attention upon what the police had felt to be an 
example of 'irresponsible parenting', it should be noted more generally that when highlighting the 
individual examples of unsafe children, the local police in the main did this simply with reference to the 
child being unsafe and rarely mentioned the irresponsibility of the parent or grandparent. The message 
of child safety, rather than irresponsible parenting, appeared to be more central for the local police force 
and indeed the parents or grandparents were to a degree represented as needing support rather than 
Punishment. 
32. John Orr had mentioned the issue of paedophiles as a problem for children wandering the streets at 
night in his launch speech of the CSI. For Orr, that parents would allow their children to be out. 
unsupervised at night, 'beggared belief. 
133 See research by Cahill (1990), Hillman, Adams and Whiteleg (1990), Barnardos (1995), Whcway 
and Millard (1997), Valentine (1997), Valentine and McKendrick (1997), Moorcock (1998), 
Livingstone and Bovill (1999), and Blatchford (1999). 
134 The myth of the problem of under- 10-year-olds is of particular significance given the later 
development of curfew legislation across the UK targeting this age group - something that was justified 
in part with reference to the success of the Hamilton curfew. 
135 See Waiton (2001), Chapter 4, for a summary of this research. 
136 There was also a psychological footnote added in the 1989 definition - Psychiatry sociopath. 137 In the journal Sociology and Social Research in 1916, for example, there was an article examining 
the 'Antisocial Behaviour of Automobile Drivers': see Ashley, P. (1916) 'Antisocial Behaviour of 
Automobile Drivers. Sociology and Social Research Vol. I- 
138 This figure shows the results from the Times' own website for the term antisocial behaviour from 
1984 to 2001, and the term antisocial behaviour in a Lexis Nexis media search of the Guardian 
newspaper. 
139'IbiS latter rapid increase is not indicated in table one, in part to emphasisc the constant increase of 
the problem before this more substantial increase. 
140 For example, ASBOs were mentioned in 142 of the 544 'antisocial behaviour' articles in the 
Guardian in 2004 -a number of these articles were discussing the 
implementation and the impact of 
these initiatives 
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141 See for example the Queen's Speeches by Tony Blair in 2002 and 2004 that highlighted problems of 
antisocial behaviour as central to future government policy objectives, and the Queen's Speech in 2005 
that highlighted the issue of respect as key. 142 The 1998 Act introduced curfews on children, and the 2003 Act introduced curfew zones that have 
been challenged and found to be illegal. Ile Scottish Act enforced a requirement that Local Authorities 
and Chief Constables jointly prepare an Antisocial Behaviour Strategy and contained much of the new developments in the England and Wales version of 2003. Other acts, such as the Clean Ncighbourhoods 
Act and the Licensing Act have targeted underage drinking - or selling of alcohol. and littcr. Laws introduced in the Criminal Justice and Police Act (2001) have also been used to fine people urinating 
and vomiting in public. 143 This information was gained via a Lexis Nexis media search of the Guardian for articles containing 
the words 'antisocial behaviour'andpolitician'or 'minister' or 'Home Secretary'. 144 In a Lexis Nexis search of antisocial behaviour and youth, children or young people there were 245 
articles in the Guardian in 2004, and there were 261 'antisocial bchavioue articles mentioning 
'community'or 'estates'. 
145 Nuisance behaviour - defined as shouting, swearing, hanging around and fooling around in groups, 
sometimes outside other people's homes - made up between one in ten and two in ten phone calls to the 
4 
Folice as noted in the Audit Commission Report in 1996 (Waiton 2001: 87): Also see Valentine (1996). 46 Antisocial behaviour was understood to be an issue at a local level'. but also in relation to %be 
public's key education priorities', where 'pupil behaviour/discipline' was the main issue that people fclt 
the government should be addressing in schools (MORI 2005). 147 Also within criniinology, the growth of research examining antisocial behaviour has developed with 
the increasing influence of psychology. In the British Journal of Criminology the increased use of the 
term antisocial behaviour since 2000, for example, has developed largely in relation to articles 
examining work by authors like the Child Psychiatrist Michael Rutter and Professor of Psychological 
Criminology David Farrington. 
148 This BIDS search looked for these terms in the Title/Keyword/Abstract fields. 149 The European Journal of Personality, for example, was first published in 1987, the Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology in 1989, The Journal of Social Distress and the Homeless in 1991, 
and the Journal of Child and Family Studies in 1992 - all of which contain articles about antisocial 
behaviour. 
150 Ile increase in the statistics on violent crime, as Jon Simmons of the Home Office and also a 
spokesperson for the Association of Chief Police Officers argued, was related to recording and 
reporting of offences and also with the increasing targeting of certain 'drinking areas' by the police on 
Friday and Saturday nights (Guardian 21 July 2005). 151 As a MORI Poll noted, despite the statistical fall in crime, 'Law and Order is now the number one 
priority for the first time in years' (MORI 2005), while despite these falls in recent times three quarters 
of the public still believe that the national crime rate is rising (Home Office 2003: 1). 152 This concentration on petty acts of incivility as being important - indeed of being the most important 
thing to study - to understand communities' sense of wellbcing has been discussed previously in 
relation to feminist and new realist thinkers. It was also something that the 'New Laboue sociologist 
Anthony Giddens, in The Third Way (1998: 86), uncritically recognises as being the case. 153 For example, it is the issue of antisocial behaviour that is more frequently understood today to be the 
problem that undermines communities - indeed this was already reflected within the Hamilton Child Safety initiative and the focus upon issues related to young people hanging around the streets. Noisy 
neighbours and rowdy youngsters arguably capture the popular imagination far more than, say, burglars 
and organised criminals do - reflected in programmes about 'Neighbours from Hell'and the increasingly 
popular use of terms like 'neds' and 'charvers'. In general the sense of a loss of rcspccf and of a broader 
social breakdown relates more to issues associated with antisocial behaviour than to those of serious 
crime - reflected in the recent Queen's Speeches. 154 1802 J. Mackintosh in Memoirs (1835) 1. Iv. 176 A collection of all the rebellious, antisocial. 
blasphemous.. books.. published during.. the Revolution. 1844 Dublin rev. Mar. 34 The dark. malignant, 
atrocious, and utterly anti-social character, which the Republican party in its contest with the new 
F505 vernment has exhibited (Oxford Dictionary 1885). 
These additions to the meaning of antisocial behaviour are not a separate meaning from the original 
idea of 'opposing the principles of society', but rather are a continuation of this meaning and an addition 
to them. 
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156 Also see Furedi (1992: 90-97). 
157 niS is not to argue that problems of behaviour do not exist, but rather that in the past, like the issue 
of crime, these troubles would not have been accepted as the'social problem'to be addressed in society. 
158 In the 1970s for example the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 'charactcriscd 
routh subcultures as cultures of resistance in opposition to ... 
bourgeois hcgcmony'(Calcutt 1996: 5 1). 
59 For example in a MORI Poll (2005) survey under the tide, 'Guardian readers like them too', it was 
noted that 67% of Guardian readers support the introduction of ASBOs. 
160 The safety of children - especially with regard to the issue of child abuse - is one of the few 
'absolute' values that British society feels confident to uphold. But this is a particularly negative and 
low-level common denominator around which to develop a web of meaning. 
161 Conservative moralists like Melanie Philips have helped to promote the problem of andsocial 
behaviour. However Philips recognises that the traditional moral absolutes of the Victorian period that 
she respects are no longer relevant to the new morality of the twcnty-f irst century. Rccognising her own 
isolation from even an agreement on what sort of behaviour is understood to be antisocial, Philips feels 
the world has been 'turned upside down', noting that: 'The Victorian reformers all had one thing in 
common. They were absolutely certain that behaviour such as drinking, sexual licentiousness or 
prostitution were wrong in themselves. That iron belief prompted them to try to curb what they clearly 
understood as vice and depravity. But now, anyone who even used such terms would be considered 
beyond the pale. The only thing now absolutely unacceptable is to regard such behaviour as 
unacceptable'(Daily Mail 17 June 2004, my emphasis). 
162 See the approach taken in the Scottish Office publication Children Young People and Offending in 
Scotland (Asquith 1998). 
163 Within criminology (as discussed in the previous chapter), issues of harassment and abuse helped to 
focus attention more upon issues of behaviour within 'everyday' life that helped to rcpose the meaning 
of crime away from traditional concerns with economic and physical concerns like burglary and assault 
and towards more minor forms of problem behaviour. 
164 As noted in Chapter 1, the 'discovery' of violence and abuse against women and children (Jenkins 
1992: 231) had helped to elevate society's awareness and concern with the behaviour of particularly 
men. 
165 Binge drinking is a relatively modern term, the first use of it in the UK press being 1989. The 
number of articles using this term grew slowly through the 1990s and increased substantially in 2003, 
and by 2004 the Guardian had 189 articles on the subject and there were thousands of articles using the 
term in all UK papers (these results relate to a Nexis Lcxis media search). 
166 In a major research document developed by the Scottish Office between 1995-8. Children, Young 
People and Offending in Scotland, a document produced at the same time as the idea and 
implementation of the Hamilton curfew was occurring, David Farrington's approach can be seen to be 
central to the understanding of crime and antisocial behaviour. Here, the use of 'risk indicators'of crime 
and antisocial behaviour are identified through a 'synthesis of current thinking on the social and 
psychological processes' and an examination of the 'formal and informal' influences on young people: 
this examination being directly connected to developing 'policies and practices most likely to have a 
positive impact on shaping the behaviour of young Scots' (Asquith ctal 1998: 1, my italics). 
(67 Here, it is the behaviour rather than the beliefs or moral values of individuals that arc cmphasiscd, 
with issues like binge drinking being understood not as ungodly but unhealthy and unsafe. 
168 At a time when the capacity for social intervention has been diminished, as has the belief in the 
capacity of individuals to act, the grab-bag approach of 'psychosocial' studies that fails cithcr to 
understand the psychology of the individual or society appears to be most appropriate (see Lasch 1979: 
34 for a discussion on psychoanalysis and the study of society). 
169 Note for example the change in the law related to doli incapax discussed previously. 
170 Note for example the recent discussion about nursery provision and the concern with the fact that 
'antisocial behaviour' has been found to occur within 3-year-old children who attend nursery from an 
early age (Times 16 June 2005). 
171 The case of the relatively recently labelled 'pacdophile' is the best example of this 'type' of person 
who is largely understood to have lost any capacity to 'act' in any other way than as a socially defined 
paedophile. This is similarly represented in the various discussions about 'cultures' of crime that give a 
sense of permanent distance between those who belong to these imagined 'cultures' and the rest of 
society (see Calcutt 1996). 
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172 See for example Frank Field's description of antisocial behaviour, which he believes is as significant 
a threat as international terrorism (Field 2003). 
173 The therapeutic turn within the Catholic Church in the USA is illustrated in relation to the 
emergence of counselling - rather than moral castigation - given to priests found to have abused 
children. As Jenkins notes, During the 1970s and 1980s, psychological values and assumptions 
permeated the religious world no less than the secular culture', the consequence being that therapeutic 
practices and 'values' began to over ride the moral/religious basis of the church itself (Sommers and 
Satel 2005: 82). 
174 An example of this development can be seen within race and the emergence of the idea of 
institutional racism - and the change in police recordings of claims of racism (indeed racism itself has 
today become just another form of antisocial behaviour). Speaking on Radio 4, cx-Chief Constable 
David Westwood explained that all racist reporting needed to be recorded - regardless of the evidence. 
As he said, 'it's about each individual respecting other individuals', you , 
record that people I)clicvc'thcrc 
was racism, and have to 'accept that someone feels aggrieved', otherwise you 'turn them right off. you 
'doubly traumatise'the individual (BBC Radio 4, July 26h 2005 On the Ropes). 
175 Tony Blair described anti-social behaviour such as vandalism, graffiti and fly tipping as 'probably 
the biggest immediate issue for people in the country'. It will be the ccntrcpiecc of the Queen's speech 
on November 13, he added during a visit to Newham. in east London (Guardian 14 November 2002). 
On November 4th 2002, Tony Blair argued that the clutch of bills to deal with crime and antisocial 
disorder at the heart of the Queen's speech was designed to create a 'victim justice system' rather than 
the present 'criminal justice system' (Guardian 4 November 2002). 
176 As an aside, but perhaps of significance, 'antisocial behavioue had already become a term used by 
the South African state in the late 1980s, to describe the problems of black youth who lacked the social 
skills by a very early age to become part of society. That this was understood as a problem of 'antisocial 
behaviour' caused by a loss of 'webs of authority', may reflect the disintegration of legitimacy of the 
South African political elite and a spontaneous attempt to repose the problem of the legitimacy of the 
state as one of the behaviour of black youth. The question of political leadership was recast as one of an 
individual's learned behaviour (Guardian 8 May 1990). 
177 For Anthony Giddens, the question of the need for social order is unproblcmatic and central to cvcry 
issue: the social arrangement of society and the development of social policies being seen as positive 
not in terms of their moral or political content, but simply in relation to the degree to which they 
reinforce social order (Giddens 1998: 102). 
178 The Dictionary of Psychology defines psychosocial as 'generally a grab-bag term used freely to 
cover any situation where both psychological and social factors are assumed to play a role (Dictionary 
of Psychology 1985). 
179 See Furedi (1992) for an historical analysis of the role of ideology in the 20'h century. 
180 See Scottish Executive Publications (2005). 
181 Disclosure Scotland is the latest vetting procedure that has been introduced in Scotland. 
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Appendix I 
Parents Consent Form 
The Child Safety Initiative Stuart Waiton 
A proposed research project is planned to interview young people in and around the Hillhouse 
area to understand what the children and young people of the area think about the Child Safety 
Initiative being launched in the Hillhouse area. 
Your child has been chosen to be interviewed for this research. The children and young 
people have been chosen simply by their position on their class register. The interview is 
voluntary and the participants are free to withdraw their consent at any time. This will be 
explained to the young people themselves at the time of interview. 
The interview will be carried out in the school during school time and will take 
approximately 20 - 30 minutes. 71be interview will be based on a questionnaire and notes 
of the interview will be taken by the researcher. No personal details of the young people 
will be used in any publication or written work and the interview will be confidential. 
Any written work will use changed names. 
If you do not wish to consent simply ignore this form. 
a. I confirm that I have read the above and give consent for my child to be 
, interviewed. 
Name of Child/ Young Person 
Name of Person giving consent Date Signature 




What is your first name? 
...................................................................................................................... 
2. Which estate do you live on? (If unsure, get the name of the road) 
...................................................................................................................... 
3. How old are you? 
....................................................................................................................... 
4. What year of school is that? 
................................ : ...................................................................................... 
5. Are they male of female? 
6. Are they White Black Asian Chinese or other? 
Get them chatting about what they like to do at night. Suss out why they like doing the 
things they do, what they would like to be able to do more of, and what they don't like doing. Then get them to go through their last week - what did they do each night + the 
weekends. 
7. Who do you travel home from school with in the evening? 71ck one of the 
answers below. 
Parents or some other adult Priends By myself 
8. When you go to a friend's house at night how do you get there? 
By themselves taken never go 
If taken by an adult - why is this ............................................................................. 
If they go by themselves, do they feel safe? YIN 
If not, why not? 
..................................................................................................................................... 
9. Do you ever go to the shops for your parents? YIN 
If not why not? .......................................................................................................... 
10. Do you play out in the streets in the evening? YIN 
If you do not play out in the streets at night, why is this? 
11. Is it different in the summer? 
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....................................................................................................................................... 
12. Do you play out in the street at the weekend? Y/N 
If not, why not? ................................................................................................ 
13. Have you heard of the Child Safety Initiative? Y/N 
If not, try Curfew? Y/N 
14. If you play out in the street at night, what time do you have to be in by? 
.................................................... 
15. Has this time changed since the introduction of the curfew? Yes or No 
16. What time did you have to be in by before the curfew? .................................. 
17. When you played out on ........ were you allowed to go out of the sight of your parents? Yes or No 
If not, why not? .............................................................................................................. 
......................................................................................................................................... 
M What time does the curfew start in Hillhouse? 
19. Do you think the curfew is a good idea? Yes or No 
Explain why you think this ................................................................................. 
, 20. Do you 
know what time the police start taldng people home? Y/N 
What time is this? .............................................................................................. 
21. When you are out: - by yourself at night in your area do you feel safe? Yes or No or I've never been out alone (do they mean they're with friends 
etc) 
If not, why not? ................................................................................................... 
22. If you were out alone at night and felt unsafe or scared, what would you do? 
.............................................................................................................................. If say go home, ask if there was no-one at home, what would you do? 
.............................................................................................................................. 
23. If you were out alone at night and needed to know the time would you ask an 
adult you don't know who was passing by? Yes or No 
If you answered no, why is this? .......................................................................... 
24. Would you feel happy about asIdng a teenager you don't know? Yes or No 
If you answered no, why is this? ......................................................................... 
25- Would you feel happy about asldng a police officer? Yes or No 
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If you answered no, why is this? ......................................................................... 
26. Did an adult speak to you (other than parents or relatives) from your street 
last week? Y/N 
If yes, who was it? ............................................................................................... 
What was it about? ............................................................................................. 
27. Did you talk to any other adults on your estate? YIN 
Who? .................................................................................................................... 
What about? .................................................................................................. * 
28. When out on your estate - 
Have you ever been told off; been asked to move on; been questioned about 
what you are doing? Yes or No 
If yes - who normally does this? Police 
Parents 
Tick one answer Friends parents 
Other adults 
other young people 
29. Have adults you don't know ver y well ever told you off, moved you on or 
questioned you? YIN 
What for? .......................................................................................................... 
30. Have you ever been told off, been moved on; or been questioned about what 
you were doing by the police? Y/N 
What for? ............................................................................................................. 
If they answered yes to both the above, which happens more often? 
Police or Other Adults 
If they have been spoken to by the police, find out if there had been a complaint 
about them and whether or not an adult had already complained to their face? 
31. Do you think the police should be phoned if a young person is: - 
(tick which answers you agree with) 
a) sitting on a strangers'wall 
b) running in someone's garden 
C) knocIcing on someone's door and running away 
d) smashing a bottle 
e) fighting 
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f) playing football in the street 
g) being noisy 
h) drinIdng under age 
D being out after the curfew time 
Any comments why ............................................................................................... 
32. Have you ever visited or called on the house of someone you didn't know very 
well on your estate? YIN 
(e. g. for Halloween, to raise money etc) Ask who it was to assess if they or their 
parents knew them. 
Who was it, why visit? 
.............................................................................................................................. 
33. Do you think talking to adults on your estate is a good thing to do? YIN 
Why? ............................................................................................................. 
34. Would you like to see more police on your streets at night? More 
Less 
No change 

















Young People's Questionnaire 
1. What is your first name? ..................................................................... 
2. Which estate do you live on? (If unsure get name of the road) 
.................................................................................................... 
3. How old are you? .............................................................................. 
4. What year of school is that? ................................................................. 
5. Are they male or female? ..................................................................... 
6. Are they White Black Asian Chinese or other? 
7. Who do you travel home from school with in the evening? Tick one answer below 
Parents or some other adult Friends By myself 
If parentsladult THEN - Why is this? 
....................................................................................................... If parents/adults THEN - Would you rather go by yourself or with friends? Y/N 
WHY? .............................................................................................. 
7a. Do you or would you feel safe walking home alone? Y/N 
WHY? .............................................................................................. 
7b. When you go to a friend's house at night how do you get there? By themselves or taken 
or never go 
If taken by an adult - why is this? ........................................................... 
8. Generally, do you consider the area you live in to be safe? Safe Unsafe 
If unsafe - why is this? .......................................................................... 
8a. In general how safe do you feel when: 
Out with hiends at night? Safe Unsafe Never go out 
Out alone at night? Safe Unsafe Never go out alone 
In your own home? Safe Unsafe 
In Hamilton? Safe Unsafe Never go 
In Glasgow? Safe Unsafe Never go 
8b. What if anything could the council or other organisation do to make you feel safe? 
........................................................................................................ 
8c. What if anything could young people do to make communities safer? 
........................................................................................................ 
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8d. What if anything could adults do to make communities safer? 
........................................................................................................ 
9. Do you and your fziends ever just hang about doing nothing in particular during the 
evenings or weekends? No 
- Yes, once in a while Yes, nearly every day 
IF NO, why not? ................................................................................. 
9a. Where do you usually go? 
....................................................................................................... 
9b. What do you usually do? 
....................................................................................................... 
10. Do/Would you feel safe going out at night? YIN 
Why? .............................................................................................. 
11. Do you play out more in the summer? Y/N 
12. What time do you play out till in the summer? .............................................. 
13. Do you ever travel outside your estate (say to Hamilton) independently (without an 
adult? ) Y/N 
If YES - are your parents happy about you doing this? YIN 
If parents are not happy - Why not? ......................................................... If parents are happy - Why? ................................................................. If NO (they don't travel to Hamilton independently) - WHY is this? 
....................................................................................................... 
14. Do you belong to any club? Y/N 
If YES - why do you prefer being in a club to being out with your friends? 
15. Who do you spend most of your spare time with? (Number 1" and 2d) 
Mum/dad Brother/sister by yourself 
Best friend boy/girl friend group of friends 
Adults who aren't in my family 
16. Have you heard of the Child Safety Initiative? YIN 
16a. Have you heard of the Curfew? Y/N 
l6b. Which do you use? Curfew/CSI 
17. Are your parents more worried when you play out since the introduction of the 
Curfew/CSI? YIN 
WHY? ............................................................................................ 




19. If you go out in the streets, what time do you have to be in by? ........................... 
20. Has this time changed since the introduction of the curfew? Yes or No 
21. What time did you have to be in before the curfew? ........................................ 
22. When you go out at night are you allowed to go out of the sight of your parents? 
Y/N/I never go out 
If no, why? ........................................................................................ 
23. Would you like more freedom to go wherever you wanted? Y/N 
If yes, where would they like to go and what would they like to do? 
....................................................................................................... If no, why not? .................................................................................... 
24. Are you happy to go places where there are no adults around? Y/N 
If not, why not? ................................................................................... If yes, why? ........................................................................................ 
25. What time does the curfew start in Hillhouse? ................................................ 
26. Do you think the curfew is a good idea? Yes or No 
Explain why you think this. 
....................................................................................................... If they say NO - ask "but do you think the police need some other powers to deal with 
the young people in your area? " Y/N 
If no, why not? 
If yes, What power/why think this? 
...................................................................................................... 
27. Do you know what time the police start taking people home? Y/N/Don't know 
What time is this? ................................................................................ 
28. If you were REALLY scared when out at night, and you weren't near your house or a 
house of someone you knew, would you be prepared to call on a house you didn't know? 
Y/N 
If no, why not? ................................................................................... 
29. If you were out alone at night and needed to know the time would you ask an 
adult you don't know who was passing by? Yes or No 
Wily? 
............................................................................................ 
30. Would you feel happy about asking a teenager you didn't know? YesorNo 
WHY? ............................................................................................ 
30a. If you had to ask either an adult or a teenager, which would you ask? 
Adult/Teenager 
31. Would you feel happy about asking a police officer? Yes or No 
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WHY? ............................................................................................ 
32. What adults do you know and talk to on your estate? 
Most in Hillhouse 
Most in my street 
Some on my street 
A few neighbours and parents friends 
Other 
(Elaborate if necessary on who these adults are they know) 
33. Do adults offer them adviceldo they respect them/do they feel they have things in 
common with them? 
EXPLAIN 
....................................................................................... 




35. Generally, do you trust the adults on your estate? YIN 
WHY? 
............................................................................................. 
36. Generally, do you think adults trust you? Y/N 
WHY? 
.............................................................................................. 




38. When out on your estate have you ever been told off, been asked to move on, been 
questioned about what You are doing? YIN 
If yes - who normally does this? Police 
Parents 
(Number 1 and 2) Friends parents 
Other adults 
Other young people 
39. Have adults you don't know very well ever told you off, moved you on or questioned 
you? YIN 
What for? ........................................................................................... 
. 
40. Have you ever been told off; been moved on; been questioned about what you arc doing 
by the police? Yes or No 
How often and what for? ........................................................................ 
41. Who talks to you most often in the street at night? Adults/Police 
42. If they have been spoken to by the police - find out if there had been a complaint about 
them and whether or not an adult had already complained to their face. 
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43. Do you think the police should be phoned if a young person is: 
(Tick which answers you agree with) Wily 
a) sitting on a strangers' wall Y/N 
b) running someone's garden Y/N 
C) knocking on someone's door and running away YIN 
d) smashing a bottle YIN 
e) fighting Y/N 
f) playing footbaH in street Y/N 
g) being noisy YIN 
h) drinking under age Y/N 




being out after the curfew time YIN 
(If yes, ask - is this not up to the parents? ) Y/N 43g) If they say YES to noisy - ask do you think it is fair enough for someone to phone the 
police on kids playing noisily in the street, rather than coming out to talk to the young 
people themselves Y/N 
(Comment) 
....................................................................................... 
43ga Then ask - If it was you being noisy -just having a laugh with your friends, not doing 
anything in particular and the person in the house was scared, do you think it is ok for 
them to call the police rather than talk to you themselves? YIN 
(Comment) ......................................................................................... 43gb Then ask - Do you think it is fair to restrict young people's freedom if adults are scared 
of them - even if the young people are not committing any crimes? Y/N 
(Comment) 
...................................................................................... 
44. Have you ever visited or called on the house of someone you didn't know very well on 
your estate? Y/N 
(e. g. for Halloween, to raise money etc) Ask who it was to assess if they or their parents 
knew them. Who was it, why visit? 
....................................................................................................... 
45. Do you think talking to adults on your estate is a good thing to do? Yes or No 
Why? ............................................................................................... 
46. Would you like to see more police on your streets at night? More/Uss/No change WI IY? 
47. Would you like to see more young people out at night? MoreAxss/No change 
WHY? ............................................................................................ 
48. Is there much bother in your street? YIN 
48a Is there much bother in Hillhouse? Y/N 
What? ............................................................................................. 
49. Has this changed since the curfew? Y/N - How? ............................................................................................. 
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50. Have you personally ever had any bother? Y/N 
What? ........................................................................................... 
51. Has this changed since the curfew? Y/N 
How? ............................................................................................. 
52. Do the people who drink in the street give you much bother? Y/N 
Elaborate ........................................................................................ 
53. Do busy roads stop you going out/hanging out at night? Y/N 
Elaborate ........................................................................................ 




Speech by John Orr Strathclyde Chief Constable (in the form It 
was handed out) at the launch of the South Lanarkshire 
, Council and Strathclyde Police Children and Young People's Safety Initiative - Thursday 23 October 1997. 
LAUNCH OF CHILD SAFETY INITIATIVE 
HAMILTON 
23.10.97 
CHIEF CONSTABLE JOHN ORR 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, 
THE TWIN CONCERNS OF CHILD WELFARE 
AND JUVENILE CRIME HAVE LONG BEEN 
CLOSELY ASSOCIATED. 
INDEED, THE ENLIGHTENED APPROACH OF 
THE CHILDREN'S HEARINGS SYSTEM IN 
SCOTLAND - IN WHICH THE EMPHASIS IS ON 
PROTECTING THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD 
RATHER THAN PUNISHING HIS OR HER 
CRIMINALITY - IS SAID TO BE THE ENVY OF 
MANY OTHER JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
AROUND THE WORLD. 
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TODAY IN HAMILTON, STRATHCLYDE POLICE 
AND SOUTH LANARKSHIRE COUNCIL ARE 
LAUNCHING A JOINT PIONEERING INITIATIVE 
WHICH WE HOPE WILL BUILD ON THE 
PRINCIPLES OF THAT DISTINCTIVE SCOTTISH 
APPROACH TO THE CARE AND WELFARE OF 
OUR YOUNG PEOPLE. 
THE HAMILTON CHILD SAFETYINITIATIVE IS A 
PILOT PROJECT WHICH AIMS - 
SIMULTANEOUSLY - TO PROTECT THE SAFETY 
OF YOUNG PEOPLE, DECREASE THE 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEM TO BECOME 
INVOLVED IN JUVENILE CRIME AND REDUCE 
THE FEAR OF CRIME AMONG THE PUBLIC. 
FROM TODAY, 3 NEIGHBOURING AREAS IN 
HAMILTON - WHITEHILL, HILLHOUSE AND 
FAIRHILL - WILL BE THE FOCUS OF A SPECIAL 
6-MONTHS-LONG PILOT PROJECT WHICH 
'SEEKS TO HIGHLIGHT THE DANGERS FACED 
_BY 
YOUNGSTERS ALLOWED OUT AFTER DARK 
WITHOUT ADULT SUPERVISION - RISKS 
WHICH CAN LEAD TO CHILDREN FALLING 
PREY TO POSSIBLE DANGER, BECOMING 
INVOLVED IN COMMITTING CRIME OR 
CREATING A NUISANCE TO OTHERS. 
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TljIS INITIATIVE - THE RESULT OF 
. 
UNPRECEDENTED COLLABORATION 
BETWEEN STRATHCLYDE POLICE AND SOUTH 
LANARKSHIRE COUNCIL - WAS DRAWN UP IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCERNS AND WISHES 
OF LOCAL HOUSEHOLDERS AND YOUNG 
PEOPLE ABOUT NUISANCE CRIME, SUCH AS 
VANDALISM AND THE PRESENCE OF 
UNSUPERVISED OR UNRULY CHILDREN ON 
THE STREET AFTER DARK. 
A KEY ELEMENT OF THE INITIATIVE, AND ONE 
WHICH HAD ALREADY RECEIVED 
OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FROM LOCAL 
RESIDENTS, WILL BE HIGH-PROFILE AFTER. - 
DARK COMMUNITY'POLICE PATROLS IN LOCAL 
STREETS. 
THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF THE PATROLS IS TO 
ENSURE THAT VULNERABLE YOUNGSTERS 
'AGED UNDER 16 - AND PARTICULARLY THOSE 
AGED 12 OR LESS - ARE NOT EXPOSED TO 
DANGERS OR TEMPTED TO BECOME 
EMBROILED IN CRIMES ASSOCIATED WITH 
BEING OUT ALONE TOO LATE IN THE DARK 
OR WITH EQUALLY VULNERABLE 
COMPANY 
........ CRIMES SUCH 
AS VANDALISM, 
CREATING DISTURBANCES AND MINOR 
VIOLENCE. 
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POLICE OFFICERS WHO COME UPON 
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN DURING THE 
EVENING PATROLS AND WHO BELIEVE THE 
CHILDREN ARE AT RISK WILL RETURN THE 
YOUNGSTERS TO THEIR HOMES. PARENTS 
OR CARERS WILL BE REMINDED OF THE 
DANGERS FACING CHILDREN OUT ALONG IN 
THE DARK. 
IF THERE IS NO SUITABLE ADULT 
SUPERVISION AT HOME, THE CHILDREN WILL 
BE TAKEN TO A SAFE ROOM IN HAMILTON 
POLICE OFFICE, UNTIL THEIR PARENTS OR 
CARERS COLLECT THEM. 
IF POLICE BELIEVE THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
GIVE RISE TO FURTHER CAUSE FOR 
CONCERN, THE COUNCIL'S SOCIAL WORK 
DEPARTMENT WILL BE INFORMED. 
IN CASES OF IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY, THE 
DUTY'STANDBY SOCIAL WORKER WILL 
ATrEND THE POLICE OFFICE. 
THE POLICE PATROLS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN 
BY A POOL OF COMMUNITY POLICE OFFICERS 
WHO HAVE BEEN SPECIALLY SELECTED FOR 
THEIR ENPERIENCE, SKILL AND EMPATHY 
WHEN IT COMES TO DEALING WITH YOUNG 
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PEOPLE. SOME OF THE OFFICERS ARE 
PARENTS THEMSELVES. 
EACH PATROL WILL SPEND TIME ON LOCAL 
STREETS FOR A FEW HOURS AS REQUIRED - 
USUALLY ON THURSDAY, FRIDAY AND 
SATURDAY EVENING, THE TIMES IDENTIFIED 
BY POLICE AND LOCALS AS MOST 
PROBLEMATIC. 
THEY WILL SPEAK TO THE YOUNG PEOPLE, 
REMIND THEM OF THE NEED TO CONSIDER 
THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY WITH THEIR 
ACTIVITIES ON THE STREET AND TAKE 
FURTHER ACTION (THAT IS RETURN THEM 
HOME/ISSUE WARNINGS/FORMALLY DETAIN 
THEM ON CRIMINAL CHARGES) ONLY WHEN 
NECESSARY. 
THE RESULTS WILL BE EVALUATED BY THE 
FORCE AT THE END OF THE TRIAL PERIOD TO 
MEASURE THEIR IMPACT ON LOCAL CHILD 
WELFARE AND CRIME. 
IN TRUTH, THE POLICE HAVE ALWAYS HAD 
POWERS TO RETURN CHILDREN HOME IF 
THEY HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR 
VVELLBEING. 
327 
IT IS JUST THAT WITH THIS PARTICULAR 
PROJECT, VVE ARE FORMALISING THIS 
APPROACH AND GIVING A MODERN SLANT TO 
OLD-FASHIONED COMMUNITYPOLICING. 
VVE DO NOT ALLOW YOUNG PEOPLE TO BE IN 
DANGER IN THE HOME SO WE SHOULDN'T 
PERMIT IT IN THE STREET. 
OUR HOPE IS THAT BY TAKING VULNERABLE 
AND IMPRESSIONABLE YOUNGSTERS OUT OF 
HARM"S WAY, THERE WILL BE A DOUBLE SPIN- 
OFF 
...... 
;... THEY WILL BE SAFER AND THEY WON'T 
BE TEMPTED TO GET CAUGHT UP IN 
NUSCHIEF-MAKING OR WORSE. 
THAT WAY THE WHOLE COMMUNITY WILL 
BENEFIT. 
SOME OF THE SITUATIONS MY OFFICERS 
COME ACROSS BEGGAR BELIEF. A 9-YEAR- 
OLD GIRL WAS FOUND IN A CLOSE AT NIGHT 
EARLIER THIS YEAR IN THIS POLICE SUB- 
DIVISION, DRESSED ONLY IN HER 
UNDERVVTEAR AND DRESSING-GOWN. 
THIS LITrLE GIRL WAS UPSET AND TOLD THE 
OFFICERS THAT HER MOTHER WAS DEAD. 
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WHEN MY OFFICERS TOOK HER HOME THEY 
FOUND HER MOTHER "DEAD". ALRIGHT - DEAD DRUNK. 
ANOTHER 9-YEAR-OLD, A BOY, WAS ALSO 
FOUND IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES FAIRLY 
RECENTLY. HIS PARENTS WERE NOT AT 
HOME - HIS MUM WAS TRACED AT THE 
BINGO AND HIS DAD WAS AT THE PUB. 
THESE TYPES OF SCENARIOS ARE NOT 
UNCOMMON ACROSS THE FORCE AREA. 
VVE COME ACROSS YOUNG PEOPLE OUT OF 
DOORS WAY AFTER NIGHTFALL AND THEY 
ARE NEGLECTED, BADLY CLOTHED AND IN 
NEED OF CARE. 
YET - AND WHAT A PRADOX - PAEDOPHILE 
COURT CASES HIS THE HEADLINES 
REGULARLY AND THERE IS CONTROVERSY 
ABOUT THE ISSUE OF THE RIGHTS OF 
COMMUNITIES TO KNOW EHERE CONVICTED 
OFFENDERS ARE LIVING. 
VVHAT, THEN, CAN PARENTS OF THE 
CHILDREN WITH WHOM WE COME INTO 
CONTACT POSSIBLY BE THINKING ABOUT? 
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THE FIGURES FOR CRIME IN. THE HAMILTON 
AREA ARE DOWN CONSIDERABLY SO FAR 
THIS YEAR, DUE TO THE HARD WORK OF THE 
LOCAL POLICE FOR THE FORCE"S ANTI-CRIME 
CAMPAIGN, THE SPOTLIGHT INITIATIVE. 
BUT IF PEOPLE REMAIN ANXIOUS AND 
CONCERNED, THEN WE MUST RESPOND - 
AND DECISIVELY. 
THIS INITIATIVE IS NO DRACONIAN CURFEW. 
STRATHCLYDE POLICE DO NOT THINK 
YOUNG PEOPLE ARE PUBLIC ENEMY NO. I 
AND THIS FORCE IS NOT ANTI YOUNG 
PEOPLE. 
ON THE CONTRARY, VIE ARE TAKING THIS 
APPROACH BECAUSE VVE REALLY CARE 
THAT OUR YOUNG PEOPLE LIVE A SAFE AND 
CRIME-FREE LIFE. 
IT'S CERTAINLY NO CRIME FOR YOUNGSTERS TO 
STAND IN THE STREET CHATTING TO THEIR 
FRIENDS. 
MY OFFICERS WILL NOT HARASS LAW- 
ABIDING YOUNG PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT 
COMMITrING OR HAVE NO INTENTION OF 
COMMITrING CRIME OR PUBLIC NUISANCE. 
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UNFORTUNATELY, THE MOST COMMON 
REQUEST WE RECEIVED ACROSS THE FORCE 
AREA IS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
ASKING FOR OFFICERS TO DEAL WITH 
YOUNGSTERS DISTURBING THE PEACE, 
FRIGHTENING RESIDENTS OR DESTROYING 
THE NEIGHBOURHOOD IN SOME WAY. 
WE HAVE SEEN YOUNGSTERS AS YOUNG AS 8 TO 
10 YEARS OLD BECOME INVOLVED IN GANG 
FIGHTS. 
LOCAL COMMUNITIES HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO 
DEMAND THE BEST POSSIBLE SERVICE FROM 
THE POLICE AND THEIR COUNCILS WHEN 
THEY CANNOT LIVE THEIR LIVES TO THE 
FULLEST, FREE FROM PETIY CRIME AND 
ANNOYANCE. 
THE COMMUNITIES OF VVHITEHILL, HILLHOUSE 
AND FAIRHILL HAVE BEEN SELECTED AS THE 
LOCATIONS FOR THE PILOT PROJECT ...... 
...... NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE MORE 
PRIBLEMS THAN OTHER COMMUNITIES BUT 
BECAUSE THEY HAVE CALLED FOR AND 
SUPPORT FIRM ACTION. 
AND INDEPENDENT OPINION POLLS PROVE IT. 
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A SURVEY PUBLISHED BY THE HAMILTON 
ADVERTISER NEWSPAPER AFTER THE 
INITIATIVE BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 
SHOWED 95% OR 972 WERE IN FAVOUR OF 
THE COMMUNI'I`Y POLICE PATROLS WITH 
ONLY 5% OR 55 PEOPLE, AGAINST. 
AND IT SEEMS THAT THIS PARTICULAR 
APPROACH TO AN ALL-TOO-COMMON 
SITUATION FOR MANY COMMUNITIES HAS 
TOUCHED A CHORD WITH THE PUBLIC. 
ANOTHER TELEPHONE POLL, THIS TIME 
CONDUCTED ON THE ITV TELETEXT FOR 
CENTRAL SCOTLAND, SHOWED THAT 96% OR 
1846 OF THE 1918 CALLERS WANTED THE 
INITIATIVE EXTENDED TO THE REST OF 
SCOTLAND. 
ONLY 72 PEOPLE, OR 4%, WERE AGAINST. 
THAT IS WHY THIS PILOT PROJECT WILL BE 
THOROUGHLY EVALUATED BY THE FORCE TO 
MEASURE THE IMPACT ON COMMUNITY 
SAFETY. 
VIEWS ON PEOPLE'S RIGHTS ARE MANY AND 
VARIED BUT THERE CAN BE NO ARGUMENT 
SURELY AGAINST THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLE 
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- INCLUDING AND PERHAPS EVEN 
ESPECIALLY THE YOUNG - TO LIVE IN SAFETY IN THE COMMUNITY ...... SAFE FROM CRIME AND NEGLECT TOO. 
PEOPLE HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES, AS WELL 
AS RIGHTS. 
ALL-IN-ALL, WHAT STRATHCLYDE POLICE AND 
SOUTH LANARKSHIRE COUNCIL WANT THIS 
INITIATIVE TO DO IS TO REMIND EVERYONE 
OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO OTHERS..... 
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Appendix 6 
Speech by Councillor Tom McCabe, Leader of 
South Lanarkshire Council (in the form it was 
handed out) at the launch of the South 
Lanarkshire Council and Strathclyde Police 
Children and Young People's Safety Initiative - 
Thursday 23 October. 1997. 
Can I echo the comments of the Chief 
Constable, for this is a partnership -a 
partnership of the local authority, the police 
and, perhaps most importantly, the 
community. 
I want to stress the reality of the joint South 
Lanarkshire Council and Strathclyde Police 
Children and Young People's Safety 
Initiative. 
I want to right away ask you to - please - 
press the delete button on those headlines 
that have wrongly dubbed this unique 
initiative a curfew. 
That is a nonsense notionl 
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Such a notion has no place in Hamilton, no 
place in South Lanarkshire. 
It has no place in a society heading for the 
new millennium. 
The Hamilton child safety initiative is about 
improving the quality of life for the people of 
Whitehill, Hillhouse and Fairhill. 
It is about the safety and the protection of 
our children - today, how - and in the 
future. 
It is about responsibility. 
It is about civil liberties and freedom - the 
freedom of everyone in the community to 
live without fear or intimidation. 
Each of us has responsibilities to other 
people within our communities. 
We have to recognise that when some 
people chose to ignore their responsibilities 
- to their children, to their neighbours, to 
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their community - to society - it leads to an 
erosion of community. 
It leads to people becoming fearful and 
distrustful of each other. 
Let me ask those civil libertarians whose 
gut reaction has been to hit out at this 
initiative to take a step back and consider 
what the council, the police and the 
community are trying to achieve. 
Let me ask them to come and talk with us. 
They will find that the initiative we are 
launching today is not about an increase in 
powers at the expense of the freedom of 
children and young people. 
It is not about giving the police the power to 
whisk off the streets young people who are 
simply there enjoying themselves. 
It is in fact about returning civil liberties to 
communities - about removing fear. 
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The truth is that our children and young 
people's safety initiative has at its core the 
rights of children. 
But is also seeks to highlight the 
responsibilities that young people 
themselves have - and perhaps more 
importantly, the responsibility that parents 
have. 
And of course it is in the home that those 
lessons are first learned. It is there that we 
learn that we are part of the community. 
The Hamilton child safety initiative is in 
actual fact about the civil liberty that 
recognises the rights of young people and 
the community as a whole. 
It is about saying no to those who throw 
away the rules and ignore the rights of 
others. 
It's about the responsibility of parents 
realising and recognising it is in their 
interest to know where their children are 
and what they are doing. 
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But it's also about the responsibility of local 
authorities to realise that they have to 
listen to what young people are saying, 
about recognising that councils - 
government - do not have all the answers. 
It's about realising that young people are 
worth listening to, about accepting that 
young people have views and ideas worth 
not only evaluating, but taking on board. 
We do no favour for children by excusing 
behaviour which can lead them into 
regrettable situations. 
In essence we are seeking to create an 
environment where everyone - young and 
old - can feel safe and secure. 
And what's so wrong about spelling out to 
those who discard the rules and Ignore the 
rights of others that their actions will not be 
tolerated. 
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The decision to launch a safety initiative 
pilot scheme comes in response to concerns 
directly raised by the community. 
A number of surveys carried out by the 
council in recent months -a System Three 
poll, a Youth Survey and Scotland's first 
Citizens'Jury here in Hamilton - showed 
that for all ages the number one priority 
was community safety. 
Let me stress that the pilot areas involved 
in the initiative have been chosen not 
because they have any more problems than 
any other communities throughout the 
countiry - but because the community itself 
has called for action. 
When we looked at the evidence from the 
surveys and from the recommendations of 
the Hillhouse Citizens'Jury - the message 
came over loud and clear - safety issues 
were a top priority. 
And that includes the safety of young 
people, particularly at night. 
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And so it is right that we should be 
concerned about the safety of young 
children on the streets at night and tackle 
the issue of their vulnerability. 
The community has raised genuine 
concems. 
Today we are demonstrating our 
commitment to respond to those concerns. 
And we are doing that by working in 
partnership with the community and by 
consulting our young people on what they 
want. 
I can tell you that part of our wider 
consultation process includes providing 
integrated youth facilities which are being 
designed by young people in partnership 
with the council. 
It will have a one-stop shop approach to 
youth issues and they will be especially 
relevant to youngsters in their mid to late 
teens. 
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These will be both social and educational 
using internet cafes, which it is hoped will 
open up training opportunities. 
Infonnation and advice on a range of issues 
will be available and will be presented in a 
way which is acceptable to young people. 
Our youth will have a day-to-day 
management role in the running of the 
facilities which initially will be set up in 
Hamilton, East Kilbride, Larkhall and 
Lanark. 
The Chief Constable has spoken of the 
support that has come from the community 
through the various telephone polls that 
have been conducted. 
I believe the support that they have already 
shown will be repaid in giving them a 
community in which they can have 
justifiable pride. 
ENDS 
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